









**THE CONGREGATIONAL LECTURE,  
TWELFTH SERIES.**

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**THE REVEALED DOCTRINE OF REWARDS  
AND PUNISHMENTS.**

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**By RICHARD WINTER HAMILTON, LL.D. D.D.**

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THE  
REVEALED DOCTRINE  
OF  
REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS.

BY  
RICHARD WINTER HAMILTON, LL.D., D.D.,

LEEDS.

LONDON :  
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“Ἐὼ τὰ θεῶν καὶ τα ἡμετερα, καὶ τας καθ’ ἡμας ἐκείθεν ἀποκειμένας  
μαστιγας. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦς σοῦς ἐλθεὶ λόγους καὶ φόβους, οὐ ποιηταῖς  
μόνοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνδράσι φιλόσοφοις ἀρεσκοντας, καὶ Πυριφλεγεθοντάς  
σου, καὶ τοὺς Κωκυτοῦς, καὶ τοὺς Αἰχροντας, οἷς ἀδικίαν κολάζουσι, Τάν-  
ταλος, Τητυός, Ἰξίον.”

Gregory Nazienzen, Orat. iv. Adversus Julianum.

“Verbera, carnifices, robur, pix, lamina, tædæ;  
Quæ tamen et si absunt, at mens sibi conscia facti  
Præmetuens, adhibet stimulos, torretque flagellis:  
Nec videt interea, *qui terminus esset malorum*  
*Possit, nec quæ sit penarum denique finis:*  
*Alique eadem metuit magis hæc ne in morte gravescant.”*

Lucretius: De Rerum Naturâ, lib. iii.

## P R E F A C E.

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THE Author of the present Volume must have felt it, in most circumstances, a flattering distinction to be appointed Congregational Lecturer. As the selection was as unexpected as unsought, private consideration could be of no account; nor was it for him to complain of unworthiness and incompetency. To be associated with the cause of Theological Science was not quite indifferent to his ambition: to be enrolled with his honored predecessors in these tasks, was, at least, exciting to emulation.

*"Forsitan et nostrum nomen miscebitur istis."*

But he confesses that his thesis almost instantly subdued any rising pride. He submitted to it as "the burden of the Lord." In addicting himself to the necessary studies for the prælections required of him, in honest purpose, yet with unsuppressible anxiety,—he invoked alike that strength of conviction, and that seriousness of temper, which befitted a subject so tremendous.

It must be remembered that the doctrine of Future Punishment is only a part of his theme. Had this been that which was assigned to him, the reader might

fairly object to the delay with which such question is approached. This seemed to be a general impression. It will be seen that it was not correct. He knows full well that they who have the charge of any reasoning are seldom thought to travel fast enough. It is a natural impatience. But in the conduct of a great argument they are bound to maintain a far-looking and wary course. Therefore, though he believes that all his premisses bear upon this extreme conclusion, he had other duties, and if these had been neglected, it would have been to the dishonor of his trust.

Concerning the plan of his own Work, it is generally hazardous for a writer to speak. It should declare itself. The reader will adjudge upon it. It ought to be so explicit as to need no key. The permission is pleaded, notwithstanding, in this case, to offer a few explanatory remarks.

He has shunned every pretension to rest his argument upon special and disputed points. It becomes us to be jealous of singular and original defences of truth: not the less, of impressing our own mental type. Such a course betrays a state of disposition more vain of adroitness and ingenuity, than liege to truth. It engenders unbelief by the division of those who hold the common principle, and by the rash advancement of doubtful proof. He has rather been inclined to inquire, Is it the uniform teaching of the Scriptures? Is there any reserve in them respecting it? Is there any part of their informations which does not, and

cannot, fall under it? Does not all go in one way? Is there exempt fact, or hesitating statement, to raise a doubt? And if there be supposed anomaly, does it not admit of quadrature with that uniform teaching?

He has found it necessary to maintain a calm steadiness amidst the boasts of an affected liberality and the concessions of a popular charity. If the character of particular speculations be thus prejudiced, the controversy is foreclosed. He deems that the belief of truth is not unloving. Truth must be good. It cannot be good to hide the truth. The peril which that truth, perhaps, supposes may be avoidable; but it can only be escaped by being made known. If, indeed, certain opinions invariably led to a disregard of human welfare, it would be their sternest refutation. But if that which is now involved does not show itself cruelly,—if it be unexceptionably seen linked with earnest effort to save mankind,—then the conviction of another's danger is not incompatible with love to him.

It is not argumentatively logical or just to appeal, in these disquisitions, to the Divine character. That conception is to be formed upon what is revealed of God. We may not assume that what we have entertained is right. We must not guide our reasonings by it. Now only let it be supposed, that eternal retribution is taught us by revelation; then, until it be allowed, the Divine character cannot be understood.\* All our views of it, until that admission, are partial and false, being dictated by a foregone and narrower conclusion.



This ought to assist, or possibly to rectify, our first and immature conception: the conception cannot, with any reasonableness or equity, weigh against it.

Receiving *nature*, in its largest sense, as an earlier revelation, the Author has mainly addressed himself to the *a priori* treatment of his subject. Thus, if the reversal of any Scripture testimony be demanded, because of its imputed contradiction to *natural* demonstration,—he has, throughout his entire argument, rejoined upon it. He has endeavored to prove that nature brings no relief by suggesting any alternative. According to its decisions, even to the apprehensions of sense, moral agents are happy or miserable, just as are the qualities of their agency. Moreover, it must follow that it can only be right so to make them happy or miserable. • If these qualities of such agents be permanent, thus permanent must be their happiness or misery. To the dark boundary-line of death we trace the equal permanency of these characters of conduct and of their awards. No *known* treatment of these agents, consequently, is at variance with these actual results. Whatever *can be ascertained* coincides. It is *always so*, to our best knowledge and experience. The difficulty may be only thrown back,—but it now presses upon the impugnors of the Scripture doctrine of future punishment. It now becomes their own.

The Lecturer, in the confession of these common principles, felt himself warranted, at every stage of the argument, to seize the analogy between nature and

proper revelation. It is his reiterated urgency that the latter, in this very dispute, only follows up the former: that Christianity, as a remedial system, proceeds but on the assumption of an antecedent, independent, dilemma ; and that it is perfectly irresponsible for it. His mottoes are but indices to the idea.

He has written, in a few instances, according to his Denominational opinions. He trusts that this cannot be esteemed unjust and offensive, when it is remembered that this is a denominational foundation.

Should these Discourses be severely criticised, the Writer will not consider himself in anywise wronged. He has taken those points which he conscientiously regarded as chiefly important and relevant: but another mind may hold light what he feels to be difficult, and consider difficult what he thinks light. He well knows how different must be the mental surveys of the same question, and of the same question maintained with equal fidelity.

It may also be, that some opponents of the doctrine which he has attempted to vindicate shall resort to public animadversion. He does not arrogate such a notableness. But should censure of this kind appear, he must be pardoned in saying, that he cannot imagine the circumstances which would bind him to reply. He has attacked no one: none can he have offended. Far from the tumults of controversy, he wishes to spend his few remaining days in the quiet blessedness of his pastoral duties.

In vain will any one look for descriptive, scenic, passages in this Work. Did he wield that power, he should have forborne. He loves not, in such grave discussions, the fierce imaginative art. He would not borrow the terrible fictions and machines of Dante, Buonarotti, and Milton. Sinner as he is, his "soul has wept in secret places."

But he shrinks not from the perfect affirmation of the dread conclusion which he has reached. He the more insists upon it, not only on account of the complete evidence of its particular truth, but for the sake of its essential relations to all moral truth. For those who differ from him, he can cherish respect and favor: he asks their candor and forbearance. Towards their theory, however, of this momentous issue, he knows no sparing terms or indulgent blandishments. Though many deem it rational, he deems it absurd,—though many feel it plausible, he feels it incongruous,—though many pronounce it benevolent, he pronounces it cruel. It can ill conceal its origin, notwithstanding its mockery of aspiration and its pretext of mercy.

"Quæ quantum vertice ad auras  
Æthereas, tantum radice in Tartara tendit."

Virg. Georg. ii. lib. 291.

*Leeds, March 22, 1847.*

## ADVERTISEMENT

BY THE COMMITTEE OF THE CONGREGATIONAL LIBRARY.

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THE "CONGREGATIONAL LIBRARY" was established with a view to the promotion of Ecclesiastical, Theological, and Biblical Literature, in that religious connexion with whose friends and supporters it originated. It is also designed to secure a convenient *locality* for such associations as had previously existed, or might hereafter exist, for the purpose of advancing the literary, civil, and religious interests of that section of the Christian Church to which it was appropriated. Without undervaluing the advantages of union, either with Evangelical Protestants, or Protestant Nonconformists, on such grounds as admit of liberal co-operation, it was nevertheless deemed expedient to adopt measures for facilitating the concentration and efficiency of their own denomination. In connexion with these important objects, it was thought desirable to institute a LECTURE, partaking rather of the character of *Academic prelections* than of popular addresses, and embracing a *Series of Annual Courses of Lectures*, to be delivered at the Library, or, if necessary, in some contiguous place of worship. In the selection of *Lecturers*, it was judged proper to appoint such as, by their literary attainments and ministerial reputation, had rendered service to the cause of Divine truth in the consecration of their talents to "the defence and confirmation of the Gospel." It was also supposed, that some might be found possessing a high order of intellectual competency and moral worth, imbued with an ardent love of biblical science, or eminently conversant with theological and ecclesiastical literature, who, from various causes, might

never have attracted that degree of public attention to which they are entitled, and yet might be both qualified and disposed to undertake courses of lectures on subjects of interesting importance, not included within the ordinary range of pulpit instruction. To illustrate the evidence and importance of the great doctrines of Revelation ; to exhibit the true principles of philology in their application to such doctrines ; to prove the accordance and identity of genuine philosophy with the records and discoveries of Scripture ; and to trace the errors and corruptions which have existed in the Christian Church to their proper sources, and by the connexion of sound reasoning with the honest interpretation of God's holy Word, to point out the methods of refutation and counteraction, are amongst the objects for which " the Congregational Lecture " has been established. The arrangements made with the Lecturers are designed to secure the publication of each separate course, without risk to the Authors ; and, after remunerating them as liberally as the resources of the Institution will allow, to apply the profits of the respective publications in aid of *the Library*. It is hoped that the liberal and especially the opulent friends of Evangelical and Congregational Nonconformity will evince, by their generous support, the sincerity of their attachment to the great principles of their Christian profession ; and that some may be found to emulate the zeal which established the " Boyle," the " Warburton," and the " Bampton " Lectures in the National Church. These are legitimate operations of the " voluntary principle " in the support of religion, and in perfect harmony with the independency of our Churches, and the spirituality of the kingdom of Christ.

The Committee deem it proper to state, that whatever responsibility may attach to the reasonings or opinions advanced in any course of Lectures, belongs exclusively to the Lecturer.

CONGREGATIONAL LIBRARY,  
*Blomfield Street, Finsbury, March, 1847.*

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## LECTURE I.

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"DOETH NOT EVEN NATURE ITSELF TEACH YOU?"

1 COR. xi. 14.

CONCLUSIONS in science cannot fail often to appear unreasonable, unless they be intelligently and ap- provedly conducted from their several first principles. They can only be shown generally reasonable, when every step in their progress is clearly reasonable. They are but accumulations of individual elements, every one of which must be as entire and convincing as themselves. We are bound to trace these intermediate conditions in their arrangement and correspondence, one to another, and each to all. The link ought to be no less perfect than the chain: if it be not, the coil is loosely inserted and easily broken. And stupendous facts and recondite truths—which seem unlikely and indefensible at first—may thus be established, redeemed from improbability, and confirmed beyond doubt.

Especially in morals, and in all branches of inquiry connected with them, is it demanded that the investigation be most searching, and the synthesis be most

complete. A fault of reasoning, a mis-statement of fact, is as fatal as a break in mathematical demonstration. Studies of such moment must be rigidly cautious if we would reach satisfactory results. The well-being of man is too implicitly involved in them to warrant lightness and haste. For morals are not, in our idea and scheme either of philosophy or of religion, simple suggestions of reflection and experience,—not mere dictates of fitness,—not only calculations of utility,—but they presuppose a Governor in the Creator of mankind; not exclusively the Contriver of the final causes which we mark in material nature, but the Designer and the Master of that conduct which shall lead us to our happiness. “He hath showed thee, O man, what is good!”

And, therefore, is it besought, at the threshold of the long and solemn argument which the Lecturer now anxiously, tremblingly, attempts, that candid patience be exercised, that precipitate decision be repressed,—that he be suffered to clear space after space, to lay stone upon stone,—as honestly resolved to discard the vicious proof by which his argument may have been defended, as to meet fairly, point to point, the most weighty objections by which it has been oppugned.

The whole question is a problem of truth,—truth whatever it may be, truth wherever it can be found, having any relation to it. But Truth is not sternly cold: majestically unbending from the claims of its very nature, it is the only standard of benevolence and source of sympathy.

He who is summoned to discourse of truth in its

severest aspects may encourage and encite himself, that he but more secretly, and certainly more painfully, promotes all the good which alone can be found in truth, and which truth only can secure. Vanity, error, and falsehood are the necessary causes of misery and beacons of peril. There can be no worthy peace, no true safety, in forgetting, evading, and opposing, truth. "The light is the life of men."

One Intelligence, one only, exists, which can comprehend the universe. We often speak of that universe as though our mind could embrace it. He who reared that system, he who preserves and superintends it, can alone conceive it. We cannot strike out the thought. It is the outbirth of the Infinite Mind. It lies in the Eternal Will. "He hath done whatsoever he pleased." We do not pantheistically call this universe infinite and eternal, for that would be himself. But it so resembles him, that to all other beings it is scarcely less than unbounded and unbeginning. None but he can grasp its interests and its connexions. In its stretch, in its utmost limits, it is confessed to him alone. All its ideas and motives are within his cognizance and moral control. It is not, then, a term to be rashly used. It is a word for the mouth of God. He only understands the interpretation thereof. We cannot employ it with a just significance. Neither model is before us, nor archetype in our mind. When the highest creatures have explored the amplest fields which their ken can discern and their thought can measure, it becomes them to acknowledge with fainting amazement: "Lo

these are parts of his ways : but how little a portion is heard of him !”

Our chief mistakes arise from a false pretence of knowledge. We vainly exaggerate it. It is not only proper to sift thoroughly what we know, but to remember what we do not know at all. Finding our ideas incongruous, our conclusions contradicted, we satisfy ourselves by what we represent the difficulties and anomalies of nature. There are none in nature. It is idle charge. And those which we suspect in morals, are only in our views, and would not find a place even there, but from supposing that our knowledge is far more complete and clear than it is. We must learn when to pause, and when to proceed : we must distinguish between the artificial, and the necessary, limits of information. The question is principally this : What is that idea upon the subject which it is proper for the human mind to entertain ?

We are compelled, then, to regard ourselves as occupying but a little nook, a narrow corner, of this universe : not quite shut up within our abode in respect of knowledge touching other provinces and relations of it, but little qualified to pronounce on any thing extraneous to ourselves. We can gather no information, can seize no fact, spontaneously,—however far natural discovery may extend,—which pertains to a single moral history or bearing apart from the confines in which we dwell.

We may unhesitatingly pronounce, however, upon our own quality and order of existence. We possess not barely senses which reveal it,—and nothing can be

stronger according to its kind than sensible proof,—but we command consciousness, which, by its affinity to a subject far higher than aught which sensible proof can entertain, is our most perfect evidence,—or, more strictly speaking, our most perfect faculty of divining and appreciating whatever evidence affects our being. Sensation belongs to the mind, and is the excitement of thought : consciousness enables us to examine that mind, and to pursue that thought in its complexion and cause. We can bring our mental state and action under a very analysis. We can commune with our heart, and our spirit makes diligent search! The things of a man, knoweth the spirit of man which is in him!

There is but one thing in the created universe essentially great, or truly worthy of infinite greatness. Others are things of space and time. They are not the full conception of the Creator, but only preparation for that which is. They are the hidings of his power. It is not light, the firstborn of the omnific word. It is not life, teeming in its countless structures and sensibilities. It is not harmony, floating from sphere to sphere. It is not sun and planet, matter in any of its forms and conditions, whatever its immensity, or whatever its beauty,—it is not to be found in the furniture of mountains, mines, or seas. It has not sign in height or depth. What is this mightiest production of boundless wisdom, power, and benignity? It is Mind, intelligent, reflective, accountable, immortal, mind! The Self-Existent “hath made us this soul!”

Mind is the only medium for the Divine glory. This

glory consists of certain manifestations which Jehovah gives of himself. He does skilfully, wonderfully, benevolently. He imprints on every side his signatures and characteristics. They are inscribed on the firmament, they fill the earth. But all hitherto is unconscious and unreasoning. Until now there is nothing to observe and appreciate. There is no power of intellectual sympathy. Matter does not investigate matter. World does not admire world. Star does not confess the loveliness of star. There is yet wanting a faculty which these do not include. Let this essence be created, and all the marks and proofs of this glory may be recognised. That which is taught, is learnt. That which is revealed, is understood. That which is impressed, is received. The Creator is acknowledged and adored. The orbs of heaven, which always declared his glory and showed his handiwork, have now found an ear on which to quire, and an eye on which to gleam. The volumes of instruction, which could not peruse and meditate themselves, are now searched by that which best resembles their author, by that which can interpret their meaning.

Mind is the only capacity for the Divine enjoyment. Our Maker loves to communicate of his happiness. He blesses his inferior portion of creatures with no mean measures of good. The insect riots through its blithesome hour. The birds sing among the branches. In the great and wide sea leviathan was made to play. But these cannot share in any high and pure delight,—in the love of truth, the complacency of excellence, the pursuit of holiness. Nothing in them can correspond

to these qualities. God has, however, made mind in his image. It contains a similar, though most unequal, susceptibility of blessedness. He can enable it to "drink of the river of his pleasures." He can bid it "enter into his joy." He condescends to appropriate it as his own true nature and description: "My soul!" "God is a Spirit:" that which is not can have no fellowship with him!

Mind is the only subject of motive in the performance of the Divine will. Those worlds which roll in the concave of heaven received a first and complex impulse, which gave them their revolutionary sweep and rotatory axis: certain principles perpetuate that impulse: and those worlds obey it still. Atom cleaves to atom as they originally cohered. But in these larger or smaller works of creation there can be no moral disposition. They yield to neither love nor fear. They can only be passive to mechanical forces. Mind alone knows respect for authority, love of excellence, sense of gratitude, dread of retribution. It alone is moved by considerations of right and wrong, of good and evil. It alone entertains the ideas of duty and of obligation.

Mind has a fearful power. It can sin. The stars of the sky might rush into wild eccentricity, the lion might lash itself into unknown fury, the serpent might spring with unprecedented treachery; but who would charge them with sin? There is, however, nothing incongruous, irreconcilable, in "the sin of the soul"!

Mind has a tremendous susceptibility. It may suffer punishment. It may be made conscious of infinite



displeasure and opposition. It may be wrecked in all its highest interests and hopes. All things else fulfil their course. None fail. None are frustrated. But this, in its defeat and perversion, may draw down upon itself an insupportable misery. It may be undone in its own undoing !

These may be regarded as rudimental propositions, and as fore-shadowings of our design. They lie close to every question which can be raised. They affect and determine every argument which may be mooted. We, also, state them as so many postulates without the allowance of which, discussion is arrested at once, and proof or disproof is utterly invalidated.

Since terminology, almost itself a science, acquires increased importance with the growth of all liberal and severe inquiry—since it must deeply concern every debate of principles—since the use of writing will vary in most men, and all generally impress their own character upon it—since a slight difference in the employment of language will invariably produce a more serious modification in ideas, we will offer the following definitions of words which cannot fail frequently to recur, or what shall be our fixed application of them.

By *physical*—when applied to man, we would denote his whole constitution or nature, those conditions of being in which it has pleased his Creator that he should exist. This, therefore, includes the mind, not less than the body with its animal life. Mind is a *physic* ; or a constituted thing. The word cannot be justly opposed to, *immaterial* : it as truly embraces what is intellectual, as it does what is sensible, in us.

By *moral*—when spoken of God or of man, we understand any predicament of legislative authority, or of corresponding accountability. It must always answer to some case or question of government.\* Moral rule is that of creatures, who can be influenced by intelligent motives, under laws suitable to them. Moral obedience is the conformity of such creatures to those laws. The word is not, then, convertible with, *spiritual*. This refers to mind, to whatever partakes of its nature or has its seat in it. We may speak of “spiritual wickedness” and of moral evil; the one term declares the *kind* of the act or principle: the other signifies its *guilt*, or that quality which renders the evil-doer obnoxious.

By *mind*—when restricted to men, we intend that chief element of our being which stamps our proper self, simple in substance but capable of various states and moods, exercises and manifestations; which can judge concerning things, their truth or fallacy, their desirableness or perniciousness; which is excited by these discriminations to passion or emotion according as objects are presented to it which can stir these feelings. Philosophically speaking, judgment and passion are not diverse in their nature, but are the unequal order and degree of interest which the same mind takes in those different objects as they impress it.

By *fitness* and *necessity*—when ascribed to truths anterior to any thing which is constituted by *will*, in-

\* One exception to the rule may seem to arise when we speak of moral evidence and moral certainty. But the idea is retained,—it is that which we must responsibly admit and may most justifiably entertain: that on which a moral agent may proceed.

dependent of anything which is the effect of *formation*, primary to any that has had *beginning*—we mean such principles the contrary of which cannot be conceived, which the earliest created mind must have apprehended, the reckless denial of which involves anarchy and absurdity, without which law could find no basis and Deity admit of no demonstration.

By the *will* of *God*—we may express distinct but not repugnant ideas. It cannot always stand for an unalterable one. There is a will, a good pleasure, which he may or may not exercise : there is a determinate will which must prevail, however opposed : there is a moral will that may be withstood, but which is always provided with the means of vindication.

By *sovereignty*—we point out that form of *divine will* which solely respects gratuitous good. It consults no law, known to us, in its disposals. The word cannot be predicated of justice. It is mere favour or mercy. It is, in our use of it, a negative term. It supposes not that God thus acts without reasons, but simply confesses that they are unknown. It is as far removed from merit in those to whom it is directed, as from compulsion in Him who exercises it.

In all propositions in which *eternity* may be employed, we would convey the notion of the longest possible duration, the strictest sense of endlessness, the perpetuity in which the idea of termination would be more difficult than that of continuance,—uninterruptedness, incessancy, of which we can conceive : a duration which physical purposes and moral considerations forbid us to believe can close.

If the proposition be deemed vitiated which admits into it any strictly unintelligible term, if any proposition be thought void,—for example, in which *eternal* may arise—because we cannot grasp its import to a strict abstraction ; then those which are fundamental, the resting-places of all religious truth, are incapable of proof. You cannot prove that there is a God, for who can by searching find out God ? You cannot prove that he is infinite, everlasting, self-existent, for who can realize these perfections ? The *truth* of a proposition must depend upon its evidence : on its *truth* it must be received : and our ignorance of much contained in it is no ground for its rejection. Every man may know enough of Him who “ dwelleth in the light which is unapproachable,” to love and obey Him. Every man may gather enough of consequences which lie in eternity, to lay hold of what he feels to be an endless good, and to flee what he feels to be an endless evil.

A few more distinctions might be specified : such as between the *effect* and *event* of things—between *appointment* and *sufferance*—between *complacency* in any course of conduct and the *subordination* of it : but these suffice. Common language, not technical, not scholastic, best represents all truth which is founded on the common ideas and sensibilities of man, which truth enters most intimately into our present inquiries.

We notice a very general observation, at this early stage, which, if correct, would abandon these inquiries to a hopeless issue. It is averred that its settlement entirely depends upon Revelation. As justly might the

truth of the Divine existence be remitted to that testimony. Revelation is equally unsusceptible of defence if it rest upon nothing save itself. The Being and general attributes of Deity must be demonstrable antecedently to any credible testimony from Him. The constituents and laws of our manhood must be known, or be open to knowledge, ere that testimony addressed to it can be shown adapted to its powers and wants. Who God is, what man is, are to be determined beforehand, or no independent revelation can supply the information and proof. Possessing revelation as we do, earlier than our earliest capacity of thought, we yet reason according to the original necessity of the case. Not thus to conduct the question, would contradict the tendency of our mind. We could not teach our children and catechumens in any other way. "There is a God." The fool only hath said in his heart that there is not. "This the Word of God." It agrees to his acknowledged character. It bears the impression of that mind, that wisdom, that greatness, that benevolence, that justice, the traces of which we mark in the works of his hands. Ye are men. He hath made you and not ye yourselves. It commends itself to you. "It is profitable" for every end you can propose. It is coincident with every feeling you can divine. It proceeds in the line of all your secret yearnings. It thoroughly understands you. It does more, it anticipates you. It reveals you to yourselves. It explains what was only felt, and solves what was hardly guessed. It deciphers the mysterious characters written on the soul. It stamps them not, but only inter-

prets them as they are there. They are wrought into it. All its discoveries act in like manner. They agree with the more solemn movements and deeper sympathies of the mind. It lays our whole being open, enforcing nothing that is alien to it, infusing nothing that is uncongenial with it. It causes it to understand, to muse, itself. "Do not its words do good?" "They are the words of eternal life." There is, then, this double parallelism: first, between the character of God and his revelation; afterwards, between that revelation and the character of man.

We are not unmindful of the probability that the first man was really treated in a similar manner with ourselves. A special communication was made to him by his Maker. Intercourse supposes it, and was itself a revelation. But not the less true is it, that "the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things which are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." Not less true is it, that "that which may be known of God is made apparent among men, for God hath made it apparent to them."<sup>a</sup> It was a distinguished favour, disturbing no previous constitution of things, a super-added benefit in perfect harmony with all which had before existed. The thesis is by no means confined to revelation. We totally disclaim the opinion that our exclusive business is to look for it within those inspired leaves. It requires anterior knowledge. It demands a more original foundation. Not only the

<sup>a</sup> Romans i. 19. Φανερόν . . . ἐφανερώσε.

external world must teach, but its government; we must, also, look determinately into our mind. In the former we discover the footsteps of Deity, in the latter his face. This is the principal subject and source of moral science. Whatever belongs to man, every ingredient of his nature, falls most strictly within the province and under the functions of our reason. Because some may have exaggerated the force, and misdirected the use, of human intellect, it does not become us to derogate from it. Sin is its perversion, but not of necessity, its diminution. The unholy disposition which turns it aside, leaves it as strong in its present direction as it was in its proper course. It is not denied that this unholy disposition may lead to mental habits and to sensual indulgences which shall actually cloud and weaken it. This is not, however, necessary to the presumed case. The mind may be filled with prejudices which shall warp the judgment when particular objects are presented to it ; but the capacity of that judgment is the same whatever may be submitted, and whether or not those prejudices operate. "The first principle of religion," says Bacon, "is right reason." Reason is of its own nature concerned with facts and principles. We are not only permitted, but are bound, to investigate all the truths which involve our happiness or misery, all which bear upon our state as actually subsisting, or on any destiny reserved for us. It is reverent to address the eternal God in the manner of those who would learn, and who, that they may learn, enquire of him: "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" not in infer-

ence that he will, but in protest that he should not. "Suffer me a little, and I will show thee that I have yet to speak on God's behalf. I will fetch my knowledge from afar, and will ascribe righteousness to my Maker."\* "Righteous art thou, O Lord, when I plead with thee: yet let me reason the case with thee of thy judgments."<sup>b</sup> There can be no piety in foregoing inquiry and refusing scrutiny into the rules of the Divine conduct. We cannot see that love to God should be indifferent to his character. We cannot honor that trust in him which is careless of every inducement to its exercise. We cannot applaud that jealousy of his glory which passes by every crimination of his justice and his goodness.

A revelation, indeed, can make nothing true. It is merely an attestation to truth. Truth has independent rank and place and subsistence. The attestation does not constitute the truth, but it can render that which is already true, *sure* and *certain* to our minds. The appeal of Scripture is, therefore, as commonly as confidently directed to our judgment. "Why even of your own selves judge ye not that which is right?" "Judge, I pray you, betwixt me and my vineyard." "Prove all things; hold fast that which is good." Whatever the evidence, reason alone can appreciate it. Through reason alone can the mind receive the seal of correspondence from the image of truth.

He, who, from whatever motives, disparages reason as it now exists in man, reflects no honor upon revela-

\* Job xxxvi. 2, 3.

<sup>b</sup> Jeremiah xii. 1.



tion. To what is this remitted, if not to reason? When it unfolds its claims, what else can decide upon them? It seeks to produce conviction of its truth. An *external* proof seems first in natural order: but this consisting of various particulars must be subjected to an intelligent process. It is to be examined, sifted, collated, applied. More frequently, though not so naturally, the internal evidence first appeals to us. We hold back most firmly from the opinion that our understanding has nothing to do with this species of evidence. The substance of the volume is essential to the vindication of its authenticity. Nothing could make it true, if it contradicted truth. Nothing could make it reasonable, if it contradicted reason. We are asked: If you knew from foreign evidence that this was the Book of God, would you not be bound to acquiescence in all which it contained? But there is no foreign evidence which could do this, unless God himself gave it to every man. The case is necessarily that of mental research. Then do we affirm that no mental research into external evidence could be satisfactory, in blindness of what internal evidence includes. No rational being on presumptive evidence (though the highest that historical argument can admit and, in such instances, as convincing as demonstration itself) could thus commit his belief and all the issues of his existence. Reason is, likewise, concerned with interpretation, and not only with evidence. And these are not separable departments: interpretation belongs to evidence and must affect it, evidence mixes with interpretation and must impress it. Little do they

foresee, who talk so lightly of reason, whither their language tends. What mean they by prostrating it? Let it rise to revelation,—expanding to its greatness and soaring in its effulgence.

We are now in a condition, we have now reached the place, to inquire, independently of any revealed authority, into the true character of man. What is his nature? In what relations does he stand? What are his prospects of a future life and allotment? How is he constituted? What survives of him at death? In what manner shall he be dealt with in any period subsequent to death? How is he regarded? How is he treated? We speak of man as he now appears: we would describe him in his present being. We believe, at the same time, that he is what he always was, and always will be. With his circumstances and dilemmas we have now no question: we only ask,—What is his proper being? The present disquisition is merely introductory. It concerns the true nature and condition of man. Until these be known, we cannot inquire into the manner of his treatment, or into what awaits him.

I. We cannot doubt that there is in us a twofold constitution; that we partake at once of material and spiritual properties,—that we consist, in one person, of a body and of a soul. Man is only organised matter, or that organised matter is only a machine for what is not matter. To avoid the grossness of the first predicament, some assert that man is homogeneous, a monophysite, of an indivisible nature. Yet this opinion can only be entertained by the materialist, thus repre-

sending man as unmixed matter,—unless we except the Pyrrhonist and Idealist, some anti-hyloist dreamer, a class of mystics we can scarcely expect to find. The immaterialist would make no such statement. The parties are divided thus: the materialist is he who thinks that matter alone enters into the composition of man: the immaterialist thinks that it not only does, but that there is superadded an immaterial principle. The former, then, affirms that mind is the effect of a certain structure and physiology of matter, not separable from it, and having no nature independently of it: the latter supposes that, though he cannot define mind, nor understand the mode of its exercise, apart from certain material instruments and manifestations, that it is different essentially from matter, and that the human being is made up of these two constituents, existing in compound, yet capable of discrimination.

We can only know things by certain phenomena, or the indications of specific qualities. By such a mode of observing, we distinguish between various objects. Why do we not mistake an animal for a vegetable? Why do we not rank a vegetable with a mineral? A child will instantly tell the reason,—they are not alike. We may clothe our reason in a loftier style, still it is no better. All comparison and contrast are founded upon this apprehension of what is similar and dissimilar. But matter comprehends all sensible things. We recognise as material whatever occasions our perceptions of vision, taste, hearing, smell, touch. We pronounce as material whatever possesses figure,

solidity, resistibility, magnitude, porosity, extension. We leave out of discussion all dispute concerning the primary or secondary order of these sensations of external accidents. That which presents these signs and induces these feelings, we justly call matter.\* We take a metallic bar into our hand,—it has a shape, it is cylindrical,—it has a density, it is massive,—it has a solidity, it is compact,—it has an extension, it is oblong,—can we for a moment doubt what it is? Yet really all this discernment must pass in our mind ere we determine its nature. It may seem involuntary, but it is actually related to a duration of time, and proceeds in an order of succession: the powers necessary to produce this discernment are voluntarily directed.

There is, then, something—if these be the marks by which matter is invariably to be known—which is not matter. That something as truly exists as matter, and it is by it alone that matter can be proved to exist. It is certified by equally descriptive phenomena. It is not only to be known like matter, but, unlike matter, it is known to itself. Mind is conscious of all with which it is affected. It exercises choice and volition. It can abstract and combine ideas. It can understand, reason, imagine, remember. These are its cognizable properties: that which manifests them is, mind.

Every particle of the human frame, however attenuated,—every filament, though most delicate,—every globule of blood, though most minute,—is but matter, and is, therefore, plainly reducible to its criteria and laws. None of these reciprocate with the characters of mind. The mind, on the other hand,

does not put forth a signal in common with the indications of matter, and cannot become a thing of shape, hardness, size. The body is not the spirit, the spirit is not the body, on the simple showing which distinguishes between opposites, or, in other words, between subjects which possess no congruous, interchangeable, attributes. If they should be seen in closest parallel, they are lines which never touch.

When we speak of substrata and essences, we often deceive ourselves. We know nothing of matter, except as a congeries of qualities—properties recognized by the bodily sense: we infer that there is something which presents them, and in which, after some manner, they inhere. This is our utmost information. Of that secret substance we cannot form a conjecture. And we readily confess that we know nothing of mind except as a series of qualities, of which we are individually conscious: we cannot but conclude, that there is something on which these rest. This is our largest solution. Of that support we can entertain no fiction. Half of our explanations are differences of language without any nearer approach to truth: and the boasted progress of our knowledge is often the substitution of one kind of ignorance for another. This much is certain: that mind may be as distinctly discriminated as matter, for by none other process can the existence of matter be argued but by adducing its properties,—while we know in our mind the sureness of those properties by which it is revealed.\*

\* "This primary and supposed obvious quality of bodies will be found, when examined, as incomprehensible as anything belonging to

This-invariable difference of matter and mind has been disputed by an adroit allegation that there is to be found a common law in both. Must not the mind, it is asked, be somewhere? If so, is it not capable of extension? But this is to claim the point in dispute. It begs the question. The fallacy and the artifice consist in the term. For the answer, that it was no where, would raise the ridicule of the unreflecting. We cannot scruple to render that answer, whatever the award of a thoughtless derision. That which *exists* in space need not to have its "whereabout" in it.\* The mind is *related* to the body. They co-exist and co-operate under a present vital œconomy, in a present objective scene. The nexus of that relation is not more inconceivable than would be the law of local habitation in the sense of extension. Nor can any conclusion be more arbitrary and violent than to affirm that the relation must be rather of the nature to which the mind is bound, and not of the nature of the mind itself. We attempt no definition of this relation. It exists. It is placed beyond the possible doubt. All its remoter speculations—how spirit exists to space, how spirit passes through space—we contentedly forego. Mind has no extension in matter. Mind has a relation to matter. We are assured of each proposition. From

our minds; and a solid extended substance as hard to be conceived, as a thinking immaterial one."—Locke: Essay on Hum: Under:

\* "The maxim is, that an object may exist, and yet be no where, and I assert that this is not only possible, but that the greater part of beings do and must exist after this manner." "Thought, therefore, and extension are qualities wholly incompatible, and can never incorporate together in one subject."—Hume.

our present limitations of knowledge, further inquiry is as reckless as vain. Language is generally as precise as intellection. We give little credit to them who complain that they cannot express what they conceive : the fault is essentially in the conception, and only accidentally, or perhaps consequently, in the expression. The sculptor might as well accuse the marble, when he has wrought Psyche into statue, that its senselessness debarred the pure, the intense, the visionary, impersonation which he had studied and had impressed upon his mind : but was his image truly more instinct and idealised than that cold form on which his eye rests thus dissatisfied ?

Motion has been considered as alike the property of mind and matter : thence it has been argued that their nature is the same. But motion is not a property of matter. Matter has a capacity for it, and motion is a condition in which it may be found. An external impulsion is necessary to give it this activity. That this activity is not necessary to matter is obvious in that it is more commonly wanting to it : matter does exist without it, and may be conceived of in a state of rest. There are no better reasons towards the proof of anything than these, that it can be shown thus to exist, and that the mind can only thus apprehend it. Now the body moves. The mind retains its relation to the body whithersoever it moves. But this is not mechanical. There may be mental independence. When tossed on the deep, we may in thought be present with our households, traversing far distant haunts and conversing with long-departed friends.

No man can doubt the being of mind distinct from matter but, by that doubt, to confirm it. There is the power in that doubt which is neither nervous nor muscular : there is a power turned upon a question of its own nature which a power of matter cannot do : there is a power voluntary and self-directed. Strange and unworthy as may be the doubt,—whence does it arise ? What entertains it ? What, save that which was different from matter, could take such a distinction ?

We feel little disposition to controvert every hardy and obtuse assertion by the coarser schools, the dissecting rooms, the vivisections, of materialism. There is one which, however, we will notice. It is affirmed that, as certain organs of the body perform their separate functions, so is it equally evident that judgment and other intellectual phenomena are only functions of their appropriate apparatus, the brain, the central organ of the sentient system. Let us, then, examine the working of those other organs first. The glands are appointed to form certain secretions. In their ducts all these secretions have been detected through alternate stages. The mechanism of the heart can be traced, together with many of the actions and changes of the circulating fluid. The alimentary canal has been frequently laid open, and the successive processes of digestion been minutely ascertained. This is intelligible, inductive, experimental. But who can apply similar examinations to the mind ? Who has identified its organ, or traced its intermediate formations ? Who can say what there



is, in even the organs of sensation, which induces their fitness? What scalpel has revealed the peculiar quality of that string which we call the optic nerve, enabling us to see rather than to hear? What ingenious theory has explained the mode in which the inverted image of the retina correctly impresses us with the true position of the thing? In what does the encephalon of the hero differ from that of the poltroon, the poet's from the hind's? Following up the physiological counterpart, as it is urged, we may rightfully demand: Where are these productions, slow, gradual, immature, of thought? All we ask is, consistent proof. Certain organs fulfil their parts. We see not only the result but every step of the process. In like manner, we are assured that the brain fulfils its part in educating thought. Show it to us at work. It is possible. Its mechanical movements, its hidden chambers, have been explored. What did they indicate of any business with mind? What declared, assured, embryo has been detected in its duplicatures? Have any of its nicer tissues, any of its secret recesses, betrayed, like palace-approaches, the mysterious presence? If thought be the effect of animal organisation, it should partake of some material adjunct. But so far from realizing, in these researches, mind made known to us by sign or essence, we cannot learn the method of any external impact upon it. There is a visual impression, a picture, reflected upon the eye. Whence is the perception of the mind? Was the nerve, which is behind the eye and foliated through it, shaken by the simulachrum, so that it

vibrated? Was there any transmission of change to the thalamus out of which it curiously shapes itself? Was there any effect which could be noted upon the great medullary substance? \* There is the eye itself,—its convex cornea, its three lenses,—an achromatic instrument: but how the mind is affected by it continues unexplained.

If thinking result from matter, it can only be in one or other of the following ways. It must be an inherent property in it. This no reasonable man asserts. Matter abounds in all kinds and forms without any accompaniment of intelligence. Or the alternative is, that thinking may be induced by combinations of particular portions of matter. Two substances, in contact or compound, often elicit what seems wholly new. But a third can never spring from them without being perfectly similar, or without a change of themselves. An aggregate may be decomposed by an addition, which, by combining with either of the elements it finds already united, liberates the one or

\* “The efforts of philosophers, constantly renewed, to penetrate the relations of the soul to animal life, have all along retarded the progress of physiology. In this attempt men left the province of philosophical research for that of fancy; physiologists, carried away by imagination, were far from being acquainted with the laws of purely animal life. They professed to explain the most obscure psychological phenomena, and yet they were unable to say what fever is, and in what way quinine acts in curing it.

“Let us, first, endeavor to refer to their ultimate causes those phenomena of life which are not psychological; and let us beware of drawing conclusions before we have a ground-work. We know exactly the mechanism of the eye; but neither anatomy nor chymistry will ever explain how the rays of light act on consciousness, so as to produce vision.”—Liebig: *Animal Chymistry*.

the other. No conjunction of parts can produce a permanent property which is different from those parts when separated. Chymistry only explains the changes of bodies—it does not create any thing. Mechanism only applies the laws and agents which are independent of it—it does not create any thing. The mighty laboratory and tool-house are built for them, with all their substances and dynamics. By what analogy is it, then, maintained that material combinations can give birth to an element, an entity, unlike them, and transcendently superior to them? Where, indeed, is there this combination? Where are the two things, different from each other, which this compound supposes? There is, according to the presumed case, matter alone and only. An arrangement and juxtaposition of brute flesh is thus combined with power, and invested with prerogative, to originate those elevated sentiments, those imperishable arguments, those glowing imaginings, those sphere-voiced lays, which bind age to age, which excite congenial efforts in successive generations, which constitute the glorious wealth of the Great Intellectual Community!

Atoms make up the human body: but they, as individuated, do not think, for then every atom would be a seat of thought, and every body would possess innumerable souls. Any particular distribution of atoms could not give this effect. Any rapid circulation could not stimulate it. You may attenuate them until imponderable and inappreciable, but you have acquired no mental result. Magnetism and electricity are only blind agents, how-

ever refined and subtle. By chymic law the power of attraction and repulsion will affect atoms : their position and temperature are altered, but there is no change in themselves. If it be allowed that mind is a super-addition, we demand no more. But a super-addition is not an effect of a foregoing state of things. If a super-addition, it must have existed previously and independently, however momentarily. If it be a mere effect, it stands unrelated to a cause, and, according to all nature, it can have no cause, because itself is superior to any which could presume to be one.

We do not think that these reasonings are at all weakened by any proofs of the influence which is exerted by the human frame upon the intelligent principle. We are prepared for such a fact, and freely confess it. The body is the machine of the mind : its irregularity must disturb the agent. If the medium of vision be dim and distorting, the eye can only thus apprehend the object. But we may argue the converse. The mind is infantile with the body : why not rather say, the body is infantile with the mind ? Let the soul be apprised of some danger—a danger which the senses cannot mark—and though the health and energy of the man until that moment is complete, you shall see the appetite fail, the cheek blanch, the strength wane : you may see, if the struggle be sufficiently fierce, the convulsions of death itself. There is often the working of a mind upon a material too frail to bear it. A supernatural and superstitious terror seizes upon its victim, an idle and fanatical imagination only,—but no poison could spread more surely, could operate

more fatally, than were the venom really in his veins. Nor can any statement be more gratuitous than that mental insanity proves the entire dependence of mind upon organisation. When pulsation is fevered and overspeeds all the wheels of life, stimulating the nervous influence beyond its proper control, delirium ensues. The mind is abused with the impression of diseased organs. Sensation is vitiated. But even then the mind is not infrequently conscious of the default, and will vigorously argue against it. In settled madness, the mind may inhabit a perfectly sound body, enjoying high health and reaching old age. There is neither organic nor functionary disease. There is no morbid structure nor physiology. The disease is, therefore, in the mind. Why may we not speak of the derangement of intellect as *its ill*, as of that of flesh with all the ills that it is heir to? Why may not there be its peculiar disease, its idiopathy? And if we needed to confirm the independence of the thinking principle on its material covering, we might dwell upon its victories over sorrow and temptation : we might unfold the scene of death ! How strong has it proved itself amidst that fall, how spiritual amidst that decay, how glorious amidst that eclipse ! Its greatness had not until then been proved, nor its triumph signalized ! It is its dawn of a brighter existence ! It is its theatre of consummated achievement !

Perhaps nothing more entirely agrees with our argument than that the mind is so little aware of the bodily instruments and their operations. Some of

these are below any consciousness, in its widest meaning. The contraction of the heart in forcing the circulation of the blood, the causes of the temperature of that fluid, the process by which the pure air we inhale imparts some quality of renovation to it in its passage through the lungs, the propelling power which repeats this passage seventy times in the minute, for the whole course of our lives—these vital acts are very partially explained. If we were of one simple nature, why should we not be conscious of all these movements? Why does consciousness extend to nothing, with the exception of a few sensations which are really mental, but to the subjects and exercises of thought? On the supposition that the body is only the organ of the mind, there seems a fitness in these blind and independent laws. There is little necessity for scanning them. They could not be included in proper consciousness. The spirit may know and examine itself: but its ministering attendants wait upon it with a mute mysteriousness and inexplicable reserve!

The sway of the mind over the bodily powers is as generally allowed, as it is commonly exercised. We beget change in it by muscular excitements. We “bend up each corporal agent for it:” and thus we “bend up every spirit to his full height.” All is subservient and subsidiary to the behest of the nobler principle. By assuming the expressions of passion, we work ourselves into it. There is ready obedience and assistance. What but an instrument, bound and subordinate, can the body be, when mind can agitate it

at pleasure, gain reinforcement from it, put it to every use, claim it as help-meet, and yet exact reverence and subjection of it ? \*

We do not feel that we are pushed to any difficulty by the rebound of our argument in support of a principle, incorporeal and independently superinduced, in adducing the case of the inferior animals. We firmly believe that there are in them many phænomena of mind. To call it instinct, relieves no embarrassment of this admission. It is a valueless word. There is no distinction in it. It tells nothing. In every animal there is that which corresponds to mind. Does it not think? Does it not decide between difficulties and choose between alternatives? Does it not remember? Does it not love, hate, hope, fear? Instinct has been supposed to intimate acts which are blindly perfect, automatic, performed without will and reasoning. But it can be shown that such acts are sometimes committed in error and end in failure. There must have been reason, for there is mistake. It does not follow, nevertheless, that while mind presents points of

\* "The most ordinary experience shows that at each moment of life, in the animal organism, a continued change of matter, more or less accelerated, is going on ; that a part of the structure is transformed into unorganised matter, loses its condition of life, and must be again renewed. Physiology has sufficiently decisive grounds for the opinion that, every motion, every manifestation of force, is the result of a transformation of the structure, or of its substance ; that every conception, every mental affection, is followed by changes in the chymical nature of the secreted fluids ; that every thought, every sensation, is accompanied by a change in the composition of the substance of the brain."—Liebig: *Animal Chymistry*, p. 9.

We are not bound to approve of the whole quotation : it is made to support our inversion of a common objection.

resemblance, that it is not susceptible of the greatest distinctions. The power of analyzing mental phenomena, we may surely affirm, is denied to these humbler existences: we may, in comparing ourselves with them, boast it as our exclusive faculty. To our mind, so superior to whatever looks like it in them, other endowments may be added. Speech, language, together with the fixed form and ready facilities of knowledge which these gifts and capacities secure, abundantly exalt and discriminate it. If there were only that wonderful property of progression by which every generation of man may surpass the former, leaving animal intelligence to its original restrictions, it would be sufficient to demonstrate that, though we even shared with it in genus, we stood at the greatest possible distance from it in species. Think of the human mind, and a gulf lies between it and every brutal form of sense: it means, as a term, quite a different idea. Nor have we any warrant to think that their mind is superinduced, or could be independent. It is but a higher form of life. It never passes into any thing higher than animal acts and functions. It is of the body, its adjunct, its instrument rather than its guide.

We only attempt a condensed view, a summary of the argument in behalf of man's spiritual nature. This is his conscious conviction. Whenever he has done justice to it, he has thus defined himself. Plato describes the soul as "an essence, bodiless, and intellectual:"\* Aristotle, as "an essence independent,

\* Οὐσία ἀσώματος καὶ νόητης.



and easily separable from its present form of existence."<sup>a</sup> All the future which the ancients anticipated, and all which modern nations, when unenlightened by revelation, yet foretel, respects the simple spirit, as not of the nature of the body, as divisible from it, as detached by death. The classic poets, the true priests of mythology, call it "eternal exile,"<sup>b</sup> represent it "the surviving soul,"<sup>c</sup> ascribe to the manes a sort of divinity.<sup>d</sup> Though the lyric, from its tender sadness and from its lofty sublimity, might be expected to chiefly impress this doctrine, we find it in the tragedy even to its parts, and in the epopee even to its scenes. Here and there,—as often as the atheist may be detected,—men may be found who deny this spiritual exemption of their nature. But no sophistry, no decree of power, could ever convince the multitude that this material form is the entirety of their being, and that death, sparing nothing, is its entire extinction. We claim for the proper distinctiveness of mind from the outward form,—in every substantive use of the phrase,—*universal consent*.

II. In attempting to properly estimate man, we cannot doubt that he was designed to be the moral agent, and that responsibility must attach to him. That which is called Conscience, we hold to be the *tendency and capacity* of every man to examine into

<sup>a</sup> Οὐσία χωρίστη καὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

<sup>b</sup> "In eternum

Exilium."

Hor. Car. lib. ii. 3.

<sup>c</sup> "Animæ superstiti."—Ibid. Car. lib. iii. 9.

<sup>d</sup> "Quæ vis Deorum est Manium."—Ibid. Epodon, lib. v. 5.

duty. It is a principle or bias natural to his mind. The question strictly considered, only involves the *mature* and the *social* mind of man: at least it is most justly illustrated by reference to it. We have no right to expect a fair exhibition of it from a mind undeveloped, or from a man denaturalised by separation from his fellows. There is nothing, however, which the infant intellect so readily catches; nor is there the isolated outcast—if ever such existed—in whom this power could not be awakened. In the brute tribes no cognate propension can be traced. Their percipience, after all the training it may allow, cannot receive any impression to be compared with it, or that looks to it. They were made to obey the dominion of man, and not of God. They were formed only for their present life, and cannot launch a thought into an hereafter. They can at best hope to please, or learn to dread, their earthly lord. But whithersoever you turn your research, man is seen with this predisposition. He knows, or he can understand, that he is accountable.\* He is capable of distinguishing between right and wrong. He is peremptory in his demand of duty from others to himself. This is all for which we contend: this is all upon which we insist. Our inquiry is into the fact of man's capacity: very indirectly and secondarily into the fact of its exercise. Now, a race of beings who can conceive of responsibility, whose highest philosophy affects it, whose universal language expresses it,

\* We do not contend for what the ancients called *πρόληψις*, but only for natural capacity to estimate such moral ideas when presented.

must be responsible. No creature rises higher than his just and appropriate ideas. These ideas reflect what he is, and for what he is intended. They are as true to him as he ought to be to them. He could never be empowered to entertain them unless he was obliged to determine himself by them. If the rank of his nature fell below this capacity, if he was necessarily inferior to that which he naturally conceived,—most inconsistent suppositions!—his level and his nature would contradict each other, and the only conclusion which could be left us to form must be this, that his Maker had created him for abortive hope and vain emulation. Failure would be the law of his being. But his Maker must regard him responsible in conferring the gift of this faculty upon him. To assert that these ideas are accidental to the human mind, that education and will-worship have injected them, can not account for their ready coalescence with it,—and only serve to prove that its requirements, its very cravings, have induced and shaped this system of external discipline and obligation. From the objection we may advise ourselves that man every where confesses such a rule. His inward sense demands a binding authority and an enforcing sanction. He feels that he is not in his due place among surrounding creatures, but as he thus yields to a will higher than his own! Upon that will his happiness rests.\*

The argument might satisfy whatever we have need to show, were we to adduce the ready admission, by

the most uninformed individual, of those moral distinctions on which the notion of responsibility proceeds. Though he should never have revolved them, perchance never have heard them, until now,—at once they commend themselves to his approving judgment. He is compelled to affirm them. They possess his intuitive assent. Now this mental sympathy can only exist in affinity with what we call natural, or naturally perceptible, truth. When revelation announces its verities, verities which never could be known save for revelation,—we believe them upon its evidence, yet without any such consciousness of coincidence as that of which we speak. We revert not to the past, though dreamy, thoughts of our mind, nor wonder in ourselves why we did not discern these things before. All is new. It had not entered into the heart to conceive them. But in moral inquiries, every conclusion comes back upon us as that which we might have decided, which lay within our own field of knowledge and our own range of mind. Or if they who have never reflected on these subjects, who have never addicted themselves to these researches, do not invariably justify principles which true ethics bring to light,—still you will observe this susceptibility of moral distinctions in their objection. To something of accountability, affecting particular duty or particular retribution, is the objection made. The duty is, perhaps, denied as reasonable, the retribution as just. This is to betray conscience,—to allow those thoughts which “excuse and accuse one another.” The reasoning which this includes anticipates the proof we might

offer that this conscience exists. Already it has questioned some law: already it has challenged some penalty. It has held its inquest: it has poised its balance. The impressions of right and wrong are, therefore, the basis of the demur. It will be in vain for the objector henceforth to deny his capacity of moral distinctions; and as vain for him, possessing that capacity, to deny that he is accountable.\*

Were reason not a guide to morals,—if morals could be ascertained exclusively by supernatural aid,—then, until and unless that aid were afforded, man could not be a moral agent. If his law might only be read in a revelation, then until and unless that revelation visited him, he could not be a transgressor. If of himself he cannot discern between moral good and evil, then only, when the difference is shown to him, can his conduct present any moral stamp, any character of virtue and vice. We see no ground to suspect that the mental powers of our nature are especially injured in their strength and clearness by any moral revolution in it. Depravity belongs to disposition, its bent to evil, and does not consist in weakened capacity. There is no pretext for supposing that man is more incompetent to form a judgment on morality than on geometry. Man, wherever found in his state of true nature (that is, social and developed,) is a law unto himself.

Any remedy for guilt, which revelation may bring, presumes guilt in him to whom it is brought. How

\* Note B.

can he be guilty who cannot, in consequence of an absolute loss of power, perceive a law and his amenableness to it? If this be the effect of his disobedience, once he must have been able to certify that law, and his obligation to it. Henceforth is he merely placed under its punishment. But it may be rejoined, that morals being very largely deducible from the constitution of man, if he be now a fallen creature, the source of information must be most imperfect and deceptive. It is like beholding our natural face in a glass full of flaws. We allow that apostasy to be as deep and inveterate as ever it was regarded by the humblest and most agonized mourner of the fact. We have no palliation to offer: no reserve to propose. We see it a law in the members,—“from the birth, and from the womb, and from the conception.” We trace it unexceptionably. It must have a source and origin commensurate with itself. If man, in every place and in every age, go in one way, there must be a reason for it. You may, or may not, call it tendency and disposition. It is universal event and issue. It has happened, it does happen, it will happen. What is the solution? Hereditary depravity, original sin. We blench not from the strongest statements. We dislike every qualification of them. We find nothing gained by such refinements. The difficulty still exists, though removed to some more speculative ground. The pseudo-philosophy with which it is encumbered adds to its weight. Displaced from its just authority, it is left open to every objection. We are not responsible for any of these extenuating views. What-

ever be the disposition, sin can only be spontaneous and responsible. But we see in man, thus lapsed, all the nature of man. Sin is not his nature: it is its depravation and abuse. Sin is not natural to him, however it is native. His constitution, truly understood, is apt for virtue: vice deranges and defeats it. "The carnal mind is enmity against God:" the mind, as it is,—not "renewed after God,"—is enmity against him, in the misapplication and perversion of its powers. It has "gone out of the way," it is "alienated," it has "turned aside." It might be love to him in its right direction. As sin takes away nothing from the properties of our being, regeneration adds none. We may, therefore, search our nature for its true interests, duties, and bearings, nor can any demand be more imperative upon man than thus to peruse and judge himself. Whatever the depraved disposition of man, his declared war is not with virtue. He does not hate justice as justice, truth as truth, benevolence as benevolence. He admires their excellence, he defends their importance, he urges their exemplification. He approves and urges them. From depraved disposition he may violate them all. In the blindness of passion he may conceal from himself the enormity of that violation. But show him the case in another. Let a far minor offence be cited. His "anger is greatly kindled." Far more pitiless himself, he denounces him "who did this thing, and because he had no pity."

What is that particular exercise of mind which immediately seizes the distinctions of right and wrong,

has often been made the subject of dispute.\* Precedently to this inquiry, another claims its notice: Why is any act right or wrong? What constitutes it such?

We need not allude to those theories which base themselves upon rules of human legislation and conventions of human opinion. These can only cast the whole question of accountability into the scales of caprice and chance. Legislation and opinion are notably diverse and fickle. Tyranny may follow tyranny, and opinion succeed opinion, in the most varying forms. Yet is the idea of rectitude so fixed and independent in the human mind, that no decree of the one, and no licence of the other, can destroy it. What could compel men to think adultery, parricide, robbery, right? What array of power could force the subversion of all their ideas? Moral distinctions are not fluctuating, but essential. Despots and their minions may attempt to wrest the common sentiments, but they thus betray their weakness and hasten their doom. "The throne of iniquity," always tottering, tumbles when it "frameth mischief by law." The human mind is prepossessed, there is a lodgement in it which cannot be assailed, there is a nature in it which cannot be perverted, and all such arbitrary violence is impotent. For we cannot ascend to that which is too ultimate in this inquiry. If it be asked: Is there any other ground of these principles than the Divine will? we must utterly dissent from that

\* Note C.



assumed appeal. The infinite excellence must have an infinitely excellent will. We speak of the necessary perfection of that excellence in accommodation to our only methods of thought and language, but not to the injury of its freest choice. Itself authorizes these methods: "He cannot deny himself." For every divine determination there must be a congruous and worthy reason. "The righteous Lord loveth righteousness." "The Lord loveth judgment." It necessarily follows that the principles exist which for their own sake he approves and prefers. But if his authoritative requirement, his mandate, communicates the quality of the act or disposition, making it accordingly good and evil, then the act or disposition would otherwise be indifferent, and each would be without good and evil until his pleasure was announced. That will, too, would render all acts of obedience alike virtuous: that which was circumstantial would rank, when commanded, with that which was founded in fitness, and a confusion would arise in our minds the most disturbing to all proper views, the most subversive of all just apprehensions. We are accustomed to speak of a class of duties as positive, that is, presenting no reason but the command of God: we contra-distinguish another class of duties as moral, their reason being obvious in their agreeableness to a pre-existing order of things. But this is not the highest view of moral relations. An order of things may not be necessary. There are truths which were always—which always will be—truths. The properties of the line, the cone, the circle, the triangle, are not

earlier nor later, cannot be more nor less. We borrow an illustration from the fact. Good and evil, right and wrong, truth and falsehood, are equally immutable. They are truths in themselves. They are independent of any constitution of things, and of any creation of agents. They are inceptive and primordial. They must have been always what they are. The contrary cannot be conceived, or, if conceived, is absurd. We speak of mathematical as eternal truths. The epithet is apt and just. There can be no contradiction and no alternation to them. They depend upon no arrangement of matter, upon no distribution of physics or forces. Were there no heaven or earth for their diagram, were there no intelligences to demonstrate them, they would be the same. They are archetypes, if they never had been shaped; they are true, if they never had been proved.\* So we reason touching virtue, or that which qualifies an act and disposition as right and good. It is conformity to nothing accidental, contingent, dispensational. Its standard and reason are to be found, likewise, in eternal truths. The contrary cannot be conceived, or, if conceived, must be absurd. It is no more violently absurd to imagine the laws of mathematical figures, or rather principles, to have varied from their present laws—to imagine that they now vary from their past laws—that the circle is not necessarily convex nor its radii necessarily equal, that the triangle does not necessarily contain two right angles,—than to suppose

\* Note D.

that moral distinctions could ever have a beginning, or that they can ever conditionally exist. Good is as exactly separate from evil, justice from iniquity, in all duration. No course, no origination, of events can affect their substance. System and oeconomy may arise, new settlements and ordinances may be established, worlds may be created or crazed,—these principles are normal and imperishable. We must remember, also, that all truths which are necessary are universal. They are the same in every case and to every being.—It is evident, indeed, that such a difference exists between these and other truths. All things are not established in a rigid necessity. Another kind of laws and another scale of proportions are not inconceivable, if we look into the great created system. Deity may have possessed boundless diversities of operation. He might have recourse to other styles of work. Gravitation is the law: and it is absurd to attempt any other explanation of what is. But there is nothing absurd in supposing the possible substitution of another mobile power. The planets exhibit, in probable respect to this power, their dimensions, relatively greater or less, but there is nothing absurd in supposing that they might have been fashioned according to other degrees of magnitude and density. There is nothing absurd in supposing that they needed not to be moulded into spheric shape, or if orbs, that they needed not to be impressed with rotatory motion, or if made to circle in a mighty course, that they needed not to travel in a common plane, or that moving in their revolutionary circuit, they needed not all turn

and pass from west to east:—because the wisdom which has decided these regulations as even inevitable to the present constitution of things, could have formed a different constitution. But can the thought be momentarily suffered to enter our mind that the Deity could invert the distinctions which we affirm? Is not the thought only a little less irreverent that they consist in his will? Is not the perfection of these qualities as made manifest in him, the moral demonstration of his supremacy? Is not the perception of these qualities, as distinguishable from his being, the only method of glorifying him as God? How can we ascribe these qualities to him, if they depend for their mere existence upon his volition or his decree?

We, therefore, rest all virtue upon a foundation the most reasonable, while it is the most remote. It is necessary reason. It is eternal truth. Its idea cannot be changed. Near or distant, in abstract or concrete, it is still the same. If we cannot lift her veil, like that of the fabled divinity, her self-announcement might be copied from its mystic fillet,—She is what has been and shall be! More appropriately may we confess her as the Wisdom of the inspired personification, the companion and delight of Deity, the spectatress of his works and the genius of his commandments!

A virtuous act or disposition is, then, inherently virtuous by its resemblance to the essential, indefectible, imprescriptible, rule of rectitude,—not to allow which were more unreasonable and more profane than not to allow a first cause of all that we prove by sense and attest by experience. If the hypothesis, that the Divine

Will is the true foundation of every difference between right and wrong, cannot be maintained without an insult, even to blasphemy, against the Divine character, much less can we favour opinions which place the very truth of virtue in the perceptive faculty of the creature. Our approbation or disapprobation of any conduct cannot make that conduct otherwise than it is. If that approbation or disapprobation invariably follow the supposed conduct, the exciting cause of such complacency or disgust must be found in the conduct itself. Then a law of connexion may be shown to exist and operate between these sentiments of the mind and the object which moves them. We must conclude from this connexion that we are constituted to feel in this manner. We cannot ascribe it, with Hobbes, to the assumption of authority; or, with Mandeville, to the love of praise. But the impulse is external to us. We need no verbiage of a moral sense.<sup>a</sup> We need no machinery of a circuitous sympathy.<sup>b</sup> Our mind judges of moral distinctions with an irresistible precision and facility. In the same way as necessary truths affect every mind alike, so do moral truths. They are quite as independent of us. The process of the one is indeed slower and more ratiocinative than the other. Many necessary truths exact a tedious demonstration. They appeal to no intuition. They carry not conviction by impact and impression. Moral truths have only to be set before us, and they are so self-convincing that we immediately close with them.

<sup>a</sup> Hutcheson.<sup>b</sup> Smith.

By these remarks we in no wise commit ourselves to any theory of conscience which supposes its innate knowledge, its subjective efficiency. We speak not of its independence, though we do resolutely concerning that of the first principles which it appreciates. It is only the religious judgement of the mind, exercised upon the great rules of morality presented to it. A law is given to it, but it gives no law : a light is set before it, but it sets up no light.\*

To this natural competency of human reason to decide upon our moral relations, it is replied, that reason does not enounce a uniform suffrage, that its dictates are widely divergent, that the conclusions to which it leads are palpably contradictory. This dignity and ornament of our nature has even been not infrequently assailed, by different parties, on these alleged grounds of difference. Cotta, in the Dialogue of Cicero,<sup>b</sup> spurns the gift, as an injury and a curse, reviling the gods in language of rancorous coarseness and impious scorn for its bestowment. Among Christian writers, engaged in the defence of their religion, a depreciating style, in referring to this power, may be sometimes observed. One eminent instance may be quoted: "Reason," says Soame Jenyns, "in her natural state, is incapable of making any progress in knowledge. Even when furnished with materials by super-

\* Note E.

<sup>b</sup> De Natura Deorum, lib. iii. It has been the fate of Epicurus always to be misrepresented. In this very Colloquy, Velleius asserts that this philosopher argued that there must be gods, from the impression which nature herself makes upon the minds of all men.

natural aid, if left to the guidance of her own wild imaginations, she falls into more numerous and more gross errors than her own native ignorance could ever have suggested. . . . She has persuaded some, that there is no God ; others, that there can be no future state ; she has taught some, that there is no difference between vice and virtue ; and to murder a man and to relieve his necessities are actions equally meritorious ; she has convinced many, that they have no free-will in opposition to their own experience ; some, that there can be no such thing as soul or spirit, contrary to their own perceptions ; and others, no such thing as matter or body, in contradiction to their senses. By analysing all things, she can show that there is nothing in any thing ; by perpetual sifting she can reduce all existence to the invisible dust of scepticism ; and by recurring to first principles, prove, to the satisfaction of her followers, that there are no principles at all.\* The ravings of the ancient Academic we need not confute,—the less so, because he seems constantly to confound reason with that intellectual ingenuity and force which are abused to a refined invention, and a colossal magnitude, of crime. But the opinions of the Christian philosopher, of our country, and almost of our age, demand a closer and a more lengthened examination. He affirms that “reason, in her natural state, is incapable of making any progress in knowledge.” By “natural” he evidently intends, unassisted. This statement is exceed-

\* “Internal Evidence of the Christian Religion.”

ingly crude. Who supposes that reason is held by the creature independently of his Maker, or that it was ever placed apart from instruction? But it could always act in a way of freedom, and it always tended towards improvement. It taught man, no more the embowered heir of Eden, to "build the city:" when he attempted to rear a tower that should reach to heaven, it, not having inspired such presumption, instructed him to "burn brick thoroughly for stone," and to dig from the surrounding plains "slime for mortar:" it raised up "the fathers of such as dwelt in tents and have cattle," "of all such as handle the harp and the organ," "of every artificer in brass and iron." We love to acknowledge and honour God in even the humblest operations of husbandry and handicraft: God "doth instruct the plowman to discretion." He "hath created the smith that bloweth the coals in the fire." But it is by reason that he thus produces these effects. In this manner man has been prompted to achieve those creations of art, whose few specimens, but numerous fragments, enrapture taste and surpass imagination, even in our far-distant times. What, save reason, conducts analysis in the exact sciences to its present incomparable accuracy? throws open and maps the highest heavens? looses the most intricate combinations of elementary substance? marshals the experiment? gathers the history? fires the epos? This writer proceeds to say,—for his book contains not a few paradoxes,—"that reason, even when furnished with materials by supernatural aid, if left to the guidance of her own wild imaginations, falls into



more numerous and more gross errors than her own native ignorance could ever have suggested." What those "materials" are, he does not show. Perhaps the advantages of civilization may be intended. If so, we consider that this is the "natural state" of man, and consequently of reason. Barbarism is his lapse and its deterioration. But where has social, civilized, man been found destitute of a moral code, or of a conscience? Reason never did persuade that there was no God; that there was no future state; that there was no difference between virtue and vice. In the proportion in which it was consulted and obeyed, it built up the opposite conclusions. Where it has been allowed its simple exercise and native authority, it has condemned cruelty and fostered benevolence; it has taught the free and accountable agency of the will; it has proclaimed the independence of the spirit on the bodily frame. It might scarcely be silenced: it could not be extinguished. The sophist has labored hard, has wrought his utmost, to prevaricate with it: he has often and widely suborned it to error and crime. Yet there was always resistance ere it could be overborne. There was tampering and menace to secure its prostitution. A false religion engenders an evil conscience. Men may be so perverted in their judgement that they shall believe that by bloodshedding they do God service. The murder of their fellows may be perpetrated by them as a consecrated rite. There was, however, a first sentiment of repugnance and horror to be conquered. The shock was felt: the mind required to be seared that it might

look upon the deed. The mother, beneath the vow of a fell superstition, has cast her child to the monster of the deep: but she was taught that the pang of such unnatural devotement constituted the merit of the sacrifice. Among the most savage nations there is the common rule of morals: theft, adultery, homicide, are offences declared and punished. Private resentment may take the place of law, but it is in execution of supposed justice. There "the thief is ashamed." "The eye of the adulterer waiteth for the twilight." "In the secret places is the murderer of the innocent." There is confusion of face: and there is remorse. The high qualities of virtue are "the things of good report," in every period and country, however rude: they win esteem: they demand protection: the "virtue" and the "praise" go together. Violence and depredation may be thought right by many peoples upon their enemies; but then hostilities have exasperated their revenge, are supposed to place them in an exceptional course, and teach them to suspend all the duties which they confessedly owe to each other and their allies. The particular infraction of these duties and its justification, imply that these duties are ordinarily in force. And were this not fact as to particular peoples,—to escape the argument, it must be proved that they have not sunk into mental dotage, under the influence of wildness, fanaticism, and vice. Did they once know the judgment of God? Did their conscience ever interpret aright? Have they lost the discrimination by wilfulness and sin? Moreover it must be proved, that there is not

buried now beneath all this degeneracy, that natural direction and power of thought which we call conscience, that religious peculiarity of man. Still further must it be proved that this capacity could not be evoked by any appeal, and that it would not ratify the distinctions of right and wrong, when clearly, fully, and earnestly, laid before it. To us it seems most certain, that no where is to be shown a people, however fallen, so utterly debased: that in none, even the most abject, is this power utterly lost.\*

These representations are impugned on historical authority. The Lacedæmonian Institute is cited against them. The vices of lying and thieving are said to have been inculcated by it as good and useful. But the whole system (though much that is commonly believed of it rests upon tradition and myth, and not on veritable testimony) supported itself in a thorough dethronement of nature. It formally interdicted all the laws and sympathies of humanity. It annulled marriage; it took possession of all offspring; it required, as the test of endurance, the self-infliction of the severest cruelties. It was a martial school; it

\* "Wherefore our decision is this; that those precepts which learned men have committed to writing, transcribing them from the common reason and feelings of human nature, are to be accounted as not less divine than those contained in the tables given to Moses; and that it could not have been the intention of our Maker to supersede, by a law graven on stone, that which is written with his own finger on the table of the heart."—Melancthon.

The only remark on this fine sentence of the Reformer which we offer is, that "learned" men are not needed for such "transcription:" mankind had done it already.

was the contingent force of a great general community; and it sought to be considered a proud experiment how far all that was common to other nations might be expelled. Much that has been quoted as a sanction to wrong was rather an encouragement to its concealment or to escape from its consequences. This was done on the supposition that wrong unfelt was unreal. It also connected itself with military tactics. But the entire tale of Sparta, allowing all its literal truth, is not an episode in the history of our species, but an exception to it. To legalise unrighteousness they had to dis sever man from antiquity, from internationality, from kindred, from philosophy, from instinct, from every strong-hold of our being. We wonder at no monstrous growth of license out of such circumstances. As reasonably might we expect the limb of beauty and strength, which from the birth had been cramped with ligature and chain, as hope to find the workings of nature in a scene contrived to withstand it. The objection becomes our triumphant argument that immorality is abhorrent to the standard of natural reason, until that be intimidated by power and debauched by crime.

Nor is it denied that individual and communal man may so corrupt their way and pervert their judgment, that they shall justify wrong-doing, and feel a very complacency in it. But after what indurating processes has the hardihood been reached? Do their sophisms quite convince them? Is all within at ease? Know they no satedness and disgust? Nor is it denied that these may also, "not only do such things,

but have pleasure in them who do them." "The pleasures of sin" may be excited by these manifestations in others. Besides, a wider example and countenance are lent to evil, the shame of a minority which all virtue condemns is better encountered, a hope is cherished that punishment becomes more difficult in proportion to the number of the delinquents, even the chance of detection is calculated amidst the increased instances of guilt. Still reason never justified this complacent love of sin. It knew nothing of this prudence, and nothing of this taste. It is the fatuity of the vile. A proper intelligence is imbruted in them. "But these speak evil of those things which they know not: but what they know instinctively, as unreasoning beasts, in those things they corrupt themselves."

It has been contended that the consciousness of responsibility in man depends upon a fear of future punishment. But these may be parts of the same truth. It is for us to require the time and the manner in which that fear was first introduced. We are wholly ignorant of such introduction: we are entirely distrustful that it can be successfully shown. If it were ever taught to man, it must possess some sympathy with our nature, to have obtained universal belief. Let us suppose that statesmen published the doctrine for the end of social subordination, to reduce men to civil subjection. Is it, then, wanted for this lower purpose? Surely it is of the Creator, when his creatures need its influence for their own social well-being. If we say that the rulers of men invented it,

it can be proved distinctly to the contrary, that the most powerful of them have been troubled with its wide-spread impression, have found resistance in it to their schemes, and have confessed that it was too strong for all their efforts to erase it! None can deny that wherever reason has been most cultivated—where its power was vindicated and its majesty revered—where its suggestion was the philosophy, and its study was the art,—there the question of morals has been most admiringly exalted and most rigorously explored. Intellectual and ethical inquiries are akin to each other, and have always proceeded hand in hand. Involuntarily we think of the Lycæum, the Stoa, and the Grove. Visions gather thence of exquisite loveliness and beauty. They play around us still in unfading brightness. Nor are they unsubstantial. The disorder<sup>a</sup> of the mind was reduced by theory to its proper adjustment.<sup>b</sup> The scheme of a government was devised, and a polity was imagined, recommended with all that is necessary to code and executive.<sup>c</sup> Invention went still further, and human virtue, in its diversified bearing, was likened to the pyramid,<sup>d</sup> while, in its even stability, it was compared to the cube.<sup>e</sup>

Nor can we forget the great ideas of justice which these nations maintained. Nemesis and Themis were not only their abstractions and deities: they were embodied in their systems of jurisprudence. Law secured property and sanctified life. Law guarded

<sup>a</sup> 'Αραμία.

<sup>d</sup> Plato. Timæus.

<sup>b</sup> Εὐραμία.

<sup>e</sup> Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.

<sup>c</sup> Πολίτευμα.

every relation and ordered every act. Law was the theme of philosophy and the burden of song. Their language gave us the word, but not the meaning, of tyrant; and their kings were the shepherds of men.

Indeed the revealed code, (and we may be allowed this anticipation,) answers not only to the statutes of universal jurisprudence, but to the general opinion, or, in Plutarch's<sup>a</sup> phrase, the common sentiments, of mankind. We might take the Decalogue, and trace its transcription upon the soul of man. That which is the more speculative and dogmatic corresponds with invariable conviction. That there is a superior power is allowed by all. Its unity of nature is not maintained, nor its concentration of supremacy; but, from the remains of every polytheistic system, we may infer that these truths were originally held, and that they now are but forsaken and forgotten. Time was, when the immorality of idolatry was esteemed "an iniquity to be punished by the judges." It must degrade and weaken the intellect, for its every plea can be only unreasonable—it must loosen the foundations of virtue, not merely by distracting devotion and dividing allegiance, but by the necessity under which it lies to invent something else than infinite excellence and truth. It must find a creature to worship. It must body forth the inferior: it will image the sinful. The reviler of the Divinity has been always regarded with horror, be the object representing it true or false: moral obligation was sure to decline with

<sup>a</sup> Κοινῶν ἔννοιων.

religious levity and irreverence.—Sacred ceremonials have been celebrated by every people, and though the kinds and periods of their cult have greatly disagreed, the principle is scarcely capable of a modification.—The reciprocal bonds of parent and child are not more widely extended, than is the idea of their importance, and of the duties involved in them. The filial relation as much supposes respect and obedience as helplessness and dependence.—None would vindicate the right of destroying human life but upon some exempt case, reprisal or self-defence.—The violation of the marriage chastity revolts the very instinct, “for jealousy is the rage of a man.”—Property, the defence of which forms the first basis of the social community, guards itself, of absolute consequence, against every trespass upon it, and its laws every where condemn all rapine.—Veracity, especially in juridical proceedings, has ever been considered most binding, and the perjurer has been pursued with universal execration.—It must follow that what is sinful in act, cannot be right in thought, and that coveting anything which is our neighbour's, is the first step towards injuring him.—We do not intend by this induction, that men have kept this law. They have been transgressors of it from the womb. But to be guilty in transgression, they must know and be able to understand that which they transgress. There is a rule before them which they understand, or, which is the same thing for our argument, might understand. They possess the capacity of appreciating its evidence and its rectitude. Their mind must be on its side.



To reason otherwise, would exonerate millions, who have every facility of moral knowledge, from all responsibility. They have not thought nor meditated. Their understanding is vacant, and their ideas are unformed. "The light which is in them is darkness." They even publish another standard of opinion and taste. But are they absolved from obligation to the law which they thus slight and supersede? So long as they are capable of its moral perception, so long they are accountable. If at any time "the commandment came" to them, occupying their attention, closing with their conscience, they must confess its righteousness, they must feel their condemnation; "sin" would "revive" in penitential awakening, they would "die" as to self-sustained claim and hope!

It is most worthy to be noted that the moral impressions of mankind are so greatly uniform. They may, in some cases, be blunted, distorted, perhaps effaced,—but these cases are comparatively few. In the incalculable majority of instances, among the polished and the rude, the commonwealth and the horde, crimes have been regarded with the same aversion, and virtues have been lifted to the same celebrity. The rule of moral arbitrations has been substantively one. The objection, then, to our view of natural conscience and of the essential difference in the quality of actions, arising from an imputed contrariety in the suffrage of the former and in the estimate of the latter, may be turned against itself. Can the exceptions destroy the rule? What is it that reveals and constitutes the exceptions? Where

are the nations which the objector dares to summon for witnesses ? What are the ages, brilliant or dark, which he shall range upon his side ? If he boasted because he found, or thought he found, that the moral umpire varied in some few points and amidst some few parties, hoping thus to break it down altogether, how does he account for its very nearly universal acknowledgment ? If this objection have any force, how much more is contained in the great aggregate testimony, this general concert of sentiment and discrimination ! We need not be surprised at this. Human nature is the same. Mankind, in Jew and Gentile, are compared by Scripture to the olive tree. The Jew is the cultivated olive, the Gentile is the wild. The flavor and richness of the fruit are to that degree of distinction unequal. But whether more expanded or dwarfed, more refined or coarse, the fruit is generally one. Revealed and natural excellence thus far must differ ; in nature, in kind, there is inalienable agreement.

We must repeat it, that it is to conflict with all fact and all evidence to represent the moral standard among our species as variable and fluctuating. We have appealed to the schools of philosophy. We have not to learn their jealousies and disputes. They quarrelled with each other in a rancor of intolerance. They placed the good of man and the reason of morality in most incongruous things. But they never differed concerning the conduct which was right. They perfectly coincided in its form and style. They firmly insisted on its immutable obligation. Epicurus

and Zeno knew no divergence here. The great elements and waymarks of duty were unanimously defined. Nor do we allow that evidence to be inferior which may be discovered in the common laws of communities, in popular verdicts, in national archives, in the revolutions which cast down oppression and tyranny, in mind untrammelling itself from sophistry and superstition, in opinion bursting open its way, in the resentment of grievance, in the demand of right. We hail the expressions of the common soul of man in the burning apostrophes of the orator, and in the soft warblings of the poet. When Demosthenes sought the crown of professional pre-eminence, he could little stir the people, for he could not work on any of the great leanings of their nature. But when he defied the invader and denounced the tyrant, he could cite the shades of their ancestors and invoke the altars of their gods, because, now his cause took part with all their sacred principles and all their natural sympathies. This lent him his masterdom over their spirits. They might not know it, but he only commanded their own sentiments to vibrate, and in yielding to his impression they only obeyed themselves. If the sterling understanding which loves truth, and hates every evasive art, had not been found predominant among the Athenians, the satire of Aristophanes had fallen harmless on the sophists. It was the general horror of all infringements upon the order of nature which created the awful spell of *Æschylus* in that Trilogy which still shakes the soul; and clothed *Sophocles* with his

fearful power in the *Œdipæan* tragedies: and had not domestic love been honored, Euripides had in vain essayed his pathos in the sorrows of the bereaved Admetus, and in giving back *Alcestis* to her home. Terence roused up in the Romans many a noble emotion,—like the lode-vein long hidden in some neglected mine,—new only in form, but ancient as the nature which gave them its response.

Nor let it be said that the morality of the classical nations was of the romantic complexion: that it was not practical. It constantly reposed upon the utility of virtue. It vehemently urged the noxiousness of vice. It not only, as was seemly and just, expatiated among contemplations of the fair and beautiful and lovely: it unfolded the benefit of good actions and the mischievous consequences of those which are evil.\* The great pandects of an everlasting right and wrong were studied, universal conscience accorded to them, history was written to illustrate them, philosophy was cultivated to defend them, drama and poem were their representation and praise, nor did wit and profanity dare to trifle with their august decisions.

But the proof from fact is superabundant, it is almost gratuitous, it is scarcely due. For the question is of faculty to discern what exists of right: not to originate the idea of right, but to conceive it. There is no disproof of this faculty, whatever notion may be entertained concerning the source of that idea.

\* “Γινώσκει τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ μοχθηροὺς.”—Plato.

Be it an early revelation, be it an unbroken tradition,—not, as we regard it, an inference from the original bias of the mind, nor a construction upon an external administration of things,—it is of no account to the argument. The faculty of estimating the idea is connatural and universal. The idea, itself, is, from the beginning, a law as old as man. Both faculty and idea form the ground of our accountability. Both are indispensable to establish against us the charge of guilt. Both must be presumed by every overture of restorative mercy. We bring the question to its humblest merits. We have confined it to what is. But for ourselves we are dissatisfied with its position. We should maintain that this could be the only law: that it was not institutional but necessary: that it lies in perfect and eternal reason: that no proper intelligence could exist without perceiving and justifying it: that, though it affects many relations which of course are dependent and conditional, its principles are independent and unconditional: that its claims are imperial and its bonds everduring.

If, however, certain speculations which some have advanced concerning man be correct and well-founded, it would be vain to assert, it would be impossible to prove, that he was free, that he was responsible, that he was amenable to law. For though eternal rectitude fills the universe, man must be endued with a capacity for it to be its proper subject.

There is a theory of bodily conformation, of physical organology, which seems to release our conduct from

approval or blame. Dispositions are supposed by it to be expressed according to outward, material, measures and proportions,—that these are developed by specific quantities of that which is assumed to be the seat and magazine of the mind, if not the mind itself,—and that, though the primitive bent may be counteracted by setting prepossession against prepossession, this must be rather the task of others than of the immediate individual,—and that the original bent must always remain. In extenuation of the inconsistency of this theory with liberty and accountability, it is pleaded that since all admit particular originalities of disposition, the difficulty is one, whether they subsist with or without material indications. But the difference is perfect between them who maintain that all such original dispositions, if evils, are things of fault, of disobedience, of depraved self-will, and them who see no more than an ill-digested mass of qualities and propensions among which the creature is only left, if he have any volition at all, to choose. Beyond them he cannot pass. A peace and composition must be arranged by him of all these contraries as his only ground and germ of virtue. We are not to be deceived by quibbles and disclaimers. Specious ingenuities are the sure sign of untruth: flattering negotiations the certain preliminaries of insincerity. The purport of these views cannot be mistaken. All, save those who will hoodwink themselves, must see to what they point and lead. But their apologists are sleeplessly wary. Their common artifice is, that their system knows no quarrel with

revelation. Believers are thrown off their guard. There never existed a deeper-plotted conspiracy against revealed truth. It is not honestly formal and declared. It marches to no assault and defiance. Its device is, to destroy every relation in which man can stand to true religion, to relegate him from its province and category, to mock all its claims upon him, to degrade him into soulless indecision, to abandon him a sport to the whirl of chance. It would blot out all religion from his nature. Its last design is to make it impossible that he should be religious. The real, the esoteric, doctrine of this school is, a gross limitation imposed upon the moral capacity and improveableness of our nature. It raises a resistless fence beyond which the human agent cannot pass. It is invincible restriction. It means nothing more nor less. We cannot make light of it as the fashion and plaything of the day. But in detestation of its lying words and pernicious consequence, we suffer ourselves to be betrayed into no extreme. We disparage not the wonderful fabric of the human body. We deprecate all descriptions of it as the coil and dungeon of the mind. The temple is worthy of its genius. It is entirely contrived and consecrated for its service. Nor can we be driven, by fear of implication in inconsistency, from those conclusions which common consent draws as to the connexion between physiognomical development and mental inbeing. We can still read the eye as the mirror, and the brow as the throne, of the intellect!

Another opposition is raised to the accountability

of man from the circumstances in which he is placed. Their power is alleged to be so assimilating and formative, that his character must be shaped by them. He is supposed to be always within a sphere of attraction, within the sweep of a vortex, out of which he cannot escape. A process is affirmed to be always going on from without, changing to itself all the determinations of the mind. But this theory passes by unexplained the cause that circumstances exist. They do not exist independently of us. For by them are not intended the scenes and operations of material nature, but our social opinions and practices, in custom, in institution, in amusement, in expectation, in requirement, in law. They are made and moulded by us. The fashion of the world is its own tyrannous demand. Circumstances may be stamped with an evil character, and charged with an injurious influence, but they are shaped on our forge. And withal, circumstances are generally more on the part of virtue than individual taste would choose. They are often, in many of their forms and distributions, salutary and counteracting. They interpose difficulty and scandal between the tempted and the temptation. They are safeguards of morality, and have grown out of social reflection and experience. They are built upon the general conviction that "righteousness exalteth a nation." They offer resistance to appetite, and entrenchment against exaction. They are checks, producing shame and repressing selfishness. They are nearly always favourable to the general decency and order. Every man addicted to vice feels in them a restraint.



Therefore multitudinous life is so incomparably more regulated than insulated life. No community can be great and good without the force of opinion, and that opinion must be on the side of what is great and good. It is written of the wicked: "They will not frame their doings to turn unto their God." Their guilt is not in conforming to others, and in yielding to external arrangements: it is their own circumstances, their own "doings,"—lying altogether in their power,—which they will not "frame." "Their heart gathereth iniquity." Circumstances merely reflect ourselves.—We are aware that a more fearful aspect of circumstances has been exhibited on every stage of the Pagan world. There is often a concentration of the worst vices of our nature. But what is this save the ascendancy of their depraved taste and temper? It is the "will of the Gentiles." Such a state is pronounced by revealed truth to be the result of unholy inclination. "They did not like to retain God in their knowledge." The consequence was: "God gave them over to a reprobate mind." The stricter sense, the closer reading, of the original is: "That since they did not use their judgment<sup>a</sup> to retain God in their knowledge, he gave them up to a misjudging mind."<sup>b</sup> A moral cause blinded them. Only on this account can it ever be true of man, that "God's judgments are far above out of his sight." Amidst the abominations of "the worst of the heathen,"—whatever the general example might indicate, however

<sup>a</sup> Ἐδοκίμασαν.

<sup>b</sup> Ἀδόκιμον νοῦν.

wide-flung the flood-gates of licentiousness, — the understanding and conscience never inculcated and honored them, no true tribunal within or without approved and justified,—virtue still could appeal to reason and right, fearless that she should be driven from their judgment seat.

Two remarks may here be introduced. The first, respects the authority and power of those superstitions by which individual reason seems all along to be seduced. We do not suppose that they are exactly what each idolater might dictate and prefer. They were the collective evil of ages. "The vain conversation was received by tradition from his fathers." "The Gentiles were carried away unto those dumb idols, even as they were led." They were captivated or overawed. Their reason did not agree: their wickedness sympathised and assented.—The second remark relates to the influence of wickedness in corrupting reason. We are not called to debate the doctrine of judicial blindness. At most, we regard it in the light of non-intervention, or abandonment. All that our present statement requires is this, that the course of evil is prone,—that the tendency of every error is to error, of every crime to crime. He who blinks truth, becomes the dupe of falsehood. He who rebels against conscience shall quickly find it "seared with a brand." If, therefore, the moral faculty of man can be shown, at any period or in any place, unsusceptible of right impressions and exercises, it is nothing more than the result of a certain, well-known, influence. We need not ask the explanation of a

higher agency. There is no contradiction of what conscience is in itself, nor refutation of the truth of its proper capabilities and prerogatives. We do not concede that it is ever thus dead to the process of moral reasoning, and to the conception of moral accountability. Let it, however, be conceded that it may thus be dead,—all that the concession includes is this, that he who is fatuous by the enervating influence of vicious habits, has wasted and disinherited his intellect of all that was true to it, and is now besotted in imbecility and lost in aberration.

Fatalism is the additional restriction which some have set upon human liberty, and, consequently, upon human accountableness. It is not denied that a perfect scheme of providence is indispensable to the character and absolutism of the first Great Cause of all. It is not denied that the right must dwell in him of subordinating all acts and dispositions to his purpose and glory. It is not denied that fixed results of Divine government are, in every sense and view, necessary. It is not denied that every agent, with the same motive and in the same circumstances, will be seen pursuing the same conduct. Yet while these propositions are wholly true, they do not comprise the whole of the truth. That which asserts that, things being equal, men would always behave alike, may be most strictly true, or, which is nearly the same, utterly undeniable,—still is its foundation a pure hypothesis. We do not discredit it on that account, for we can conceive of hypothesis as the ground of reasoning and as the triumph of demonstration. But

it is only just to repeat what has been objected to it: to acknowledge that some of the objections cannot be very consistently disallowed. There has always been some point of diversity between them whose resemblance has been closest in character and conduct. Any stringent pressure is contrary to whatever we know, and whatever we feel: we *know*, that any doing of ours might have been reversed,—we *feel*, by that law of consciousness which can alone certify our existence and our reason, that we retain the fullest power of choice. Passion does not hurry us away, does not overpower us: it is the momentary, mistaken, judgement and preference of that which we deem happiness or good,—though, when gratified, reflection will decide that it is evil. No subtlety, no abstraction, of argument can convince us that we are otherwise than free. We would not speak of philosophical necessity and of fatalism without a just contradistinction. The one makes every account of a moral difference in conduct: the other does not. But the writing of the necessarian has not seldom been ambiguous: not allowing an independence of motive which might sway circumstance, but converting circumstance itself into motive.\*

III. We now proceed to inquire into the evidence which reason may obtain and apprehend, touching the <sup>a</sup>duration of human being. There are natural proofs, strong and convincing, that this is not the only life of man: these we must carefully select from

\* Note F.

those which are presumptive, and from those which overreach their suggested use. It is, also, very equitable to lay the burden of disproof upon them who would withstand the general consent of the species.

We admit no weight in any argument for immortality drawn from material organisation. Animals possess, in their upward scale, all the germs which are perfected in ourselves. They approach us in symmetry, and often exceed us in the quickness of the senses. To ask, Can such a structure perish? is to doubt, if with lessened confidence, whether other sentient creatures can perish also? If there be any truth to which this doubt can refer, it is the resurrection of the body. But this truth we wholly rest upon Divine revelation. What uninspired mind ever indulged the thought? The inference, could it be supposed, would lead us to expect the resurrection of mammoth and of creeping thing buried in the wreck of a former world, of the exuviae of uncomputed periods, of the monster and the insect whose congeners are unknown to the living system, strewn in frightful embalmment among our cliffs and rocks. Still more strongly would it apply to that of all known creatures now subjected to us.

Not less firmly do we reject any imaginary evidence attached to the immateriality of the soul. We may believe that human intellect is an independent <sup>\*</sup>super-addition to the body; that whatever resembles such intellect in animals is only a high degree of functional life. But we do not think that reason could deduce any such consequence from this

premiss. Every analogy would show that there is constant destruction of a power which thinks and wills. If it be said, May we conceive that a spirit, active until the very moment of death, can in that moment cease to be? it is only to be rejoined, with some abatement of the improbability, May we conceive that the intelligent principle of the brute can thus suddenly determine? To the present position of the argument it only belongs to decide upon immaterialised properties, and upon their possible, or likely, extinction.

Nor do we feel the force of any statement which asserts the independence of the human soul on the animal functions. These cannot originate thought, or any intellectual agency; but then no proof, at this stage of the inquiry, can be given, that thought, or any intellectual agency, may proceed in separation from them. This would be to tread precarious ground. Our only known development of mind is by the means of that organism which it rules. The independence of the mind might, indeed, be better supposed than that of its frame, which we know comes to nought. But no reasoning of this kind could be sustained. For all we can adduce to the contrary, these are mutually subservient. Besides, we are at an equal loss to account for the operations of intelligence in the inferior tribes: how does their structural œconomy assist it? Who can trace the reciprocal connexion?

We deny not ingenuity to some methods of reasoning, but they look to us as retrospective views.

Already, it is pleaded, the spirit survives the flesh. In a given interval the body is changed and reproduced. Yet the old man tells the tale of youth: he appropriates a distant past. But the irresistible conviction of every one is that, through all these transformations, it is his own body, his one body, liable to any outward evil which the most distant crime of the mind may have incurred. Nor has it,—unintelligible as may be the theory,—though it may be an untenable conceit,—been finally and demonstratively disproved, that there is some ultimate particle, some rallying nucleus, the secret subject and pivot of all the chymical and mechanical influences which affect our frames. So likewise, it has been affirmed that annihilation is no law of the ascertained universe. Not an atom is lost. To the philosophy of this opinion, perhaps discovery, we readily accede. But then this fact as much wars with identity as it favors immortality. The mutations which convert our earth into one vast laboratory are all conversions. Nothing returns to what it was. Creation is not diminished by a corpuscle from the beginning. But its elements have passed into different forms. Who can recall them? The forest is consumed. It is exhaled. The ashes which are left are its smallest portion, a residuum which has not escaped in volatile flame and air. Who can collect the dissipated essences? Our body moulders in the dust. It returns to the ground. Worms devour it. It does not reintegrate itself. Like other physical decompositions, it passes on from change to change, farther and farther from what it

was. If the soul be separated from it by some similar law, it has passed away, intermixed, perchance, for so was it fabled, with some infinite mind. These are not the results we seek.

Reasonings, like these, have been pursued in our age: we have little proof that they are ancient. Former generations did not find in them their hope of immortality. They are not sufficiently natural and elementary. Not organisation the most perfect, not immaterialism the most conscious, not any established inferiority of the body to the soul, not any presumed independence of the soul on the body, not any evidence, could it be obtained, that the mind is identical amidst corporeal change, not any resemblance of that change to a metempsychosis of mind, can satisfy us that these are sound rudiments of judgment, or that they were ever prevalently allowed. True, original reason demands something clearer, stronger, always as it is found to be the expectant and advocate of immortality.\*

And there are firm grounds on which to settle this belief. Some of these may be traced in our mental constitution, others in our relations. We must esteem these grounds sufficient; for otherwise, though all are treated as immortal, millions could never know themselves. They are sufficient; because truths, which are readily believed and practically followed by all, rest not on a moiety of their convincing force. But this admission by no means involves, in so serious

\* Note G.



a problem, the undesirableness of other and still more explicit evidence.

It is no arbitrary assumption that, of all earthly creatures, we alone can entertain the idea of a future existence. We know not that the thought of a morrow ever flits across the imagination of a beast, save as it lays up stores for an emergence, which it cannot define, because it has never proved it. To us the thought is easy and inevitable. Now it may be taken as certain, that whatever conception is simple to us, it is fitting for us to cherish,—that we were formed to indulge it,—since no nature can rise above its strict limit. We, therefore, sought no better evidence that man was responsible than the fact of his capacity to revolve the question of responsibility. We argue now, with equal confidence, that as man can meditate his immortality, he cannot be less than immortal. But man feels—except when the fear of consequences drives back the desire—a powerful bias and aspiration towards such perpetuation of being. He shudders at the prospect of nonentity. Death is dreadful because it cuts him off from the light and land of the living, but is relieved if it open the gate of another life, or rather of a continuous one. This is the yearning of the soul. And who does not observe the provision which is made to meet every deep-implanted need and longing of the vast animations around us? Who does not admire and attest the beautiful description of the Universal Parent, that “he openeth his hand and satisfieth the desire of every living thing?” Surely, then, this lofty tending and greed, so charac-

teristic of man, so peculiar to him, so true to his proper reason, so interwoven with his superior condition, is not the only one which shall find no encouragement and scope, is not the only one reserved to be shamed and mocked!

Responsibility furnishes no barren proof. Man knows that there is a Power with which he "has to do." He stands in inseparable contact to it. He is now in favor or displeasure. But the reckoning is not made. The common sentiment is that, beyond death, the Power may continue unfavourable still. There may be arrear of retribution. Wrath may be unappeased. Hence posthumous sacrifices and prayers. All this points to a future award, and necessarily to the existence of him who is the subject of it. It is obvious that, when the present life is regarded as the term of man, it does not admit a perfect measure of justice. The ancients, who inveighed against a future state, invariably made light of all moral distinctions. Responsibility and immortality are truths of accord, and weigh each other!

A most obvious reason demands the survivorship of the soul, if moral responsibility attaches to man. For not only is this life too contracted a sphere for rewards and punishments,—some last act of life, at least, falling under neither,—but its uncertainty defeats them. Were it only broken short by the Creator in his immediate act, we might suppose that the administration of both was complete. But the hand of violence may interrupt the present reward of the virtuous. The wicked, by breaking in upon the

of his own life, may escape his only punisher. Later would, thus, be set at defiance. Moral government would be helpless towards its self-defence. In such a state of things it could not be properly said to exist. Must there not be a hereafter, in which the interrupted reward and the baffled punishment shall be renewed?

We speak of future existence and of immortality as very proximate, if not indissoluble, truths. There is a plain distinction. The existence which is future need not be immortal. Yet in our argument they possess a very equal character. Few allow the one without the other. There seems no fitness in the resumption of a life after death only to await another death. Whenever the cessation of being might happen, that cessation would be alike startling and abhorrent. The remotest futurity would not mitigate the shock. Why should life, thus renovated and prolonged, cease at all? In any period of eternity, the destruction would be only more improbable, more unreasonable, and more violent!

While the cast of our moral ideas and cravings doubtlessly raises the doctrine of our immortality to presumptive certainty,—though, these being founded in our nature, some stronger form of statement might be used,—there are circumstances which give it an impression of necessity. Inferring from the recognition of a primitive and universal law, that there is not only a lawgiver, but a government over which he presides, we cannot but notice many instances in which the course of retribution fails in uniformity. Wickedness

principles. The sentence against an evil work is not executed speedily. "There is a vanity which is done upon the earth; that there be just men, unto whom it happeneth according to the work of the wicked; again, there be wicked men, to whom it happeneth according to the work of the righteous." The system of Divine administration must be perfectly equitable: but then to affirm this, requires us equally to affirm that it is imperfectly developed. It needs expansion and maturity: not less counterbalance and reparation. If it terminate here, it is left incomplete. It is broken short. The moral question is unsettled, which it involves. There is no settlement, nor adjustment, nor conclusion. The issue is cut off. In the middle of the drama the curtain falls. Injustice has prevailed. Wrong has triumphed. No inferential argument can be more stringent than that which we now enforce. The lawgiver, the law, and the government, must be worthy of each other. To none of them may failure be imputed. They demand but an adequate theatre. That is not found on earth. There must be, therefore, an after life, in which they shall enforce their entire claims and receive their righteous satisfactions. Nor can it be forgotten, that events occur which it is impossible to consider as justly and benevolently complete to them who are the actors in them. These events lift tyranny to power: they trample down the patriot and the freeman. They may be ultimately advantageous. But it is by the indirectness of over-ruled evil. If they call forth the resistance of the champions of liberty, the good is bought—should it

even be secured—at a fearful price. A long interval, a weary pause, holds back the purchase from generations. These are enigmas. Their solution is not now. “The end is not yet.” It does not satisfy the case, to suppose that the intricate plot of the tragedy shall be explicated and evolved. That is not indemnity to the individual; that does not bring conviction to the countless witnesses who perished in ignorance and stupified suspense. Let a posterior existence be conceded, let this life be supposed the opening scene and primary act, and then may we understand how all that is anomalous shall be reconciled, and all that is perplexed may be arranged! As an imperfect retribution and an unequal providence intimate the future life, and demand it for their vindication, so have they, conjointly with our natural sentiments, wrought in mankind the firm general impression, that they shall exist beyond the grave. The argument is not sufficiently advanced and ripe to admit analogical reasoning. This, otherwise, might be adduced, not to confirm this impression by direct proof—which is not its province—but showing that no counter-impression can be presumptively entertained. We turn to facts. We cite not the Jewish nation, for the question of supernatural discovery is involved in their history. We may, however, think that such a reference to them would not be argumentatively unjust and partial, because, in order to manifest the præter-human administration of that theocracy, its sanctions wholly concern the present life. And they would be as competent witnesses, as other peoples, to

the natural capacity for such an idea. Nevertheless, take peoples the most uncultivated and unlettered, the rovers of the desert and of the fell, where fallen nature is the most sunken, and olden civilisation most obliterated. They possess their spirit-tale. They chant the wild hope of future feast with their sires, and perhaps of future triumph over their foes. The clouds compose, to their eyes, the ghostly array, and the mountains girdle the shadowy home. Associate with peoples the most philosophical and refined. Sit at the banquet of their dialecticians, follow to the death-scene of their sages, gaze upon the hieroglyphs of their temples, dig into the riches of their languages, and all will reveal the pervading power of this belief. Doubtless it was a darkling view they took. There was no spiritual congeniality between their general principles and this solemn anticipation. But it urged itself. And when it was brought into controversy, it was not among the multitude, but by the few, who entangled and confused it with their strifes about words and contentions against facts. With what toilsome labor do they oppose the opinions of nations, and the monuments of ages! How feeble do they stand before the consciousness of every man in a reasonable state! This heavy, fruitless, labor, always confined to a narrow range, is no mean proof that the expectation of immortality is proper to us, and cannot be dis severed from our nature but by the crafty logomachy which blinds, or the arrogant profaneness which desecrates, it.

There is a speculation, to which we may just

advert, concerning the immortality of man. It regards this as conditionally bestowed or withheld. Some of the ancient theories forerun it. The doctrine is, that man may, or may not be, immortal, according to certain moral terms. It is itself a reward, and its denial is a punishment. Now, in investigating the truth of immortality, we could not overlook this statement. Nothing can be more fallacious or self-inconsistent. Reward and punishment are contingents. The nature of him upon whom they pass remains the same. They must respect, they cannot change, it. Immortality cannot be mere reward, or its loss mere punishment, through the means and capacity for it, for that would constitute a difference of being. In a nature, created only perishable, there can be no physical power to become immortal. But, if created immortal, then immortality cannot be the reward of obedience, for it would exist without it: and its abscission cannot be punishment, but escape from it, seeing it was in the creature's original nature that the sin was committed, and the forfeiture was incurred. Besides, there are serious objections to any supposition that nature's physical constitutions can be reversed. They are seen by us, through all their types, to be insuppressible. However we torture them, they cannot be eradicated. For perishable nature to become immortal, or for immortal nature to become perishable, contradicts all we learn from the counterparts and analogues of the creation, and, therefore, equally opposes all we infer of the con-

sistency which belongs to Him "in whom we have our being."

And the immortal life which pagan reason contemplated was not vague and inactive—it was retributive. There virtue found its reward, and wickedness its punishment. When the Grecian and the Latin bards cause their heroes to descend by the Kimmerian portal, or by the Cumæan gate, into the Erebus of their mythology, they beheld the bowers and groves of them who were renowned for excellence, the blest : and, the instruments as well as the conditions of punishment, to which the reprobate were doomed. The patriarchs of philosophy descanted, in like manner, upon the happiness or misery of the future state. It may be said, that the common poetry of the age moulded its philosophy. Then whence was the poetry inspired? It is not of this mighty art to invent opinion and usage ; it can but cast back their image on mankind, in colors of its own. It calls into existence, or commands into combination, the forms and types of sentiment : it were not only to transgress its bound, but to lose its power, did it attempt any realms but those of imagination—that law of mind which must not desert, in all its parables and allegories, the substance of what is known and real—which can only reflect, though with diffused rays, what actually exists—which can only give its pomp to history and its intensity to truth ! Whatever be its flights, the poetry to which the column is due, is but the picture of a common conception, the sublimation of the



popular sentiment and belief. And, if poetry tinged the ancient philosophy, it did not give it legend or machinery. It might embellish it with beauty. But what is so beautiful as reason? It was reason which prevailed. Homer often must veil his fancy before some later sage. His tenderness and magnificence yield when we

“Unsphere

The spirit of Plato, to unfold

What worlds, or vast regions hold

The immortal mind, that hath forsook

Her mansion in this fleshly nook.”\*

The constitution of man, as an immortal being, depends altogether upon the will of God. It hath pleased him so to constitute man. It is his design and plan. He foresaw all that it comprehends. If we be asked: Is man necessarily immortal? we have already answered that he is not, but only physically. God has given him an immortal nature. Should it be asked: Cannot the power of God undo his work? we reply: That we know of no power of God to be inconsistent, to recall a purpose, to evade a design. We might, perhaps, have been spared some impertinences of sophistry. We are taunted by the query: How can God create an immortal being? The supposed dilemma is, that such a being must be independent. But he is only a creature, therefore dependent, and only exists in immortality, as he is immortally vivified and upheld. It is put forth, that

\* Milton: Il Penseroso.

the utmost which can be understood, is an intention to make him immortal. Assuredly, if by the epithet were meant that he has run out his immortality, there could be no such creature, since, in every age of eternity, he can be no more immortal than he is now. He never can be immortal. Immortality flies before him. But this is trifling. How can God make man? He sustains him in manhood. But the nature is specific. He sustains him as man. God made the man immortal. He gave him—as a part and condition of manhood—a capacity for immortality, or, an immortal nature. Immortality is as much a property and determination of his nature as reason, or any quality besides. God sustains him at every breath and pulse: he sustains him in immortality. It is as sound speech to say, that he created him immortal, as to affirm, that he created him accountable. Both were cases of development. Man was to be immortal. He was to be accountable. “He calleth those things which be not, as though they were.”

Wonderful is the fact of man's immortality. But there are laws and tendencies around us which require it. All matter changes through ever-shifting modifications. It does not perish. For the extinction of animal intelligence and life we are prepared, they being mere subserviencies to human welfare and authority, and also attaching to races which are incapable of progression, and which “have no understanding.” That intelligence and that life are never seen in independence of particular animal acts. They are involved things. They cannot be conceived in separation from

each other. The intelligence is exclusively directed to the life. The former is but a quality of the latter. Far other is the human soul ! It has its own essence. It can disregard and spurn the earthly, fleshly, life with which it is now associated. It holds an independent dominion. It looks afar. It soars on high. Its affinities are without. Its communings yearn beyond itself. It is drawn to a mysteriously distant centre. It longs after another form and order of being. It reads its own book of light. It rules its own world of ideas. If the soul does not survive, while nothing properly perishes around it, it stands the lone dread exception, it is the solitary prey of annihilation !

There is some aid afforded to the evidence of immortality by proofs which, as distinct and while apart, we cannot allow. They help the cumulative argument, which the highest truths need not disdain. The spiritual nature, the immaterialism, of mind is not a sufficient prop, but it is not without its strength in the clustered pillar. Though it cannot prove that the mind is immortal, the mind could not be immortal were it disproved. The two exactly, naturally, consist. We may say with perfect right that nothing agrees with the annihilation, that every thing agrees with the immortality, of the soul. Suppose it as a theory. You now search for evidence. You must support it. What you want presses upon you. All is in harmony with it. Nothing jars. It is the key-note, the pitch, of the universal song.

And the anticipatory impression which immortality gives to man is not in any violation of those rules by

which he is ordinarily governed. He is adapted to the present, and the present is adapted to him. It does not divert him. It becomes his greatest motive for whatever his hand now findeth to do. He best fills the present in the degree of his conviction that there is always something beyond it. The comment of nature is at hand. In the human body there are, at its successive stages, prospective contrivances for future functions. They are only at fixed times in a course of development. They always proceed to their maturity, and find their true result. Similar providence is there for the progress of the mind. And these are so many counterparts to the preparations of the soul for its future state. Its destined immortality contradicts no present law, but is favoured by the most striking analogy.

It must be remembered that we speak of reason making its way to this truth, and clinging to it, with no eulogy upon its innocence and holy impartiality. We know that depraved disposition is in full effect. We know that the whole intellectual and moral nature is corrupted by it. But this does not destroy the power of the understanding to establish the certainty, and to harbor the consciousness, of human immortality. Our apostacy of guilt and wickedness alters our relations to it: many may attempt to thrust away its impression: but it still remains the common faith.\* The exceptions to it are no more than to

\* "Conscience and the *present* constitution of things are not corresponding terms. The *one* is not the object of perception to the other. It is conscience and the *issue* of things which go together."—Davison on Prophecy.

other laws and proportions of humanity. There are those who are wanting in common emotion, who are lost to rightful principle, who cannot in habitual insincerity distinguish truth, whose judgment is covered with darkness, whose fancy is bewildered with levity. These may not respond. They "despise their own soul." They "count themselves,"—by a low depreciation, by an abject estimate, of their nature,—“unworthy of eternal life.” But this is an alienation. And if the idea of future existence, like that of accountableness, be ever indiscernible in man, both have faded from him by one process,—it is equally possible for him, at the same time, so to brutify himself by voluptuousness as no more to feel himself immortal, and so to debase himself by crime as no more to feel himself responsible. This is, however, true, wherever he is found, and in whatever condition,—in the last pollution, in the deepest ignorance, in the extremest abandonment,—he may be recalled to this consciousness, he naturally agrees to it, he unfolds a capacity which justifies and appropriates it, he allows in the newly-awakened sentiment that which, even mentally, he had always wanted to complete the integrity of his being! We speak not of Seneca and Antoninus, but of man, however low his degree and narrow his philosophy. The truth of this immortality is not speculative, but rests in consciousness and capacity,—consciousness, not that it is so, because we cannot be conscious of the future, but consciousness of a nature which requires it, together with a capacity to conceive it. No argument can

refute it, when it can be shown that man can, and does, entertain it. He cannot have escaped beyond himself. He does not prefer it. No prejudice cherishes it. No pride dictates it. It is forced upon him, and rises up necessarily within him. No revelation could overthrow the fact, for to dispute the fact would be to overthrow its own pretensions. It could not come from him who made us, who made our spirit in the image of his own. A revelation, denying the existence of God and the immortality of man, would be equally worthy of belief!

Such are the outline and the base of those great notices of our nature which we must receive, if we would reason on its condition, duties, prospects: which we must be capable of taking, or any such reasoning is neither availing nor obligatory.

## LECTURE II.

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"YE BELIEVE IN GOD, BELIEVE ALSO IN ME."

JOHN xiv. 1.

WHILE we have offered but little direct proof of the existence of an Almighty Cause and Governor, at no stage of the argument could we treat it as a question, in no step of the discussion could we stoop to labor for its defence. We assume not only his being and moral government, but also the truth of the Christian revelation. We, indeed, are argumentatively working out our way to the results of this revelation,—not our way to its authority, but to its fitness and application. If there is but one being, he must be God: if there be a second, he must be a creature of that God. We are not indifferent to the outshining of the Divine glory which we behold in the material creation,—the firmament, with its hosts of luminaries,—the world we inhabit, with its oceans, mountains, vegetations. But we obtain more exquisite and worthy evidence in the intellectual features and exercises of man. There is the image of him who created us. And when we can, upon this, superinduce the moral capacities of

man, we must infer that all which is cognate to both has its seat in the Divine mind,—and thus the demonstration that there is a God who is a Spirit, and that there is a God who is Lord over us, becomes perfect! And most impressive is the contrast between all that we discern of Divine and human ruling power. “The Lord is our Judge, the Lord is our Lawgiver, the Lord is our King.” Society could not subsist without magistracy and legal restraint. In surveying the operations of earthly government, we are struck with the complexity of its proceedings and the jealousy of its principles. On every side, there are its inquisitions and menaces. It clothes itself in pomp. It is full of stir and ferment. There is parade and obtrusion. It loves ceremonial and emblem. It holds court and crects tribunal. It constantly publishes itself. Its sword is always naked. Its balance is always raised. It “bringeth the wheel over the wicked.” It is palpable through all its workings and all its checks. It imposes itself with pageant and stâte. It cries aloud. Yet in all this apparatus, there is the effort of a conscious feebleness. It is display to make up the want of power. It rebounds to its own strokes. It bends under its own burdens. There is an unceasing confession of its impotence. There is perpetual sign of suspicion and self-distrust. Little can it punish. Little can it prevent. Its inefficiency is in a very close proportion to its external magnificence. But the dominion of the Most High moves in a far different course. “The law of the Lord is perfect.” It seeks and needs no



badge and observance. It disdains ministry and instrument. Its sword is "bathed in heaven." Its balance is that in which the hills are weighed. It is noiseless and unseen in its mechanism. It has access to mind. Its power is in conscience. By inscrutable influences it enforces itself. There can be no partiality, no indecision, no resistance. It cannot be turned aside,—warped by indulgence or intimidated by danger. Vain is every hope to elude and defeat it. It allows no difficulty. Silent as time, serene as star, it keeps its way. Obedience is attended by happiness, transgression by woe. So linked together are offence and suffering, that "the tormentors" are ever waiting and ever ready to exact the connexion. The blow may be long delayed which strikes down the oppressor, but his first act of injustice smote him. The punishment which appears slow, has already fallen. The dealing is summary. The punishment has begun. The wicked flee when no man pursueth. There are arrows which drink up the spirit. The transgressor may vaunt loudly, he may be the object of general envy, all may flatter him,—yet shall he be the drift of an inward tempest, the wreck of the soul's own sea. "All darkness is hid in his secret places." "In the fulness of his sufficiency, he is in straits." To cause the mind to punish itself, to work a retribution out of ourselves, to secure it by fixed nature, to inflict it by inflexible necessity, to convert the capacity of sin into the instrument of suffering, is the prerogative of Divine rule. It is unlike any other, though inferior jurisdictions may be helped by this its conduct. The

feelings which it awakens may subserve far lower administrations. In the prison-houses of earth there may be mental anguish: but man there trembles under the original liability. \* He agonises in his troubled thoughts as a subject of God. There is, indeed, the sense of social guilt, unworthiness, and shame. But unless he had first felt that he was the subject of God, little had his mind suffered for anything he had done as the subject of man. It is in this infinite ease, and repose, and omnipresence, of the "kingdom which ruleth over all," that we learn its unparalleled and inimitable excellence. It is uniformly, and it is universally, administrative and executing. "There is no darkness where the workers of iniquity may hide themselves." Its design is direct, and its effect sure. This is true majesty!

The irrespectiveness and universality of human law, which are its highest honor when they obtain, are the occasions of its frequent failure and injustice. It being a human enactment and administration, its very generalization betrays its imperfectness. It cannot comprehend every case of claim or grievance. Another form is needed. Men call it equity. Its province is to provide for that which law could not reach, and did not contemplate. It is the control, and curb, and custody, of law.

We are wont to speak of certain laws as subsisting in physics. We tell of the laws of matter and mind: the laws of mechanism, electricity, and heat: the laws of relation, of suggestive thought, of reasoning judgement. Such a use of language is arbitrary and unjust. In

these instances we suppose and can conceive no proper rule. We understand these things, they being found in given states, conditions, successions. We know what are electrical affinities, and that they invariably act: we know when water will freeze or evaporate, and when metals will fuse or volatilize: when bodies will become precipitates, and atoms chrystals. Yet all these phænomena reveal no law: at most are they seen in obedience to one. They prove, in Aristotelian phrase, a *universal*. They lie within uninterrupted experience. Their sequence has never been known nor reported to fail. But when we speak of law in reference to a responsible agent, the application is strictly correct. It is the only use which is proper and true. At best is it, in any other employment, an accommodated term. In this, it stands up to the idea. It proclaims authority rather than power. It asserts its right over intelligent nature. It is a grand exhibition of moral principles. It binds all in justice, but that justice addresses all in inducements. A law, whatever it be, which moves matter, can never describe a law which operates upon the mind.

Any parallelism between material necessary effects and moral contingent actions must be, therefore, very remote and strained. They involve perfectly different subjects of influence. They oppose to each other the relations which are borne towards those subjects. They respectively present,—uninformed and irresponsible matter, impelled by a foreign and resistless will of pleasure,—and rational and amenable mind governed by an independent but legislative will of right!

We must now, then, represent to ourselves this world, this dwelling-place of our species, as a Divine monarchy,—ruled by allowed, definite, self-interpreting, law,—every man accountable to that law,—that law placed before every man,—moral obligation being immutable in all times and regions, its substance one, its force eternal. In following it, there is conscious profit and peace. In its infraction, there is evident confusion and misery. Its great compendium is in the volume of nature, and its copy is on the tables of the human heart.

The right conception of law is easy and ready : it is within the compass of every mind. We may begin with the simplest form and earliest case. A child is commanded to do, or not to do, certain things. That is the *Injunction*. He owes this obedience to his parent, but in all moral duty only through him to what is primal virtue and truth. This is the *Obligation*. The child is assured that reward and punishment will ensue on obedience and disobedience. This is the *Sanction*. We have now reached the full idea of law. Let us analyse the terms which it has suggested, or these its proper elements, as they apply to ourselves.

We have taken our illustrations from domestic discipline as most apt, familiar, and intelligible. The child is directed or forbidden in a particular course of conduct. Injunction must be indicative or prohibitory. "Thou shalt not," is as necessary as "Thou shalt." The tree of knowledge is that discrimination which shows both good and evil. We may perceive

and understand what is to be pursued, and what is to be shunned. There is an essential distinction, and "woe unto them that call good evil; and evil good!"

When the injunction is laid upon the child, he feels what he ought, and ought not, to do. He is conscious of duty. He knows that he is bound by what is right. He is conducted by his parent to a higher Being, Father, and Governor, by whose will this right is made known, and in whose nature it inheres. The obligation is exemplified to every man in the same way, associated with authority and rule, but in itself right, and universally and ever found to be reasonable and just.

The child is warned that particular consequences of benefit or disadvantage will attend upon his acts. Favor or displeasure will greatly enter into the form of those consequences. The order of the household, its happiness, could not otherwise be maintained. Civil government steps beyond the hearth of fond instinctive yearning,—too tender and partial to be more than a most imperfect type of popular rule,—and, erecting itself into a great social protector, exhibits the sanctions by which it confirms and enforces as to all its subjects the consequences of their deeds. God sets before us life and death. Law may appeal to some higher principles of our nature, but the sanctions of law are no more than persuasions to obedience and discouragements to transgression, by showing that thus far the several agents are happy or miserable. Both the happiness and the misery may be far removed from the sensible and the gross:

they may be highly intellectual and moral : they may be that which such creatures only can share. Still it is the question of interest. It is compressed in this : "Say ye to the righteous, that it shall be well with them : Woe unto the wicked ! it shall be ill with him." Self-love is Godlike : it inspheres each angel in his bliss. It is a deep-seated principle of our nature, it is inalienable from our being, it ruled our innocence, it follows our apostasy, and, however debased, it yet supposes the desire of good and the disgust of suffering, and the promises and threatenings of law are but calls to its right decision.

We cannot be too strongly impressed with the goodness or benevolence of the Divine law. Right and good are correlative ideas, but we are not equally affected by them. More spontaneously can we conclude that all good is right, than that all right is good. And we more slowly confess the good of law, because we commonly regard law itself as restraint rather than as protection. We forget that it is far more restraint upon others than upon ourselves, and that our protection is in that restraint. Every interdict is on all, and each one obtains the benefit. Every obligation binds the whole race to the security and welfare of the individual. The best definition of liberty is, protection from wrong. And if we inspect the great social law, what is it but a fence and safeguard thrown around our dearest, most precious, interests ? Its heed holds back that which receives every denouncement, when we call it lawless. Its observance defends the allegiance of our household,

the sanctity of our life, the legitimacy of our offspring, the possession of our store, the reputation of our character, even to the proscription, and to the driving from the heart, of any secret wish that might seek to injure us. It sets a seal upon all. Our forbearance to aggrieve others, which must be harmful to ourself, is repaid by forbidding any grievance against our welfare from the millions upon millions who might otherwise inflict it. The duty which every man owes to love us as himself, is a blessed and rich return of our duty thus ourselves to love every man. The rule commands and obliges every man to love me, to uphold me,—invests him as my brother, authorises him as my keeper, arms him as my defender, pledges him as my surety, adorns him as my example, couples him as my coheir. It is the law of love. It is the perfect commutative justice. How benign must be the universal regulation, all whose requirements, bearings, consequences, motives, aims, are fulfilled by love! The same reflections are appropriate to the law which respects the claims of Deity. Polytheism is not only unreasonable, but the conception of any god, save the One, must be an accumulation of other qualities than those which reason shows can dwell in that one God alone. Therefore these qualities are less than Divine, and contrary to divinity. The degradation of a man must commence at the first act of adoring qualities so unworthy. To materialise worship by idolatry is to break off the spiritual medium between the Deity and ourselves, is to induce the most besotting superstition, is to assi-

milate the human mind to the vanity of this mean and crude idea. They must be in the last stage of fatuity, who worship the works of their hands. "They who make them, are like unto them; so is every one that boweth down to them." "An idol is nothing in the world:" but it acquires a fearful power as the type of evil passion, and as it then becomes the pattern and the god.—Every irreverent and light employment of the Divine name indicates and induces a low estimation of the Divine nature and character: the depression of the moral standard immediately takes place. In that depression, all well-being sinks.—The celebration of Him who made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, must elevate the mind towards him, purify its feelings and calm its cares; will bring a respite from labor and a solace to grief; tends to awaken the soul to its true portion and rest.—The reversal of these rules, or their mere absence, would draw down upon us evils, which it appals the heart to foreshadow. Anarchy would rage with unappeasable malignity. The conflict would not be of interests, but of listed minds. It would be the unrestrained grapple of spirits. Chaos has been painted to us by poetry: however wild, it works itself to quiescence, and its fury stills. Not such the end of the intellectual elements when in their strife and uproar. They cannot rock themselves to peace. Theirs is ever-rising surge. Where all power is ill, and all motive is selfishness, there can be no controlling principle, no attempering pause. That sea, self-wrought, cannot rest. There is no voice to bid its



proud waves stay! Let us honor law as the crowning blessing of blessings. Let us remember that intellectual creatureship without it, is as inconceivable as it would be insupportable. Let us acknowledge it as the most sublime of ideas, the true exponent of happiness, the proper basis of dignity, the exclusive shield of freedom, the pure fountain of good-will,—inaugurating truth in its state, decking benevolence in its majesty, lifting right to its throne, and then proclaiming with imperial authority that all this is but God; and that, therefore, there is none good but one, and that is God!

The administration of this law raises a most important inquiry. It is ever vigilant and operative. It is no idle symbolism and parade of government. It executes itself. While there is nothing arbitrary in its principles, there is nothing partial in its enforcements. Reward and punishment are not annexed, but involved. The administration can scarcely be conceived of separately from the law. When it is obeyed, or broken, the sanctions are already in the course of fulfilment. They are drawn out from the acts themselves. The sweet peace dawns forth from an approving conscience: the viper is self-engendered by an evil one. "In keeping of God's judgements there is great reward." "The wicked is cast into a net by his own feet, and he walketh upon a snare." "God's commandments are not grievous." "The way of transgressors is hard." There are those who must say, as of a present thing, "Our transgressions are with us, and as for our iniquities we know them."

Were we to exclude every other consideration from

the enforcement of this law, except its self-acting influence, we should grievously shock our strongest convictions. We speak not of it as blind and unintelligent; we speak not of it as subsisting in independence. We detach it not from an accompanying mind and disposition, from the power which rules by it. Whatever be its grounds, the perfect counterparts are in that power. Whatever be its natural effects, these invariably agree with the will of that power. All coalesce with an infinitely wise and energizing government. "The judgements of the Lord are true and righteous altogether." "Who hath given him a charge over the earth? or who hath disposed the whole world?" The outward creation, and human nature enclosed in it, may be the ark of his witness in which is laid up his law; but we overlook not his glory which is upon it, nor the oracle which speaketh from above. Far be from us the Godless philosophy which exiles the cause of all from the habitation of his creatures, however it may affect to leave his law behind: that law needs his government to give it subsistence, life, force, explicitness, application. "He is not far from every one of us." "God speaketh once, yea twice, yet man perceiveth it not." The wicked are too indifferent to listen, too hardened to obey. "They are far from his law."

We now invite attention, in treating upon the administration of Divine law, to three peculiarities in it, confining ourselves at present to its ordinary and silent course. We must often recur to them, and consequently desire that they may be well understood. In

some respects these peculiarities require, according to our ideas, no positive will to direct them. They must happen. But, then, why must they be? They are the results of our physical constitution, and are so far the expressions of his mind who formed and rules us. They are founded on the very principles of that constitution, and when put in force, we read the counsel and pleasure of God. According to our own guarded definition, we cannot call them *laws*; though they are as much so as any other conditions of nature and being. They stand, however, related to that which is indisputably law—they are the means of its constant operation.

The first peculiarity on which we cast our notice is, *Habit*. Its facility of acquirement, its strength when formed, its power for good or evil, are universally allowed. Its philosophy has been closely studied, and its finer transitions have been traced. It has been seen how thought can thrud with thought, and feeling flow into feeling. The tissue is woven of countless filaments, each of which the infant might break; the mass of which the man cannot rend. The painting looks forth in its broad effects as though a few bold strokes had produced them, when really is hidden from us, though not lost to the composition, the labor of touches which only the artist knows. It has an important place in morals. The conduct of all men inclines to some particular direction: in all, some particular acts will prevail. "They have turned every one to his own way." There is a sort of coherence and affinity between these acts. They declare a

strong disposition determining them. Whatever be their quality, in their progress they become less and less consciously difficult and laborious. They run into each other. The path is prepared and cleared for all successive steps. But, though the ease of proceeding is thus secured, an equal impediment is raised to halt or to return. The bias increases, until what was once deliberated, grows into what is little more than mechanical; like some impulse of velocity, which, overbearing our powers of resistance, hurries us away. The moral accountability of such a mental series comprehends the whole. Every act retains its character, as though insulated from the rest. But not such is the relative influence of all. The earlier, if not more blameworthy, are the more decisive. And any just view of habit, applies alike to holy and unholy agency. Still we must take a distinction. The spiritual apostacy of our nature, the sin which is in us, inclines us to what is like itself. Custom, in this case, forms a species of necessity, only the *more* guilty as it is the more unyielding. But the same description cannot denote the evolution of virtuous habit. It must contend with everything contrary to itself in fallen humanity and external life. The way to heaven is steep. Nevertheless the same rule applies. Good principles and good works cannot be cultivated with diligence, and cemented into order, but their struggle is diminished, and their hold confirmed. "The path of the just is like the shining light, shining more and more,"—with less and less danger of obscuration, with less and less effort to overpower

cloud and rain,—“unto the perfect day.” Now, in this working of habit, reward and punishment are greatly comprised. A pious deed handsels a second. It facilitates it. It renders it probable. It is a motive to it. It is an encouragement. It is an earnest. It is a specimen, which seeks repetition and demands consistency. Look now upon vicious practice. The way to destruction is a quick—if concealed—descent. Conscience is silenced. Taste is depraved. Check is withdrawn. Disposition has only to follow its unbridled license.—We see in the upward course, the joy of victory. There is self-respect. A fellowship is gained with all the righteous. There is peace of conscience. The yearning of a new happiness is felt. There opens a higher existence.—In the course of sin, we behold an inveterate and hoary wickedness. The fruit is matured of folly and shame. “His own iniquities shall take the wicked himself, and he shall be holden with the cords of his sins.” What darker sequel can we conceive? What juster doom can we imagine?

The second peculiarity, in connexion with our argument,\* which we consider, is, *Character*. Acts constitute habits, and from habits is evolved a form or cast of the man who contracts them, which constitutes his moral individuality. This is very different from any original modification or idiosyncrasy of mind. It belongs to him as a candidate for rewards and punishments. It becomes more and more strong and decided. Its elements gain force and expansion. It is not so much external, for that manifestation is only an

incident: it may be hypocritically shrouded, or be sincerely portrayed: true character is the stress and ascendancy of the soul, of the real self, of "the hidden man of the heart." Every man takes some part, is found on some side, in respect to good and evil. He cannot be neutral, nor balanced between them. Deception, urged by a supposed policy, may restrain the seeming of what is. But the actual, the ruling, energy of the mind, is known to consciousness and exposed to omniscience. The whole essence corresponds. This is the in-being. If it be known, it is known to be this. If it be laid open, these are its springs. Here lies the truth, the identification, of the man. "As he thinketh in himself so is he." Dive deep enough into the spirit, and you may seize the nucleus of idea and passion; the master-predilection, which shapes it to all its distinctiveness. It is this inconvertibleness, this self-discrimination, of every spirit, which assists us to conceive how, in some future judgment, each shall stand apart, find its lot, take its place, and inherit its portion. All this doctrine of character may be traced in its relation to the Divine government. Men are for it or against it. Their dispositions are in sympathy with it, or in repugnance to it. The real idea, the predominant desire, of the mind settles this. To every anticipation of a future state, in that awful light it stands forth confessed. No longer can it be an equivocal thing. Now it seems to waver. We may misjudge. It is not, however; the less true, that the soul wears its own moral features. It cannot be indifferent. Such an

affection is fearfully insincere. There is not a type of nature more fixed than is every human agent's character. It is in as determinate a direction. There is not an instinct of nature more certain, than is every human agent's will. It is as susceptible of notation. By this process is retribution largely conducted. In the settled state of the mind it bestows its good, and inflicts its evil. They, whose character is righteous, live according to rules and motives which they can approve. They are not at variance with themselves. They have the answer of a good conscience. There is a dignity in their principles, and an assurance in their hopes. This honor have all the saints. They are good men, just, devout. They have "hidden treasure." Their coffer-house is their heart. In these qualities consist the rudiments and pledges of happiness. They, whose character is unrighteous, contradict their reason, and desert all the ends of being, which they must revere in others, and could only justify to themselves. The accusations come all from within. There is the restlessness which makes a vacancy of all that is without. Every principle which sways them is a proscription upon happiness, and an incapacity for good. Though the Divine government secures moral purposes by natural causes, though the disposition of the mind itself make the chief difference of the joy and the suffering, this is the basis and index of its rule. The simplicity of the arrangement is not only like the acts of God, but strictly agrees with his employment of whatever means of acting may already exist, and his avoidance

of superfluous accessories. The connexion between these dispositions and their reflex states of mind, cannot be disputed. Such a connexion marks the design of the Creator. It is his will that it should exist, and he has subjected our humanity to it. And, what is his greatness of power to rule, when our character,—our mere “inward part, and hidden part,” that which we should be demonstrated to be, were our innermost spirit in its cogitations and motives exposed,—is so large a contrivance to enjoy his favor, or so ample an instrument to execute his wrath! “Blessed are the undefiled in the way.” “There is no peace, saith my God, unto the wicked.”

The third peculiarity which our argument, concerning the operation of the Divine government, suggests is, *Consequence*. Since habit has moulded character, that definite bearing of the whole mind, and thus in a measure a consequence itself, every consequence of which we now speak is something, not necessarily external, but future, however proximate,—something successive to the act. It may be that our conduct is followed by peaceful feeling, honorable esteem, the health of body, and the strength of mind. It may bring remorse, disease, the wounded fame, the heavy-laden heart. We are expectant of all these issues. We are aware of the order in which they will occur. It is no difficult prediction of what intemperance must induce. It is as easy to foretel the result of evil in the mind. Experience attests what is the entail of vice upon the circumstances of the present life. “The seed of evil doers shall never be renowned.” That which



we must seek to distinctly trace is the affinity between such conduct and effects. In many instances this is too obvious to need a remark. The fall from a mountain-precipice is not a plainer cause of destruction. But even in more remote and entangled consequences, study and reflection will convince us that a moral antecedent accounts for all. The recompense is meet. Like follows like. The philosophy of medicines and poisons cannot be better understood. The ordinances of seed-time and harvest cannot be more perfectly developed. It is thus that the Divine government can promise good and forewarn evil. It is thus that men can anticipate, as in any secular affairs, what must flow from virtue and vice. These are events which must proceed, which only can ensue. To arrest them, all things must be changed. Outward and internal nature must be inverted. There must be a dissolution of every social tie and bond. Tendency must be stemmed. Prudence must be falsified. Probability must be destroyed. Analogy must be annulled. Experience must be frustrated. But we have the proof in ourselves. We know that all is under our control by being at our choice. We can place it before us. We can look into the seeds of time and of things. We possess a power of infallible foresight. We can, with perfect sureness, determine what will impart dissatisfaction and inspire complacency: what will excite uneasiness and secure peace. And we believe that these are evidences that God judgeth in the earth. It is his doing. He has not originated, which were impossible, eternal laws of right, but he has enacted

them in his government of us, and has created us in reference and subordination to them. He has caused us to feel the influence of conformity to them, or of departure from them, at every point. He has honored them, and established his own perfect excellence by reflecting them in his law. "For the work of a man will he render unto him, and cause every man to find according to his ways." That the contrary cannot be, that the contrary cannot be conceived, is only an example which might find numberless parallels, and derogates in no wise from the holy and legislative rectitude of the Infinite Will. The principles of right and goodness are unconditionally and universally necessary, but the consequences of which we speak are only relatively necessary to a system which might not, and need not, have been, to a particular condition of Divine government and creatural responsibility. As that rule is based, as that responsibility is imposed, consequence is not only due effect, the result of the nature of things, what we must feel in any circumstances,—it rises into moral requital. Its undeviating uniformity only better confirms the fact, and glorifies the law which finds in it so constant and so exact a retribution!

We can pursue these peculiarities only until death. But a strong presumption arises that they do not terminate with it. The spirit survives. They are chiefly things of the spirit. How can they be separated from it? How can it throw them away? They are wrought into it. How can it turn from them, escaping or overcoming them? They must acquire only a

broader stamp, and a more certain perpetuation. What if they continue for eternity? Who can say that they do not? Who can show how they shall not?

But while the conditions of habit, character, and consequence, are the general means by which Divine rule is administered and enforced, we may not infrequently mark more direct and tangible manifestations. Virtue sometimes receives a prosperity, and is crowned with a success, which its own principles do not explain. Leprous plagues, which have no early record, which are inexplicable on any natural cause, are suddenly let loose upon particular vice. Visitations of pestilence, storm, earthquake, assert the punitive resources of Nature's God. Innumerable instances rise up to the observer of events which cannot fail to convince him that, beyond the ordinary train of simple consequences, there is a perpetual regard to the good and evil of conduct, and a perpetual acting out towards men according to their deserts.

An objection to these judicial views is taken from the possible contrariety between an act and its motive. The act may be good, the motive may be wicked. It may be done in hypocrisy. How, then, can retribution distinguish between these different things? It is clear that the whole transaction is evil. It does not arise from the proper, the true, man,—the inward man: it is foreign to him. The goodness of the naked deed is quite separate from the agent. So far as it is good, it may do good. So far as it may do good, there may be some consequence agreeable to that good. The beneficiary will give him thanks. He, having

done it to be seen of men, has verily his reward. But the motive leaves him only guilty. He is already punished, for he is miserable in that motive. He feels that the gratitude is undue. That motive is a part of his character and disposition. The duplicity supposed in the contrast of the act and the motive, will certainly aggravate that misery. There is no deeper misery than the conscious shame which feels that pretension is false and praise unmerited. In such a case retribution is not embarrassed: it has fallen upon the inward thought, which is very wickedness. It has seized the treacherous spirit which had sought the honor of goodness in the indulgence of evil, and pierced it with its own shaft where it was most vulnerable and most sensitive.

A reward or a punishment may frequently be observed in the Divine government of us, in which no formal consequence, no natural tendency, can be shown, but which answers most accurately to a precedent virtue or vice. A course of events, on which that virtue and vice could, as we should judge, have no possible effect, is wrought out most independently, and yet nothing could be more nicely adapted to place both upon the stage again. At a vast interval that virtue reappears in a most appropriate consummation, covered with the ensigns of triumph: the vice is resented with its righteous catastrophe. No final cause could be more unerring.\* We may account for much by simple operation, events bringing about similar events, dispositions exciting kindred dispositions:—but this order of retribution stands by itself; and we

might deem it fortuitous, save for the resemblance, like an image from a mirror,—like a rising from a grave ; and that resemblance points to a direct interposition of the Deity.

We may be reminded that the administration of the Divine government is not without exceptions ; that there is no infrequent deviation from it ; that rewards and punishments are confounded ; that obedience and sin are treated indifferently ; that its uniform recognition of moral distinctions cannot be maintained. The objection is admitted to a certain extent,—it has been anticipated in a foregoing argument,—but always with this limitation, that it is only the external retribution which can be brought under it. The principal happiness or misery attendant upon certain courses of conduct, consists in a state of the mind. The objection cannot show that this severer proportion is disturbed : it can merely refer to the sensible constitution of things. Something of this irregularity might be expected. Our future reasonings will not lose sight of it.

For the present state is probationary. It is filled with tests and temptations. There is an admixture and a strife. It is not clear nor dark. It is the mystery of God which is not finished. Its plain intention is to prove and discipline us. Were it perfect, there could be no trial : there could be no room for faith, no exercise for patience. But an actual, immediate, unreserved, administration would render it perfect. Its probationary character would, from that moment, cease.

Moreover,—since many virtues which holy law

encourages and rewards are those of humble submission and acquiescing belief, a complete exhibition of all reasons, a complete solution of all difficulties,—nothing short of which this objection demands,—in the entire vindication of that law, would withdraw the scope and blur the modesty of such virtues. They could not grow in such a soil, nor bloom in such an air. It would be a dispensation of sight and not of faith.

Likewise, if every judicial result were at once mature, if law were visible in all its workings, if there were immediate awards, if there were no delay nor interruption, moral motive would find no opportunity for itself. The high questions of authority and right could scarcely be entertained. The mind would be left without pause to approve, obedience would not stand in choice and freedom, the present grounds of responsibility would be all displaced.

It may be added, that the state of things which the objection contemplates, would be as unnecessary as unsuitable. For, seeing that there is a future existence, a sufficient theatre is afforded by it for all results growing out of probation. As it is improbable that the present and the approaching state should be exactly of the same character, for then they might have constituted but one,—so is it the more likely that the first should be less perfect than the second.

Two analogies do we derive from the most ordinary view of the present life, its interests and its results,—which we deem of the greatest value in simplifying the preceding law of responsibility, and in illus-

trating those final issues which such responsibility involves.

The first respects the sagacity or foresight which belongs to man in the general arrangement of his concerns. He is a provident being. He acts upon rules of prudence. He reasons them out of general experience. Prudence speaks to him of the whole œconomy of life. It enters into his noblest phrase: There is nothing which he more impressively knows, nothing which he more intuitively feels, than that his future happiness—whether of the next moment, or of the last stage of life—depends upon present conduct. He perfectly understands the fast connexion between what he is and does and what he shall be and do. It is an unquestioning conviction. Were we shut up to the actual instant, never looking beyond it, never reasoning upon what must follow, there could be no polity, no contract, no engagement, no plight, no undertaking: the wheels of society would stop and the sensibilities of nature die. How precisely does the doctrine of rewards and punishments adapt itself to this property of the human mind! It asks none other calculation than that it is continually giving to this transient scene! • It assumes only the same admitted relation between what is, and the hereafter! It requires only the same sacrifice of momentary gratification which we are accustomed and compelled to make in seeking health, and fortune, and fame! It is a notorious *fact*, that present conduct is most potent on future condition,\*does concern and affect our successive being, as far as we can trace it:

it is a notorious *motive* of human conduct to forecast such an end. "The God of recompenses" proceeds on these grounds, and invokes these dispositions.

The second analogy which is suggested to us is, that one error or fault, committed even in a very early period of our life, may entangle and prejudice the remotest portion of it, as far as our knowledge of its course extends. It may be the bane of character, insidiously corrupting it unto the last. It may be the taint of reputation which no subsequent reform can retrieve. There is a compromise, an injury, of the entire being. We may conceive of this error or fault as contradicted by the most solemn proofs of repentance. The party shall be changed into another man. But that first sin is on him. Every where it impresses itself. Like the one dark vein of the purest marble, it intersects the entire mass, or gives sinister expression to the fairest statue which can be moulded from it. That first false act pursues its victim still. You cannot cut it off from his fate. It lives on with him. However forgotten, it returns. The spectre of evil omen, it crosses every path, and meets every turn, of existence. The remembrance of that step, which has made every other stumble, destroys the power of principle and the glow of virtue. It is like the sense of a cleaving curse. It is a serpent coil. It is as the cyst of ever-gnawing virus. How often has this description been realised! For greatness, for ascendancy, for independence, for usefulness, this single cause has been the life-long disqualification. The Divine retribution which we defend operates, then, only



in agreement with what all allow. The sin of our youth may stamp its bias on all our future acts and circumstances. In the extreme hour its injuriousness may be felt, and its guilt deplored. The vibration has travelled through every link of the chain. We see not beyond death; but until that mysterious pass, we have marked the early sin still in effect and the early penalty still in exaction.

We have thus endeavoured to build wide and strong the foundations of moral science, or rather of natural theology. For if there be a revealed religion, it can only be addressed to man as already a religious being. It must come from Him who is previously known to be the Creator and Ruler of man. It must take its place among relations antecedently established and ascertained. But if this revelation convey a restorative means, it can only be addressed to this religious being as fallen. It must, therefore, in both cases, be subsequent to such a state of man as supposes his responsibility, and to such a state of man as supposes his defection.

This "glorious gospel of the blessed God" we possess. We verify it by abundance of authenticating proofs. Miracle and prophecy surround it with an external divinity. Yet were it our business now to arrange its evidences,—we should willingly forsake the prouder signs, the more trophied monuments, dwelling upon that intrinsic credibility which it presents in its contrivance and adaptation to engage the faculties, and reach the wants, of man. He who was its Author "knew what was in man:" all the motives by which he can be affected, all the relations in which he stands.

Now, upon these strict, just, ideas of man, is the Christian revelation superinduced. It appeals to man as a being of rational discourse, of moral obligation, of true immortality. It premises the law by which he is bound. It proposes none other. It only lends it a more distinct articulateness and a more solemn authority. It lays no new basis of responsibility. That responsibility must include every requirement to believe and to obey any system of truth which the Lord of man may make known. The principle and ground of every duty challenged by such system lie in the constitution of man and in the nature of things: it is only differently applied. Always must it have been binding upon us to credit whatever God might aver, to accept whatever God might bestow, to forego whatever God might restrict. A law does not know, indeed, any thing of repentance for sin, or of plea for mercy, yet, only because stringently it debars all hope. But these exercises of mind in the sinner, even under law which cannot encourage them with any intimation of success, would be proper in themselves. The abandonment of all claim, of all self-righteousness, on the part of the sinner, would correspond to the best conceptions of that law. And as revelation can initiate no new principles of obligation, so it can inflict no new sanctions. The moral system is fixed and necessary. It is not modal and dispensative, but absolute and immutable. Christianity insults not the sacrament of Eden, nor the decalogue of Sinai, nor any earlier elements of law that these express. Law is the term which it often adopts for its own designa-

tion. It is "the law of faith." It can only be received by "the obedience of faith." It is a government of royal sway. It is "the kingdom" of God." All of accountableness and authority is native to it. It only places itself on common moral grounds, and only strengthens itself by common moral enforcements. The question of higher degree which belongs to it does not yet arise. The nature of our first relations is unaltered. Nothing as to its kind is changed. God rules in the Gospel, only, as he rules by the law. Two discrepant orders of moral rule are impossible.

We might, for the sake of argument, suppose that Christianity had failed, its evidence being discredited, or its efficiency being disproved. Take suppositions less violent. Suppose that it had been withdrawn: The moral agency of man would remain, its grounds and principles unchanged. Moral evil would remain, its characters and tendencies unaltered. What we observe, feel, hate, dread, of the defection of man from rectitude, would be still with us and around us. The history of man would remain, his wars, his vices, his crimes, his remorseful apprehensions, his wrongs done or suffered, his laws and their penalties, his temples and their offerings, his alternate presumption and desperation. All his guilt, danger, helplessness, would remain. The only difference would be that the remedy, or the alleged remedy, had been withdrawn. No evil could have been aggravated by its short-lived presence. It came and departed. Bitter disappointment would it, indeed, bequeath: "we trusted it had been that which should have redeemed!"

We behold, then, the Christian revelation settled down upon the original principles of all law and of all religion. It exactly coincides with this basis, it falls easily into this frame. To suppose the contrary, is to suppose a self-contradiction in the Deity, and a variance between his plans.

A remedial revelation, the doctrine and purport of which are the recovery of man to the Divine favor and service, takes for granted the apostacy of man. It sees him, in all cases, the sinful, guilty, ruined, creature. It regards him as "without strength," to raise himself from the consequences of his transgression. It declares this depravity to be universal as to individual nature, and universal as to the race. "They are all under sin." "The Scripture hath concluded all under sin," because it found it to be so. "All the world has become guilty before God," and it represents the world accordingly. This is all that Christianity does in the matter. It creates no evil. It only brings it to light. If every where it recognises in man the sinner, man has sinned independently of it. It cannot have reduced him to this condition. It cannot have laid one of his woes upon him. In other relations must it be that his condemnation has fallen. There must have been a law which he, of old, has broken: there must be an existing law, which still he breaks. If he be guilty, this law must be in force. If in all the conditions of humanity he be guilty, then it is a universal law. "Now we know that what things soever the law saith, it saith to them who are under the law." Christianity has as little to do with the

consequences of our apostacy, is as little chargeable with them, as with that apostacy itself. All the punishments which are now going on, or which shall still go on, retributively upon sin, are perfectly disconnected with it. Had its tidings never been heard, every present suffering would still have been endured and in inconceivable aggravations. Sin would have radicated itself in *habit*, would have shaped every rudiment of *character*, would have embittered every efflux of *consequence*, just the same. Man would be obnoxious to every penalty which sin deserves. What he was, would be infixed in his immortal nature. He would have continued the sinner. He would have continued to receive the due of sin. Sin would have cankered the core of his final destiny.

That Christianity, by the character of its discoveries, should enhance the element of accountability in man, that it raises the motives and may exasperate the penalties of accountableness, we are prepared to expect, we are ready to affirm. It is an unavoidable possibility. It springs from moral necessity. The mind can allow nothing else. "To whom *men* have committed much, of him will they ask the more." Where "the kingdom of God comes nigh," human responsibility must enlarge in commensurateness with its blessings. There may be a guilt which would never have been otherwise borne. There may be a remorse which would never have been otherwise felt. There are threatened forms of punishment, until now unrecorded and denounced. These threatened forms, until now, could

not have fallen upon their proper mark of guilt. This is the effect of greater light and advantage. There is a richer trust. There is, consequently, a heightened obligation. But we abide by our statement. The nature of every legislative principle, of every moral relation, is unchanged. Whatever was certain in retribution, is not now more certain: whatever was enduring in retribution is not now more enduring. Man is universally sinful; man is, at all times, and in all places, consciously, demonstrably, guilty. With this undenied admission, Christianity merely coincides. It authenticates the independent fact. It seals and imprints the natural conclusion of reason and conscience. It takes and confirms the judgement of the human mind. It avails itself of an invariable testimony. Having done so, its high and exclusive business commences !

But in order to impress and exercise that mercy which is its only work,—its restorative mercy,—we willingly concede that, in the first instance, it more fully explains and establishes the law. It adopts it as its own. It discovers that which has been so frequently and universally forgotten, corrupted, abused. It gathers up the broken tables, reconstructs the fragments, and writes its characters anew upon the flaws. A clearer exposition is afforded of its spirituality, latitude, and force. Nothing is added, it is but elicited, it is but laid open from what it always was. It is recognised as the standard of all decision. Every man is convicted of having broken it. He is exhibited as shut up by it under condemnation. “Was

then that which is good made death unto him? God forbid. But sin, that it might appear sin, working death in him by that which is good, that sin by the commandment might become exceeding sinful."

And it must, also, be remembered, that for the very purpose, as well as in the very act, of saving man, the Christian revelation supports all the claims and honors of law. It abolishes nothing. It came not to destroy but to fulfil. Its glory is, that it far more solemnly vindicates right, and asserts obligation, and enforces sanction, than could be done on any other conceivable principle, or in any other supposeable case. If mercy rejoiceth, it is upon judgement, as the propitiatory rested upon the ark which contained the tables of the law. Until justice shall first receive its most perfect acknowledgement of due, its most perfect reparation of injury, its most perfect proof of consistency, its most perfect demonstration of impartiality, its most perfect range of punitiveness,—the Gospel has no province, no place,—not a sinner can be pardoned, not a sin can be purged! It "magnifies the law, and makes it honorable." Its atonement, in the awful sacrifice of Calvary, is the removal of the moral difficulties to the forgiveness of sin. It is the measure of the Divine government, protecting its law, but publishing amnesty to its rebellious subject. It is a declaration of righteousness in the remission of sins: it is the exhibition of God as just, and as the justifier.

The case of man is the argument of revelation. He is perishing. It offers an effectual remedy. He need not perish, if he will embrace the overture addressed

to him, and employ the means directed for his deliverance. The case and the remedy must be clearly understood. Even the style and condition comport with the manner and bearing of moral legislation: it treats man, whatever the besetment of his wicked dispositions, not the less responsible, than if wholly innocent; and it urges compliance only on promise of greater good, or on pain of greater misery; the very terms of the original law.

The cardinal doctrines and blessings of Christianity are known by the names of Justification and Regeneration. We propound them in the twofold form of doctrine and blessing. They are *doctrines*—for they are pure discoveries, not admitting of approach to the remotest guess, not to be learnt from any other source, wholly depending for their truth and their knowledge upon this single testimony; to be believed, in order to any effect: they are *blessings*—for they must be accepted from a feeling of utter need, they are to be appreciated on account of their transcendent grace and mercy, they are of no avail unless appropriatingly received; and the destitution of them can only be imagined with horror.

Justification is a word, as peculiar in its theological sense, as the original term it renders.\* They both take an arbitrary meaning. They are made to express an idea that is new to them. The man who reads concerning justification in the Bible, sees at once, that it does not intend to exculpate and clear. It has to

\* Δικαιοσύνη.



do with all that is unjustifiable, all that makes vindication impossible. This is an inconvenience which cannot be escaped, when you introduce a new conception into established languages which contain no expression suitable to it. The inconvenience can only be repaired by periphrases, or by the writer's demand for a peculiar use of a common term. Paul spoke of a righteousness: he found none other word: he claimed his plea, that it should be understood in another than the current acceptation, than he himself would have attached to it in a debate upon philosophy, or in a court of law.\* It belongs to Christian technology.

Evangelic Justification considers man as liable to punishment, and, as consequently or implicitly estranged from Divine favor. Its purport, viewed doctrinally, its efficiency viewed beneficially, is to destroy the necessity of this punishment and of this perpetual estrangement. Pardon releases the first, but does not touch the second. Poenal consequences being absolved, it cannot follow, of any necessity, that the forgiven one shall become the object of complacency. The prison does not open into the palace. The

\* The complaint uttered by Lucretius of the difficulty he found, in the necessity of employing the Latin tongue, to convey the sublimity of Greek philosophy, may apply to the Christian case; only, *its idea is new and excessive to every language* :—

“Nec me animi fallit, Graiorum obscura reperta  
Difficile inlustrare Latinis versibus esse:  
(Multa novis verbis præsertim quum sit agendum),  
Propter egestatem linguæ et rerum novitatem.”

De Rerum Natura, lib. i. 136.

alternative from the grasp of the deathman is not the embrace of the prince. A new connexion of things is wanted. Acceptance, or more properly acceptableness, must be supplied. These two elements are inconsistent, their combination\* is impossible, in any instance of human impleading. The charge is confirmed or disproved. If confirmed, the guilty may be pardoned, but never can be justified : if disproved, the innocent must be justified, but never can be pardoned. These are perfect incongruities. Both are secured, as both are needed, in the justification of the sinner with, and before, God. But justification, in this treatment of the sinner, has a moving cause or reason ; it is unmixed mercy. Nor less does it demand a satisfactory ground ; it is the entire moral effect, compensative, expiatory, and meritorious, of the Incarnation and Death of Jesus Christ, the Eternal Son, the One Mediator, who on the cross—in the completion of his mission—offered an atonement, and paid a ransom ; so that, indebted to the whole, we are most peculiarly “justified by his blood.” This virtue, this desert, this influence, of his advent and sacrifice, is his “righteousness,” in respect to which “God who justifieth,” not only remits sin, but favors and accepts the sinner, that being accounted to the sinner the moment he believes, that being imputed to him at once, so that it cannot be reckoned more or less. All this is ensured by a substitution. The just is for the unjust. There is no change of *character*. “He was made sin for us, as we are made the righteousness of God in him ;” showing that it was but a transposition of relations,

Christ no more personally becoming sinful, than we personally become righteous. There is no confusion of distinctions. He died for our sins, and was treated as if accountable for the consequences of those sins, not being for a moment, or by any fiction, identified or mixed with them. We receive the benefit of the death, as endured instead of us, and are treated according to its merits, not however by any supposition that it is our death, not by any virtual challenge which we have on it,—it being only capable of construction into an act of independent and authoritative grace, and being for ever reserved unto the government and purpose of that God who was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself. The scope of the justificatory act is simply objective. It cannot be possibly wrested to imply an infused grace or an inherent work. The whole is a question of state and relation. But there is great danger of contradicting this by exaggerating the character of faith in this process. We are justified by faith. Why is this the medium? "It is of faith that it might be of grace." We maintain its Divine origin. Though the earliest exercise, it is of God. Though its most characterless form, "it is given to us on the behalf of Christ to believe on his name." Yet is it not, in this stage, the operation of a sanctifying, but only of a disposing, an inducing, grace. It is not selected, in preference to any other mental act, for its present holy nature or on account of its future holy influence, but because it is the most simple, the least operose, the farthest possibly removed from any appearance of goodness. It just

"sets to its seal that God is true." "They who receive Christ believe on his name." Were this faith that instrument of potent change, that source of spiritual fruit, which many describe it, our justification would be by works, instant and foreseen. But "God justifieth the *ungodly*." Yet if this faith were regarded actually and seminally holy, according to these descriptions, in our justification, then would he justify the already sanctified, those who are godly. Much of the error—which really goes to establish justification on works—arises from attaching an occult power to faith. We are justified by it, but it does not justify us. "Can faith save?" By it we "come" to Christ, but we come to Christ for "life." It, in no sense, enters into our justification; it is no part of its form or matter.—Such, we believe, is the justification which Christianity reveals; it corresponds most exactly with the phraseology and illustration of the Hebrew Scriptures. A righteousness is announced there most correspondent to this. In the records of both we may remark that this blessed state of justification is confirmed by juridical allusions and forensic terms in a manner repeated to uniformity. These are not to be slighted, for they give a peculiar complexion to it, even if they do not belong to its essence, while they invest all its immunities with a Divine adjudication!

Regeneration, in contradistinction to the justifying act, is a change, not upon our state and relation, but our nature and disposition. It is the work of God upon the soul. Unlike the former, it bears a less simple unity of character. That referred but to the

question : How we stand towards God ? This implicates all the motives and tendencies of our mind. These doctrines or blessings are always to be discriminated but never detached. For not only, whatever be the succession, are they invariably bestowed together,—that is, are without exception to be found combined in the same persons, and never known apart,—but they are intimately connected. The faith which receives Christ the righteous, or our righteousness, having formed the union between Christ and the soul, he becomes its life. “Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ is born of God.” The soul is regenerated. This mental transformation is represented by various terms, all expressing some distinctive idea,—all involving the common effect. It is to be “washed,” “renewed,” “quickened,” “converted,” “new created ;” while its chief characteristics are vitality, knowledge, and purity. Regeneration and sanctification may be considered one work,\*—the former the origin, the latter the continuousness ; the first immediate, the second progressive ; both proving that there is no holiness without spiritual life, and no spiritual life without holiness. The Third Person of the Trinity is the Covenanted Author of this Divine effect. The truth, which he inspired, is the means which he employs to accomplish it. We do not, however, so interpose the truth that his influence shall act through it upon the mind : we hold that his influence is direct, and acts upon the mind towards the truth. We see in this view an efficient agency, and also an intelligent evolution. Again, we mark the function of faith in

its mere subordination. God purifies the heart by faith, but faith does not purify the heart. It discerns and receives the holy testimony. "Being born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible," ("the seed of God," his effectual grace,) "by the word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever." "Sanctify them through thy truth,—thy word is truth."\*

It need not create surprise if we be most anxious, extremely anxious, to be understood concerning the way of human salvation, when so dark a shadow rises with every step of the argument, and becomes at every step more lengthened and profound. We owe it, not only to prove that Christianity is perfectly clear of every ill and every sentence lying upon man, but that it provides for their entire and eternal reversal.

How glorious is this grace ! How great is this sal-

\* It has of late been declared by the sciolist, and uncontradicted by the incurious and the ignorant, that, though we speak freely of regeneration as an approved and common Scripture word, its correlate only occurs twice in the New Testament : Matt. xix. 28 ; Titus iii. 5. It is objected likewise, that in these places it means not what we intend. We think it worthy of Christianity, as an œconomy, to call itself by the name of one of its primary truths—it is "the Regeneration;" we see no mystic allusion to any rite in the "washing of regeneration;" water signifying the cleansing power of Divine influence, to be no more literally understood than "the fire of the Holy Ghost." We confine ourselves to the first cavil. Is *παλιγγενεσία* the only correlate or equipollent ? The description of this change as "birth," as "being begotten," as being "born again," is the rule of the inspired word: John iii. 3, 5, 6, 7 ; 1 Pet. i. 3, 23 ; 1 John, *passim*. The same style is preserved when man is regarded as the agent of producing this change. 1 Cor. iv. 15. Philemon 10. The whole structure of Scripture phraseology seems studiously accommodated to this idea.

vation. Mercy compasses us about! These blessings reach to all our spiritual necessities! There is nothing which comes not under them. Justification is a qualification of title: Regeneration of nature. Justification alters the relative character: Regeneration the personal. Justification reconciles us to the Divine favor: Regeneration to the Divine service. Justification removes every obstacle of law: Regeneration every obstacle of disposition. Justification destroys the incapacity of guilt: Regeneration the resistance of depravity. Justification makes us one with God in acceptance: Regeneration makes us one with him in will. Justification opens heaven: Regeneration causes us to walk in its white. Justification furnishes the song of deliverance: Regeneration teaches us to modulate it.

We must not conceive, if we would think aright, of revelation as tardy in its introduction. The great outline of it was made known to the guilty pair, from whom we are descended, on the evening of the day of their fall. It was in promise, that it might be believed: it was in allegory, that it might be impressed. A salvation was insured by the woman's offspring, *her's alone*. An enemy, detected by the evil he had brought upon them, was denounced. The wound, which the deliverer should receive, was to be inflicted in the act of trampling upon that enemy. The heel of the foot, while crushing the head of the serpent, was to be bruised. This is "the first principle of the doctrine of Christ," or "the first word of Christ."\* At the "head," on the outer roll, of "the

\* Hebrews vi. 1.—"Τὸν τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ Χριστοῦ λόγον."

book it is written, Lo, I come." Revelation is Christology. All its subsequent disclosures have not affected the substance of that first promise. It was unfolded gradually in "many parts or sections," in "many styles and mediums."<sup>a</sup> When we speak of the fact of revelation, we intend that which was made to man almost in the moment of his apostacy, referring wholly to it, occasioned wholly by it: when we speak of the discoveries of revelation, we denote all the informations which have been educed from that first breviate, and which it now perfectly conveys. We speak of it as distinct from any revelation which may have been presented to innocent man, and equally from that doctrine of ends or final causes, of laws and sanctions, which is inscribed on the scenes of nature, on the external administrations of the Divine government, and in the conscious workings of our own mind. It is a scheme of extra-judicial grace to recover man. Nothing in it could have been anticipated by us. It has no subsistence apart from the will of infinite mercy. It rests simply in the purpose of God. "It is the good pleasure of his goodness." He "hath made known to us," that which has no independence nor outbeing, that which he alone could know, "the mystery of his will." But this revelation is in variance with nothing which is already constituted. It expands every oconomy: it confirms every law. It ratifies all the principles hitherto recognised. It proceeds on all the operations heretofore allowed. It brings with it no rival claim. It surrounds itself with no disturbing

<sup>a</sup> Πολυμερῶς, πολυτρόπως. Heb. i. 1.



force. It ascends its "glorious high throne" with the statute-book, by which this world could alone be governed, in its hand; and reigns in harmony with all the physical and moral facts with which this world is distinguished.

And we are thus conducted to a great canon in regard to all the problems, the deep things, which revelation is supposed exclusively to comprehend. Its Author is the God of nature and of providence; that latter term being employed to express not only care and bounty, but moral rule. Now an analogy may be expected between the works, and the doctrines, of this same Being. He can be no more inconsistent than untrue, he can no more contradict than deny himself. This canon of analogy, therefore,—if not a stout argument in itself,—is an invincible rejoinder to all the general objections against revelation. For if we can show that the same objections lie against the system and administration of mundane affairs, the opponent must either withdraw his objections as being any longer *peculiar*, or deny, in one reckless falsehood, the experience of history and the demonstration of sense. He has his choice, but at the worst, revealed religion only is invalidated in the ruin of all evidence and truth. Even another choice is left him. Allowing the evils of this world,—evils palpable and inexpugnable,—sparing himself the folly and the hardihood of denying them,—he may assail the system in which they exist. He may curse the day of his birth. He may war with all as unjust. He may arraign high heaven. But having done this,

amidst his execrations and ragings, the system still girds him in. His quarrel with revelation, which only affirms these evils to heal them, is to be expected from such maniacal fury. It is enough for sober reason to defend revelation in its presumption of evils, by showing that they do exist. It is enough for true faith to exhibit revelation in respect to those evils, as producing none, as redressing all. The analogy is between insisting on human misery as it actually subsists, and in holding out its remedy. This is the only charge which can be brought against Christianity. This is a charge in which we glory.—A more positive argument is derivable from the use of analogy than this. So far we have merely seen revelation not questioning the fact, or the justice, of the evils which surround us: allying itself only to them to extinguish them. But it is strongly presumptive that any thing comes from God, if it bear the impression of those clear and solemn signatures which are emblazoned upon all his acknowledged doings. “This *also* cometh from the Lord of hosts.” The principle, if not the use, of this canon of analogy was understood by the ancients.\* Their verisimilitude<sup>b</sup> answered very nearly to it. Cicero descants upon it in his writings.<sup>c</sup> But in the *Philocalia* of Origen lay its true philosophy in application to revealed religion,—though, in a single sentence, there for centuries it lay,

\* Note H.

<sup>b</sup> The Greeks express it by *eikos*, sometimes by *πικανός*.

<sup>c</sup> *De Naturâ Deorum*, lib. i.—“Quod maxime verisimile est, et quo omnes duce natura vehimur.”

—a mighty, universal, truth,—a truth most staid, most germinant,—surrounded by an African wildness of fable, by an Asiatic profusion of romance,—when a mind in a far distant region, a mind most differently formed and schooled,—with the least possible kindredness to his,—caught the idea, as a ray from heaven, kindling all the elements of thought and reasoning susceptible of it, and from that one idea built up a demonstration, though with a humbler name, matchlessly complete. It is not too much to say that Butler, with his unpretending diffidence, stands in the highest rank of logicians. If the sentence of the Alexandrine Father first gave movement and direction to his great undertaking, his originality is not disparaged by the fact. Incidents are impulses only to genius. Philosophers have owed their discoveries, and poets their inspirations, to that which is casual; but such casualty can excite only philosophers and poets. The dignified modesty of reserve with which he reasons, his contentment with sufficient proof when overwhelmed with his amplitude of store, his quiet homage to truth though his loyalty inwardly throbs to ecstasy, his conscious strength, his subordination as from a secret centre of all that was convertible to his aim, his intuition of the most difficult relations, the impression of a sacredness which he stamps upon the most common things, his unambitiousness of originality, his grasp of the chain which binds the universe, withal that subdued manner which betrays and does not boast his might, render his well-known disqui-

sition\* a masterpiece of ratiocinative redoubtability. In its own high qualities, no work of ancient or modern times approaches it. Nor is it too much to say, that it has given a new, though a natural, turn to thinking wherever its questions, which are of world-wide interest, are entertained,—and that it places the defence of Christianity upon better grounds than new, even the everlasting foundations of reason, experience, and truth. Applying the argument of such physical and moral correspondences, we see the Christian system taking its station as in native scenes and amidst rightful circumstances. Its way is prepared, and its high-way is made straight. It follows in the footsteps of that God, “known unto whom are all his works from the beginning of the world.” It is no intrusion upon the earth. Laws necessary for its premisses it has not to establish,—they are already enacted: resemblances favorable to its probabilities it has not to invent,—they are already shaped. It rises like a majestic temple in its integrity and its independence, but still within an earlier outer court, a noble basilica, most inferior but not unworthy; even to be compared with it, if only its subordinate design be remembered, and presenting many points of agreement, in its more unhewn and unadorned style, to the perfect and glorious structure which it surrounds!

\* “The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature.” The passage of Origen is quoted in the Introduction, p. 6.

## LECTURE III.

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"I UNDERSTAND MORE THAN THE ANCIENTS, BECAUSE I KEEP THY PRECEPTS.

PSALM cxix. 10.

REVELATION, having appropriated and identified all the moral theorems of reason,—the great truths, the first principles, taught by the light of nature, by the constitution of mind, by the administration of Providence,—having raised its peculiar and exclusive discoveries upon them,—might have been absolved from any blame of deficiency, had it assumed them silently as matters already proved. But, not satisfied to leave the possibility of mistake, it retraces their outline—often dim, sometimes effaced—in more than its original vividness, because, in its infinite mercy, it charges itself with a remedy which can only be shown necessary, and rendered availing, by the demonstration of human apostacy, and, of consequence, by an exhibition of the law by which that apostacy can alone be demonstrated. It supposes a universal law, because it contemplates in mankind, "the children of disobedience." It supposes guilt and penalty, because it addresses mankind, as "children of wrath." This law is

but one, though its copies were not equally clear. This guilt and penalty were but one, though their degrees largely varied in aggravation. The Jew had received the recapitulated law,—precise and full and cogent,—“the form of knowledge and of truth.” The less favoured Gentile was left to explore a wider volume, but, being more diffuse, less distinct and emphatic. The Israelites had learnt its general features before they received their special code; but there was transcendent advantage in such digest, defining their ideas and affecting their sensibilities. The Gentiles were not abandoned without instruction and impression, but in a more uncompact shape. They often cherished the most beautiful refinements of sentiment, the most analytic ideas of obligation.\* Among many of them the grosser and more monstrous vices were not only denounced,—they were “not so much as named among them.” The stern fact is declared concerning both: “There is no difference; for all have sinned and come short of the glory of God.” The Gospel clears its immediate, urgent, way to this conviction of universal liability to punishment that it may sound forth its pardon and its peace. In the same manner of eager haste it determines the invariableness of the enmity of the human heart to holy good, that it may at once put into operation its power to renew it.

And we now pursue the inquiry, whether those great characteristics of man, and whether those main instruments of retribution,—which we think have

\* Note I.

been proved to exist,—do actually enter into the ground-idea of revelation? For since we have deemed it most important to learn whether the primary, universal, law be recognized by it, it is equally imperative to ascertain whether it regards our nature, we will not say truly, for the bare notion of alternative, having assumed its divinity, would be offensively profane ; but whether it regards our nature as we think, after our most careful estimate, that it is just and necessary to regard it ourselves.

We have argued, from the several phenomena of human nature, that it is composed of inconvertible substances, corporeity and mind. We see in it the different attributes of matter and spirit. This has been the universal belief. There is a body and a soul in man. In no method can you derive one from the other. By no occult organization can you confound and intermix them. Without reasoning upon the questions of particular nexus and reciprocal influence, we are content with the indubitable fact that this two-fold constitution has been affirmed by all men. The fact is not weakened nor disestablished by pointing to the subtleties of the dialectician arguing himself into universal scepticism ; or to the imbruted habits of the savage, lost to all the distinctions of his being. It is of that class of truths which are peculiarly human. Man may be easily convinced of it. Man finds in himself whatever aids and answers to the conviction. Man cannot be naturally dissuaded of it. But our only inquiry now is : Does Revelation speak to this idea of man? Is this its theory and assumption? It

is almost trifling to offer proof and example. "There is a spirit in man, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth him understanding." "Whose spirit came from us?" "He is God of the spirits of all flesh." He is "the Father of spirits." "The spirit of man is the candle of the Lord." "All souls are mine." "He giveth breath unto the people upon the earth, and spirit to them that walk therein." This is discriminated from matter, and animated corporeity: "Their horses are flesh, and not spirit." This is also distinguished from the vital principle: "Why is life given to the bitter in soul?" And when soul is employed to represent the vital principle, as it occasionally is, that which is more intellectual is added: "Body, soul, and spirit." "What man knoweth the things of a man save the spirit of man that is in him?" "The spirit of the mind," is the perfect designation. The Scripture, therefore, in all its conceptions and declarations of man, separates between the frame and its doings, and the soul and its powers. "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul." "Glorify God in your body and in your spirit, which are his." "A spirit hath not flesh and bones." "Let us cleanse ourselves from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit." "The body without the spirit is dead." To this spirit, as distinct from the body, the Gospel appeals, demanding its choice and offering its salvation: "Hear, and your soul shall live." "Receiving the end of your faith, even the salvation of your souls." Should judicial visitations of disease end in "the destruction of the flesh," it is that "the spirit may



be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus." Surely none can doubt that this structure of inspired language is consistent with itself. When is its uniformity broken? Surely none can deny that its common, is its plain and unforced, interpretation. Surely none can dispute that the popular notion of man is reflected most unwaveringly from its page. This is all for which we ask. We have not to learn how the most precise and perfect language may equivocate on the neological rack.

We have argued, from the relations in which man is found, and from the capacities with which he is gifted, that he is a moral agent, that is, he is responsible. The freeness of the individual is due to him who is placed in such a condition, but his freeness must be under law, or no fellow of his species could be free. If they were not reduced to obligation, all his fellows would exercise a liberty incompatible with his. "Law, properly considered, is the defence and exposition of liberty. It is absurd to suppose that any creature can have a right to contravene the will of the Creator. It is absurd to suppose that the Creator would resign the creature to purposes, however unworthy and anarchical, of his own. The Creator would not be free. Here arises the question: Does revelation thus regard us? Is our responsibility its assumption? It cannot seriously and formally, as in some protocol, proclaim it, for without it there could be no claim upon our attention. It cannot stoop to define and urge that which alone warrants it to teach and to command. It cannot deign to prove the great natural truth that God has the power, and marks the design,

of calling men to account for their conduct, and to reward, or punish, it accordingly. But in all its assertions and implications the principle shines out. It cannot be hid. "Ye are not your own." "Do all to the glory of God." "Yield yourselves to God." "A son honoureth his father, and a servant his master: if then I be a father, where is mine honor? and if I be a master, where is my fear?" God is a great king: sin is rebellion. God is just: sin is iniquity. God is good: sin is an evil work. One law binds us. "There is no respect of persons." "So, then, every one of us shall give account of himself to God." Nor does Scripture allow that anything from without hampers that moral liberty, in the withdrawal or injury of which responsibility must cease. Human agency is always referred to motive, or choice. Instead of bodily conformation excusing us from responsibility by impairing our liberty, we are commanded to "mortify our members," to "keep under the body and to bring it into subjection." Instead of circumstances overpowering the will of the agent, we are commanded to "come out and be separate," and to "keep ourselves unspotted from the world." Instead of any necessity binding us to a course of disfavored conduct, (though Prophecy and Providence must ordain means as well as ends,) every step of that conduct is proved to be most free. It cannot be otherwise in the nature of things. What but our personal, conscious, motive could sway us? Can we do anything without inducement? They who "condemned" Christ, "fulfilled the voices of their prophets;"

but it was "their own voices which prevailed." "They *desired* a murderer to be granted unto them." "They delivered him for *envy*." "By *wicked* hands they crucified and slew him." Pilate "delivered Jesus to their *will*." We have not yet to learn how the doctrine of accountableness is assailed in our day, but the quiver of hostility fills itself from other armouries than revelation. There it stands, inextricably gathered up with the whole.

We have argued, from the moral susceptibilities and inappeasable longings of the soul, that it is immortal. The power of conceiving it, amounts to demonstration. Universal impression is a voucher, which cannot otherwise, than on its truth, be explained. We know not the gross ambition, which some have boasted, to rest in animal laws and to perish with animal stems. But our business is now to inquire: Does revelation thus account us? Does it not promulgate the fact? Is it not its intimation, when it is not its assurance? Is not the treatment of man, as it describes it, on any other consideration, laboriously vain? We have only spoken hitherto of the immortality of the spirit when separated at death. Something more than this lies behind our argument; but we now satisfy ourselves to examine the doctrine of Scripture touching the parting of the soul from the body, into a conscious, distinctive, state. We find that it is the instruction of the Old Testament, and, also, of the New, that death is connected with an unseen state of things. *Sheol*, *Ades*, and the old Saxon *Hells*, all present the same idea. It is an invisible issue. Is

that condition of secrecy and concealment, simply the grave, or is it a state of the soul after death? Now it is not denied that the lot of death, as it appears to us, mortality, interment, is often only in the sacred writer's mind,—he has merely to speak of it, and he intends no more. It is not, however, that these respective languages contain no other equipollent terms. From no such cause of poverty is this selection made. The Hebrew gives us *מוֹת*, death, *חַיָּת*, corruption, *קֶבֶר*, *קֶבֶר*, tomb; the Greek, *θάνατος*, *μοῖρα*, *πότμος*, *κατάλυσις*, death, *τελευτάω*, to die, *καταορύττω*, to bury, *τάφος*, *μνήμα*, *θημὼν*, tomb; the Anglo-Saxon, death and the grave. A peculiar reason must, therefore, have prompted this specific preference, though that reason may not invariably apply. It cannot be an accident. Often they must mean more than simple dissolution and burying place. Jacob could not hope that, in going down into Sheol, to his son Joseph, to find his body there, as if it suggested to him no more than the grave, for he believed his body to have been devoured by some ravenous beast. Many other instances might be assigned, when mention is made of being gathered to their fathers, or to their people, whose ashes were far away, and which expressions could not imply the sepulchral mingling of remains. But that the word denotes far more than this re-assembly of mortal dust, may be inferred from the introduction of the idea of reward and punishment into it. It is often described as a resting-place.\* Some-

\* Many examples might be quoted: Job xiv. 13, 15. The inquiry of the 14th verse should be rendered: "If a man die, shall he not live again?"

times it is described as a scene of suffering. "A fire is kindled in mine anger, and shall burn to the lowest hell." Surely something more is intimated than the deepest grave. It is sometimes set forth as distinct from punishment and yet connected with it. "Hell is naked before him, and destruction, or perdition, hath no covering." "Hell and perdition are before the Lord." גֵּהֶנֶם, seems easily associated with punishment. "A false witness shall not be unpunished, and he that speaketh lies shall perish." In the fearful descriptions of "the strange woman," Sheol is solemnly repeated to denote something ulterior to the death of her victims. "Her feet go down to death, her steps take hold of hell." "He knoweth not that the dead are there, and that her guests are in the depths of hell." But, waiving any such retributive idea, the word, so often rendered *hell*, cannot be understood of the grave in many passages of Scripture. Their sublimity forbids. "Canst thou by searching find out God? canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection? It is high as heaven; what canst thou do? deeper than hell; what canst thou know?" "If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there; if I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there." "Though they dig into hell, thence shall mine hand take them; though they climb up to heaven, thence will I bring them down." This is the abyss. Punishment is not supposed, but we must think of that vast and universal abode of all departed spirits, to which all are rapt, whatever be their respective condition, wherever be their local separation,—the Scripture representation

generally laying it subterraneously, a nadir, the deep! It is the under-world. When Korah and his company went down alive into it, only the chasm of the earth may be meant, yet it is not the superficial grave. The suggestion is that it is more. When the monarch of Babylon is hurled into it as from a throne of stars, when the king of Egypt goes down into the midst of it, mysterious spirit-shades greet him scornfully, the Rephaim. It is the region of ghosts. To prevent mistake we repeat, that though this word, employed seventy-nine times in the Hebrew Scriptures, does not infrequently, nor necessarily, mean any more than death, yet it is death as something secret and inscrutable, following out in many cases a state in which the spirit can only share, of good or evil; sometimes shadowing forth an awful profound in which all spirits are irrespectively beheld, the translated word not signifying a condition of suffering, but only of concealment, the original import of it, though its modern use includes pœnal suffering alone. So, *inferus*, among the Latins, merely intended that which was beneath, in comparison of the surface; it was applied, without disparagement, to the god and to the blest; we find, in our own language, how it is changed, for only in a bad sense do we speak of what is infernal.\*

In the same contrasted style is the *Ἅδης* of the Christian Scriptures portrayed. It is one, a whole. But its departments of reward and punishment, its hemispheres, are now made distinct. All parting souls go to Hades: but their character determines to

\* So were the Greek words inoffensive: *εὐδαίμων*, *καταχθόνιος*.

which of these two portions of it they are severally assigned. Hades never expresses of necessity any other idea than that of death and the grave as invisible, or leading to invisible consequences, but from its possible connexions it may intend all that is frightfully condemnatory!<sup>a</sup>

We have referred, not for the sake of authority but of illustration, to a vernacular term. The real conception of hell, is that which is unseen, the invisible state. When the Bible was translated into our language, this was its proper use. When the grave is only to be understood, we think the translators never adopt it: they employ it for that which ensues on death. In the ecclesiastical symbols of that, or of a higher age, the same nicety of signification is preserved. "He was crucified, dead, and buried; he descended into hell." Here are the common stages, though not in order of time. His "descent into hell," that is into the state of separate spirits, is discriminated from the act of dying, from the ceremony of interment. But now in conventional use, hell speaks only of punishment, and no little perplexity arises to the unlearned from the difference between this ancient, and this current, acceptation.<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Josephus, speaking of the Sadducees, says: "They take away the belief of the duration of the soul, and the punishments and rewards in Hades." A Jew, writing in Greek, would be well-informed upon the lexicographical, theological, and popular sense. Wars of the Jews, book ii. chap. 8.

<sup>b</sup> We think that an advancing sense in the use of ᾍδης may be traced in collating the Septuagint with the New Testament. The Alexandrine Translators certainly apply it, as the writers of the New Testament never do.

It is not, however, by the exegesis of particular words so much as by the consensus and use of Scripture, that we are anxious to establish its uniform doctrine, that the soul is self-existent. Enoch, the seventh from Adam, testified it in his announcement of the judicial advent. We learn, from unerring cypher, that the patriarchs "died in faith," and that they "desired a heavenly country." If we review the book of Job in the light of a specimen of the earliest post-diluvian faith, the doctrine is most clear. The pious sufferer "would yet have comfort," though "cut off." The impenitent sinner shall be "brought to the king of terrors." In the sublimest strains of the poem is found that prophecy of the descending Messiah and of the final resurrection, that spectacle of the conscious soul contemplating its bodily devastation, yet assured and triumphing that, from the midst of that restored frame, it should see God,—than which Christianity has nothing more perfect to unfold, to which a timid criticism than that perfection has nothing more to object. If we regard the book of Ecclesiastes as a treatise of plain, oracular, truths, or as a reply to the scepticism of its period, what can be more explicit than its dictates? "There is no man that hath power over the spirit, to retain the spirit, neither hath he power in the day of death." "Who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth upward?" "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was: and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it." It is in the contrasted



consequences of death to the pious and to the sinner that we read the truth and perceive the necessity of immortality. "The wicked is driven away in his wickedness: but the righteous hath hope in his death." How, otherwise, can we understand the wish of Balaam? "Let me die the death of the righteous, and let my last end be like his." How, otherwise, can we interpret the conviction of David? "God shall redeem my soul from the power of the grave, for he shall receive me." "In Zion the Lord commanded the blessing, even life for evermore." "Israel shall be saved in the Lord with an everlasting salvation: ye shall not be ashamed nor confounded, world without end." And if such be the suffrage of the Old Testament, it was the direct purpose of the mission of our Lord to substantiate all that the light of nature and of earlier revelations had poured upon this anxious question. "I am come that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly." In the New Testament we, therefore, discover the most absolute proofs. Concerning the departed saints, the Saviour testifies that their covenant relation to God consists in unbroken being, "for all live unto him." He received the spirits of the contrite malefactor and raptured martyr. Concerning the wicked we learn the same continuance of existence, turned only into a source of misery. Judas "goes to his own place," and they who were, of old, disobedient, are "the spirits in prison."

In one most emphatic disclosure, our Lord has set before us the invisible world in its rewards and

punishments. Perhaps the curtain, which overhangs it, was never so widely drawn aside. It is not entitled a parable. The description stands out with a realness which proclaims its certainty and truth. And well it may! "He hath the keys of death and of the unseen state." In some sense we may call it a parable; we should not oppose the most absolute application of the term. Its great principles become not, by this concession, ambiguous. Such a vehicle always contains some history, what might be, what has been, what is. A fixed moral does it invariably present. Even its accessories are often pregnantly instructive. In this forewarning, we follow two human beings,—their circumstantial states are merely to be considered as exponents of character, types of their respective moral classes,—in life, in death, into eternity. That eternity opens at once: Its distinctions are, without any formality of preparation, unveiled. The indifferent, common, character of Hades, as held by some, as apparently warranted by its often indefinite use, is suddenly refuted. The poor man is in Abraham's bosom, and is comforted: the rich man is tormented in the flame. It is impossible to evade the *immediateness* of these distinctions. We feel the stroke of the spirit's wing towards its perfection; we hear the plunge of the spirit into its fiery abyss. All is taught to us of *consciousness*. They remember, know, feel, themselves. It is an *unalterable* state. There is a great gulf. Where is the crossway which can span it? Where is the hidden path from those opposing strands? It admits of no *relief*, however intense the

suffering. Not the tip of the finger of the blessed may be dipped in water to cool the scorched tongue. It may be, that there are new conditions introduced into those spiritual realms since the resurrection and ascension of the Son of God. It may be that the dread allusions, which we have marked, more nearly corresponded to what existed previously to these august events. But if we be asked, Does the machinery, the incidental description, agree to fact? We believe that, substantially, it does. Though these abodes be not now contiguous,—and even then “Abraham was afar off,”—the thought of the lost heaven is present to the minds of those who themselves are lost. Though this dialogue were never held, there must be a knowledge of the saved by the lost, and of the lost by the saved. Such appeals and answers, though only supposed, are not less the assertions of general truths. It is due to the whole of the genius and framing of this disclosure, that its perfect impression be allowed to settle upon our souls. We may well submit the judgment of those souls to Him, who, with unapproachable authority, could say: “We speak that we do know, and testify that we have seen.”

Though the illustrations which we have selected lead to conclusions which involve retribution as well as immortality, this only, as connected with our spiritual nature and the separableness of our spiritual principle, has a strict place of right in our present argument. It may, therefore, to meet the question of our real nature, be proper to look around us, and to inquire whether we can contemplate it as elsewhere

reflected, beyond our partialities, and without our evils? Or if our evils should attach, it might be by a voluntary assumption of them, in condescending to our nature as far as possible in its present circumstances.

It has always appeared to us an irresistible demonstration in favour of the immaterialism of the human soul, and its capacity of independent existence and action,—irresistible as its biblical defence and exposition,—to think of “the man, Christ Jesus,” and especially to meditate his death. “He became obedient unto death.” We see him die according to the mortal conditions of our manhood. The virtue of the sacrifice depends upon the most exact conformity. “It behoved him in all things, to be made like unto his brethren.” His death is the separation of the spirit. “Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit.” With the causes of that resignation we have not now to do. The fact is plain. The avouchment is infallible. “He descended into the lower parts of the earth.” His spirit entered Hades, though it was not to be “left in it.” His spirit returned. Then he rose bodily; the “body of the flesh,” the corporeal organ, remaining exanimate until his spirit, resuming it, caused it to revive. This is our nature. We trace, in “this fashion of a man,” our laws of change and separation. It is the complete pattern. If it were not the true course of our nature, its native evolution, that which is predicable of every man, He would not have tasted death for every man, nor been our proper substitute.

But here an enquiry arises—it is not new—whether

we may not have mistaken the lessons of nature and Scripture, in attributing to man a physical immortality? Was he made immortal? Or, is this but conditional reward? We will not again open the question, which respects the teachings of natural reason: we have reported our honest convictions upon them. From these we cannot recede. The inspired testimony may, however, be examined touching this fact. This is the proper order in which the examination should occur.

Now an immediate thought arises, that, if men perish, their sin forfeiting the immortality which accrues to obedience, it is probable and fitting that such perdition should take place at death. This is the sentence. This is the only termination of being made palpable to us. Every thing of external sign and token answers to this supposed catastrophe. It is the limit beyond which we cannot follow any sensible evidence of life. At this point it seems most reasonable, if man be not immortal, that all existence should cease. Death is by sin. It is, then, the prepared execution of the sentence. It is a ready stroke. Why should another fall? Man has sinned to his utmost reach of responsible motion and action. Why should he not now suffer the threatened doom? If life be carried on, subsequently to death, it is a new gift, an addition to the proper term. It is more than mortal, though it be less than immortal. It is not included in the original case. Then it cannot be necessary to it. To us, who see in the suggestion only a vain conceit to serve a particular purpose, it appears an arbitrary prolongation of misery, an hereafter which was not

forewarned, something beyond forfeiture; an unnecessary revival of life, contrary to its own conditions; an excess of punishment, because a strain of law.

Another thought might arise, that, if it be true that revelation contradicts the general confession of mankind, their most precious moral instincts, then the greatest professed blessing ever extended to them, casts them down to a grovelling far below their once ardent and elevating hopes; depresses the standard of their aims and fears; and strangely teaches them that their capacity for this belief was not given them to be exercised. While the idea might be encouraged that every man, by the practice of virtue, would become immortal, no man could be prompted by this as a yearning of his nature,—no man could feel that he truly was. It might be a motive to us, for it would be a gain set before us, but it could be nothing drawn out of our proper sensibilities and aspirations. But surely it is not like Christianity thus to lower the pitch of what is noble and refining. It is surely inverse to its spirit. Besides, this contradiction must invalidate itself. What is the law of nature? Is not common consent its promulgation? Eternal truths are sup-

\* The argument is employed by Cicero, and with great fairness, considering his sceptical turn and habit of mind, both as to the existence of a higher power and as to human immortality. "*Ut porro firmissimum hoc afferri videtur, cur deos esse credamus, quod nulla gens tam fera, nemo omnium tam sit immanis,\*cujus mentem non imbuerit deorum opinio. . . . Nec vero id collocutio hominum aut consensus efficit: non institutis opinio est confirmata, non legibus. Omni autem in re consensus omnium gentium, lex naturæ putanda est.*" . . . "*Quod si omnium consensus, naturæ vox est: omnesque, qui ubique sunt, consentiunt esse aliquid, quod ad eos pertineat, qui*

posed, not in human immortality, for that being a divine effect is but a contingency, a physical maintenance; but in the inference of a First Cause, in the demonstration of a moral law, and in the connexion of that immortality with these eternal, necessary, facts. The first clash of any system with such truths must be its subversion! But in examining the sacred volume we can detect no lineament of the hypothesis that man is not by nature immortal, and only possibly immortal by acquisition. Our nature is there regarded as *one*: an assumption, or a negation, of immortality would perfectly diversify it in different individuals. It addresses that nature fully, religiously: it governs it with equal laws for good and evil. It throws a solemn character over this probationary life, because of the future depending upon it. It shames to glory and virtue now, by what we must be. Its hand ever points to indefinite consequences.

Let us study the creation of man. We possess its history. We are prepared to see in him no common greatness. If he be wanting in faculties necessary to the brutes, it is because his life is to be different from theirs. He crowns the whole. "There was light."

*e vita cesserint: nobis quoque idem existimandum est. Et si, quorum aut ingenio aut virtute animus excellit, eos arbitramur, quia natura optima sunt, cernere naturæ vim maxime: verisimile est, cum optimus quisque maxime posteritate serviat, esse aliquid, cujus is post mortem sensum sit habiturus."* Tusculan: Quæst: lib. i. cap. 13-15. It is to be regretted that the writer of these fine sentiments did not better found them. He compares the belief of a Deity to the naturalness of grief. "Atque hæc ita sentimus natura duce, nulla ratione nullaue doctrina." He rests the belief of immortality upon the passion for posthumous fame.

The heavens are stretched into their arch. The stars peal out their courses. Even these are for his seasons. The creatures of every element are his attendant retinue. Does he spring forth to the fiat which alone has been already heard,—“Let there be?” The very accents of consultation are heard,—there is plan and model,—there is the first intimation of personal Godhead,—there is the communication of infinite benevolence,—“Let us make man in our image, after our likeness!” What was that image—that likeness? Any resemblance of form, it were as gratuitous to deny as impious to suppose. We may learn something of its reality, by that which regeneration works in the disciple of Christ. “He puts on the new man, which after,” or according to, “God is created in righteousness and true holiness:” “he puts on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of Him that created him.”<sup>a</sup> These are the master-strokes. But upon what *ground* could they be drawn if not on an immortal nature? It is, therefore, worthy of notice, that after man had become deathful,—after he had begun to “bear the image of the earthly,” even after the awful judgement of the flood upon his race, God throws a singular protection around him, from the consideration of this original nature, then spiritually defiled, but not physically destroyed, nor physically destructible: “For in the image of God made he man.”<sup>b</sup> It may be replied, that so long as the image was unmarred there would be immortality. Yes,

<sup>a</sup> Ephes. iv. 24; Coloss. iii. 10.

<sup>b</sup> Gen. ix. 5, 6.



agreeably to this hypothesis, there might in the sense of a conditional favor. Our question is, however, of another kind: we demand how that image could be delineated upon a nature which, though it might be rendered immortal, was not then immortal, which could only grow into immortality by the most entire change? For such an impartation,—whether at first, or in present renewing,—since it is nothing short of the appearance of the Divine similitude in all the features of the soul, no adequate subjectiveness can be found save the mind, not breathed for an insect existence, but itself formed for endless knowledge, rectitude, and holiness in truth.

When we proceed to survey the actual Adam, constituted upon this honorable archetype, we are assured that he was “made a living soul.” That similar language, though accompanied with important distinctions, is employed concerning creatures inferior to man, is allowed. This, in the confined range of speech, must often occur. Life may be applied to the most different species and conditions. But can we doubt that man,—so created and so signalized,—is thus indicated for the express design of marking his rational and deathless soul, the only exception to all the other tribes, whose spirit goeth downward, and only inferior, though with an infinite remove, to Him who is “a quickening Spirit?”\*

We may be reminded of the discipline of Eden, in which man was placed, and of the tests of his obedi-

\* Note J.

ence there. Life and death were set before him. It will be said, that he could only understand what death was by what he saw of vegetable and animal death. It is unhesitatingly granted that mortality is the rule of all mere animal life, and that it is quite probable that he witnessed specimens of it. But as to himself, sin was not followed by the immediate loss of life. Shame and horror intervened. Another mental state arose in him. A new arrangement of toil and privation was decreed. He had died, though not physically, when he sinned. Nine hundred and thirty years prolonged that spiritual death, unless Divine mercy recalled him during that interval to spiritual life. We see the immediate effects of this disobedience in conscious disgrace, in remorse without penitence, in evasion of guilt, in concealment of sin, in sullen flight from the voice of God. These are the symptoms of spiritual death.—He was tried most properly by a positive enactment. It was not founded on any necessity or fitness. It was the pleasure of God. No other reason was given why it should be obeyed. It was also most proper that it involved restraint rather than effort or enterprise. It is called the tree of knowledge of good and evil, because, being the test of obedience and disobedience, like any other law, by it was the knowledge whether he obeyed or disobeyed, by it was the discrimination of good and evil. The fruit itself contained no virtue which could give the intuitive sense. But arbitrary tests excite moral dispositions. In the transgression of this commandment, burgeoning forth in this particular tree, lay every sin: all that belongs to the essence of

sin. Herein was every misery : the fibres of all curse struck out from it. They who deny the natural immortality of man, think that in the sequel of this narrative they acquire a strong position. "Behold," said the Triune God, "Behold, now the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil : and now, lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and taste and live for ever"—there the sentence abruptly ends. It is from this inferred that man was not immortal, but that his attempt to become so might succeed. This is sufficiently extravagant. It would seem that the prize was all but in his grasp. It might almost appear that he could have anticipated prevention. It could, perhaps, be speculated that this was a possible issue, and that it was, at least for a moment, in his power to snatch the mighty boon. But what was that tree of life? The sign and pledge of life to man so long as he obeyed, not only of a present undying life,—it promised spiritual life, that which consists in divine favor and self-approving peace. He may have eaten of it again and again, for its fruit was not forbidden. Yet we are inclined to suppose that it was untouched : the presumption may be that its purport acted as the interdict which certainly is not declared. A mysterious sacredness would most probably fence it. Our progenitor has fallen! The lure was that he should be as God. He feels that he is duped. His eyes are opened,—not as he was tempted to expect, in Godlike illuminations, but to his debasement and ruin. He despairs. Looking only to himself, he would clutch at any relief. This sacrilegious attempt would destroy

the only hope; it would cut off man irretrievably from God. That sin might not be remedilessly sealed and consummated, a voice is heard of terrific irony, but of tender mercy. It is not derision: it is the exposure of consequences. The result of the snare laid for man is shown. The kind of success attendant upon his emulation of Divinity is described. He is exhibited in all the folly and impotence of his ambition. "Behold, the man is become as one of us!" But farther infatuation shall be checked. It is not the effect, but the wickedness of seeking it, which is resisted. The effect itself, if attempted, would only be as void as the first. Man would no more secure impunity,—for that was his futile scheme,—than he had become a god. Yet the mere essay, however abortive, must be fatal. It had been inexpiable temerity. It had superseded and surpassed the power of mercy by spurning it. "Lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat and live for ever"—lest he should act again under that credulous idea which moved him first; lest he should as vainly dream that the fruit of one tree can constitute him deathless, as he hoped that the fruit of another could make him wise;—no more is added, the hiatus is supplied by deeds.\* The sinner is driven from the scene of his double temptation. The meaning of the symbol, however, by which he would have last transgressed, is preserved. A language is employed which denotes a ritual of typic mercy. A tabernacle envelopes the wonted emblems of communion, favor, and pardon. There is a glory,—“the shining of a flaming light,”—a sword

of fire,—not only to scare impiety, but to protect contrite and sacrificial access. And the true secret of deliverance, the true blessedness of immortality, is “kept,” is honorably and graciously guarded, nor ever since was lost !

Confident that the hypothesis of conditional immortality cannot establish itself upon this dread narrative, it is only just to add that it considers itself greatly supported by the general tenor of Scripture. That of these Christian records is deemed especially favorable. We observe in it frequent allusions to an alternative of life and death. It is contended that this is the alternative, man not being essentially immortal, whether he shall continue to exist or not. It would prove nothing for the hypothesis, if life and death were always put in antithesis, because it would still remain to prove that immortality and corruptibility only were expressed. The terms of the proposition would continue undefined. And it is no small vice in any proposition, no loose ground for suspecting it, when terms formally opposed to each other are differently applied. It may be said that life and death are ordinary terms to be understood in an ordinary sense. This is, however, to beg the question. It is the very point of debate. But even they who say this, do not give the ordinary sense for which they contend. Life would then mean only this human life : death only bodily dissolution. They intend by life a future existence, and if they allow any life consequent on death, it is a life which soon may cease. We altogether dispute the rule of

interpretation. For life and death in all these cases respect the soul: the life is not dependent upon common life, nor the death upon common death. They are spiritual states, of which the soul only can be capable. "To be spiritually minded is life." "Your life is hid with Christ in God." "Now we live if ye stand fast in the Lord." "This is life eternal to know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent." "The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus, hath made me free from the law of sin and death." So death does not necessarily imply the cessation of being. "You hath he quickened who were dead in trespasses and sins." This "quickening" is spiritual life: the reverse which is overcome must be spiritual death. "The life I live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God:" this is independent of organic and mental existence. "She that liveth in pleasure is dead while she liveth:" this is a death equally distinct. We are now "dead to sin." "To enter into life," "to enter the kingdom of God," are the same thing.—And we even find that the terms are not invariably opposed. "He that believeth not shall not see life,"—that is, not in ceasing to be, "but the *wrath* of God abideth on him,"—"he shall not see life,"—good, favor, blessing, "the life of God," "the light of life," "the grace of life," "the crown of life," but he shall live on under *abiding wrath*. The resurrection of life is not contrasted to that of death, but to that of damnation or judgement. "He that *hath* the Son *hath* life; and he that *hath* not the Son *hath* not life:" it is a present distinction.

during a common present life. Therefore the rebuke: "Ye have no life in you." Moreover, Christianity never claims more than a clearer discovery of the future state. "It hath brought life and immortality to light." Its gift of life, and abundance of life, is the good to which it converts our immortality. "Eternal life" is, consequently, not the language which it ever adopts to denote a mere immortal existence. It is the fruition of that duration. It is the perpetuity of bliss. "To them who, by patient continuance in well-doing, seek for glory, honor, and immortality,—*eternal life!*"

Nor is this hypothesis solely untenable on the grounds of revelation: objections lie against it arising from the nature of things. The following, out of many, may be mentioned. It strives to induce man to think of himself,—we will not say unnaturally, that being the involved dispute,—contrary to whatever of the noble and the great he so readily entertains. We will not say that he was made to revolve the question of immortality,—the argument forbidding it,—but he does entertain it as if he were thus made. The wicked have thoughts and fears which fill a dread futurity. The righteous crave the "pleasures which are for evermore." But each must regard himself henceforth as unenduring. Immortality is no part of them, nor enters into their natural being. It may, or may not, be superadded.—The *religiousness* of motive is impaired by this opinion, if not destroyed. An instinctive love of life and fear of death are the only inducements. The higher appeals, which sound up

through the soul, are stilled. How unworthy a construction is given to the inspired words,—“If ye live after the flesh, ye shall die: but if ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live!” In the one case, it has only the power of human legislation: in the other, it only perpetuates what civil magistracy as long as possible protects.—Depravity has so deadened the mind of the voluptuous transgressor, that the thought of this threatened non-existence, would scarcely awaken alarm or repel allurements. It is an end to which the sensualist consents, rather than the hazard of a renewed life. For while piety pants for the immortal, sin struggles against it,—not against being as such, but that which is feared to be retribution.—It would be difficult to prove that non-existence was an *evil*. If man live out his original term, he suffers no injury. He has sinned,—but by conditions of nature, had he not sinned,—though there would not have been this form of death,—his life must have determined. Immortality, being adscititious, may be withheld, but the human nature cannot be said to have suffered deprivation. It is at utmost a loss of what it never properly possessed.—The whole theory is weak and mean compared to the grandeur of Christianity. It reduces, it does not honor, man. It enfeebles, it does not confirm, religion. It supposes a treatment of moral agents, inconsistent, and that which defeats itself.

If any inquire why life and death are set forth so invariably to express joys or sufferings of a present, but especially of a future, life,—why they should be



the constant figures employed to denote them, it is sufficient answer that they present the greatest natural good and evil. Some figure must be selected. None could be so solemnly expressive as this :

" 'Tis not the whole of life to live,  
Nor all of death to die."\*

Trusting that it has been fairly argued that Scripture avouches all the great characteristics of man,—the spiritual, the accountable, the immortal,—it is time to prove, that it appropriates all the great ideas of law, which we have exhibited as dictated by reason and experience, in injunction, in obligation, in sanction. In every sense, it is a system of rewards and punishments. What law would have done, it either ~~does~~ or permits to be done. The principle and operations of law it only more firmly establishes. Some of these have passed under our review. In *habit*, *character*, and *consequence*, we have pursued the universal law in its often silent, but always sure, enforcement. All this is identified with the strongest emphasis.—Habit may be seen in any series of acts or of principles. "Can the Ethiopian change his skin; or the leopard its spots? then may ye also do good, that are accustomed to do evil." "But evil men and seducers will wax worse and worse, deceiving and being deceived." "Profane and vain babblings increase unto more ungodliness."—Character is laid open in its elements and constituents. We are taught that in every man there is a biased frame of thought

\* Montgomery.

and course of action,—not improbably concealed by more powerful temporary motives,—“the hidden man.” There is “rejoicing” in “the testimony of a good conscience.” “Many walk,” in all the decencies of profession, who are “the enemies of the cross of Christ.” Men are happy or miserable in what they are.—Consequence forms a matter of the most earnest admonition and warning. “So run that ye may obtain.” “Lust when it hath conceived bringeth forth sin : and sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death.” “The end, everlasting life.” “The end of these things is death.” “We shall receive the things done in the body, according to that we have done, whether it be good or bad.” To these consequences the supreme Governor has but to relegate the wicked. “So I gave them up to their own hearts’ lust.” “Ephraim is joined to idols: let him alone.” If we be perplexed by the delay or partial execution of law, revelation anticipates the objection: “Because sentence against an evil work is not executed speedily, therefore the heart of the sons of men is fully set in them to do evil.” “The Lord knoweth how to reserve the unjust unto the day of judgement to be punished.”

And there are other operations of the Divine government which we have noticed, that find a correspondent report in Scripture. Not only do we see men under the influence of their habits, characters, and consequences of conduct,—“their own doings besetting them about,”—but we are forewarned, according to what has been already recognised as the prudence of life, touching the dependence of the future

upon the present, as the very sanction of responsibility and secret of retribution. Eternity rolls on time. Moral agency is a vast calculation. "Laying-up in store for themselves a good foundation against the time to come, that they may lay hold on eternal life."—We are likewise adjured, agreeably to a well-known fact, to be watchful unto the end, lest one error endanger all. In a moment the labor of years may be undone. A single offence may permeate an entire life. "The righteous shall not be able to live for his righteousness in the day that he sinneth."—If, again, we have marked in these administrations issues for which no order of consequences and arrears can account,—if we discern the fall of punishments very distant from what we may presume to be their provoking sins, and yet most even to them,—such idea is not unknown to revelation, which not only asserts an ordinary system of things, but that "*God cometh out of his place* to punish the inhabitants of the earth for their iniquity."

But while Christianity seems to do little more than to replace the questions of law and obligation upon their just grounds,—than to address man in his true characteristics,—though it repeats them only with greater clearness, and promulgates them only with greater force,—reserving for its sublime originality the doctrine and the means of redemption,—there are announcements in it which may be called its discoveries, however they be most strictly related to the first constitution of things. They grow out of that constitution, but as they fall neither under our con-

sciousness nor experience, they could not be known save by explicit revelation.

The Resurrection of the human body after death, may be as necessary for the purpose of moral recompense as the immortality of the surviving soul. It does not owe itself, in any probability, to the remedial system of grace. If morally necessary, it cannot be contingent on what need not have been. It was, we must believe, equally in the scope of the law and in the mind of the Lawgiver, when the sentence was denounced: "Thou shalt die, thou shalt return to the ground." It is a universal event. The body, being the organ of the mind, is held to an account beyond this sentient life. The full development of the mind depends upon the restoration of its organ. Justice could in neither instance be exercised unless by their rejunction. If it have relation to man in a future existence, it is to the whole man. That man may be modified,—he is now constantly modified in every advancing stage of his being,—but he is still the same. He is a fitting subject for the same justice. This speculation, could it have presented itself to reason, must have appeared reasonable. It did not, however, cross the mind: by none was it entertained. Mankind were conscious of the soul, and frequently felt it strong in its life, glorious in its triumph, amidst corporeal dissolution. They more than inferred,—it was a spiritual intuition,—that it could not perish. There was no proof that it had died. There was every counterbalancing argument that it could not die. It was a different result which forced itself

upon the ~~sense~~ when man had given up the ghost. There lay the ruin. The eye was glazed. The heart was congealed. It was a mouldering heap. It was earthed among its kindred dust. It resolved into it. Nothing promised change. Spring dressed again its flowers: autumn renewed its riches: but man returned no more. His urn crumbled; and his sepulchre was effaced. Nor was this the hope and solace of them who themselves awaited death. They could only think of the body's entire waste and wreck. No device, no monogram, was engraven on the tomb which could intimate that those ashes should revive. But wherever the voice of revelation was heard, the resurrection was made known. It was early taught. It became the popular belief. The common people held it fast. Only the proud disciple of Sadoc said that there was none,—nor angel, nor spirit, so far being consistent with his first denial, for these are cognate truths: we are only true to Scripture, so long as we confess both.

It may be asked, whether the separation of the soul and the resurrection of the body can be considered as occurring in an order of nature? Doubtless neither of these changes would have been known to unsinning nature had man retained it. He would have been upholden in his undivided integrity, and his body been deathless like his soul. But he is so constituted that any change, which is the effect of sin, shall, as little as possible, disturb and set aside the order of nature. The foresight of the sequel (how can it be denied to infinite prescience?) is seen in these new

effects. He dies. His body decays. But when it was newly-created in purity and happiness, "the Lord God formed it of the dust of the ground." There is little violence done to general nature, immense as the evil is to man, when it returns thither and decomposes into its native clay. The spirit separates. This is an immense evil to man, considered in itself. But nature, by its anticipative provisions, is in this not greatly deranged. The spirit is not of the earth; it often acts to control the body, and, in independence of it, it maintains its own inward life. It was given separately to man, it is his heavenly dower, and we may conclude that it may still exist separately, apart from the frame, in its own consciousness, and in every exercise which the frame did never, could never, share. The resurrection, only properly affecting the body, synchronises with the restitution of the soul: the one, by an act not inferior to creation, is taken from the ground; the other, by an act not inferior to the first inspiration, is infused into its former tenement: and that two-fold event is the reintegration of the long-disparted man.

The resurrection of the dead being the doctrine of both Testaments, there are facts in both which prove its possibility, and foreshadow its certainty. And in these facts we mark a peculiar coincidence. They stand in parallel to one another. They regard death in its gradual effects. The son of the widow of Zarephath is restored to life shortly after decease, as is the daughter of Jairus. The child of the Shunammite mother is raised to life after lying dead for a longer period, laid out for burial,—while she hastens

from the city of Issachar to Mount Carmel ; and so is the son of the widow of Nain, after protracted interval, restored, while he is borne forth to interment. The corpse, which is hurriedly cast into the sepulchre of Elisha, revives and stands upon its feet : and Lazarus comes out of his grave. Thus, in far remote histories, we see bodily restoration in all the stages of death. To suppose that such events could take place among the same people, though at very distant periods, without convincing them of the great fact of the resurrection, or, which is equal to it, without answering to their settled belief, seems impossible.

Concerning the resurrection, it is enough to say that it is one event in time and action, that it is simultaneous ; that all who have lived must reappear in their moral order, be they just or unjust ; that it is accompanied or immediately followed by the change of our planet,—that it is preparatory to a great judicial decision.<sup>a</sup>

In language of mysterious resplendence and ætherealness, as though reflecting the outward brightness, as though breathing the spiritual interest, of the scene, is the resurrection of the saints described. Their forms are invested with lustre, knitted in strength, sublimated to indestructibleness, refined after spirituality. They are material, albeit for offices high and holy, only for impressions gladdening and pure. We do not read literally any where in Scripture of the resurrection of the body, though it must be understood when we

<sup>a</sup> Note K.

read of the resurrection of the dead. There must be a reason for this. The silence condemns the various theories which would explain the reorganisation of the body, or which would, because of its supposed difficulties, deny the doctrine altogether. "The vile body," the humiliated flesh, is to be "changed." That of the righteous shall be around them in its completeness, but rather as it existed in germ than as it was ever hitherto evolved. The seed is of the nature of the fruit, but the fruit may not always be discoverable in the seed. The seed-body is sown: the only pledges of incorruption, power, glory, spiritualism, were couched in corruption, weakness, dishonour, materiality. Has all been unfolded according to a principle and tendency? Apostolic description would imply it. A process has been going on, like a slow vegetation. We know not what is the influence of Divine grace, relatively considered, upon the flesh. It brings it into obedience and service. We know not what may be the effect upon it by union between the soul and Christ, and by the temple-inhabitation of the Holy Ghost. It is bought with a price. It is sanctified and preserved blameless. It is for the Lord. It may have received some power of development which shall be consummated by the resurrection. Or is the resurrection that special form of Divine interposition, without auxiliary, beyond law, which we call miracle? We would not dogmatically affirm or contradict. We know that it is by "the power of God." "The fashioning" shall be "according to the working whereby Christ is able even to subdue all



things unto himself." We are disposed towards both ideas. Something we deem to be in preparation, which may be illustrated by the figure of the seed. The figure is not to be pushed to the reality. Grant us but the force of that analogy, and we are satisfied. The raised thing is corporeity still : it is identity still. That which we sow is not quickened except it die. That which we sow is not the body which shall be. What must be the Power which shall achieve this mighty result ! Yet need not we call it miraculous ; it is not likened to it in its design ; it follows a great pre-arrangement ; it follows in a succession of principles and events. Our view of the fact,—the only one which now concerns us,—is to help the moral argument. The change in the saints is a resurrection to *life* : immortality is already sure, and is not peculiar to them. It is a prelude to their bliss. It is their equipment for their destiny : it is their capacity for a full reward. They put on robes of state : they are clothed with the badges of incorruption and immortality. Their body has become "glorious : " it covers the spirit as a holy veil, or as an imperishable enshrinement. One stage only is wanting for their consummation.

The pattern of their resurrection is that of the Son of God. And this statement is offered to mark an important distinction. We are inclined to think that there has been an exaggeration of certain qualities supposed to attach to his risen frame, in contradistinction to those of "the holy thing" which he received at birth. Familiar approach is not checked. Another

awe is not thrown around him. He is the same. If he exclaimed, "Touch me not,"<sup>a</sup> it was only because the hold which would have detained him, implied the fear that he was about immediately to ascend: ample interval for communion remained; "For<sup>b</sup> I am not yet ascended to my Father." "In the days of his flesh" he had often stood in attitudes of greater majesty than after rising from the dead. He had then given his form impalpability at will. He had rebuked storm and wave. All his miracles, with one exception, were done within that term. Now he ate and drank. He went in and out. "Reach hither thy finger,<sup>c</sup> and behold my hands; and reach hither thy hand, and thrust it into my side," was his method of convincing his incredulous disciple. Nothing was reserved: none were repelled. We only know most indefinitely what was the glory of his resurrection. It is not most passingly described. We are not told the appearance which he wore. A calm and a facility are just intimated in the manner with which his grave-clothes are disposed. The guards become as dead men, but it is before the angel and amidst the earthquake. In the whole narration he is not once seen. And until his ascension "his glorious body" is not assumed. There must be a reason for this. Why did he not rise as his saints shall rise? His flesh could see no corruption. It

<sup>a</sup> John xx. 17.

<sup>b</sup> There is the *truth* of description in this: the "finger" to follow the wound of the nail; the "hand" to certify the larger orifice of the spear.

could therefore, like their's, need no restoration. The proper glory was restrained. It was always ready to be manifested. At his pleasure its coruscations would have streamed around him. But he was to be recognised by his disciples, to his voice, to his features, to his wounds. Then, when "he showed himself alive, after his passion, by many infallible proofs, being seen of them forty days," the heavens receive him, he is by the right hand of God exalted, he sitteth down upon his throne! It is not so much to the risen body of Christ that his people shall be assimilated, as to his ascending and glorified one. They are his at his coming. They shall be like him, for they shall see him as he is. Yet is there for them the judgement. It is honorable and safe. It shall be their public acquittal and vindication. It is not the less solemn and real.

Concerning the resurrection of the wicked, the change wrought in the texture of their bodies, whether there be any tendings save those which are moral to the event, we are little informed. That all men shall rise is sure. That the unjust rise under the arrest of justice is certain. Christ is the author of this amazing effect in all. The resurrection of the just, as to its character and result, depends upon their union to him. He is their head. But the mere effect itself is not so related. That of the sinner, it is plain, cannot be so ascribed. It would be false to treat it as any benefit which flows to him from Christ. The resurrection of both belongs to the creative rule, or to a modification of it: it may be a physical

compensation for its disturbance. It is a requirement of retribution. It is, therefore, however different the awards, strictly judicial. The matter is thus determined by Christ. "The Father hath given authority to the Son to execute judgement. Marvel not at this: for the hour is coming, in the which all that are in their graves shall hear his voice and shall come forth." "The resurrection of the dead" is thus conjoined with the "execution" of "judgement." In that "end of the world," in that general resurrection, a fearful discrimination shall be pursued. It is the harvest: the reapers shall gather the tares of the field and bind them in bundles to burn them. The net which is full shall be drawn to shore, and they shall cast the bad away. The figures are explained. "The angels shall come forth and sever the wicked from the just." It may, at least, be assumed respecting the soul, which we think has been proved immortal, that the resurrection of its body cannot disfavour its immortality. Why is that body raised? Is it commanded to a second life, with the omnipotence of its first creation, to be the companion and auxiliary of what is perishable? All looks tremendously serious in the way of retribution. "The things done in the body" rise too, verifying their agent and their instrument. All stand ready for the sentence!

The judgement, as a great event and universal summons, can only be made known to us by revelation. The resurrection is its antecedent and preparative. Reason would tell that a decision waited to pass upon us. The consciousness of obligation would lead us to

believe that God would bring us into judgement with him. In the progress of life we should fear that "He would come near us in judgement." But that there shall be the gathering of all men, small and great, at that tribunal,—that three worlds shall attend the citation,—that it shall be the judgement of a day,—that Christ, the Mediator, shall be the judge,—no independent powers of our mind can teach. How does every hope and fear tremble in that balance!

An immediate adjudication of man's responsible conduct would be wanting in that high instruction and impression which such a scene must command. It is held back for this public and universal inquest. "After death is the judgement:" there can be no suspense. Character and decision are instantly confirmed. But it is not generally known. It is in the hiding-places of the spirit. It shall now be proclaimed. "The day shall declare it." "Their folly shall be manifest unto all." "God must be justified when he speaks, and be clear when he judges."

And though character and allotment be confirmed to every one who has passed into a future state, there is an obvious reason in the entail of sin for such a pause. "Some men's sins are open beforehand, going before to judgement; and some men they follow after." It is frightful to reflect what an extent of injury the evil influence of no long life may propagate through far distant times and peoples. The written infidelity, and obscenity, and blasphemy, is still actual and demeritorious as in the moment of their nascent thought. Maxim and example travel on, when the

very dust of those who gave utterance and vitality to them is no more. Guilt may lie in augmenting amount. Mischief may spread in a self-renewing process. This prolongation applies to the good, as well as to the wicked. "Their works follow them." "He being dead, yet speaketh." And, therefore, this final judgement stands back until probation shall close, when every man shall appear in it to account for all that he has done, and for all which has sprung out of what he has done, as the matter of his responsibility. If it be objected, that responsibility only concerns the moral agent's life,—we admit this, in general terms; we admit that he cannot be responsible for the acts of others in scattering the unholy store he has bequeathed; but is he not punishable for the accumulation of that store? is he not punished, in the fact, surely known to him, that he is still "teaching to sin?" Is not the righteous happy, not only in his life reviewed by him, but in surveying the good, that comes after him in deep-descending lines, which he promoted, and the impulse of which never may be lost?

The perfect recognitions of this one judgement are exacted by the confusion and irregularity which, upon earth, often seem to overwhelm the cause of truth and justice. In the mean while the Divine wisdom and righteousness are arraigned. And even human government is not infrequently wrested to violence and wrong. "Moreover, I saw under the sun the place of judgement, that wickedness was there; and the place of righteousness, that iniquity was there. I

said in my heart, God shall judge the righteous and the wicked." There needs the open setting forth of the great principles upon which man has been uniformly governed, and earth as uniformly ruled. There needs the finishing of that mystery which has enveloped so many transactions in its folds, and that a notable solution should be given to it. There needs that God should plead his own cause, and that he prove his invariable regard to it in those periods which have seemed to justify the charge of indifference and neglect. There needs the public avowal of his people and children, and the public disgrace of his enemies. Reason agrees to the justice of those declarative proceedings which such a judgement includes, and to which the Scripture bears its fullest testimony.

The first consequence of the judgement is, the separation of mankind into two classes,—classes which are sufficiently broad to receive all shades and distinctions of character. To one or the other is every man attached. For the first time is the separation notoriously made. The right and the left hands of the Judge form the points of division. Nothing can be more intelligible, marked, certain, extreme.

This awful scene respects the issues of all human conduct. It leaves and confirms all those influences for good or for evil, which attend every moral act,—it gives them an undiverted course. These influences have been partially and occasionally suspended during earthly probation. Self-accusation may have been lulled. Factitious circumstances may have counter-

veiled disgrace. The heart has deceived. Long-suffering and mercy have interposed. A check has been laid upon countless reactions. Tendency has been arrested, consequence forbidden to arise,—in other words, punishment has been restrained. But now the crisis is presumed when the full direction and scope may be allowed to the bearing and determination of all that has been done. Nothing requires it to be delayed. Nothing requires it to be controlled. The perfect result is there! “They shall proceed no farther.” Character is fixed. It has taken its final form. Nothing can affect it. The last vibration between good and evil has stopped. An entire, thorough, choice has been determined. It is perfect self-decision. The vessel is fitted by internal moulding for destruction. We may believe that none are delivered to this punishment but those who would still sin, whose hearts are set in them to do evil, who would not repent. The irrevocableness of disposition is settled ere the irrevocableness of doom. Since punishment mainly depends upon conscience, it may be supposed that this faculty will then gain its entire ascendancy. Amidst the illusions of life and enticements of society, its remonstrance may be repressed. It is, even now, sufficiently terrible to guilt. “We still have judgement here!” In the few intervals when its upbraidings are heard, it can bow down the stoutest heart. It has much in its manner, in its power, in its independence, of “the judgement to come.” “Our heart condemns us.” Then shall there be no blinding of the mind, no forgotten deed, no



evaded charge. The soul shall live through all its depths, and in the certitude of things. Memory shall present its woven chain of what was, and the order in which it rose, true to the natural succession, but as we never traced it, though the tissue lengthened out itself beneath our eye. Remorse shall utter all its taunts and reproaches, brandish all its scorpion scourges, and stretch wide its racks. The wicked "have rewarded evil to themselves." And, within this range, may be considered the motive which made evil so many acts, which were not evil in themselves. It remains for evil. It rages in the heart. It gnaws the soul.—Yet justice is not tied down to the measure of punishment which is filled with consequences, nor to the self-infliction of the sinner. These do not necessarily express its proportions. And now has the period come when it shall forego all oblique retribution. What, in its earthly administration, it only sometimes, and very rarely, did, it may now find necessary to do once for all. Its satisfaction, until that direct procedure, may have been incomplete.—Counterparts of retribution to crime were not unknown before this "judgement was set." We could not always follow them up in the train of events,—they proceed upon an immediate interference, which, if frequent, would give a sensibleness to present probation,—still these have appeared, though at distant æras. An invisible hand was at work. An unerring remembrance kept the record. But now in this last assize, that which was rare becomes the universal rule,—no reasons growing out of an immature dispensation forbid,—the

parallelism is perfect,—the bed of wickedness is the torture-bed, the cup of abomination is the cup of wrath.—These several circumstances of the judgement towards the wicked, equally apply to the righteous. Their holiness acquires all its due and natural influence and effect. “Their righteousness endureth for ever.” The felicity of their conscience and of their motives is complete. They receive a reward far greater than the simple consequences of their principles and acts could secure. All is seen of their former history, it returns to them, how they fed the hungry, clothed the naked, visited the sick, and comforted the prisoner. They are recompensed. They have a reward in heaven.

The chief doctrines of Christian grace, already adduced and defined, maintain a direct reference to a certain state of mind and of conduct in all who embrace and experience them. They presuppose the infraction of the Divine law. This infraction involves both guilt and depravity. That guilt and depravity it is their business to remove. But they contemplate an ulterior end. That law, being reinstated in all its inviolable dignity, becomes the code of the kingdom of grace. It is to be kept and obeyed, and everything besides is a mere contrivance and pre-requisite that it may be kept and obeyed. Justification removes the hindrance of guilt. Condemnation cannot co-exist with obedience. Were the obedience conceivable, the condemnation would vitiate it. We cannot speak of the loyalty of the branded traitor. His dungeon and fetters not only declare his treason, but his in-

capacity for being anything else. Loose his chains, forgive him, trust him, honor him, restore him, and he may be—he has the full opportunity—loyal yet. Regeneration removes the hindrance of depravity. The disaffection of the traitor would preclude his loyalty, did even his pardon allow him to display it. But if that traitor were absolved and received by his prince,—if his disaffection were purged, and greatly by the influence of this clemency, from his soul,—what would be the design? The clemency of the prince would be magnified, but that would be rather a personal celebration. The public grounds of the clemency would be to restore the convict-rebel to the privileges and sentiments of a good subject. And until these evangelic blessings be obtained by us, obedience in its welcome and disposition is debarred. Though duty is all the while the same, the sinner is not in a case nor in a temper to obey. In both these respects there is a disqualifying taint. Nothing is acceptable: nothing is of love. But now he has “by the faith of Jesus,” “access into this grace.” No guilt need intimidate him as though his obedience were proscribed. It is taken away. No depravity need discourage him as though his obedience were impracticable. Sin now suffers a crucifixion, and it shall perish. “God now accepteth thy works!” Enlightened views of the justifying righteousness of Christ Jesus, and of the regenerating inworking of the Holy Ghost, support all these conclusions. “That the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit.”

"How much more shall the blood of Christ purge your conscience from dead works to serve the living God." "Of his own will begat he us by the word of truth, that we should be a kind of first-fruits of his creatures." The first care of the Christian system is to enthrone the law of God, with a full redress, in all its rightful honors, beyond a possible charge of vacillation and indifference, of connivance at sin, or of partiality towards the sinner : then to "put it into our mind, and to write it in our hearts."

The new occasion and motive of obedience, which Christianity furnishes, constitute a feature most marked and important in the operation of Christianity. It is shown to be not a mere indemnity. The believer "yields himself to God as alive from the dead." Gratefully acknowledging the justifying acquittance, and the regenerating element, to which he owes his all, he is set in a new probation. His state and principle are brought to the test. A constant discipline is conducted, to prove what is in his heart. Temptation tries his courage. Affliction ascertains his submission. Amidst the good and evil of the present, his character must be formed and developed. It is to be determined, whether his state be real and his principle valid. A profession is to be sealed. In these adverse scenes the pilgrim moves. There is much to encounter, much to endure. But it is salutary. The furnace purifies the gold by its rigorous assay. The vine is pruned until it bleeds, that it may bear its richer clusters. A theatre is raised for lofty struggle and celestial dint. No evidence can

supersede this. It belongs to Christianity. The Christian is justified before God, by faith, without works : he only can be justified as to the genuineness of that faith before man, by works. Any impression of his mind that he is safe, in carelessness of holy endeavour, is perilously vain. Consciousness is, indeed, necessary to the proper examination of this evidence, for the dispositions of the mind form a large part of it : but the outward is that of which others can only judge, "Tribulation worketh patience, and patience proof:" the corroboration that we are "in Christ Jesus." It is in this way alone that Christianity can receive its visible portraiture ; and it is from the exercise of its principles in the minds and lives of its disciples, that this receives its finest touches and strokes. "The trial of faith," is the great business of this probationary arrangement. "They that are approved are made manifest." Others are detected who are "reprobate concerning the faith."

These views of the holy purpose of evangelic revelation, and of the new probationary œconomy into which it calls us, have a distinct bearing upon our relations to the final judgement. We are informed, repeatedly, most solemnly, of its rule. That is not, indeed, what we might have expected. It is another ordeal and process. It is true that "we shall be judged by the gospel." It is most legitimate, in anticipating it, to breathe the prayer, "the Lord grant that we may find mercy of the Lord, in that day." The whole constitution of things, of which this event is the close and the climax, is founded on "the gospel,"

and is the express covenant of "mercy." But it is not to be mistaken, that the great bias of Scripture directory and warning, is to draw off our special thoughts from grounds like these, when it points to the "day of God." We are not to be adjudged as justified, but, whether we be justified : we are not to be adjudged as regenerated, but, whether we be regenerated. In order to this proof, we shall be judged every man according to his works. The judgement-seat is not the mercy-seat. We must regard this awful transaction as an inquest into character. It is in our character of responsible agents, that we must give account of ourselves to God. In that simple condition shall we stand there. The question is only implicitly, whether we have obtained mercy, and found grace in the sight of God : the question truly and directly is, whether such mercy and grace—supposed to have been received—have moulded the righteous character, and stamped the holy life? These sovereign favors are reflected in their proofs, but the proofs are the exclusive subjects of the scrutiny. The merit of Christ is still the ground of hope. The power of the Holy Ghost is still the cause of difference. But the adjudication proceeds on the evidence of character and conduct, not the righteousness, but the mind, of Christ,—not the gift, but the sanctification, of the Spirit. Faith is dead without its work, love is dissimulation without its labor, hope is not hope without its waiting patience, repentance needs to be repented of without the fruits meet for it. These statements are due to a healthy, masculine, Christianity. It is a system of rewards and

punishments. The Christian is a candidate for the approval of his Judge. He labors that, whether present or absent, he may be accepted of him. He is a probationer for that sentence, "Well done, good and faithful servant!" It is not a holy humility to hide and weaken views like these. It is false and profane to set any honors of mercy against them. The constitution under which they, who were "enemies in their minds by wicked works," may now "walk before God, unto all well-pleasing," may know that he "has a favor towards them," may seek a recompense, is necessarily a constitution of mercy. To affect a greater jealousy for the claims of mercy, than its own constitution demands, is most hypocritically to insult it. Well-being is the state and the disposition which it confers: but well-doing is the course it enjoins and the evidence it requires. There is allotted to us a charge and a trust. We must give account of that stewardship. We are a peculiar people, zealous of good works. We must carry out that description. Wisdom must be justified of her children. We must study to show ourselves approved unto God. The men who have most clearly and triumphantly vindicated the unmingled purity of the Divine grace, to whom it was most reverently dear, even saturating all their thoughts and emotions, have ever thus spoken of duty and its remunerableness. We will be no parties to the dilution of their vigorous style. It agrees with "the words of the Lord, which are pure words." We will not enfeeble it by explanation, nor dishonor it by concession. Duty would cease to be duty if not urged

upon such terms. All will admit that this would be true were it attempted against law ; that it would surrender its authority, betray its name, and contradict its notion, but for its sanctions. Yet, what is law, save the handwriting of duty ? Was it a sordid thing in the lowly suppliants for mercy, to emulate the crown of eternal life ? It was thus that the ancient saints “had respect unto the recompense of reward,” and struggled “for a better resurrection ;” it was thus that the first propagandists of the Gospel, amidst the gathering clouds of mortality and the rising terrors of martyrdom, could address their converts—“Look to yourselves, that we lose not those things which we have wrought, but that we receive a full reward ;” could each lift his eyes to heaven, and assuredly exclaim—“I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith ; henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous Judge, shall give me at that day ; and not to me only, but unto all them also that love his appearing !”



## LECTURE IV.

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"AND, BEHOLD, I COME QUICKLY, AND MY REWARD IS WITH ME, TO GIVE  
EVERY MAN ACCORDING AS HIS WORK SHALL BE."

REVELATION xxii. 12.

THE analogy which we ascertain in the physical to the moral world must so fully convince us that there is a unity of design in both, as to banish every doubt concerning the oneness of their Author. The dual hypothesis of good and evil powers is not only proved to be absurd, but it is unneeded to explain any difficulty. All is now anticipated and relieved. The physical and moral worlds, as we are accustomed to call them, are but one world: their elements and laws are mutually subservient and perfectly blended. They are not parts and divisions of a whole: there is a transfusion of the qualities from which the whole is constituted. They are not properly different systems adjusted to each other, but are one entire and mature system. They may stand as mighty gates, furnishing distinct entrances, but they are covered by the same porch and lead into the same temple.

In examining the constitution of things amidst

which we are placed, we find that certain pleasures, or pains, follow on certain courses of conduct. This may seem monitorial, but it will be necessary to make some exceptions ere we establish upon this sequence a rule of right. For our sensuous nature in its solicitations and refusals cannot be an ultimate criterion. Reason assures us that these must be often withstood and always moderated. Gratification, or aversion, where the animal propensions are concerned, constitute these exceptions to a general rule, exceptions taught us by the obvious facts, that there are higher principles in us to regulate them, and that they cannot guide themselves. They are blind and headlong: they require control. Judgement and moral motive are given, and are competent, for this. But soon as we reach the province of mind and morals, we are impressed with a clear distinction. Right is good, wrong is evil. The tests of real happiness and misery present themselves. The distinction is, indeed, worked out very beautifully in the operations of insensate nature. None of its ordinances can be violated without a particular resentment. However disturbed, they will revert to their true direction. There is a fixed relation which, ever and anon, renews itself. However you break in upon it, it is presently repaired. The original order triumphs. However combined, or disintegrated, the same primitive proportions remain. If the intrusion be on sentient nature, a shock is immediately felt. Signs of resistance appear, not to be mistaken. It cannot be forced, nor perverted, without suffering. So far, nothing of moral

conclusion could be drawn. Hitherto, it is but a wise and benevolent arrangement, a preservation against confusion, a guardianship from danger, a warning to care. But it is a first step by which we ascend. It prepares us for a progressive law. The order of oecconomy merges in the order of obligation. There are acts and affections which cannot be cultivated without convenience and advantage, which cannot be crossed with impunity. Here the pleasure, or the pain, being predominantly, though not to necessity exclusively, mental, we find in them the indications of a rule. Unlike inferior indulgences, these can look to nothing higher in our nature. They belong to intellect and conscience. They are, therefore, though not the reasons, the sanctions, of a law. For we, as it must have been seen, dissent with utter scorn from the theory which places virtue in pleasurable emotion. We bow before its holy essence as enshrined in eternal necessity, we adore its perfect image in God. But that which accompanies, or succeeds, compliance with it, is its enforcement. Vice is its opposite, deterred by the opposite to real happiness. Destruction and misery attend on wicked doings. These effects are only the more silent operations of conditions which the revealed law avows: "Obey my voice, that it may be well unto you;" "If ye walk contrary unto me, I will walk contrary unto you."<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> "But all this is to be ascribed to the general course of nature.' Time. This is the very thing which I am observing. It is to be ascribed to the general course of nature, i.e., not merely to the words or ideas, *course of nature*; but to Him who appointed it, and put things into it: or to a course of operation, from its uniformity or con-

In this distribution of good and evil, the sanctions which the law of nature dictates, we shall detect a peculiarity which will be found to operate more widely and impressively in revealed law. The benefit is as real as the disadvantage, the good as the evil, or, which is the same thing, the reward is as real as the punishment. But it is not so instantaneously visible. Health is soon shattered, peace broken, character destroyed. These consequences are more sudden, notable, direct. Health and peace and esteem, the true results of virtue, may be greatly defeated by the contingencies of this life. They may be almost too uniform for notice, almost too habitual for consciousness. So, even they who now possess these blessings, would learn their truth and value, their absoluteness, more intimately and sensibly, though certainly more painfully, by any interruption of them, even in momentary illness, agitation, and reproach.

It is most desirable, then, that we carry our natural, common, ideas of obligation and sanction to the government of God and to his revealed dispensations. We must not employ language of a two-fold interpretation. Justice and truth and right, mean always the same things. They are in God, what they are in man. We disclaim all esoteric, and exoteric, distinctions. It might be the boast of the Homeric deities, that for everything named on earth, they had another name.\* But the ideas of moral rectitude, as they exist stancy, called natural, and which necessarily implies an operating agent."—Butler.

\* "Ὅν Ζῆνθον καλέουσι θεοὶ, ἄνδρες δὲ Σάμανδρον." Vide Scholium. Iliad, l. 20, 74.

in the Divine and human mind,—taught to the human by the Divine,—differ not in substance, however they shall in clearness. The medium which conveys them is strictly one, it is of earth,—than this none other has been employed. It can only be used in its own determinate sense. Nor is there any intimation that a higher sense is reserved for these ideas in the infinite intelligence, so that a real difference takes place in them. This would be self-contradictory. The ruler and the subject would be seen to act upon different principles. Opposite significations would sway them. Surely this definite acceptation of moral ideas and terms is confirmed by Him who spake of old: “Yet the children of thy people say, The way of the Lord is not *equal*; but as for them, their way is not *equal*.”

The principle of legal sanctions, finds an early analogy to itself in the constitution of our minds. It is always most important in moral reasonings, to trace, if possible, such analogy. No argument is more convincing to the reflecting observer, than that which arises from the fact. Whatever is the law of the wise and righteous God, must be consonant to him who is the subject of it. Are we, then, formed to act from such a motion as sanctions presume? The question resolves itself into one, only different, by being more simple. Would we be happy? This is instinctive choice. When reason is unhinged, that choice might cease, but not until then. The most solemn sanctions may be to us only the solemn application of the daily use of means and ends. “A prudent man foreseeth

the evil, and hideth himself; but the simple pass on, and are punished."

The dependence of the future upon the present, we all unhesitatingly admit. Our bodily vigor, our mental peace, our reputation, our influence, are greatly in our own keeping. We know, with obvious exceptions, that we have power and command over them. This is the care which we exercise as prospective beings. None dispute the fact. Youth is bound to age, and lays up its store of good or evil. Successive moments are not only related to one another, but each bears on each. This may be called *natural* reward and punishment. It prepares us to expect something far more unerring and determinate in that government, by which motives are sifted and actions are weighed.

The obnoxiousness of crime to punishment is an idea quite easy to the mind. The degree and matter of it must depend upon the demerits and the relations of the crime. The most ready application of this idea is to society. We readily understand that a community of persons and of interests can alone be guided by regulations and protected by laws. The magistrate but represents it. He enforces its covenants and conditions. Offence committed against himself affects all the members of the commonwealth: offence against any or all of those members affects him. The claims of both are inseparable. They hold together for general order and safety. The disturber, the marauder, the violent and bloody man, are regarded with

horror. Their wickedness is anticipated by precautions in statute and police. The first view taken of crime is its mischievous and destructive tendency. It is to be repressed. But enlightened governments soon legislate in reference to its desert. They cannot always, nor often, repress by prevention. That attempt, in the most favourable circumstances, will be very commonly void. They must punish. This is required to satisfy the justice of the state ; not a poetic impersonation, but its consistency, its impartiality, its trustiness, its strength. Their function is also to convince, by such punishment, that the protection of the peaceable and obedient citizen is not overlooked. Moreover, by examples of retributive justice, they must warn and coerce other offenders, whose crimes are not sufficiently obtruded for notice or matured for vengeance. The proportion of desert, therefore, becomes a most serious study. Severity and leniency are equally injurious extremes. Nor must distinctions be confounded. To punish all classes of offenders alike argues a blind resentment. It will speedily efface the sense, or destroy the care, of such distinctions. Men will grow reckless. The most enormous transgressions will be dared when but a uniform penalty is affixed to them and to the least. To conceive of a social system without these self-supports, without resting upon defined laws and fixed retributions, is to conceive what perhaps was never projected, what certainly never did exist.

We soon find, in examining the best governments of earth, how very unequally rewards can keep pace

with punishments. The citizen must be satisfied with the security and quietude of his humble station. This is what he earns. It is his merit and his meed. Virtue is not notorious as is vice. The fame of goodness is not like the clamour of ill. Every social offence jars through the social frame. The public attention gazes upon the individual delinquent. The general disgust is awakened towards his particular act. He is known, who was unknown before. Obscurity bursts into light, and insignificance rises into prominence. And now are prepared the forms of judicature. The emblems of justice are held on high. Law sits in throned state. Pleadings of accusation, it may be of defence, are heard. Crowds gather around the court and the prison. In a breathless silence, which seems to still the nation, sentence is awarded. And then, amidst dread publicities, falls the inflicted stroke. But it is not this proof alone which we adduce. In wise and good jurisdictions the grosser offences are not suffered to escape their due punishment. Yet are there many evils with which civil polity can scarcely intermeddle. Merely their overflowings can be checked. Yet if we look among the lieges of that state we shall find the independence of the social virtues which they cherish and maintain. They are meek and retiring. Of their own nature they follow an order of quiet and unpretension. Contentment, industry, temperance, modesty, domestic love, household faith, do not report themselves. They ask no chronicler; they seek no blazonry. Society unconsciously feels its health, its sweet rest, in their culti-



vation. They mildly grow like the olive ; they beautifully entangle like the vine. They are committed to prove their own reward. All that they can obtain, save inward peace, is security and respect. Splendid guerdons fall to few, and seldom to the lowly good. The arm of power, if desirous to honor them, is short: there is very little which it can do. Feeble is even its succour, slow its recognition, and faint its praise. The punishment of the oppressor is not necessarily the indemnity of the oppressed.

In the institutes of earthly legislation we possess a very imperfect copy of the Infinite rectitude. God is righteous. Justice and judgment are the occupation of his throne. To think otherwise of him were to undeify him. Better would be the foolishness which denied that he is, than the blasphemy which represented his power as lawless, arbitrary, will. By his justice we understand a disposition to rule his intelligent and accountable creatures, with a constant reference to their well-being ; to "give them all the goods which fall unto them:" when his rule is obeyed, to reward : when his rule is opposed, to punish. We do not see how the propriety of rewarding, and not of punishing, can be momentarily entertained. This would not be justice. We cannot understand the mercy of reward. Mercy may be the basis of the constitution under which it is given, but reward can respect rule and condition alone. Did he not punish, the forbearance would be an encouragement, and an implied love, of evil. God would be tempted by it. He would not set himself against it nor walk contrary

to it. He would pass by the breaches of right, and truth, and happiness. He would abandon his creation. He would abdicate his throne. Horror-struck by these dilemmas, we look up to him, and adoringly exclaim: "Thou art not a God that hast pleasure in wickedness, neither shall evil dwell with thee." "Thou hatest the workers of iniquity." We feel the force of that declaration: "The righteous Lord loveth righteousness." We allow the weight of that demand: "Is God unrighteous who taketh vengeance? God forbid; for then how shall God judge the world?" We bring the whole question, therefore, of distributive justice, punitive and compensative, to bear upon those great events which we have found assured in holy Scripture,—the resurrection and the settlement of the last day, when "God shall judge the world in righteousness;" when we, and all who have either risen or been changed, shall behold "the revelation of the judgement of God."

This rectitude knows none of the limitations and incapacities which attach to human government. It measures all its exercise by a faultless rule. It is baffled by no difficulty, it fails of no end. Right cannot perish nor wrong overcome. There is no physical restriction to this law. It has access to mind. It has sovereignty over conscience. The whole man is helplessly in its power. Reward and punishment suppose delay. Yet this is not conceded on the part of the Divine government, in any rigid view or to any large extent. The inward emotion, itself reward and punishment, accompanies the act. The judicial issue

may be withheld. But when it is reckoned up, there shall be shown no inequality, no evasion, no compromise, no giving way, no turning back, no capitulation, such as the powerlessness of earthly rule so frequently betrays. All obedience and disobedience shall receive its due.

Now it may be necessary to adduce proof that the Christian revelation does aver the doctrine and promise of rewards. The theme of penal retribution must afterwards be considered. To the question of these rewards our present attention is claimed. Not a few, who bear the Christian name, survey the subject with jealousy and dislike. They suspect its interference and incompatibleness with salvation by grace. Its vocabulary is repugnant to their taste: they never employ it but with qualification. They might almost account inspiration incautious in its style. They are always ready to correct it. They affect a concern for the Divine character which it does not confess. They are always impatient to set it right. It is a sentiment morbid and profane! It is "speaking wickedly for God!"

The sacred Volume plainly defines what is, and what is not, its principle upon this question. It supposes the case of an unfallen man, who has kept the whole law, who is entitled to the life of justification by works. "Now to him that worketh is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt." That case is purely hypothetical,—it is utterly inapplicable and unavailing,—it is for ever past. The ground of a sinner's justification is altogether different. He of

himself can do nothing to recover favor and acceptance. The attempt to do so is a fearful aggravation of his guilt. "He worketh not." He can claim no "reward of debt." When "he believeth on Him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith"—that which is its object, or that which it embraces—"is counted for justification." Now, in such an instance, after such a pre-requisite, may we prepare ourselves to understand "the reward of grace." Let us, with this distinction in our mind, examine inspired language concerning the well-doing of justified and regenerate men. "God is the rewarder of them that diligently seek him." "The Lord rewarded me according to my righteousness; according to the cleanness of my hands hath he recompensed me." "Verily, there is a reward for the righteous." "Great is your reward in heaven." "And whosoever shall give to drink unto one of these little ones a cup of cold water only in the name of a disciple, verily I say unto you, he shall in no wise lose his reward." "Let no man beguile you of your reward." "Ye shall receive the reward of the inheritance."\* The principle is not dependent upon a word, or some nice shade of expression. The conditional manner in which all promised good or benefit is ensured, confirms it. It is pledged to character: it is

\* Reward may be used in the sense of punitive recompense. So our translators occasionally employ it. Psalm xci. 8; Hebrews ii. 2; 2 Peter ii. 13. Sometimes it is employed indifferently for good or evil. *Μισθωδορία* is taken to be stronger than *ἀντιδορία*. This cannot be proved. We adopt it in its conventional acceptance, exclusively as the premium of virtue: punishment can only have an invariably evil meaning.

unintelligible and unsuited to them who possess not kindred sentiments and tastes. Character is here the condition, being the capacity. We therefore read, "With the merciful thou wilt show thyself merciful; with an upright man thou wilt show thyself upright; with the pure thou wilt show thyself pure." Nor is it less so when this promised good rests with our dispositions to give it effect. "If I do, this thing willingly, I have a reward." "Cast not away your confidence, which hath great recompence of reward." The final state of happiness to which Christians are admitted is thus described: something to be enjoyed by a peculiar aptitude and under a condign claim. They are "accounted worthy to obtain that world." They are "worthy of the kingdom of God for which they suffer." "They walk in white, for they are worthy." The theory of Christian reward depends upon a fixed constitution of holy law which has its foundation in the atonement of Christ. From that Real Sacrifice proceeds a consideration by virtue of which the strict justice which regarded the sinner is satisfied. That justice no longer forbids his salvation, but confirms it. An infinite merit, or righteousness, becomes the basis for the acceptance of his person and his works. Could his works challenge a perfect conformity to the Divine will, he would not need the aid of any atonement. They now look to the satisfaction of Christ for the sole reason why they can find favour with the Righteous One. The entire basis and scope for such treatment of them is the Mediatorial system. All is done "through Jesus Christ," and "in his name." All

is received "for his sake." "Whatsoever ye do in word or deed, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to God and the Father by him." "For his name's sake they went forth." We are explicit to guard against misconception. We would found the doctrine of rewards aright. But we would speak in no tone of exception and excuse. Whatever its relations and its reasons, it is a perfect doctrine,—to be understood and defended in itself. God, the rock of faithfulness, binds himself to it. It is not that pseudo-scheme which stipulates his dishonor by the allowance of a sincere, instead of a complete, obedience; itself adjusted and accommodated to a mitigated law; (a predicament which, by its terms, must make insincere what it tolerates as incomplete,) but an order and arrangement which insisted on, against the Substitute of man, a perfect obedience even unto death, ere the imperfect virtues of them upon whom the penalty has no farther claim and force could be approved, and still exhibiting that obedience as the exclusive ground of approval. This course being settled, God having engaged himself to it, there arises an order which he authorises, an expectation which he fulfils. "God is not unrighteous to forget your work and labor of love." "Blessed are they that do his commandments, that they may have right to the tree of life, and may enter in through the gates into the city."

It may be said that, while punishment is considered as a recompense, every benefit of salvation, and all that flows from it, is ascribed to grace. The one may be of desert, but the other is gratuitous bestowment.

"The *wages* of sin is death; but the *gift* of God is eternal life, through Jesus Christ our Lord." To any such statement we assent. It must, nevertheless, be remembered that the former applies properly to the first constitution, while the latter is peculiar to the second. And assuredly we speak not now of eternal life, otherwise than a gift, certainly not as the wages which we have earned—however, beneath the dispensation which secures this gift of eternal life, there be terms and rewards which serve the better to illustrate its simple mercy, its holy character, its glorious immutability!

We now enter upon an inquiry, which passes beyond the fact and the doctrine of reward: we investigate what may be called its philosophy. Are virtuous affections and acts, in the circumstances which we have supposed, rewardable? Can the contrary be imagined? Could it be gravely urged? Is it fitting, reasonable, agreeable to right, consonant to the nature of things, that they be considered and treated as proper subjects of reward? Should we succeed in our proof, one thing may be demanded. We must be shamed out of constant apology for the term itself. We are bound as openly to declare the doctrine as any other. In maintaining all truth, we shock many classes of persons and many orders of feelings: why are they, who oppose the theology of Christian rewards, only to be accommodated and soothed? Are they the most worthy defenders of Divine grace? Are they the most devoted assertors of morality? Are they the men of large views, of connected ideas, of

holiest principles? We must revere the diction of Scripture, nor trust ourselves to refine upon it.

1. If it be objected that a mercenary feeling is implied in this idea and expectation, we disclaim, once for all, that religion ever proposes itself to an abstract disinterestedness in man. Such a tenet holds not with the first speculative view of law. It contradicts all the love of happiness, and fear of misery, which are our earliest conscious emotions. It is at variance with our probationary position during the present life. It wars, with every sanction of obligation. The greatest exercise of reason, the best conduct of understanding, to which we can have recourse, is to seek the most extensive measure, and the most durable continuance, of good. We are not called to "serve God for nought." We are warranted to anticipate "profit, if we pray unto him." Every duty is but a path to the pleasant direction, and cheerful use, of our being. Every sacrifice is secured its ample indemnity. Every restraint is the prevention of so much ill. A proper self-love finds in religion, a perfect expiation. It is "a fulness of blessing." This is reciprocally explained and understood. God declares it: "that they may fear me for ever, for the good of them; and I will make an everlasting covenant with them, that I will not turn away from them, to do them good." His people avow it: "Lord, to whom shall we go, but unto thee? thou hast the words of eternal life." We need not, then, apprehend that the purest sentiments of piety, the most disinterested repose on the Divine



beauty, the most complacential veneration and esteem, the warmest spontaneousness of gratitude, can in any wise be impaired by the creature's necessary desire and pursuit of happiness. Religion is itself a reward,—but one reward,—and it appeals to all who are capable of emulating it. “Eat ye that which is good, and let your soul delight itself in fatness.”

2. Whatever was rewardable at any time, and in any circumstances, on account of its own intrinsic qualities, or its agreement with the nature of things, must be always rewardable. Light and darkness, sweet and bitter, are not less interchangeable than good and evil, right and wrong. It was not arbitrary in God, to connect happiness with obedience to his will, for his will is not arbitrarily holy. It must be holy, he being infinite perfection. That will towards moral agents, is now a governing will. It rules us in rectitude, and for good. It is necessary that it manifest its nature, its delight in rectitude and consequent happiness, by corresponding laws. It, from the beginning, gave life and energy to them. Is there variability with the Father of lights? It is to say nothing in the shape of argument, to reply that we are now in another history. This we have assumed. In this new history, our nature is restored. We may, and can, obey. We obey from an acceptable and sanctified motive. We do it not perfectly, but the consideration of acceptance is always perfect, and the sanctifying work in us is always pressing towards perfection. As far as we obey, there must be the restitution of the original good. That is only another term for the

originally affixed reward. Obedience must not be unmarked and neglected, for that would suppose indifference towards it. This would be injurious. It would induce in the creature a similar slight. A general indifference would prevail. But, we may indeed ask, why, after such a manifestation of mercy, in nothing more signalized than in this privilege and capability of obeying, any advantage, ever bound up with it, should be withheld? Let us remember that the œconomy, beneath whose grace obedience is now rendered, supplies more abundant reasons, than could exist in any other, for its recognition, encouragement, and support. Is reward, the natural and the appropriate incentive, to be excluded?

3. An analogy will be found to the conditions of reward in the highest examples, as well as in the humblest forms, of moral motive. We wish it to be understood that motive of this kind can alone constitute the freedom and significance of any moral act. It is inconceivable that a motive can sway such an agent, even any rational being, which is not prospective of a beneficial result. We cannot momentarily think of the inducement for this course of conduct in preference to that, or for that in preference to this, without the certainty of the conviction that the inducement is in some presumed good, in the tendency of one course rather than of the other to immediate or ultimate happiness. Place the question however low. "Who goeth a warfare any time at his own charges? who planteth a vineyard, and eateth not of the fruit thereof? or who feedeth a flock, and

eateth not of the milk of the flock? Say I these things as a man? or saith not the law the same also?" From humble instances like these, we may ascend to glorious illustrations. We must find a motive for the daring of the confessor and for the constancy of the martyr. Did they not listen, amidst tortures and flames, to the command and promise: "Be thou faithful unto the death, and thou shalt receive the crown of life?" But we cite that benevolence which only was without abatement of self-sacrifice,—that perfect devotion,—that holocaust of purest, intensest, love,—and yet, in emphatic explanation of that love, are we taught, that "*He, for the joy that was set before him, endured the cross, despising the shame.*"

4. If human conduct, so influenced and performed, be acceptable, it must be capable of praise, as the opposite would be liable to blame. This is praiseworthy. There are forms of it which are met by "the honor which cometh from God only." "Whose praise is not of men, but of God." "For not he that commendeth himself is approved, but whom the Lord commendeth." This is a clear distinction, a fixed idea, of Christian obedience. It would be cold and inert in their withdrawal. The praise marks its true quality, and pronounces its just ratification. The refusal of praise would be unreasonable and discouraging. What is distinctively excellent, demands distinctive notice. But distinctive notice is honor. What is this plaudit but reward? Thus our Lord, in speaking of affections which are supposed to be selfish or self-requiring, asks: "What thank have you?" It

is assumed that affections more generous and useful would be entitled to thanks. If disregard to virtue be impossible in the virtuous mind, then it is impossible in God. Can there be higher reward than his approval? "Study to show thyself approved of God." "He that in these things serveth Christ, is acceptable to God, and approved of men." If "the trial of our faith be found to praise and honor," if it be truly laudable in its own features, what must be the crowning esteem and favor of Him whose smile is the light and life of all such "praise and honor?" "Then shall every man have praise of God."

5. The character of these dispositions and acts will support our argument, that they belong to a moral order and classification, and that they are consequently rewardable. They are commonly described in holy writ as "good works." They are so allowed. "We are created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them." "That ye may abound to every good work." "This is a faithful saying, and these things I will that thou affirm constantly, that they which have believed in God might be careful to maintain good works: these things are good and profitable unto men." They, as good, are convenient and beneficial. They extend that which is good. All duties, even the most ordinary, yield appropriate advantages: "Children, obey your parents in all things, for this is well-pleasing to the Lord." They are "well-pleasing" on account of their "necessary uses:" they reach the foundations of social life. They supply want,

maintain order, spread affection, heal strife, diffuse happiness. They propagate their own influence. Only omniscience can estimate how they soothe the passions of men, bind the breaches and dislocations of civil life, and hush the commotions of earth. These are the patterns which arrest the general corruption of manners. These perpetuate the voice of reason and truth. They cannot be separated from their agents. These are "good men." They are "full of goodness." This "goodness" is "the fruit of the Spirit." Their "goodness extendeth not to God," but it does to his saints and his creatures. Precious are the effects of such habitual principle. Nor need we restrict our definition of "good works" to that of benevolence. The good man is "good in the sight of God." What he does is "good and acceptable before God." But surely He, who is "good and who doeth good," cannot fail to regard whatever is like himself, and to bless it. He will signify most decidedly his complacency. He will "do good unto those that be good." This is nothing else than reward.

6. Christianity is moral administration. It is a "kingdom." Even its immediate blessings enter into this form, while it authoritatively addresses the children of men. It is "made known to all nations for the obedience of faith." "God commandeth all men every where to repent." Whatever is done under this "reign," and according to it, partakes of the same quality. The Divine will, or law, is proclaimed. If we "obey the gospel of God," we see the rule of our conduct, we know what the "will of God

is;" we approve it as "good, and perfect, and acceptable;" we "live to it;" we "do it from the heart." His dominion is thus restored. But shall only the code be reinstated? Shall not all the principles of moral government be resumed? Shall He not rule in equity and in truth? If his will be now done on earth, shall he not favor that act? Is not this obedience that which he loves to mark with peculiar honors, with tokens of satisfaction? Why, then, abrogate the sanctions of moral government at the moment of its most solemn inauguration? Why invalidate its very meaning and support in its most signal crisis, just as it is adopted and incorporated into the greatest system of order and sway which ever can be framed? Why deprive it, in such a conjuncture, of all that is vital and executory? Why invest it with newer dignities, while it is shorn of all inducement and defence? Why speak of its mightier power, at the time that it is abandoned without any means of enforcement? Destroy its sanctions, you destroy itself. To build Christianity upon that negation, to take that defunct authority and therewith to deck it, is once more to put the reed in its hand, and to cover it with the ensigns of derisive royalty. This would be to seek occasion of it, of its awful marvels and deific truths, to break up the system of conduct which God has invariably pursued towards intelligent beings. And "thus the kingdom of heaven" would be postponed to every creature-administration. Its sceptre would be impotent. "Wilt thou not be afraid of the power? do that which is

good, and thou shalt have praise of the same." Law can exclusively operate by these considerations. Despoil it of sanctions, it may be counsel, but it is no more law. God, in thus legislating, appeals to the motives which he, at the first, implanted in us. If that which is good is the subject of precept, that precept must be enforced with a reason, a reason not in answer to the question, why it is required? but to the question, why the creature should obey it? "That he may see good." "So shall it be well with thee." "So shall good come unto thee." An act could not be one of obligation were it not susceptible of reward, and connected conditionally with it.

7. We might desire to know, in such an inquiry, how far those things which, by fixed constitution, must be esteemed rewardable, are, in themselves, pleasing to God. We have marked them, as objects of his praise, as well as entitled to general honor. Is this a relative, or a real, approbation? Certainly it revolts all our sense of his consistency and truth that he could accord it in secret disgust, or with the absence of a distinct delight and satisfaction. His mind must be towards it, if he pronounce his pleasure in it. So far as simple good is supposed, he is most ready, we believe, to bestow it. But reward is a legal condition and shape of good, only to be bestowed on particular character and conduct. Now these can only be made the subjects of this good, in proportion to the manner in which they correspond to the will of God. The testimony is very early that the restored children of

Adam may, "by faith, please Him." "He worketh in us, that which is well-pleasing in his sight." They "keep his commandments and do those things that are pleasing in his sight." Their language, invoking the most solemn scrutiny, is "Not as pleasing men, but God, who trieth the hearts." Their love and service towards each other, are "an odour of a sweet smell, a sacrifice acceptable, well pleasing to God." "With such sacrifices God is well pleased." It must be perfectly agreeable to his moral government and to his covenant promise to "reward" that "openly" which pleases him, to let his "beauty" be upon that which he truly loves, to crown those who "walk before him unto all well-pleasing," with "the favor which is life!"

8. Since whatever pleases God must conduce to his glory, we may justly desire to know whether there be proof that his glory is thus promoted, whether he has declared that Christian obedience is so regarded and admitted by him as subserving this end. He who rewards will surely consider, in acting after this manner, what is due to himself. He cannot compromise his character in honoring anything by which he is dishonored. His glory will he not give to another. We find the rule of his conduct proclaimed by himself: "Them that honor me I will honor, and they that despise me shall be lightly esteemed." Now we shall infallibly learn from Scripture, that those acts and virtues which are the proper subjects of reward, are formally identified with this great purpose which he invariably and necessarily pursues. "Herein is my



Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit." "That others, seeing your good works, may glorify your Father which is in heaven." "Being filled with the fruits of righteousness, which are, by Jesus Christ, unto the glory and praise of God." He delights in them who display these excellences. They are "his signet." They are "a royal diadem in his hand." He will "make them up as his jewels." "The riches of the glory of his inheritance are in his saints." The end of his glory being secured by the holiness of his people, they who have in this manner glorified him being the objects of his most favorable regard, no reason can offer itself why there should not be the expression of all this, why that holiness should not be applauded, and those holy ones should not be set on high for distinction and admiration, "the glory of Christ," "glorified in him," "glorified together with him," "shining forth as the sun," "shining as the brightness of the firmament!"

9. Nor can any other conclusion be suggested when fact, rather than argument, is revolved. In every virtuous deed and feeling, (and the case supposes them to be of the purest principle and standard) there is immediate and consequent pleasure. We are conscious of this. This is a natural state of the mind. Christianity does not break in upon the order of our moral sentiments. Our original constitution of being is not changed, but renewed. We may, therefore, rest assured, that the whole operation of true religion,—notwithstanding its difficulties, arising from much remaining disaffection and infirmity,—is, of itself, an

actual, though not of its nature a formal, reward. "Great peace have they that love thy law, and nothing shall offend them." "Godliness is profitable unto all things, having promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come." Even this promise, here standing for tendency, does not fully state the fact. There are more transcendental views. "There is no man that hath left house, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for my sake and the Gospel's, but he shall receive an hundred-fold now in this time, houses, and brethren, and sisters, and mothers, and children, and lands, *with persecutions*; and in the world to come eternal life." Language like this can only admit of spiritual construction. Such pledge can only redeem itself. All is restored, while all is confiscated; and the pleasures which the possession of these acquisitions gave, their loss multiplies, and heightens into a century of far higher pleasures;—held beyond the possibility of a loss, in the consciousness of him, around whom, and upon whom, at the very moment, these persecutions rage. Sublime as this inward restitution is, enriching the Christian to the proportion of his spoiliations, and then beginning the vast accumulation upon his recovered store, it is but consistent with other numerous appeals. "Count it all joy when ye fall into divers temptations." "For this is thankworthy, if a man for conscience toward God endure grief, suffering wrongfully." This "rejoicing," this "leaping for joy," is made to originate in present, and not reversionary, good: or it is "the substance of things hoped for, the evi-

deceit of things not seen," now realised to the soul. God says, "I am thine exceeding great reward." And this he proves in innumerable ways. He can cause liberality so to prevail against selfishness, that "it is more blessed to give than to receive." He can impart that assurance, amidst the most discouraging efforts, which shall encite us, "inasmuch as we *know* that our labor is not in vain in the Lord." Every service his people perform, repays itself in the joy which it brings with it. "The joy of the Lord is your strength." "Light is sown for the righteous, and gladness for the upright in heart."\*

10. That good works look properly for reward may be inferred from their source, and from the purpose of their inspiration. God is the author of all holiness. Whatever of its beauty his creatures possess, can only be derived from himself. "Thou hast wrought all our works in us." Man is wholly depraved. The sanctity which he may exhibit, must be a simple and independent acquisition. In him—that is, in his fallen nature—there dwelleth no good thing. "The very God of peace sanctifies him wholly." His piety and purity are the promptings of a spiritual principle, implanted in him. "God has begun, and still performs a good work" in him. But why is this? "He fulfils all the good pleasure of his goodness." "He worketh in us of his good pleasure." "He makes us perfect in every good work, to do his will." In this transformation, does he behold and glorify himself. We

are "changed into his image, from glory to glory." He "dwells in us, and walks in us." Since we were "precious in his sight," we have been "honorable." We "show forth his praise." We are to make him known. The Christian is "a vessel unto honor, sanctified, meet for the Master's use." And is it unfitting that his own work should be acknowledged, and his own design declared? That he should have a desire toward all who are the subjects of them? That he, who now rests in a sabbath of love towards his people, and now rejoices over them with singing, should make triumph of their final redemption? Oh! every reward is summed up in this: "I will confess his name before my Father, and before his angels!"

11. It must be remembered that "the world shall be judged in *righteousness*." All men shall be brought into judgement. There shall be the same rule for all. Some are not to be judged by equity, and others by favor. In such a process, partiality, the respect of persons, cannot be supposed. The evil-doers shall be punished for what they are. But the sentence pronounced on them who do well, must be according to truth. "The Lord, the *righteous* Judge," gives the crown. It is "the *judgement-seat* of Christ." "The good works of some are manifest beforehand; and they that are otherwise cannot be hid." Nor need we, nor can we, dismiss from our minds, that the scrutiny, is that of justice. It is directed into the character of each candidate, into the quality of each work. The tribunal knows nothing of foregone conclusions, and of

inconsequential awards. Who, what, are they standing there? The scrutiny concerns not the question, how character was formed, or how conduct was influenced? it regards it only as it is. By the character and the conduct of the individual, shall he be tried. It is the chief reason of this final and universal account, that the justice of God may be made apparent, that all intelligent creatures may attest that every sentence is right, as right towards the good as towards the wicked. The wicked are condemned for their crimes—justly; but then, for the opposite virtues, the good could not be justly condemned. An equal treatment would be demoralisingly and flagrantly unjust. It would be a contravention of moral government. If, however, their condemnation would be so far unjust, there is only the alternative of acceptance. They *are* the righteous, the just—they are so dealt with, and their reward respects their character and their works, (of whatever grace these are the index and development,) and this is "righteous judgement!"

It is too late to urge, it would be equally superfluous to refute, that duty precludes reward. For duty is correlative to authority. They are in equipoise. It is monstrous, if it indeed be possible, to think of mere naked, unrelated, obligation. That duty may be intelligent and reasonable, it must act upon intelligent and reasonable grounds. Among the tyrannies of earth, a contrary doctrine may be imposed. Vassals are made for their despot: slaves for their lord. In milder forms of civil administration, it is too difficult to discern, that government is the means, and not the

end. But any statement like this, shocks all our principles and revolts all our feelings. Something is always due from man to man. No one has any natural superiority over his fellow. We are not compelled to speak of what is due to man, from God. Yet we need not shrink. He has a right to every capacity which moral requirement necessitates. If called to account for a talent, it has been deposited with him. God, however, anticipates us in these delicate, and somewhat hazardous, prejudgements. He proves that, even in his rectoral character, he legislates for the highest happiness of his creatures. "His commandments are not grievous." They are the expositions and remembrancers of our good. Their reiteration is to call forth our means and faculties of true enjoyment. Instead, therefore, of duty being incongruous with reward, reward is, not accidentally but essentially, involved in duty. Our *perception* of such duty may not always apprehend the reward: we may not always seek it. It is a ready thought, a holy prompting. It takes immediate counsel from command and admonition. But the duty itself, is only duty as it is thus confirmed. Reference, for the opposite opinion, is commonly made to the parable of our Lord.\* "But which of you, having a servant ploughing or feeding cattle, will say unto him by and by, when he is come from the field, Go and sit down to meat? and will not rather say unto him, Make ready wherewith I may sup, and gird thyself, and serve me, till I have

\* Luke xvii. 7 *passim*.

eaten and drunken ; and afterward thou shalt eat and drink? Doth he thank that servant because he did the things that were commanded him? I trow not. So likewise ye, when ye shall have done all those things which are commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants: we have done that which was our duty to do." The citation is deemed to establish the futility of rewards. But it cannot avail. For the servant has his reward. It is only delayed for a higher claim. He eats and drinks after he has prepared and attended the master's board. The great Householder first claims his own glory. He can require no end so diffusively beneficent. In that very end, only a little later, his servants share. Their services are rightfully his. He does not "thank" them, as if indebted to those services. They are "unprofitable" servants, if considered in any view of benefit they can confer upon him. They cannot exceed their "duty," because all their powers are given to them for its performance. Every idea of obligation rests exclusively upon them. Being a parable, it is not to be pressed; for the relation between an earthly master and servant, is a mere civil agreement, and cannot express that creative condition which binds us to our Master in heaven. Its conclusion, or moral, is not to be strained; since what is only true and proper for us to confess, may not satisfy the goodness, which not only apportions but lavishes its gifts, which does exceeding abundantly above all that we can ask and think! He may turn to unexpected account, he may interpret in unexpected manner, acts which we should not prefer. "When saw we thee an

hungered and fed thee?" "Inasmuch as ye did it to the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me." On no account would we, then, suppose that the *measure* of these rewards is regulated by simple justice. There is counterpart, there is consequence, there is adjustment, in them. They belong to a great settlement of moral righteousness. They maintain an important place in moral government. He who receives them is treated as one that "worketh righteousness." But were they stinted to any standard, or proportion of justice, how small would they be! Other considerations often attach to earthly honors, bestowed for services of the council or the field. There is royal generosity and bounty. A precise calculation would destroy the grace. Let us remember that, while God is "faithful and just" to us, these attributes have respect to that which can endure their severest application. "Messiah has brought in an everlasting righteousness." There is an evangelic constitution, all whose "promises are yea and amen." We can now better understand the glorious eminence of these rewards. Though they are perfected to us through duties, yet we feel their mighty excess. Of them we are unworthy. They contrast with our "unprofitableness." Though they follow in an order of rule, though they are adjudged, they are infinitely munificent!

But that the idea of reward may not be lost by being swallowed up in mere mercy,—which would convert it from its strict character to that of sovereign, or adventitious, gift,—we must remember that it admits of degrees. Were all who differ in moral excellence to



receive the same honor, that difference would be slighted as much to the injury of those who fell short as to the disparagement of them who surpassed. Reward must imply proportion. This proportion does not respect the outward act alone, but the internal man, the whole man. "If there be first a willing mind, it is accepted according to what a man hath, and not according to that he hath not." "Thou didst well in that it was in thy heart." This rule allowed, the idea of such proportion is always maintained. "He which soweth sparingly, shall reap, also, sparingly; and he which soweth bountifully, shall reap, also, bountifully." The apologues, of the Prodigal son, and of the Labourers hired at the eleventh hour, cannot be employed to oppose it without wresting their most obvious scope. They refer to the calling of the Gentiles. The younger brother, unlike the elder born of Israel, had wandered from his home, the seat of patriarchal counsel and discipline, the church in which salvation was revealed. He went forth, not without some knowledge: his earlier youth had been trained beneath the broken rays of truth. Even then, breaking away from his only hope of permanent shelter and instruction, the "divided substance" was not refused. All natural and moral claims were granted to him. He returns after the wretched experiment of his boasted self-sufficiency: he was dead, he was lost. His Father, the God, not of the Jews only, but of the Gentiles also, folds him to his breast; and his home, the unpartitioned church, welcomes him with its festivity. He is alive again, he is found. Now hath God granted to

the Gentiles repentance unto life.—The Husbandman had wasted the day in sloth, while many of their occupation had toiled from the morning light. The eleventh hour came. The Israelites had from the beginning been “hired:” the Householder, having “agreed with them,” “sent them into his vineyard.” The Gentiles had been, though not unmeritedly, passed by, “no man had hired them.” Both were now to be received to a common “agreement,” to a common “hire,” to a common “vineyard.” “For there is no difference between the Jew and the Greek.” “Seeing it is one God, which shall justify the circumcision by faith and the uncircumcision by faith.” This is the denarius which all alike receive.

Connected with the general argument for the distinctions of future reward, is that which arises from our consciousness. All are not equal now in holy excellence and happiness. There are those who “labor in the Lord,” and those who “labor much in the Lord.” There are those whom we “have for ensamples.” “The good man is satisfied from himself,” and to the degree of his goodness. The greatest happiness experienced by the saints has been in circumstances of personal postponement and suffering. “This my joy, therefore, is fulfilled.” “I take pleasure in infirmities, in reproaches, in necessities, in persecutions, in distresses for Christ’s sake.” Those circumstances were the occasion and the measure of their delight. Is not the glow of satisfaction which the generous spirit feels, amidst its sacrifices and labors, correspondent to their disinterestedness and dirt?

Can the contracted mind know the joy of expansion? the churlish, of liberality? the proud, of humility? the implacable, of forgiveness? the selfish, of love? Can these contracted emotions affect us otherwise than in the proportion of their influence? It is plainly impossible to make men feel alike, though they should be engaged in the same course of action. But in feeling, does Christian reward very mainly consist.

Moreover, this distinction is agreeable to the truth of things. The consciousness, upon which it principally depends, meditates particular acts. But he, who is not a party to those acts, cannot partake of the satisfaction which springs from their performance. "The anointing" of the Saviour's body "for his burial," by Mary of Bethany, secured her a "memorial" which is all her own. So there are various distinctions, more or less prominent in the present life, which look forward to their *kind* of reward. "Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of unrighteousness, that, when ye fail, they may receive you into everlasting habitations." "He that reapeth receiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto life eternal." "That I may rejoice in the day of Christ that I have not run in vain, neither labored in vain." "For what is our hope, or joy, or crown of rejoicing? Are not even ye in the presence of the Lord Jesus Christ at his coming? For ye are our glory and joy." There is "a prophet's reward," and "a righteous man's reward." All this is specified and individualised: each distribution is inconvertible, intransferable, agreeing to certain characters, certain classes, certain

doings, and to nothing else. Thus the self-revolved reward is presented in those sublime words: "Let *him* know, that he which converteth the sinner from the error of his way, shall save a soul from death, and shall hide a multitude of sins."

No feeble proof of the fact that these distinctions exist, is furnished by the practical use made of their idea in scriptural admonition, "for instruction in righteousness." We are exhorted to aspire after the highest degrees of glory. "Knowing that whatsoever good thing a man doeth, the same shall he receive of the Lord." Therefore are the saints commended who "come behind in no gift, waiting for the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ:" therefore is prayer offered "that their love may abound yet more and more, that they may approve things that are excellent, that they may be sincere and without offence till the day of Christ." These states of mind and conduct are regarded in their intimate connexion with heaven, as meetness for it, as germs, and earnest, and preparations,—yearnings which it only can satisfy, and tastes which it imbues. And still more declaratively is this connexion told. "Giving all diligence, add to your faith virtue; to virtue knowledge; and to knowledge temperance; and to temperance patience; and to patience godliness; and to godliness brotherly kindness; and to brotherly kindness charity. For if these things be in you and abound, they make you that ye shall neither be barren nor unfruitful in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ. If ye do these things, ye shall never

fall: for so an entrance shall be ministered to you *abundantly* into the everlasting kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ." The original gives the thought far more elegantly and fully. The word "add," which governs all these cumulative virtues, is the same with "minister," which bestows this "abundant entrance." If we "minister" these virtues, they will "minister" this "entrance" in a surpassing manner. They will turn it into a glorious progress, with greeting and acclaim, with festal garland and triumphal arch. The conception is of a chorus or a choral train. All these graces of the Holy Ghost are like the notes of a musical progression, clear, resounding, sweet, concordant,—or they resemble celestial figures, lovely in attitude, woven in movement, harmonious in voice. And when the saint expires,—his faith, his hope, his love, his humility, make sweet music to him, falling like requiem upon his departing spirit, with a blended strain: or, as a sister-band, gathering around that spirit, animating it and strengthening it, they ascend and descend upon it, they point its way, entone its song, and carry it on their wings to heaven.

Nor can any other condition of things, than the existence of such degrees, be supposed without the grossest consequences. If there be no distinctions of reward, we must allow that there are no distinctions of character, for character is capacity and security for reward. But at death there is undeniable difference in character between those who pass to the inheritance

of the sanctified. There is as undeniable difference, then, in the reward of joy and triumph. Until death every form and variety of difference can be proved. If all this ceases immediately after death, there is no supposeable predicament but that universal character is assimilated, and universal capacity equalised, to one standard. Yet by what process? Is it that any is forcibly reduced, or forcibly raised? It is not possible that higher excellence should, in the region of excellence, be depressed. It cannot be brought down and made to merge in an inferior quality. Besides, excellence, however inferior, being the development of intelligent principle, cannot be mechanically elevated. The assimilation, on either theory, would be unlike an act of God. It supposes a violence which ill accords with his love of holy discrimination. It contradicts all that we know of his righteous procedure. "For I say unto you, that unto every one that hath, shall be given, and he shall have abundance: and whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken even that which he seemeth to have."

In conjunction with these sentiments, we must bring to a scriptural inquisition the language which is employed by us respecting states of Christian mind and conduct. To our conviction, that inspired authority always stamps the impression of what is *strictly personal* on whatever these suppose. The grace of God is the source of all spiritual light, and purity, and love. "It is given to us to believe," but that act of belief is our own. We are not the instrument, but the agent. "God worketh in us," but the

effect of that operation is on our "willing" and our "doing." Most guarded is every representation of the first inducing cause: not less guarded is the representation of the manner in which it enters into responsible motive and exercise. "Yet not I," exclaimed the apostle Paul, "but the grace of God which was with me:" that "grace," however, "was not bestowed on him in vain, for he labored more abundantly than they all." "Yet not I, but Christ liveth in me:" that "life," however, "he lived in the flesh by the faith of the Son of God." The language becomes most clear and steady when the thought of accountableness is declared: "Let every man prove his own work, and then shall he have rejoicing in himself alone, and not in another. For every man shall bear his own burden." The doctrine, thus, is that this grace interferes with no personal relation, and absolves from no personal responsibility. At every moment this is true of us. We allow it in the defection of any professed believer, when he is overtaken by a fault, or declines into sin. He is to be blamed. It is his guilt. Greater or less as may be the degrees of his delinquency, there is no question of his censurableness. We may pity everything about his fall,—his exposure, his shame, the consequences,—but not the crime. The charge is entirely upon himself. We ought surely, then, to speak in parallelism, when we acknowledge the stability of the righteous. We have seen whose is the backslider's fault: whose is the established Christian's virtue? He owes the disposition to the grace of God. But then he is responsible

in respect to that disposition. He was bound to have *always* exercised it, and would have been culpable for its loss. Now that by the Divine influence he may recover it, lost as it is by native sin, he is bound to seek it, and is responsible for its possession. By "faith he stands." He "watches unto prayer." He "keeps himself in the love of God." He "keeps himself pure." These are all personal exertions. Then this is worthy of praise as the opposite instance is of blame. No right view of the case can justify us in speaking of the defection as only active, and of the consistency as only passive. It is not just to describe our depravity with its power to exercise itself, and our piety with no such power. God keeps us from falling by the cherished habits and incumbent duties of an inward, heartfelt, religion : it is no small part of our responsibility to acquire, to lay hold on, confirming grace. It is a frightful perversion of the truth to allege that the reason of apostacy was that God did not directly and independently uphold : and it is as practical a perversion of the truth to allege that the reason of Christian perseverance is that he did. This is to destroy accountableness, which cannot be asserted of particular forms of conduct, if it cannot be maintained of all. It is surely "sound speech not to be condemned" to say, that the alternative of obnoxiousness to punishment is title to reward : that what it would be unjust to disfavor, it is only just to approve. We can enter into the humble disclaimer that all our acts are so imperfect, and all our motives so impure, that they cannot challenge an appeal to Him "who marks iniquity." But this is to forget the



accepting righteousness and the sanctifying element which precede those acts and motives, and which are the characteristics of that mediatorial constitution under which those acts and motives are wrought. Grace, as the cause of good, takes from us any perfect, unmingled, claim,—any suit of absolute right. Still this mediatorial constitution has its own conditions, gives us the means of satisfying them, and therefore “the righteousness of the law is fulfilled in us who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit.” “We labor that, whether present or absent, we may be accepted of God.” Responsibility is quickened and sustained by grace, was always presumed by it, can never be superseded by it, while its most serious and stirring sense is the strongest proof that “grace has not been received in vain.”

A physical power to obey belongs of justice to every moral agent. He must be physically capable of whatever he is morally obliged to do. The disposition, the motive, may be produced by an outward influence on the agent, but only by working upon his real nature or capacity, and only by recognising them as his personal disposition and motive. Scripture, therefore, never wavers in its language. It calls upon all who have the physical power of action, to act. “Be converted.” “Make you a new heart and a new spirit.” “Repent of thy wickedness, and pray God, if perhaps the thought of thy heart may be forgiven thee.” “Cleanse your hands, ye sinners; and purify your hearts, ye double-minded.” It is to be feared that we concede too greatly to prejudice, that we

equivocate with these explicit terms, that we qualify their earnest tone of responsibility. Do we find a commandment laid upon men accompanied with an explanation that they cannot obey it? Why should we divert its point and weaken its strength? Why should we falter in urging it, when it is enunciated from on high without apology or reserve? Why should we soothe men with the notion of the inadequacy of their powers to meet the requirement? When we show them, "out of the law" and out of themselves, that the state of their will is the only bar, they understand the charge, they feel it, they are shamed: but tell them of deficiency of powers, or employ a style of phrase which can scarcely be otherwise construed, they are furnished by you with a sound and reasonable excuse.—In the same view may those acts be placed which are related to the conversion of others by our agency. Not shrinking from the healthy language of "saving ourselves," of "working out our own salvation,"—we are taught that God accomplishes the salvation of man by man. It is supposed of the sinner that "one converts him and saves a soul from death:" encouragement is given, that "the wife may save her husband, and the husband his wife." We love not the use of the word, instrumentality, when a rational being is employed. The act is man's, in all that constitutes an act: its efficiency or success utterly depends on the power of God. The manner of the act, and the character of the agent, are connected with the result: "They so spake, that a great multitude believed." "He

was a good man, and much people was added unto the Lord." "We also believe, and therefore speak." The arrangement, reciprocal and reactive, is fixed: "I have planted, Apollos watered, but God gave the increase." The "planting" and the "watering," are coupled with the "increase," and are not less necessary as means to the end than the end is to the means. The rules of conduct are even laid down for securing the result. "If by any means I may provoke to emulation them which are my flesh, and might save some of them." "I am made all things to all men, that I might by all means save some." "Take heed unto thyself and unto the doctrine; continue in them: for in doing this, thou shalt both save thyself, and them that hear thee." "And of some have compassion, making a difference: and others save with fear, pulling them out of the fire." This language is bold and clear: it proves the agency,—not the instrumentality, which is only a blind, involuntary, thing,—of man in saving man. Why do we hesitate to speak forth this strain? Why should circumlocution and comment betray our misgiving? Why should we arrogate to ourselves a purer idiom than that of inspiration?

Before we pass to consider that future scene in which Christian reward shall obtain its development and consummation, a question urges itself upon our attention: Does Christianity promise any temporal, secular, rewards to its disciples? We are not to be informed that much and obtuse mistake exists upon this subject. Promises, necessarily involving a theocratic jurisdiction, attached to an abrogated economy,

resting upon a præternatural order of things, are quoted as now valid and as availing ourselves. If we "honor the Lord with our substance," it is gravely inferred that "our barns shall be filled with plenty and our presses burst out with new wine." "Length of days, riches and honor," are borrowed from a former dispensation, to which they were the appropriate appendages, and transferred to this which they encumber and contradict. These citations will illustrate our meaning. They are specimens of a theory which we feel compelled to oppose.

We deny, indeed, that the outward advantages which some are anxious to establish as the tests of Divine favor and the sanctions of true religion still, were ever invariable and consequential in any dispensation. When men were authorised, in any specific case, to regard them as marks of personal acceptance, they were the exceptions rather than the rule. "Behold, these are the ungodly who prosper in the world; they increase in riches. Verily I have cleansed my heart in vain." "The sinner was a hundred years old." "There is one event to all." These more than anomalies urged themselves upon general notice. It was a common problem and complaint. The rule, if such it could be ranked, was not unequivocal. The question, at least in present times, is not, whether God may bestow present good on the Christian, but whether the Christian is warranted to expect and plead that good? Whether any promise assures it? Whether it be bestowed in the way of reward? Is there a settled connexion between this

character and this benefit? The inquiry is delicate; its discussion must combat many prejudices; it would demand spacious limits; but though it is inevitable, when our theme is considered, only a few of its prominent points can we touch.

We may claim preliminary admission: we may protest against consequences which might be alleged and opinions which might be assigned.

The Providence, which is properly antecedent to Christianity, cannot be limited by it. Subservient to it, frequently an active movement of it, incorporated with it, how can it be less bounteous, and kind, and just beneath such a gracious institution? Whatever, to say the least, that general government would dispense of good and redress and honor, this particular institution will not thwart.

Christianity, all things being equal, does exercise a most beneficial influence on the earthly lot of its followers. Contentment and cheerfulness, prudence and discretion, industry and probity, are not the meanest lessons which it inculcates, and for these virtues it finds an ample sphere. No man in civilised and communal life,—persecution being unknown,—is less prospered because he is a Christian: tendencies being calculated, he is the more. All other blessings, physical and domestic and social, are naturally, reasonably, enhanced.

It is almost tiresome to repeat that state of mind which Christianity promotes in all who are the subjects of its influence: it is its present reward. But it may be found amidst poverty which it does not

necessarily remove, and amidst disease which it cannot possibly heal: it may exist in the most adverse scenes and repulsive circumstances. Here it distils its balm and breathes its peace.

Nor can it be denied that a Christianity, professing secular recompense, that which should sensibly act upon the present, would so disjoint every idea identified with it of hope and greatness, that little *present* satisfaction could it yield. In this manner, as shorn of its mighty future, the apostles disclaimed it. "If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable." Is it asked: How could this be? Is not virtue its own reward? Christianity is the very code of virtue, but it is infinitely more. They were called to profess it unto bonds, and stripes, and threatening deaths. For what? They championed a religion which lay in the bosom of eternity. They behaved only reasonably as this was true. Without any adherence to it, any suffering on its account, they might have cherished all the virtues which shed their grace over this life,—which are favourable to health, and tranquillity, and reputation,—which may well be cultivated for their own sake. This was a perilous superaddition. For it there was no present indemnification,—what, if there were no future? A doubt turned all into an egregious wilfulness, an aimless sacrifice, a fatuous adventure. They felt the impossibility, they saw the madness, of embarking in the Christian cause with this suspense of uncertainty and disregard of result.

But, then, it is obvious inference that, thus placing

the reasonableness of their conduct in future compensation, they let go the hope of reward in this life. Since nothing could be more unmeaning than Christianity without a future state, so nothing could be more unmeaning than committing themselves to persecution for such a system. They linked themselves fearlessly to all its hazards for the sake of its glorious destinies.

And, therefore, we contend that the only personal blessings which our religion secures are spiritual, however its indirect influence may be physically and civilly salutary. It tells of no exemption from calamity, of no extended life, of no earthly increase. It knows no idea so poor: it plies no inducement so ignoble!

The New Testament writers do certainly transfer, from the Old, particular declarations which formerly, without doubt, looked to sensible, present, good. The command upon the child to honor his parents is said to have been "with promise." It was thus originally distinguished and dignified as "the first" to which "promise" was attached.\* Why is this repeated? To be urged in a literal sense on those addressed? In those times of cruel persecution did filial piety bring a respite from early and violent death? Did Stephen's martyrdom convict him of disobedience to this commandment, or was it a violation of any promise on which he relied? Could the apostle intend that the promise was then in force, length of days, while they

\* Eph. vi. 2.

who could plead it were "killed all the day long," in the land which the Lord their God gave unto them, while they were "driven to strange cities?" The "promise" is adduced, he having to impress the same duty,—to prove how high that duty always stood, how it had been ennobled for its fitness and importance. Though that adjunct was now to be lost in spiritual motives and considerations, it was only that what had existed should be remembered, that such a note of pre-eminence should be chronicled still. It is the primary statute of the second table, it is the foundation of all social requirement, it is worthy of every commendation!—"He that will love life and see good days" is adjured to "refrain his tongue from evil:" but when Peter\* borrows this admonition of David, he need not, he does not, diminish its original reason and strength by the most Christian interpretation. For it seems never to have been more than what we can perceive it now to be, a means to an end, the due regulation of the tongue, that "world of iniquity," if we would enjoy an unembittered life.—And when the promises of our Lord are examined, a spiritual comment is often necessitated. We must understand that an equivalent is intended, and not the very thing. "Give, and it shall be given unto you; good measure, pressed down, and shaken together, and running over, shall men give into your bosom." "He that findeth his life shall lose it, and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it." "He that hateth

\* 1 Peter iii. 10. Ps. xxxiv. 10.



his life in this world shall keep it unto life eternal." Such promises are incapable of proof in their literal sense, being impossibilities in their own nature, and contradictions to fact.

The doctrine taught by the apostle Paul to the Corinthians,\* has been supposed to favor the opinion, that Christianity employs, in its administration, temporal rewards. The church in that city was urged to liberal contributions, on behalf of the needy saints in Jerusalem. Not one pledge, however, is offered of reimbursement in this life. There is no usury, until He, who gave those cheerful givers their talents, shall come again. A spiritual motive is derived from a future recompense, which must be spiritual. And if any part of the language be deemed to point out a secular benefit, it is only the assurance, to which none would object: "God is *able* to make all grace abound toward you; that ye, always having all sufficiency in all things, may abound to every good work;"—or it is only the prayer, which none would refuse to offer: "Now, He that ministereth seed to the sower, both minister bread for your food, and multiply your seed sown, and increase the fruits of your righteousness." There is no mention of reward.

It has been supposed, that the promise of Christ, "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you,"—affirms the question. But the connexion points to a *general* providence. The illustrations are borrowed

from the fowls of heaven and from the flowers of the field. Christians may surely cast themselves, without any distrust, upon the same. Let them not think that God will forget to feed and clothe them. They may be persecuted, but the Care, which is over all, will not forsake them. *Our* view, still, would rather favor the interpretation of a *spiritual* reparation for earthly loss.

In this withdrawment of the temporal and secular, the more immediate and sordid, from Christianity, we mark its contrast, we acknowledge its superiority, to Judaism. That religion,—in order to convince all of its divinity, to confound the nations which worshipped graven images, to demonstrate that no human policy could invent and wield it, gave a chief prominence to this lifetime, and made it the sphere of its most signal proofs. It dealt the good and evil of earth for its sanctions. It unfolded the inventory of the most ostensible blessings. It shook the scourge of the most ostensible ills. All might be weighed and appreciated. It put the decision of its evidence to present proof, the proof of sense. The religion of Christ inverts all this. It discovers most fully its immortality, and, by the brightness of that glory, darkens the present scene. The world which was as every thing to the one, is as nothing to the other. Judaism told us “earthly things,” Christianity tells us “of heavenly things!”

In this casting from it all of sensible lure, we behold the grandeur of the gospel. It is wholly spiritual in its sanctions as well as in its principles. The passing

prize it turns from and disdains. Things which perish in the using, it little regards, seldom commends, and never appropriates. It stoops not thus to win our hearts. Its is an incorruptible crown. Its are durable riches. In this world, it plainly testifies that we shall have tribulation. The only good it insures to us now—save its ineffable blessings—is inward peace, the light of the Divine countenance, and the witness of the Divine Spirit. “It is through much tribulation that we must enter into the kingdom of God.” Thorns strew its path. Persecutions are the attendants of its profession. It seems to oppose its design to give us ease and rest. It beckons hence. It calls us away. It weans us from transient advantage. It teaches us to overcome the world. It sets a balance in our hand, to weigh all things with eternity. It fills the mind with this conception. It seizes it with this ambition. In penury, it assists us to lay up treasure in heaven. Amidst reproaches, it amasses for us the exceeding weight of glory. “We walk by faith, not by sight!”

## LECTURE V.

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"IT DOETH NOT YET APPEAR WHAT WE SHALL BE."

1 JOHN iii. 2.

WHILE gazing upon such openings into future happiness as this, we are often conscious of an indistinctness. There is a vastness, an intensity, a magnificence, not to be denied, but on that very account most difficult to be appreciated. It is general, bodiless, impalpable. Metaphor scarcely offers any aid. Comparison hardly yields any illustration. They as much bewilder as they explain. Nothing is defined. Impression takes the place of idea. A confused majesty overpowers us. It is not like star coming forth after star, each beautiful and a resting-place for the eye: it is as the mighty firmament, in all the depths of its concave and with all the constellations of its glory, covering and perplexing the eye at once. There is no relief, no repose, no distribution. We are amazed with sublimity. We are absorbed in immensity. We wander on and meet no confines. We search around, and find no parts. All that affects us is the illimitable and the unimaginable. There is no manner of similitude. It is the unbroken and undelineated mass. The mind

aches with the oppression of its effort and attention. It staggers beneath this burden of bliss, this sun-light splendor. An inferior disclosure, that which was more shaded, more subdued, would be rather welcome than this excess, this infinity. Our vision fails. The wings of the soul falter and fold. We cannot awaken from the trance.

Do we, then, complain of this transcendence? Do we murmur at so much bliss and glory? We speak thus in order to ascertain, whether there be that which can afford fixedness and precision of thought concerning heaven, which can bring it into the compass of strict and legitimate conception, which can make it intelligible as well as sure?

So full is the delight, so rich is the interest, of heaven, that its exclusion of all known and possible evils is the feeblest claim to our notice, the lowest call to our aspiration. Yet when we read how every cause of grief and desolateness has ceased, it is told with a manner so beautiful and touching, that it is difficult to dwell upon it as only a negative description; it imposes itself upon us as absolute and all-comprehensive. "They shall hunger no more, neither thirst any more." "And God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain; for the former things are passed away."

A passing reference may be made to the hieroglyphical representations of heaven. All figures are pressed into them. Light and verdure and living water,—palm and harp and regal diadem, are but

specimens of their diversity and multiplicity. We maintain that in all this lavish profusion, there is nothing casual and nothing wasted: a meaning is to be extracted from every type. We rest not in themselves: they are poor and unworthy when compared with what they signify. We ask but one right of interpretation, the most reasonable and necessary. Figures are employed only because the ideas they would convey cannot be more abstractedly presented, and, because, whatever those ideas are truly, we are compelled by the substitution of figures for them always to conclude, how far nobler they must be than any mediums which only struggle so ineffectually to unfold them.

The mystery of the celestial state is not a purposed reserve,—that which might be, but is not, told. No concealment is sought. No veil obtrudes. No haze interposes. The realities themselves forbid the realisation. The objects are too large for admeasurement and too bright for discernment. They master sense. They outgrow analogy. They task faith. Language is no invention to speak them. Hope is no passion to anticipate them. They alike subsist beyond experience and prepossession. They are not of a nature to be taught. Their knowledge, in our present state, could not be imparted.

“It doth not yet appear what we shall be.” Yet this shuts us not up to the suspense of a merely privative idea. It lays an absolute condition of things, a perfect consciousness, for the foundation of the future destiny. There is a very lofty sentiment in this confession of ignorance. It labors with meaning,

and swells with expectation. It tends mightily and greatly. It takes to itself wings and flies towards heaven. There is in it a throbbing ecstasy of undefined instinct. It is a prophecy hastening to its fulfilment: desire desiring its consummation. It is a dark saying upon the harp, resounding and tremulous as its strings: yet not less a sure word, a faithful saying: a vision of the Almighty which for a time tarries, but in the end shall speak out and shall not tarry. Withal there is in this language a breathless pause, well-nigh an impatience. It is earnest intentness. It heaves as the bosom of the heir on the eve of possessing his inheritance. It glows like the brow of the warrior whom the next onset must crown with victory. It quivers with rapture and with awe, like the touch of the newly-anointed high priest, when preparing to draw aside for the first time the curtain of the most holy place. And still is there something in the tone of the expression that breathes of a resigned, attempered, confidence. It is crossed by no vexatious doubt, and chilled by no depressing suspicion. "The hope is laid up in heaven," and we "hear of it before," even now, "in the word of the truth of the gospel." We know what withholdeth. The limitation and inferiority of our mortal state restrain its instantaneous manifestation. We have considered it in itself. It is not arbitrarily delayed. Its own essential excellence forbids. Its grandeur would baffle our faculties. It is too large for our littleness. It is too strong for our weakness. It is too spiritual for our sense. Nor is it here that it could be evolved. The scene could

not contain nor bear it. The difficulty is only increased when we turn our thoughts to ourselves. Our probation is not finished. The government under which we are placed has not completed its history. Great events are to arise. Comprehensive predictions remain to be fulfilled. The præmillennial apparatus is not complete. The millennium has not begun to count its ages. The postmillennial measure of iniquity is not full. The end is not yet. And least of all, need we wonder that this issue is not hastened, when we consider our own unfitness. Where is our affinity and equipment? Where is our preparation for that which we shall be? The mansions were long since reared, but the days of our purifying are not numbered. The works were finished from the foundation of the world, but we have not worthily labored to enter into that rest. The marriage feast is spread, but the fine linen, which is the righteousness of the saints, is not sufficiently white for those mysterious espousals.

But this is our defence. We are mocked by scorn and scoff. Our soul is exceedingly filled with contempt. We are taunted. Where are the proofs of favor attached to the saints? What profit have they? What is their reward? We concede that there is little which is apparent, nothing strictly sensible; that there is much to try and perplex our faith. This should, however, be remembered, that when we argued the immortality of the soul, and consequently of a future state, we rested no small portion of the proof upon the mixed and imperfect character of the present life. Had we found a visible Providence,



## THE HEAVENLY STATE.

adjusting all right and avenging all wrong; the good outwardly happy and the wicked outwardly miserable; nothing crooked left to be made straight, and nothing wanting which called to be supplied,—we could not have deduced the necessity of a future state, and so far must have abandoned the implicit argument for our immortality. If there be no future state, that immortality cannot be entertained. Whatever judgement we then pronounced upon the passing condition of things, their unsatisfactory aspects, their inconclusive lessons, their immature results, strictly coincides with this calculation. We know no disappointment. We do not repine. Derision shall not tempt us to fret ourselves. "We wait for the Son of God from heaven!" A momentary concealment ought not to be refused to that which, once revealed, no more shall be obscured. A transient pause need not be grudged to that which, once commenced, shall never be interrupted. That it "doth not yet appear what we shall be," is most nicely true to all the inferences which this stage of probation would suggest, and to all that we are taught concerning the spirituality and futurity of Christian rewards.

This language, nevertheless, while it confesses ignorance, does not suppose entire ignorance. It declares only that there is not now the consummate blessedness and honor of the righteous. The glory is not hitherto revealed in them. But there is intimation. There are grounds for some judgement; we possess some guiding views; we may certify some particular features. Our minds incline in a right direction;

they are disciplined with explanatory principles ; they are filled with substantive informations. They are in a progress of transition ; they approximate not only by the course of time but by a process of assimilation. " Now is our salvation nearer than when we believed."

Nor must we suppose, notwithstanding this state of future being so far surpasses all our hearts can conceive, that its superiority consists in any element or perception which shall constitute an abrupt reversal of all we know, or violent estrangement from all we feel. It is not the shock of a bewildering surprise. The mind does not reel beneath the sense of the utter new. " It doth not yet appear : " yet are there signs and intimations. The scale, whose degrees the saints had begun to climb, is only so much higher than they had supposed. The paradise, whose overhanging flowers they had plucked, is but so much lovelier than they had hoped. There is something actual, known, experienced, on this side of heaven from which we may deduce some of the characteristics which distinguish it ; from which we learn by necessary inference what it is ; on which we found this hallowed knowledge and anticipation ; by which we may descry, as quick reflections from a mirror, glances and glimpses of that blessed condition.

And this is the idea which now we seize. There is a present germ in the Christian soul which seeks a nobler expansion. There is a yearning which tells of congeniality with something far higher than that which has been attained. It is the bias of nature, original and renewed. It reaches forth to the things

which are before ; it mounts to the things which are above. Faithful to this " power that worketh in us," the evangelic hope soars toward the world to come, with sufficient warrant for its certainty, with sufficient presage for its direction, amidst escaping shoots of light which lead and cheer its expatiations. When we yield ourselves to this celestial impulse, kindling and energising in us, we have the foretaste which assures the banquet, the cluster which pledges the vintage. Well may we believe, when thus it can at once fore-show and substantiate the region after which it longs !

Only we would not let it be supposed that we believe this heaven as simply future. To the living it must be, but not to the pious dead. It now exists ; it is real, and not only true. Each saint finds his way thither. There is the gathering of all the sainted host. That celestial state is permanent in its existence, but not in its character. It has changed. Still shall it be changed. Like its subjects, it is to be seen in development and progression. That " kingdom was prepared from the foundation of the world." The righteous Abel stood in it for a time alone. Ages may have intervened ere companion-spirit stood at his side and assisted in his song : yet may it be considered the rudiment of that kingdom which now is, as this is but that of the kingdom which shall be, each form of it invested with richer array, each succession advancing with more holy resplendence.

Then are we bound, in obeying our previous course of argument, to regard the heavenly state in relation to the doctrine of Christian rewards. Only as the

comprehension and pre-eminence of all rewards, could it find a place in these dissertations. It has been contemplated, in all holy obedience and conflict, as the prize. They who run the race set before them, so run that they may obtain. They who fought the good fight, so fought that they might lay hold of eternal life. This was their encouragement and incentive. The connexion of their past conduct and their present felicity is as certain as that of cause and effect, as of any means and end. "They sowed to the Spirit, and of the Spirit they reap life everlasting." "Did they on earth know the "joy of faith?" What must be the joy of realization! Did they prove that to be spiritually-minded is life and peace? What must be that life in its intensest throb, and that peace in its purest calm! If their confidence had in itself great recompense of reward, what must be that confidence in its fulfilment! "Through faith and patience they inherit the promises." "They strived to enter the strait gate and the narrow way which leadeth unto life." "They were diligent that they might be found of the Lord in peace, without spot and blameless." "They, having this hope in Him, purified themselves even as he is pure." "Having been wise, they shine as the brightness of the firmament; and, having turned many to righteousness, as the stars for ever." "Delighting themselves in God, he has given them the desires of their heart." "They were dead with Christ," and now consequently "live with him." "they suffered," and now consequently "reign with him." "If so be they suffered with him, they shall be glorified

together." "Having endured to the end, they are saved." "They, through the Spirit, mortified the deeds of the body, and they live." "They had their fruit unto holiness, and the end is everlasting life." "To him that overcometh," are the celestial badges and allotments given. "They eat of their own fruit." "They long enjoy the work of their hands." "They receive the things which are good, done in the body." They "sought for glory, honor, and immortality," or rather for a glorious and an honorable immortality, and there is bestowed upon them "eternal life." They sought this "by patient continuance in well-doing." "They labored to enter into that rest." In expectation of this, they "loved the appearing of the righteous Judge;" "they hasted to the day of God." The heaven, so anticipated, is unfolded greatly from that which is already holy and blessed; it is the reward not only of congruity but of self-evolution; and of its own nature it must grow and endure. This is the reward, the last and the perfect, which, different from others, multiplies itself into higher and yet higher degrees. The series knows not exhaustion, renewed and propagated in an endless progression. It is as the tree of life, its seasons ever revolving and still ever in their prime, its fruits ever enriching and still ever matured. According to well-approved principles, which must be applied again and again, and which reappear in every stage of the argument,—all of the present must affect their eternal well-being. Habit has been acquired, and shall then be confirmed. "He that is righteous, let him be righteous still; and he

that is holy, let him be holy still." Character has been formed, and shall then be sealed. "He that doeth the will of God abideth for ever." Consequence has been drawn out, and shall then be adjudged. "Righteousness tendeth to life." "To him that soweth righteousness shall be a sure reward." Has an apparently trivial event of individual history, or an apparently insignificant emotion of individual mind, proved the turning point of all this distinguished bliss? So have we already learned from present analogous facts that prudence, the true economy of life, itself often determined by the minute and incidental cause, lays up a rich inheritance of life-long good. All proceeds in a course. All is regulated according to an order. "All things work together" in mutual subserviency and for a common end. And when we examine all gracious and providential means, we shall see them in full operation towards this result. Is it the internal influence of religion? "The water that I shall give him shall be in him a well of water *springing up into* everlasting life." Is it circumstantial sorrow and trial? "Our light affliction, which is but for a moment, *worketh* for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory." Here is the plainest view of proper tendency and of constant elaboration. When our mind shall be sufficiently enlightened, perhaps this result will seem to us as naturally facile as that of the most common physical occurrence. Seed-time and harvest have a known connexion; but that connexion cannot be traced. God alone can constitute and mature that connexion. He has ordained,

he consummates, this moral connexion between holiness here and happiness hereafter. "In harvest there is increase which a hundred-fold exceeds the grain that was cast into the ground: "but to every seed its own body." And it is of the nature of heavenly reward that, while it corresponds in quality to that out of which it grows, it manifestly surpasses all the labor and all the suffering which, according to the terms of the mediatorial system, it acknowledges, accepts, and dignifies!

Next to this idea of heaven, suggested by darkling but earnest intimations, while "it doth not yet appear what we shall be,"—we may conceive of it as a state in which perfect law is loved and obeyed. That perfection impresses itself upon the love and the obedience. Perfection in the creature, considered as moral excellence, requires a standard for its aim and for its recognition. When we read, "Knowing this, that law is not made for a righteous man, but for the lawless and disobedient," not law itself is to be understood, for then how could the righteous man be discriminated?—but punishment, the execution of the law. The thoughts of heavenly order and subjection are some of our sweetest and most wholesome thoughts. The Divine law is good, is ordained to life, is full of blessings. What had been apostate angel, what lapsed man, had law been their monitor and defence! This constitutes the true heaven and them that are heavenly. Law has there its seat and sovereignty. There is universal delight in its principles and administrations. This is the concord of the song: this is

the bond of the multitude. They move round this centre. Oh how they love this law! The emblems of royal dignity glorify the scene. "The throne of God and of the Lamb is in it." It is "the kingdom of Christ and of God." "His will is done in heaven." "Here are they that keep the commandments of God and the faith of Jesus." Nor must it be supposed that this obedience is necessary in any sense which disjoins necessity from will. The approving judgement, the ardent affection, direct the soul. It is no longer the probationer: its reward is found in an eternally-sustaining power, inspiring its disposition and impelling its exercise. "God dwelleth in them and walketh in them." "They are the complement of Him who filleth all in all." They are "kept from falling," not by adventitious grace so much as by a graciously unchangeable constitution, acting upon intelligent and consistent principles and motives. But it is the promptest will. It is the loyalty of subjection and dependence. All submits and yields, but from the freest, most complacent, choice. Every being is in his right direction and in his proper sphere. Yet is it government. Still is it obedience. The reward of ever-increasing-good is its sanction, and is fully felt. "The work of righteousness shall be peace; and the effect of righteousness quietness and assurance for ever." What will be perfect justice and amiableness! We have indulged visions of even such an earthly scene. Looking down upon some mountain-brow upon the dale beneath, there has risen the simple village with domestic air and rural peace. Sequestered in those



sylvan solitudes, there contentment seemed certainly to dwell and order to prevail. There might be supposed no room for turmoil and strife. Ambition, in surveying it, might long for such calm, and affliction for such asylum. If innocence could be found, there might it dress its bower and forego its shield. The charm is broken when we suspect or learn that this is not even comparative truth, that passion obtrudes upon that stillness and that wickedness pours its taint over that retreat. But it was lovely as it was unreal: embosomed in the associations of virtue, however soon their spell might break, it awakened right emotion, it was worthy of our delight, and its momentary influence soothed and improved. And so have we been taught by the formative minds of all ages to fable out a happy commonwealth. Here the social fabric was to be laid upon new foundations. Right and truth, reverence for law, sympathy with affliction, could be enacted at our will. Prescription might no longer protect error, nor usage sanction wrong. And who has not retired into this beauteous model, this microcosm, when the ideal polity was framed, and felt that could this be embodied, that were a recovery of that happy state whose vestiges remain to tell us only what once was? Such illustrations, poor in themselves, unworthy of application, are only touched by us because they strike a sentiment which makes us feel that could perfect obedience be rendered to perfect law, that would be perfect happiness; and that every trace of this, though but a dream, reminds of a condition from which man has degenerated, but

also of one to which he yet may look. Heaven presents this view,—alone can present it. Its brightest glory is its everlasting *reign*. That reign cannot be disturbed and marred. How real is that description of sin,—“it defileth, it worketh abomination, it maketh a lie!” It is uncleanness, unloveliness, untruth! But it shall “in no wise enter” there. There “shall be nothing to hurt and to destroy.” Moral evil cannot for a moment dwell in it. As though the leprosy of sin had struck too inextricably into the abode of man, had even contaminated the habitation of angels, we anticipate a scene purer than earth could afford however it were changed, purer than the heavens from which the angels fell. And when we can conceive of such a state, that which gives to law all its power of sway and yet debars its curse, that is heaven, the highest heaven, the heaven of heavens! We know it by this, we desire it for this, “wherein dwelleth righteousness!”

But since law is social, and not only the index of our relation to God, since the fruit of obedience to it would be always benevolence and not only piety, we may now think of heaven as the development of all that affection and good-will which man owes to universal being. The excellence shall not provoke envy. Personal elevation shall not inspire pride. Each shall love his fellow as himself. The law of truth and the law of righteousness are completed by the law of kindness, and their triple influence must operate perfect good. Love is the fulfilling of the law. “Blessed and holy,” is the title of all the

subjects of this state: "in love serving one another," is the best conception we can form of their relationship. "The comfort of love" was not unfelt on earth, even by the unregenerate. Sympathies are essential to whatever we understand by communal life. Parental, filial, fraternal, attenuating into others less tender because more general, though scarcely inferior in importance,—these ties lend a grace to existence and a strength to society,—these are elements which purify, refine, and soothe. The regenerate prove the genuineness of the change which has passed upon them, by "unfeigned love of the brethren," and are "taught of God,"—not so much by law as the instinct of a new nature,—"to love one another." Enlarge these thoughts: multiply their applications. The redeemed are seen in perfect accordance with Him who hath said: "Be ye holy, for I am holy." They are, distributively, "without fault," "without spot," "without rebuke." But they are beheld in an entire comprehension, "made perfect in one." They are "one body," a "whole family," a "general assembly." They are not merely united to each other. "They are gathered together in one with all things in heaven," all its native spirits. Here is the celestial fellowship! What is the vibration of its reciprocal ideas and sensibilities! What is the interchange of congratulation and triumph! Love which never faileth,—which is an immortal thing,—once had a humbler duty to exercise. It ministered supply to want. It allayed the pang of woe. It visited the fatherless and the widow in their affliction. It moved with a carriage

suited to a vale of tears. It wept with them who wept. But now is it acquitted of every painful and toilsome task. It has here obtained its true abiding-place and appropriate range. It was born here. Earth is its exile, this is its home. It has hereditary claim. It recognises every scene, and identifies every familiarity. Its bosom freely breathes, and its heart healthily pulsates. Accustomed to the present requirements which press upon its commiseration, we can ill understand those functions which exist in a region where need, and disease, and trouble are unknown. Where there is not ignorance, nor suffering, nor death,—where there are not tears,—what can be its scope? Our minds must essay to rise. We must think of spirits made perfect, but spirits which are creatures of motive, of impression, of still greater perfectibility. We must think of those spirits as bound to duty, and incapable of happiness save as thus bound. Then let us think of them in their intercommunity of intelligence, of interest, of feeling. Their's is a treasury of ideas and emotions which all increase and share. Their's is an action and an impulse from each to all, from all to each. It is influx and it is diffusion. It is the excitation, ever circling, of ardors and delights. No harp can thrill, but every string of heaven awakes: not a note can warble, but myriad strains respond. What must be the power of those spirits one upon another, none of them living to themselves! What must their communications of thought and passion be through all that throng, quickened in every stage of the transition! What

must be the mingling of minds of the most diversified modification, and of the most complete affinity ! Individuality of temperament exists for the common good. The mystic "four-square" of that city,—its equal length, and breadth, and height,—tell not of sameness and uniformity, but of union, and impetration, and compactness, and strength : its corner-stones bind it into stability, and its head-stones crown it with grace. This is nothing but the end of the law, which is love. Heaven is unfolded from its mere operation. All now, while in this world of strife, testifies to us, within us, how good and a pleasant thing it is for brethren to dwell together in unity. This friendship of the glorified is its highest and eternal exemplification. "He that dwelleth in love, dwelleth in God, and God in him." The Dove once descended from heaven to earth, if that he had not sat aforetime upon the deep of chaos brooding,—and though Jordan had of old been driven back before the terrible symbols of Deity, now its waves were hushed to calm beneath this gentle, loving, presence : but heaven is his proper abode, and there he sheds his perfect peace. "Love is of God:" "God is love:" both must be heaven !

Pursuing this principle of moral development from considerations of reward thus fully allowed, and of law thus indefectibly obeyed ; rising, after this manner, in our thoughts toward heaven, we may apply the same principle to the human mind in its descriptive powers and tendings. We have seen that man is a spiritual being. Not depreciating his material organism, believ-

ing him to be incomplete, according to the terms of his nature, in separation from it, we yet regard it only as an instrument and machine. It is not himself. The soul is the integer of the man. He is spiritual, whatever he be else, in possessing perfect mind. It can exist and act separately and independently. It is capable, if opportunity be granted it, of understanding all subjects of which created intelligence can be informed. There is not an angelic track but it may, in proper season, overtake. It is a likeness, though finite, of that understanding which is infinite. Its knowledge, though derived, is assimilated to that which is underived. Its essence is necessarily limited, but not defective. Its information, though partial, need not be confused. The mind, in what it is, in that of which it is capable, is a thoroughly furnished contrivance to the extent of its province and to the purpose of its creation.—We have seen that man is an accountable being. He was formed to be happy in proportion as his will coincided with the supreme will. That supreme will promulgated its law in order to be the guide and inducement to happiness. Obedience was the condition, not arbitrarily, but because there was none other happiness and could be none. The relation between God and the creature, which this supposes, is unchangeable. Neither can be released. And no rule of created existence can be so honorable as this. It is a treatment the most ennobling and advantageous. It does all, except take away the restriction of our nature, in the usury of unrestricted good.—We have seen that man is an immortal being. This springs from the

simple will of his Maker, and so it becomes his birth-right. The death, which may be threatened and inflicted on him, can disturb the natural order of his existence, but cannot impair its truest and highest qualities. That greater life, his proper life, is indifferent to the world he now inhabits, and to any other in which he may dwell. All worlds are indifferent to that life. That is an imperishable entity. None could kill it but God ; and if on any supposition he is described as able to do it, it is by a moral blow, and not by undoing his most foreseen and purposed work.— Now such are the attributes of man. In these are the capacities of his fruition. Looking upon them, in ignorance of sin, we should pronounce that he must be happy. How is he placed on high ! With what noble faculty is he endued ! He is capable of the favor of his Maker ! He may be worthy of his reward ! He may rise indefinitely towards his blessedness ! By sin, these faculties grow into frightful means of dishonor and misery. But the Christian is restored. His sin is forgiven, his person is accepted, his nature is renewed. Again they are for good. The Spiritual ! What are his pleasures of knowledge, his kin with intellectual existence, his elevated rank, his inquisitive facility, his independent consciousness, his inner life, his access to Deity, his brotherhood with angels, his sympathy with all the advancing scenes and unfolding glories of the universal system ! Holy principle governs all. What may such a being become, and what attain ! What a power of increase is in him ! Along what a progress does he speed !

Mind is the one and perfect ascendant! The immaterial essence is fully evolved! Nothing opposes the entrance of Divine knowledge! Nothing contradicts the reign of spiritual joy! Upon such a mental power, enlarged as it is sanctified, what of the great and the transcendent may not be grafted! From qualities like these, what a heaven may be raised! The Accountable! This being interpreted, implies a degree and store of good which no independent gift, no physical ordination, could command. It is of our own motive, however inspired, it is of our own doing, however prompted, that it is produced. It is personal in all its bearings. And thus is laid open a course for the constant pursuit of good. There is always duty. There is always reward. We can never exceed duty. We can never go beyond reward. Responsibility is a measureless means of well-being. It is the Divine largess in giving to man a happiness so peculiar, that none other procedure could realise it for him, rendering it certain by making it an operation of the mind, securing its interminableness by directing it towards infinite perfection. Here is a perception and a susceptibility by which heaven is more than shadowed forth. Open heaven to this perception and susceptibility, and how shall they emulate its thrones, whatever their boundless range, and win its crowns, whatever their heightening glory! The Immortal! From his initial point of existence, man numbers ages parallel with the Everlasting One. He is henceforth His coeval. It is an inestimable donative. It must be solemnly significant. Unlike the swarm of life, this must include an awful



purpose. Such a gift cannot be lightly doled. Irrevocable,—the character of the Giver, the seriousness of the gift, the responsibility of the recipient, all required that such a duration should not be bestowed in vain. Wherefore is this? Lavished by infinite benevolence, we must be convinced that it is only a blessing for the accumulation of blessings, that it is only an earnest for the fulfilment of earnest, that it is only a capacity for the outgrowth of capacities, that it is intended for all of infinite happiness which a creature can know, by finding all but an equivalent to infiniteness in perpetuity. Here is a sphere of being, and of power, and of endlessness, on which, as on its natural foundations, more than on its twelve rocks of precious stones, heaven may rest! “It doth not yet appear what we shall be :” but there are latent feelings which begin to appear, and slumbering sentiments which begin to rouse. The unformed thought takes shape, and the nascent emotion acquires vigor. The spiritual aspires, the accountable awes, the immortal expands, within us. We are strangely moved. “A fire is shut up in our bones.” This is not our rest. This cannot be our portion. “That which is wanting cannot be numbered.” An inextinguishable desire, an insatiable capacity, throws us forward on the vast, the indefinite, the unknown, the boundless! If the greatest possible felicity was the design of the Creator to bestow, can we imagine a receptacle for it capacious as the nature of man? What is that greatest possible felicity, which man was made to receive, which man is capable of enjoying, but heaven?

But as these outlines of our natural constitution are only obscure predictions of our future blessedness, we may the rather think of what is already done, change which is wrought, impression which is induced, in true Christians. Effects are accomplished. Processes have passed upon our minds, purifying their tastes and elevating their desires. Acts of mercy, operations of grace, have succeeded each other, until, in Scripture language, we are now "the saved," "the ransomed," "the redeemed." Every believer has experienced these transformations. This is the ground-idea of all future improvement, of heavenly destination. And when this language rises to our lips, amidst these longings for better and higher stages of being, "It doth not yet appear what we shall be,"—we are conducted by it to something certain and intelligible. "Behold what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called the sons of God!" The idea of the description which thus labors to explain the love so wonderfully introduced is, that of something foreign, belonging to another region, bearing an impress of entire singularity and strangeness.\* It is extraneous to whatever has been known and proved. It is a new thought, an unrealised conception, meeting no intimation, finding no germ, in the human mind. It was an unprecedented thing in the earth. Where was it not new? In heaven? In its archives there was no such record of grace. In hell? In its prisons there had been no remission.

There was no type of such a principle. There was no formula for such an idea. And to this moment it stands detached, isolated, unmixed, unreflected; a pure originality, a sublime anomaly, to every created community and mind. Only had it its element in infinite benignity, its coalescence with eternal mercy, its home and in-being in the bosom of God. What manner of love! When did love assume such forms? When did it overcome such difficulties? When did it repress such disgusts? When did it incur such sacrifices? When did it endure such wrongs? When did it afford such proofs? When did it expend such efforts? When did it suffer such provocations? When did it distribute such blessings? When did it abide such tests? What a manner! What a bearing is this! It is not the manner of men. It is the manner of God. It is like Him who doeth wonders; whose march is among marvels; who can never be anticipated and prejudged. It is true to him. It is worthy of him. But if we may trace the resemblance, if we can recognise the style, and pronounce it to be so like,—“Who is a God like unto Him?” This love takes a subsistence in all its proper objects, in all who feel its influence and glory in its manifestations, distinct and abiding. This manner answers to itself, to its original mien, its earliest seeming. It commiserates the hardened sinner,—his case of woe,—but how can it proceed? \* It sees in him disaffection and hostility. He is an enemy. The general love rose unimpeded in a spontaneous overflow: but every thing obstructs this application of it. It seems as if mercy were

pierced with the consciousness of the hopelessness of interposition: "How shall I put thee among the children?" But it can achieve the tender conquest. "I said, Thou shalt call me, My Father, and shalt not turn away from me." He is adopted! He is God's child! God's favor covers him with its smiles; God's image shines through him with its features! And we behold him advancing amidst ministering spirits and guardian angels, with a dower of indestructible riches and in a kingly state. Every thing combines to show what is the magnitude of the change. It is "the exceeding grace of God in us." It is "the exceeding greatness of his power towards us." It calls into "marvellous light." "The peace of God which passeth all understanding rules in our hearts." Then all these views surely will suggest heavenly meditation! All suggest it. Our justification is "of life." Our repentance is "unto life." Our regeneration is "the grace of life." What is not indicated and augured! How absolute is the inference that all this honor and privilege shall not run to waste! Was it given to fail? That which is so elaborate, was it fashioned to perish? The costly vessel, was it embellished to be marred? "We are called the sons of God." Does not this speak of mighty issues? "It doth not yet appear what we shall be." But can expectation stretch itself too far? The strictest reasoning henceforth banishes all necessity for sentiment and imagination; it forces upon us conclusions which sentiment and imagination cannot depict. "If children, then heirs; heirs of God, and joint heirs with Jesus Christ!" We discover

now a perfect resting-place on which to project our scale. "We know that we have eternal life." "The adoption of sons," the present privilege of Christians, was never intended to be fully developed in this life. It is concealed under infirmities; it is clouded by afflictions; it is connected with a probationary dispensation; it is subjected to moral tests; the sons of God are to be approved. But it shall not always be circumscribed by this narrow and unpropitious sphere. It yearns with prospective aims. Its more beautiful lineaments begin to set; it already expands itself into more worthy proportions. It carries with it "the example and shadow of heavenly things." To this correspond the premonitions awakened in our minds. We verify within us congenial emotions. "He who hath wrought us for the self-same thing is God, who also hath given unto us the earnest of the Spirit." "We rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory." We are "partakers of the glory that shall be revealed." "We are vessels aforetime prepared unto glory." We are "partakers of a heavenly calling." "Our conversation is in heaven." This stirs within us heavenly foretastes and predispositions. We now "do enter into the rest." We "hold that fast which we have, that no man take our crown." "The first-fruits of the Spirit" are waved over our souls. "We sit with Christ in the heavenly places." "Eternal life dwelleth in us." These are not only prophecies going before upon us, they are experiences. We "know in part," as we "prophesy in part." Pledge is fulfilled. Promise is experienced. Faith, and hope, and love, have

not only spied out the land, but have returned with specimens and spoils. Yet, remembering how great this adoption is, we feel that nothing present, though consciously real, can satisfy it, can comport with it, can answer to it. It has scarcely been approached. It is still hidden in the mystery of this "manner of love!" It needs heaven itself,—though it brightens with it, though it savors of it,—to ripen its results. It is checked where it cannot find infinite range and eternal duration. Thither all its affinities tend. There all its transports enlarge.

We have reasoned upon a particular blessing of the gospel, that of which the sublime text on which we comment is but the augment, that text which is less a betrayal of ignorance than a foretelling of faith; and when we consider that specific blessing of adoption, we feel that we cannot draw it out too fully and too permanently. It is the guarantee of all the glory, and all the happiness, which heaven can contain. But the gospel itself is the comprehensive index. We see in it, "all the words of this life." We require that this emphatic description should be understood. "This life!" Commonly it is a little phrase. We read of "the cares of this life," of "the things which pertain to this life," of "the affairs of this life." These all are poor and mean: they belong to an earthly existence. But when we read of "the words of this life," it is eternal life,— "this life is in the Son!" It is life, which stands alone from all besides, life, incomparably greater than any other life, that which is only worthy of the name. It is the scope and inspiration of the whole. Its doc-

trines, like stars, sweep onward to that source of light. Its promises, like gentle whispers, cheer the Christian pilgrim's heavenward way. Its duties, like self-denying but self-recompensing means of health, brace the spirit for its struggles with mortality. Its graces, like angels, just alight below, that they may waft us in their swift return where they can only rest. It summons us to forecast. We look beyond ourselves. It answers to what we already feel. We have the inward experience. We boast a present salvation. "It doth now save us." "Our faith hath saved us." "We are saved by hope." "God who hath saved us!" Mysterious preparations are hastening in our heart. "Christ is in us the hope of glory." And so manifestly does "grace" prepare for "glory," so plainly is the rudiment of heaven contained in genuine piety, that we may mark, as it were, the growth of the spirit's wing, its supple joint and callow down, which, when clothed with its plumage and poised in its strength, shall bear it up, and speed its flight to that heaven, from which suns, left far beneath, look little, poor, and dim!

But what we now understand, what we now feel, is only incipient. The principle of development still must be applied. Of heaven, the pattern and the presage are very imperfect. Then are we required to extend all that we understand, and all that we feel, concerning it, to think, and to cherish them to the utmost, while we cannot give them that way and career which they deserve, while they fall so unworthily short of the true illimitability. "It doth not yet appear what we shall be." Immediate confirmation is

yielded to us. For who wrote that pregnant sentence? A man of little mind? of cold affection? of lifeless soul? A man who knew scanty enjoyments of devotion, and possessed narrow opportunities of improvement? A recluse of the desert, with heart barren as its waste? A churl, who repined beneath his lot? It is the disciple who leaned on the bosom of Jesus: who heard and felt that heart, which it enclosed, to beat! "A door was opened in heaven." "Immediately he was in the spirit." He stood amidst the celestial wonders. He beheld, he talked, he enquired, he heard! He saw the great number of the redeemed, which no one can number. He listened to the voice of many angels—"ten thousand times ten thousand, and thousands of thousands." The tree of life fanned his brow; the river of life brightened to his eye and made sweet music to his ear. He ascertained the admeasurement of that city which is "continuing," which "God hath prepared;" he counted its gates, he traced its walls, he searched its foundations. He was collected in all his surveys, and self-possessed in all his thoughts. There is no bewildered manner, nor does his spirit sink. The spirit of the prophet is subject to the prophet. "I John saw the holy city." But after all, little can he tell. It baffles his report. And as Paul, in an earlier rapture, had declared that he "heard the unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for man to utter:" so does the beloved disciple, whose heavenly spirit might have retained, if any spirit could, so much of heaven, might have, most readily of all, caught its idea and reflected its



splendour and drank its bliss—confess his utter incapacity to set it forth. “It doth not yet appear what we shall be!” What must it be, when an infinite accumulation upon all that was ever imagined and desired by the most ecstatic saint is necessary to constitute it!

But as “it doth not yet appear what we shall be,” so when the heavenly order of existence has begun, there is still a necessary development. It is carried out in progressions. \* We may mark it stage by stage. There was the patriarchal heaven, whither the spirit of righteous Abel passed, in which the fathers of Israel lived to God, in which each walked in his uprightness,—Abraham’s bosom—the paradise to which Jesus commended his spirit, and bore that also, which he had saved amidst such a contrast of weakness and omnipotence. This state is invariably described as nether, subterranean, requiring descent. We do not dogmatise, whether “these lower parts of the earth” ought to be literally or figuratively understood; whether they denote local habitation, or comparative inferiority of honor and joy. It continued the same until the ascension of Christ, though we may suppose that it would share in every increasing disclosure and advantage, allotted to the saints on earth. Considering what departed spirits had known, the holiness they had attained, the spiritual-mindedness they had enjoyed, that state must have been most desirable to them. It was a great exaltation of their being. It was the scene of a peculiar Divine manifestation. The anticipated advent of the Messiah, their

reliance on his righteousness, and salvation, forbade them to sink away into darkness, or into silence. They "became not like them who go down into the pit." It was the abode of light, and confidence, and repose. They "had their good thing," though not "the better thing."\* It is quite impossible to ascribe to them, mental inactivity and trembling suspense. Did they leave their new song, which they chanted here, for no correspondent strain? When heart and flesh failed, was not God their portion for ever? Their often faltering distrust of the immediate future, their ignorance, their gloomy views, are not the proper measures of what they found that future to consist. If it could be the refreshment and the reward of the Redeemer's spirit, between his death and his resurrection, we may not think that it could be unworthy of them "who first trusted in Christ." But it did "not yet appear what they should be." Christ, in his Spirit's visitation, descended to them. He has now "ascended up, far above all heavens." He has "sat down at the right hand of the Majesty on high." His dwelling is "higher than the heavens;" all known, and supposeable, firmaments. The idea of altitude is not incidental, but is continually impressed. "He is made higher than the heavens." The blessedness of departed saints is, that they are with him. "Absent from the body, they are present with the Lord." He has "willed that they be with him, that they may behold his glory." This is that towards which they

\* Heb. xi. 40.

aspire, that they may "follow him," if not "now," yet, "afterwards," soon as their course is run. They who have died since the ascension of Christ, have unquestionably, like himself, "gone into heaven." They are "before the throne." But what is the condition of those, who died previously to the ascension? We know what it was. Are there, then, two different allotments? Are the disadvantages of the first retained? Is the superiority *exclusively* theirs, who are placed later on in the history of time, believing in Christ *as* come, but with no stronger faith than was exercised by them who believed that he *should* come? *They*, in the strictest sense of all, had "not seen, and yet believed;" they were, of all, most entitled to the "blessedness" of that peculiar faith. Is it conceivable, that they are left, while others, for no pre-eminence of excellence, are advanced? It is then clear, that the Hades of the righteous, under the law, is not the heaven where the ascended Christ is, and where all his disciples, *since* his ascension, are gathered. May we then infer that, such Hades is absorbed in this heaven? that its place is changed? that its spirit-throng is transferred? that its restrictions are abolished? that the patriarchs and prophets have risen thence? This is but presumptive reasoning; we may expect that, if it correspond to fact, there can be found more substantial evidence. Now, that was paradise: there the soul of Christ was, on the day of his crucifixion, together with the soul of the rescued malefactor. Where is now that fair and bowered garden, in which happy spirits dwell, eating its immortal fruits, and

drinking its living waters? The rapture of the apostle Paul seems to identify it with the third heaven. Thither he had been caught. It is replied that, this is the description of two different events.<sup>a</sup> We readily concede, that in the verb is no necessary sense of elevation.<sup>b</sup> But the designed impression of the narrative seems to us to be, that of simultaneousness: that he went into paradise, and into the third heaven, at once. Nor do we feel the force of that which is cited to prove the difference of the events: "visions and revelations." Might not these include disclosures of the same object? If they were but two, would they be denoted by, "the abundance of the revelations,"—"revelation," pointing out specifically each? Can abundance be applied to two? Besides, his account is only of one: the unutterable things were of paradise, nothing is said of the third heaven, unless it be included in paradise; and, therefore, we hold the inference to be just, that the scene was one.<sup>c</sup> The paradise, if the same with that which was of old, was inferior to the third heaven, but it is mentioned *climacterically*: is the third heaven visited first, and then, is this explored, as the more glorious place? There is in the *repetition*, only the natural rhetoric of awe and partial information: the manner of the vision is indescribable, and its indescribability is twice told. The same kind and direction of motion, as to the region or regions, is expressed by a common verb, which would be unfaithful,

<sup>a</sup> See Campbell on the Gospels. Prel. Diss.

<sup>b</sup> Ἀρραβω.

<sup>c</sup> 2 Cor. xii.

at least undescriptive, were these regions so different and extreme in their sphere.—It is a *Christian* promise, which unfolds this more exalted view of the present paradise: “To him that overcometh, will I give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the midst of the paradise of God.” This is the last employment by Scripture of the particular *word*: not so of the thing. For in the concluding chapter of the concluding book of Scripture—in a description of the final heaven, the new heavens—this very imagery is preserved: “On either side of the river, was there the tree of life.” We are congratulated in a sublime tone of confident appeal: “Ye are come unto the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and to an innumerable company of angels, to the general assembly and church of the first-born, which are written in heaven, and to the spirits of just men made perfect.” This is their present, actual, state; for we, living men, now come into contact with them. They are beheld in the Divine residence, in the true heaven, in a common congregation, in a celestial enrolment, in all possible perfection, according to their circumstances of bodily deprivation. From this “*general assembly*,” are all the believers of the ancient œconomy excluded? Could the scantling of those, who were emphatically, at that instant, “the dead in Christ,” constitute the whole of that assembly? Were not Jews and Gentile made “both one?” Was there not a perfect type of this union “of twain,” in “the one new man?” Would a “middle wall of partition,” here “broken down,” be left between their states beyond the grave? We are

distinctly informed that, "God has provided some better thing for us." Their participation was suspended upon our attainment of "this better thing," "that they without us, should not be made *perfect*." But they now share it: "ye are come to the spirits of just men made *perfect*." It is the same word. "Without us they could not be made perfect,"—they are now comprehended in "the general assembly,"—their historic precedence pointing them out distinctly, "the church of the first-born,"—they are "made perfect."—The resurrection of Christ, almost invariably identified with his ascension, is represented as possessing a retroactive influence. He has "become the first-fruits of them that slept." This seems not only to secure their happy resurrection, but it supposes some previous disadvantage. This is retrieved. It could not be as to their resurrection, for that was pledged before. But their spirits, in comparison with those believers who die under the present dispensation, were subjected to detriment. They were held in a species of captivity,—implying rescue and ransom, but also detention and suspense. They were like a liberated band, consciously safe and joyfully grateful, but who saw not the issue. Their feelings answered in some measure to their own "law," which "made nothing perfect." They could not cast off all the limitations which had beset them: the ~~will~~ was not entirely removed: they "could not stedfastly look to the end of that which is abolished." They knew better from what they were delivered, than to what they were reserved. But he, in entering heaven, "led captivity captive."

They who were held of death, he had freed: he took them, the children of captivity, captive to himself. Until heaven was prepared for them, he put them into charge and safe-keeping, "that they should rest yet for a little season." How happy were they to be his,—even his captives,—as their souls were upon earth brought into captivity to his obedience. They were disenthralled by his power, and awaited a share in his triumph. He led the way, he showed them the path of life, and they shall reign with him.\*—The "inheritance of the saints in light" is "among *all* them which are sanctified,"—they are the redeemed of all nations, and kindreds, and people, and tongues,—they are sealed according to their tribes,—they are called in one hope of their calling,—they form one mighty complement and aggregate, like the city in which they dwell, a quadrature of perfection. "Jerusalem, which is above, is the mother of us all!" "Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord, *from henceforth.*" This, then, is the heaven of Christian souls. Nothing better awaits them in their state of separation. The believer dies, all of him that can suffer dissolution,—and even something more, earthly life,—not forgetting that the separation of the spirit from that which may be dissolved is an effect of death, and that the separated spirit is under the influence, and in the state, of death. They whose spirits are separated are called the dead: but they are "the dead in Christ." "The body is dead because

\* The author, in another work, has endeavoured to support this criticism by Genesis xiv. 14, &c., Judges v. 12, 1 Samuel xxx. 18.

of sin, but the spirit is life because of righteousness." The soul has no parts to be separated: in Butler's phrase, it is indiscerptible : it, therefore, lives in defiance of mortal decay. It is released. We esteem not this to be a desirable escape, considered in itself. It would be a greater good that need should not exist for release, that the existence of the body should always go on with the existence of the spirit. This is the consequence of sin. The *penalty* is cut off from the believer in Christ, but not the inconvenience. It involves suspense, incompleteness, unfulfilled aim, defective instrumentality. It is now redeemed to him, and turned to inestimable account. He who is "absent from the body is present with the Lord." He who "departs," "departs to be with Christ!" "The spirit is made perfect," but it is only its own perfection, and amidst an immature state. That perfection is not absolute, development being a condition of spiritual nature, and its higher developments depending upon the restoration of the body. "It doth not yet appear what we shall be!" Holding a material resurrection, putting from us every dream "that it has passed already," we are now to think of those perfected spirits awaiting a destiny so glorious, that in their vehement aspirations, while upon earth, they were wont to seem unmindful of all besides: "I shall be satisfied when I awake with thy likeness : " "If by any means I might attain unto the resurrection of the dead." The most costly worth is attached to this recovery of our whole manhood. The perfecting of the soul, though the nobler process in itself, is not



compared with it,—not merely because this is the confirmation of that precious effect, but as it gives our nature its integrity, its right position in creation, and is the proper era for the “manifestation of the sons of God.” The glorification of man now strictly begins. The body is “raised in honor,” it is a “glorious body.” This may intend outward form, beauty, and grace,—power and facility of influence,—the assimilation to Him who was “fairer than the children of men.” But it is “raised a spiritual body,”—not by a conversion and transmutation of different properties, yet matter exquisitely æthercalised, refined, unmixed as spirit, active as spirit, indestructible as spirit,—wholly subservient to it, wholly informed by it, its stay, and mirror, and wing. And thus a new development of heaven ensues. The heaven of spirits was not, indeed, divested of all adjuncts which corporeity might apprehend and enjoy: for it had received some of our nature in its entirety, some who had not died and some who had been raised bodily from the grave. Still shall unfold another heaven, more adapted to the expressions of the incarnate God, to the exercises of his risen saints, to the triumphs of redeemed and immortalised mortality! That development depends upon a far distant event. No transition of abode can we anticipate ulterior to it. These are the new heavens and the new earth. But progression belongs to their inhabitants. “It doth not,” at any point of their perpetuity of bliss, “appear what they shall be.” In the revolutions of that duration there is room and verge for proficiency in knowledge and for advance-

ment in holiness, which may be as inconceivable to them as their present knowledge and holiness can be to us. They may acquire new mediums of perception, susceptibilities which we should not understand how to explain save by comparing them to new powers and faculties, though we must maintain that they can only be high and nobler conditions of their original mind. That mind, in its blessed circumstances of physical completeness and of final glorification, may evolve in capacities, and subsist in states, of which we cannot conceive. Where study cannot be a weariness, it may be illuminated with thoughts and expanded with reasonings to which we cannot unite an analogy or attach a name. How may it rise, not only above all ignorance and prejudice, but gain the mastery of essential truth,—unravelling mystery, solving problem, sounding depth, as it careers along! In the Divine light,\* it shall see light. What will be the effusing savor of the knowledge of Christ when it is now so sweet! What will it be to comprehend with all saints and know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge, when now that meditation can fill us with all the fulness of God! The will, the movement of the purest affections, cannot then be left to traverse in a narrow round,—vibrating amidst incessantly recurring duties of humble import, and low temptations, and fretting cares,—it must pursue its way among unmixed good, choosing only from the less to the greater, finding its pivot in the infinite volition and its inclination towards the infinite glory. It is of the nature of mind, in its understanding and will, to

keep this active and opening course. No present information can content it. No present happiness can satisfy it. We see this bias, by a wretched perversion, in the restlessness of the wicked. We see this same intellectual order in the pious, their growth in grace, the abounding of their love more and more, not counting themselves to have attained or to be already perfect.—This, then, is the basis and history of all the celestial developments from the beginning,—how heaven has grown and shall grow, heaven out of heaven, it never appearing what shall be,—yet taking a permanent form at last, though all its blessings still proceed in an infinite series. What *has* been, and what *is*, in comparison with “what we *shall* be,” is only as the first bar of light in the orient, though the harbinger of day,—the most partial unhooding of the bud, though a yielding to the outpressing flower,—the infant lisp ere it strengthens into manly speech, containing, however, its true articulations,—the baby curiosity ere it settles into scientific reason, anticipating, nevertheless, its proper elements.

We have withheld a principle, in speaking of heaven, which we think may regulate its evolutions. It is, that while they are always in advance, as to clearness, of the religious dispensation at any time subsisting upon earth, still must they be in conformity to it. “The righteous men” of old desired to see the things which we see: but not from their heaven could they see things which had not come to pass. Their ideas, until Christ came, were those of expectancy. Now that Christ is come, the

ideas of heaven are in resemblance to him and his mediation. "The Lamb is the light thereof." So, whatever may be the enlargements and triumphs of the Christian church, the sympathy with these cannot be unknown to those who compose the church which is above. This sympathy can only be progressive. Until the events themselves it cannot be awakened. Voices are heard in heaven only when these events occur. And this view relieves the question of any arbitrary character. The knowledge of Divine things is in revelation. It is given to man. All other beings must acquire it thence. The higher conclusions cannot be otherwise anticipated. "Into these things the angels desire to look." "The principalities and powers in heavenly places learn from the church the manifold wisdom of God." The unfolding light of earth passed over celestial spirits, and each changing scene of heaven answered to the rising splendour. When the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the glory of God, thus brighter shall the heavenly places glow. It may be that the final heaven shall reflect, though earth has passed away, the glorious transactions of the universe, whatever the hand of Deity may still produce and govern in its farthest realms! Central to that universe, its gates, open night and day, may receive glad tidings from other worlds, and heaven continually swell forth to newer proportions, and echo distant songs!

There is a special sympathy in these later developments which we must distinguish. It will appear necessary and reasonable that Christianity should

bring us into close fellowship with its Founder. Every present blessing propounded by it depends for its vital experience upon our union to him,—one of its leading doctrines,—and that one effect by which we are made “partakers of Christ.” He is the subject of its facts and revelations. He is never seen but “at hand, and not afar off.” His present, living, influence animates it. “Christ in you,” is the appeal which every Christian understands. The closer his union, his identification, with Him who is his Head and his Life, the more glorious is the aspect, the more intense is the operation, of Christianity. Love to him is the grand criterion that we are in him, that we abide in him, that we grow up unto him in all things. “Formed in us,” he is the model after which we are fashioned. “For us to live is Christ:” while this is the plan of our life, our life is the fitted scope for its fulfilment. We may become “the glory of Christ.” We cannot anticipate, we cannot conceive, any state of superior, preferable, blessedness to the Christian life on *earth*, which does not bring us nearer to Him, into a more distinct presence, into a fuller realisation, than we now enjoy. But this is assured us. Heaven is heaven on this account. “We are confident and willing rather to be absent from the body and present with the Lord.” To the future heaven, consequent on the resurrection of his followers, more marvellous manifestations shall be unfolded. “When Christ shall appear, then shall we appear with him in glory.” “When we shall see him we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is.”

He is visible. He is known. There shall be a peculiar ascertainment of him. He wills that we may see his glory. He will come and take us to himself, that where he is we may be also. So shall we be for ever with the Lord. It shall be vision the most certain. "See Him as he is!" Not as he was in "the days of his flesh;" not as imagination has lent hues to hope when we have cried, Come, Lord Jesus, come quickly! but in a realness which subsists, though that which we cannot now apprehend. The transforming power of that vision depends upon its truth and fact, that it is of Christ indeed; that it is clear without cloud, full without stint, constant without interruption; as at every period he can be only worthily regarded, justly considered; in exactest recognition, in closest communion; with nothing to be exempted, nothing to be corrected, nothing to be supplied; the medium as perfect as the object,—as He is! What heart does not bound at the thought of "the glory of his presence?" To see as with a glance all the virtues scattered among creatures,—in them irregular, detached, unharmonised, immature,—collected in his character, perfect, concordant, the infinite convergence of spiritual loveliness! It is "the King in his beauty!"

It would not be heaven were it not desirable above all that is now known of highest happiness on earth; were it not to the most holy Christian, in the most advantageous circumstances, a blessed exchange. If to our minds it be that in which we *only acquiesce*, to which we are barely *reconciled*,—an alternative to which, being inevitable, we yield,—we have not found

the true conception of heaven. The first Christians, when they must enter it by violence and cruel deaths, passionately sought it, and strove for it the more. They supplicated for *patience*, because their temptation was to repine at the delay. They saw how the meteyard of the present and future inclined, and without hesitation pronounced the decision. "They took joyfully the spoiling of their goods, knowing in themselves that they had in heaven a better and an enduring substance." This confidence was put into the most summary form. "I count not my life dear unto myself." "For to me to die is gain." "To depart, and to be with Christ, is far better." The *superiority of advantage is there*. Yet seems and sounds it paradox. What disarrays like death? It defaces the fascination of the beautiful. It breaks the lamp of the wise. It withers the strength of the mighty. It snatches the store of the rich. Kings are stripped of trapping, trophy, treasure: "their glory shall not descend after them." The Christian is really more interested in the *present* than all\* men besides. None have such a stake in it as he. Life is his. Things present are his. He must know the denudation of death as any other man. Is it not loss to be withdrawn from the fruits of our industry, the frugal recompense of toils and pains? Is it not loss to be torn from all our endearments of nature and love? Is it not loss to forsake the spectacle now unfolded to us, the arched sky and verdant earth? Is it not loss to forego every haunt where the sole of our foot has found its rest and our heart its hold? But he who awarded, that death was *gain*,

that to depart was far *better*, had learnt to count all things but loss for Christ, and had been caught up into the third heaven. We receive from him the double estimate. He can pronounce respecting both. Does he simply regard as an equivalent for life,—not only when harassed but when most gifted and enviable,—whatever ensues upon its close? Something to which it is our duty and wisdom to consent? In his view, it is not indemnity, not compensation, but an incomparable good. It is an incalculable exaltation. The actual, the absolute, desirableness of heaven, must then be established in our mind. We know what sacrifice there is in death: what proves it such a capacity of happiness? such a melioration? such a gain? As an isolated judgement it can stand on no ground: it cannot momentarily impose. It must belong to some system: it must spring from a peculiar class of principles and affections. It is a relative, a contingent,—not a necessary, nor a universal, truth: but for certain things it would not be true, and as to certain persons it is not true. Nor do we think that the profit of death could be shown by any measure of general happiness. That happiness might not seem congenial: it might not allure nor draw. We might not be capable of appreciating it. We might be reluctant, for that greater enjoyment—*indefinitely great*—to part with that less and inferior which we now understood and possessed. It is necessary, in order to inspire the just emulation, to prove that there is an augmentation of that *kind* of happiness which Christians experience in their present state.



Now we do think that there is a frequent intimation in Scripture, that heaven, with all its amazing secrets, follows in a natural order from the present, that while it affects our physical constitution of body and of soul, putting exquisite refinements upon both, so it regards our present habits and acts and dispositions, consulting them, directing them, enuring them, and always in reference to our happiness, by making them the means of it. We are not to think of it as strange. If we be now "made meet for it," there must be a correspondence to that meetness. If we are bid to prepare for it, there must be that which agrees to the preparation. All the good done in the body is received again. The first-fruits answer to the harvest. There must be, therefore, some medium of anticipation. There must be some ground of comparison. And it is this which we would confirm; for it is not another species of happiness,—however transcendent, and that only the more indefinable,—which can, in man's judgment, satisfy him for the loss of that which he feels now to be happy.

Is there *Life*, as we now understand it? We are conscious of it, we value it more than any good, we shrink from whatever may endanger it. To speak of a metempsychosis, is to speak of another's life and not of our own. To speak of the continuance of a life which had ceased, is to speak of a new existence. To speak of the revival of a forgotten past, is to speak of the creation of the present. A life without perception, a life without intelligence, a life without memory, a life without identity, we can neither con-

ceive nor prize. Any such, whatever else it can be, sets aside, supersedes, annihilates, our being. The Scriptures represent to us that heaven sustains our life. "We keep it unto life eternal." It is life in its intensity and fitness and concentration, corporeal, mental, spiritual. "We shall reign in life." The final heaven,—and we must pass through all the stages to it,—shall restore and sublimate all the essentials of our being, all its instruments and capacities, with the accession of whatever besides may belong to life everlasting!

Is there *Devotion*, as we now approve it? The Omnipresent can now manifest himself to the religious mind as he does not unto the world. He can see in secret where piety bends and pleads. He is "in heaven," after a manner in which he is not elsewhere. There is his "presence," his "right hand," his "majesty," his "high and holy place." There He is most proximate. His glories ray out their brightest splendor. "To draw near unto God," is the Christian's present delight. "God is his exceeding joy." "He has boldness to enter into the holiest." He may "walk with God." Any abridgment of this privilege, whatever could check its tenderness, its freedom, its welcome, would be an alienation of his purest good. But heaven cannot interpose repression or restraint. It is consecrated to praise. It is a shrine full of incense and music. They have every one censers. Harpers harp with their harps. The soul, which the ancients defined to be a harmony, now first finds its proper song. Communion with the Lord God and the Lamb

constitutes the rite and the spirit of heaven. Of those multitudes we are told, that they "serve God day and night in his temple," that "He who sitteth upon the throne shall dwell among them." "His servants shall serve him." All this is assured. We believe it. We know not how this shall be. "We know not with what we must serve the Lord, until we be come thither."

Is there scope for *Benevolence*? The love of creatures is sweet to us, and life were heavy could we not exercise it. It is a part of the law, "the royal law:" its neglect is sin, and sin is misery. On earth we cannot deplore the unsuitableness of the sphere for this virtue. There are objects for its complacency, and far more for its pity. To spread happiness around us is our happiness. We may go about doing good. Love is of God, and is Godlike. Who would be "shaken from this labor?" Who would be stayed in this career? We have the "opportunity" of doing good. What a "stewardship" of trusts is committed to us! It would not be heaven, if that opportunity, if that stewardship, were suddenly denied. But it only *otherwise* directs that sympathy. It is even now a higher act of mind to rejoice with them who rejoice, than to weep with them who weep. It is greatly more difficult. It is far more generous and noble. It is a better triumph over our little and envious nature. It does not, as when we condole with the miserable, place us in a more advantageous position and commanding light: it does not invest us with an imaginary superiority: it does not suffer us to look down:

it does not invite by any sense of power nor repay by any expression of gratitude. It can scarcely not be pure, if it be sincere. In the eternal world there will be only excellence to admire. There will only be happiness in which to exult. Fellow-convicts may pity each other: no sentiment may be less moral and laudable. Commiseration may shed a selfish tear. Pride may erect itself in assisting the weak and relieving the indigent. A mixed passion, however unconscious and however deprecated, almost belongs to such exercises. You bestow. You relieve. You lift up. They call you benefactors. It is a gift. But what will it be, when all the affections of our nature, purified of all possible pride, shall have soared above all that could tempt it in benevolence itself! The evil eye of jealousy looks not forth! To prefer one another is the common consent! Heart, soul, and mind, in all their strength, will be constantly engaged in the complacency of holiness which is perfect and in the congratulation of joy which is full. We shall feel no mortification at any good which is superior to our own. It will affect us with as much pleasure as though it were ours, and yet excite us to emulate it. This is the love which never faileth, whose lowest exercise was of succor and compassion, which, now surviving the existence of misery, gives all her ardors to good and purity, which pursues her best and immortal triumphs in seeking not her own!

Is there facility for *Friendship*? We know that word, how it turns our thoughts to a few, how it particularises the chosen objects of our love. No univer-

sal esteem and sympathy could compensate its loss. Now while all those glorified saints shall call forth perfect love, while their spiritual loveliness might attract the entire heart, we believe that there will be the reappearance of every character which death conceals, and the renewal of every tie which death dissolves. Not only shall remembered worth inspire afresh its proper regard, but recorded personality shall be individualised to us. The multitude shall stand confessed. They who must be the objects of holy curiosity shall not remain undistinguished. We shall see Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of God. "We shall know even as also we are known." But it is in the recognition of those, to whom natural and religious bonds have united us—"lover, and friend, and acquaintance"—that we must feel the most immediate concern. To lose them by their death, to leave them behind by ours, is a bitter woe. The pang would not be medicable, were this final separation. It could not find relief in a general assurance of their happiness. To know that they were near to us, without the power of discerning them, would not be joy, but the torment of a baffled sense, of a withholden desire. Do we now "come to the spirits of just men," without a warrant of discrimination? May we not think specially? May we not stretch forth our hands towards those companions of our pilgrimage, who have outrun us to the tomb, and sped before us to their rest? And if this re-union be not assured, this resumption of Christian friendship, heaven seems postponed to earth, and that refused to the future

which principally blesses the present. But is not Scripture emphatic in its testimony? How otherwise is it to be understood, when the mourning Thessalonians are not left in ignorance concerning them who had fallen asleep—their relatives and their fellow-disciples—but are certified that “them who sleep in Jesus, shall God bring with him?” How otherwise, when Paul anticipates in his converts, his glory and his crown? How otherwise, when Philemon receives Onesimus for ever? How otherwise, when “every man” shall be “presented” by him who “warned and taught him in all wisdom,” perfect in Christ Jesus? How otherwise, when He who raised up the Lord Jesus shall raise us up also by Jesus, and present us with each other, with those to whom we write and speak these things? How otherwise, when the appeal is “by our gathering together unto him?” How otherwise, when we are commanded to “remember them who had the rule over” us, to “follow their faith,” to “consider the end of their conversation,” that when “they give account, they may do it with joy?” Is all the fellowship of saints, all the comfort of love, to be broken short? Are these memories all to be blotted out? Have we no hostages in heaven? Are none of our first-fruits garnered there? We might well inquire, Can the spirit be made perfect in the destruction of its sensibilities? What has plucked its very nature from it? Is the garment of glory a disguise? Are parents and children, pastors and flocks, intermixed, without one identifying sign, one happy greeting? We recover when we die, far more friend-

ships than we forego : and there is none but shall be perpetuated. It is a reasonable thought that the age of eternity may come, which shall have completed an interchange of ideas and feelings, with all the angels and all the saints. From the first, our studies, our beatitudes, our songs, shall be the same. From the first, we shall be one. Yet does not this exclude the more descriptive affection, and the more defined relationship, to which religion now owes so much of its strength and sweetness; nor is heaven ever thrown into such contrast with our hopes and desires, as to render it conceivable that this recognition can there be denied. It is the implicit doctrine of entire revelation, not avouched because assumed, not propounded because unquestioned, with which all agrees, which embarrasses and impedes nothing; in the abrogation of which, man is deprived of his most natural principles, and those humanities which familiarise heaven, in its most attractive representations, are violently effaced.

Is there ground for *Security*? The changes and uncertainties of this life betray us into indifference, or tease us into disgust. We would not live alway. Here we abide not in one stay. In a still more saddened mood, we may regard our spiritual instability. "It is a good thing that the heart be established with grace," but how imperfect and languid is that establishment! Is there a world, where bond is never weakened, prospect never overcast, safety never endangered? Where the apprehension of vicissitude can never rise? Where we need never tremble? Where sin can never tempt, nor doubt annoy? Where hearts can no more

sink nor chill? This is revealed. . The city we seek, hath foundations. The house we shall inhabit, is eternal in the heavens. We go where health and strength know no decay, love and attachment no blight, connexion and fellowship no decline. Character cannot degenerate, nor principle deflect. Influence cannot lessen, nor usefulness pause. The corruptible has put on incorruption, and the mortal, immortality.

Is there range for *Research*? The delight of pious study and investigation in the great fields of nature, is of the purest kind. "The works of the Lord are great : sought out of all them who have pleasure therein." "I will triumph in the works of thy hands." Philosophy and science, baptized by religion, are the best ministers of human happiness. They who thus addict themselves are the best benefactors of mankind. What realms—vast, profound, measureless—remain yet to be explored! Death would bring a pang to the Christian, versed in discovery and ardent for illumination, if it must for ever quench his knowledge, and debar its enlargement. Must he leave every question unsolved? every suspense unrelieved? Must his invention be waste, and his labor vanity? Is there nothing in his elevation which shall still lift him? Nothing in his present pathway, which still is onward? Perhaps sublimer results await him. Here he wrought at principles, was engrossed in calculations. Here was his toil of pupilage and initiation. There he may build his orrery among the stars, and look out over all the heavens! There he may discern the compositions of this sphere, or, if they be unworthy of further



thought, he may be guided by them to those awful periods which preceded it, and to those mighty histories of which its changes are the schedule and mark. Nor need we suppose, that the lettered taste finds there no gratifications. In thought, beautiful and graceful, only can religion live, and piety meet its congenial element. What numbers, spontaneously sweet, may flow! What imaginings, self-excited, may kindle! And if we may speak our impression of that heaven, it is not so much that particular directions of inquiry and disquisition prevail, but that they have given formation and strength to mental habits, and have furnished resources which heaven only can fully occupy and employ. All nature may appear to them one self-interpreting symbol, bringing out to their eye far more than those secrets which once they sought; and all knowledge, in its exquisite and lovely refinements, may prove to have been but one intellectual preparation for perceptions and relishes of the great and wonderful to which it could never have aspired. And yet shall the earnest student of revelation find the most congenial perpetuity of his research. Something there may be in it which none at present fully understand: something may be inferred from it which all will need to correct. Who has grasped all its treasures? Who has scooped its mines? "They keep the sayings of this book." It is "hidden in their hearts." It is "fitted in their lips." "For ever it is settled in heaven." The sensible form has perished: its truth, its power, its glory, survive. It has "thoroughly furnished" the Christian for all the "good works" of

earth: it shall be his text and song for eternal ministrations.

Is there opportunity for *Progression*? No happiness can be satisfying and lasting which lies in any imposed limits; knowledge could yield little pleasure had it reached its utmost possible extent; and holiness would, of its very nature, die, might it not rise into higher and higher perfections. This may now be attained. "Grow in knowledge." "Follow holiness." The aspiration, the effort, induces delight. It rewards itself. Wine cometh of the winepress. With striving we knit our strength. Think then of heaven. There is the infinite to explore, the divine to enjoy, the eternal to pursue. In this is no restraint. An unprogressive immortality is inconsistent and inconceivable. We speak of ourselves. We know the workings of our nature. Such an immortality could not make us happy or great. It would wrap us in a trance. It would deaden every activity. Nor can argument avail from what we know of the Deity. And if it be said, that his is unprogressive perfection, and that he is blessed for ever, we dispute the justice of the deduction. We cannot argue from his essence to our nature. Nor do we allow the fitness of the terms. What is meant by unprogressive perfection? That he cannot be more glorified than he is? that in his existence he does not continue and endure? that facts and events as they arise, are not real to him? that he does not distinguish order, relation, succession? that he is ignorant of whatever all other beings perceive? that past and future are to him as a present, that is,

what they are not? A metaphysical argument may disprove the possibility of any augmentation of the Divine happiness. We distrust it. Scripture cannot be read by such a rule. That happiness is boundless plenitude. May not the will, the fulfilled purpose, the evolving agency, of God, affect it with some change, some influence, we speak not of excitements, nor strictly of degrees, which shall correspond to his own word? He pronounces some of his works "good," and some "very good," he can "rejoice with joy," he can "joy with singing." We do not suppose that this is all the truth. We do not suppose that we could understand it were it all placed before us. But as we concede that there can be no proper increase of the Divine blessedness, so are we alike convinced that unprogressive perfection does not truly denote the operations of the Divine nature. And such cannot express ours. The soul shall expand in its immortality, and that heaven is worthy of the name which is itself immortal!

Is there celebration of *Redemption*? This is the blessed desire and practice of true Christians in their earthly lot. Their song is now: "Unto him who loved us, and washed us from our sins in his own blood, and hath made us kings and priests unto God and his Father, to him be glory and dominion for ever and ever." They show his death till he come. They glory in his cross. Can they forget him? Can they cease to worship him? Would that be heaven where they saw no memorial of his atonement and heard no anthem of his praise? It is the high place of this

service. There sitteth the Lamb in the midst of the throne. His worshippers wash their robes and make them white in his blood. They sing a new song,—new, for deathless are those realms,—new, in its awful, tender, burden,—new, in its copious matter and inextinguishable inspiration. “Thou wast slain !”. Not only in the present heaven, the scene of the evangelic administration, but in the final heaven, when all administration shall have closed, there is the holy city of sacrifice, everywhere presenting the marks and the associations and the high honors of the Lamb.

Therefore do we conclude that not only is heaven to be desired and “sore longed for,” on account of its general happiness, but because of every kind of happiness which the Christian at present knows. “We praise the dead, which are already dead, more than the living, which are yet alive.”

And the glory of all consists in the beatific vision of Deity. This is sublimely expressed : “That God may be all in all.” But this is always associated with sanctity, as though this were the very medium of the perception. “Blessed are the pure in heart : for they shall see God.” “Holiness, without which no man shall see the Lord.” “His servants shall serve him, and they shall see his face.”

There are mystic tokens of the celestial happiness which we must not overlook. Beauty, concord, proportion; are familiar ideas; we mark their actual application; we must endeavour to understand how they shadow out higher elements; and how their archetypes are in heaven.

Beauty, the most sensible, only impresses the corresponding emotion, by standing forth the emblem of intellectual attraction and moral loveliness. Bright and color and shape do not constitute, but represent, it. And when we muse of heaven, though we shall there "in our flesh see God, whom we shall see for ourselves, and our eyes behold, and not another's," though we shall gaze on sensible wonder and glory, we must endeavor to transfer the more materialised impression to that which is ultimate and more refined, the tree of life to life itself, the pure river of water to purity itself, whatever is bright to knowledge, whatever is fair to innocence, while "the beauty of the Lord" is but the assemblage of "the beauties of holiness."

Concord, the most exquisite, is not merely an animal delight; it stirs the memories, the imaginations, of the soul. We know not why there should not be ode and song in heaven. We know not why we must refine away all such literal intimations. Still is a deeper signification to be found. That which was divided, is now the united, heart. The mind and body, which struggled against each other, are now in a perfect concert of exercise. Sweet harmony sways all thoughts and all feelings. The combination of every interest is exact. The company is a choir. The unanimity is a chorus. There is a strain of praise and thanksgiving, beyond the power of voice to utter and of harp to resound.

Proportion charms the taste, as something more than it is in itself. It lies removed from artificial rule. It tells of order and subordination. It gratifies an inner

sentiment. We think of heaven. There is configuration. We may measure it by the typic reed. These admeasurements speak of grander relations. Heaven is complete. There is no irregularity, no want, no excess. Unlike the crooked things, the ill-balanced events, the extreme passions, of earth, it is moulded to one standard, and answers to the exactest plan. Judgement is its line and righteousness its plummet.

And on this "glory is a defence," that of immortality. The eternity of heaven, so far as we know, is undenied. None steal a beam from that crown which fadeth not away. None abridge a moment of eternal life. None would shorten eternal redemption. None would lessen eternal salvation. None would reduce eternal inheritance. Otherwise could it be heaven? The heathen never supposed the end of their Elysium. All descriptions, save where argument has grown, under opposition, wilful and desperate,<sup>a</sup> sustain its immortality. If the certainty were that all this must end, however distant and still unknown the period, that oppressive conviction could never flee the spirits of the blest. It would hang like a dark cloud over every scene. It would haunt every thought. How every voice would falter in its hymn! How every hand would quiver as it struck its harp! Suspicion would hasten the drawing nigh of that doom. Deep, dread, suspense would anticipate its approach. The vesture would seem to decay, and the crown to dim, while yet they were unimpaired. The amaranth

<sup>a</sup> Whiston is the only assessor of it whom we recall.

would seem to sere amidst its brightest bloom. "The twelve foundations" would seem to shake long before they sunk away. Was it but the pageant of ages? Must it, when they expire, dissolve? It is an inconceivable catastrophe! No reason, no fitness, could explain it. Faint was the shriek of Sin,—embodied by our bard in hideous form,—when she brought forth, full-armed, her monster son, and "fled and cried out, Death," and hell "back resounded, Death,"—in comparison with the horror which would awaken in these "nations of the saved!" Their last look, their clinging hold, their dying groan, their annihilation! It is an unholy, lawless, dream,—alike impossible to be true, and impious to imagine!

Rather be it our part and pleasure to meditate heaven in its glories and raptures because thus eternal. Let the "everlasting joy" be now upon our heads. Let us endeavour to conceive those lengthened measures of duration, which we must renew and still renew, though all is endless still. There shall not be lack, for there is "fulness of joy;" there shall not be satiety, for there are "pleasures for evermore." And yet may heaven be seen in a certain development, agreeing with the progression of its inhabitants, through this eternity. "What we shall be," may always be an experience to gain! It may rise continually in refinement and spiritualism! It may advance perpetually towards fuller impenetrations and transfusions of the Covenanted Godhead! So in the Apocalypse thoughts of this order are not withheld. It opens in a temple, but at its conclusion there is seen no temple, for the

Lord God Almighty and the Lamb are the temple. There was silence, but afterwards the song never dies away. At the first we behold more of arrangement and activity, more of recent earthly remembrance and association, but at the end there rise more congregated wonders, more calm, more fixedness, more rest. All becomes more enlarged and ample, more elaborate and glorified : not "the living fountains," but "the river of life ;" not a door just opened in heaven, but the twelve gates which are not shut night nor day ; not the restraint of the sun from its smiting vehemence, but itself outshone, so that there is no need of its further shining ; not the tree of life in the midst of the Paradise, but flourishing on either side of the river ; not the dim and distant mysteriousness of Him who sitteth upon the throne, but his tabernacle with men ; not the throne of the rainbow, mitigated and faint, but of peerless glory ; not the throne of undefined Deity, but of God and the Lamb !



## LECTURE VI.

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"THE LORD, THE LORD GOD, THAT WILL BY NO MEANS CLEAR;" LITERALLY,  
CLEARING HE WILL NOT CLEAR, OR NOT TREAT WITH IMPUNITY.

EXODUS xxxiv. 6, 7.

IN revolving in our minds all questions which affect eternity and its interests, it is certain that we cannot think too intensely, if we think aright. Our thoughts being once in the due direction, may travel forward in a boundless way. The difficulty afterwards is in giving to those thoughts a correspondence with their theme. The idea of eternity is simple and undivided to none save to Him who "only hath immortality:" to the human mind, when it *most nearly* approaches it, it is a succession of many ideas; or, so to speak, idea resuming and relieving idea, *that* starting anew when *this* has wearied, others carrying it forward when preceding ones have failed. We "know not the numbers thereof." "The powers of the world to come" quickly overwhelm us.

Punishments, as they stand in connexion with our argument, respect the same subjects and the same principles as rewards. They belong to one government, and their existence in the light of sanctions,

though they were never called for, are indispensable and essential to it. Whatever rectitude and benevolence can be in reward, must be likewise in punishment. The law cannot know, in these alternatives, different dispositions. The Lawgiver cannot be directed by different motives. The government designs only good : punishment, equally with reward, is a precautionary measure, a provision, to secure it.

We might ask, Why does God deal with men in government? But there are anterior questions, and not more presumptuous. Why did he make them reasonable, and, consequently, free? We dare not put the ultimate demand in its supposed tone of impiety : "Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?" "Shall thy work say, He hath no hands?" "Shall the thing framed say of him who framed it, He had no understanding?" The wise are satisfied to abide by final, though prescriptive, limitations. They yield to the fact which they cannot oppose. They obey the system of physical and moral subordination, of which they are a created part. They, however, do not merely forbear to gainsay what they cannot subvert. Moral government admits of a clear defence and easy justification. None other means could make the creature so great. The faculties which render him accountable are his exact capacity to be happy. They give him the power of an indefinite rise and melioration. Nor could any system illustrate the principles of rectitude and purity which must be of infinite account. God must be known, that he may be glorified as God. "I am the Lord

which exercise loving-kindness, judgement, and righteousness; in the earth: for ~~in~~ these things I delight, saith the Lord." Moral government is their exercise. Besides, no reason can be stronger for the arrangement, so far as our mind is concerned, than the impossibility which every objector feels of suggesting any other. If men will challenge the right of the Creator to form such a race, upon them be the profane temerity of the protest. We are content to begin our inquiries with the existence of man, and challenge, with perfect confidence, the conceivableness of any different scheme and regimen.

But moral government is prepared, by its terms, for possible defection. It is no compulsory instrument for individual happiness. The best for all, the best for each, to prove itself this, it may be requisite to punish some. Though punitive infliction is no end of this government, it is its resource and alternative. A moral system is not frustrated, so long as it can enforce its sanctions. Always conditional, it is sustained while it keeps its conditions. With this it can only be occupied and charged. It must rest with infinite goodness whether it resort to any other method, either of securing obedience from defection, or of retrieving the consequences of defection when it has taken place. The first might be effectuated by upholding in sovereignty: the second, by forgiveness on satisfaction and atonement.

Let us, then, think of original man. He sinned. The penalty ensued. Men sin. The penalty falls upon them still. The first government is in force. It

is not pressed by any difficulty, nor betrayed into any inconsistency. Strong at this hour as at the beginning, it vindicates itself whenever transgressed. The law remains the same: it is holy, just, and good. Speculations offer themselves to disarray the authority of this government, to make null and void its law. It is conjectured by not a few, that our first parent would have suffered alone, that none would have been born of him to share his fall, unless remedial measures were contemplated. But this is to suppose the defeat by sin of the whole creative system,—of all the laws, rudiments, tendencies of this mundane constitution,—the subversion of this stupendous work. That would have been failure, a reduction to insurmountable dilemma, a necessity not to proceed. Who dare entertain the thought? Our ancestor was not considered in himself. He was proto-plast. Whom did he type? He was the federal head. Who were his constituents? It has also been conjectured that the justice of the representative test applied to our manhood, depended upon the certainty that remedial measures were in store. This is a vicious theology. For every act of moral government must be entire in itself. To suppose that it looks to any foreign solution, to any superaddition of an utterly diverse element for its vindication, is to condemn and reject every principle proper to it. It would not, then, be righteous unless completed by something else. But that something must be of justice or of grace. If of justice, then without it man would not have been treated justly. Justice coming to the aid of justice, seems to us no

very intelligible nor holy thought. If not of justice, it must be of grace. Grace, however, is extra-judicial. It may, or may not, be exercised. It can never be needed until justice is obliged to punish; then its need is founded upon just punishment. Grace thus admits that the punishment is just. It does not rescue from the justice, but only from the punishment to which the sinner became liable. So far from arraigning the justice, it acknowledges, honors, and supports. It celebrates it with sacrifice and expiation and satisfaction. It provides a perfect moral indemnity. It brings in "an everlasting righteousness," and constitutes this the basis of forgiving and accepting mercy. We cannot conceive of a sentiment more dishonoring to Christianity than this,—that it was a new law; that it was the mitigation of the original rule; that it was an arrest upon a course of things which would have been unjust had it continued alone; that it was a virtual apology for a method of trial, if not absolutely opposed to righteousness, severe and extreme.

Practically every man is now placed under the original law, and so he would have been had there been no act of mercy. The forms of that law may be varied, but our responsibility is always the same. We believe that this act of mercy has respect to all men, and regards all whom it reaches as responsible for its believing welcome,—redeeming them from the curse of the law which they have broken, recovering them to the dignity of the nature which they have debased, but leaving them morally accountable as they were before. What was their duty cannot be less their duty

now. "Not as being without law, but under the law to Christ." In whatever relation we stand to a sinful parentage, whatever may be its influence, guilt and depravity are *personal* considerations; for ourselves we stand or fall. Not doubting the transmission of sinful bias or disposition, we behold it in all as choice, as the operation of moral liberty.

By these lights cast on the state of man, by these clews to his real history and condition, we proceed to consider him in his fearful catastrophe of present and future condemnation. "Cursed is every man who continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them." Continuance is the requirement: on its failure the curse is precipitated. This is assumed by Christianity. It takes for granted that this is the true state of all. Its doctrines and overtures proceed on the admission as that which cannot be denied. But it surely follows that it is independent of this catastrophe. It only "plentifully declareth the thing as it is." Had it never been known, had it never existed, that condemnation would have been upon us. It does not bring us into it. It finds us there; and proclaims to us salvation. Its language is that of the Saviour: "Think not that I accuse you." Hell is not its pile. It creates no hell. "God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world; but that the world through him might be saved."

To stave off future objections, we modify these statements without remitting their truth. Christianity, though it be no part of its nature, though it be no

consequence of its design, may affect the punishment of man. For while it is a mere system of restorative mercy, it is invested with legislative authority and judicial power. It is possessed of the attributes of government and law. It is raised, for the purpose of its moral enforcement, upon common moral grounds. It could not be allowed a place in the universal administration except it were in nicest harmony with it. It could not be suffered to intrude on the presence of any sacred principle, or to rush into collision with any established right. One character of moral rule, having reference to all the motives of mind and the interests of being, is stamped on the Divine procedure: Christianity must receive the same impression. Its reception, therefore, wherever it is known, is the turning point of salvation,—its rejection, of punishment.—And, also, it may not only inflict punishment, in its moral bearing and jurisdiction; it may cause, incidentally, its more dread degree. This, according to a condition or predicament previously urged, is inevitable. It does not fall within its true design. But it may arise,—certain circumstances being given, it must. Increase of light, and favor, and privilege, enhances accountability. What is the Gospel of the kingdom but this increase? A “sorer punishment” may be the result, and yet not at all proceed from its direct purpose, while it even opposes its immediate end.

Leaving on record these exceptions,—which argumentative consistency requires,—we revert to the case of man who has corrupted his way, and has

become obnoxious to punishment. We demand the independence of all this on Christianity. There may be mystery in the condition of man, but Christianity does not weave the web. There is evil,—that *simplest* of consequences, that *profoundest* of problems,—but Christianity does not call it into existence. An amnesty might as truly be charged with the rebellion, or a medicine be held accountable for the disease.

The condemnation is thus upon every sinner : all having sinned, it is upon all. What is the punishment which is necessary ? We ask not, at present, what it should be, in the desert of sin ; but what it must be, in the nature of man ? Well-defined principles are capable of inverse applications. They are far-seeing and comprehensive. Their influence is steady and searching. Those which we have previously established, we must still pursue. We have argued them at length : we have built them upon broad foundations. We have proved their subserviency to cheerful, pleasant, desirable, truth : we must now try them upon truth painful in itself, but which it is equally necessary for our happiness to understand.

Man is a *spiritual* being, though the spiritual nature subsists with certain limitations. There is an animal restriction. This may be exaggerated. His body is not the clog and den, but the instrument, of the soul. When viewed aright, every thing conduces to his higher nature, his intelligence, his conscience, his immaterial life. In this is a vast power, a world for suffering. Troubled thought, evil passion, headlong despair, may fill it. Sin is its corruption, its loss,



its ruin. Consciousness, memory, foreboding, may render needless and imperceptible any external affliction. Abandonment to itself, to its "vile affections," its pride, its envy, its malice, its mortification, its satiety, its vacancy,—fulfils its doom. "Sin is ever before it,"—in its freshest shame and first remorse. What more can justice, if it meditated the misery and destruction of its subjects, demand? A soul like man's, in enmity against God, filled with hatred of every other soul, at variance with itself—this is the torture-chamber, in which all the engines of agony are contained, and which the victim can never fly! What anguish can be compared with that of the spirit? when it grovels in shame, when it rouses in fury, when it lours in disappointment, when it pines in jealousy, when it stagnates in apathy, when it crouches in fear, when it congeals in despair? What arrows could be so sharp? What poisons could be so deadly? We must so think of it, that nothing of itself is concealed from it, and nothing of its state. The past burns in light to its remembrance, and yet yields no ray. The consciousness fills up its solitude, and yet finds no rest. It is alone with its thoughts and reproaches. It is surrounded by other minds alike wretched. It has no secret. It is explored and detected. Shame covers it. It is made known to all, and debarred the sympathy of any. There is nothing that it loves. There is nothing that loves it. It is in the outer darkness, that verge and confine of being, which is cheerlessly removed from every struggling beam of light, every meaner pittance

of joy. "A wounded spirit, who can bear?" An outcast spirit, who can imagine?

Man is a *responsible* being. This distinctiveness, the noblest alliance between a God and his creature, brings him now under a Creator whose law he has disobeyed, a Creator displeased and bound to punish. Every faculty, without which he could not be accountable, becomes an inlet of woe. The upward degrees by which he might have climbed to a heavenly throne,—the scale from earth to heaven on which angels ascended and descended and which was given him for his glorious pathway,—are inverted; they are those which decline to the wards of a prison-house, they are the downward steps to a dungeon, in which all evil, fallen, natures are immured. Within the soul, this sense of its abused responsibility is made to dwell. What are its necessary reflections! It has trodden down all that was right for it! It has withheld all that was due! It has cast away the most honorable opportunity of rising to a measureless dignity! The violation of claim and equity never yet brought to the most unjust soul any portion of peace. But this is the disruption of whatever binds man to his Lord. It is to "rob" him. It is to "come short of his glory." The sense of this abused responsibility is now supposed to be full, clear, undisputed, unrelieved. There is the evil conscience! It wields its scorpions. The foreboding of punishment often suffices ere it strike. "My punishment is greater than I can bear," was the cry of Cain, when really there was only the mark, which secured him from present punishment, as yet upon him.

There is a "disquietness of the soul," which no judicial inflictions can overtake. When the "heart meditates terror," no symbols of vengeance could horrify that mood. Nor can any argument lie against this retribution, because of its distance from the period of transgression. To say nothing of its inherence in memory and consciousness, it is a principle of all legislation, that man is answerable for his acts after the longest possible interval.

Man is an *immortal* being. He is this, just as he is of any other quality, by the will of God from whom his nature is derived. Always a solemn attribute, in certain connexions it becomes terrible. Sin has no tendency to wear itself out, or to loosen its hold upon the mind. Sated passion disgusts. Menacing consequence alarms. But iniquity can only find its way to the heart through its love and desire: in these it securely rests. Therefore sin reigns. Other feelings come and go: this abides. It is of the soul: its aim and determination. Therefore "they cannot cease from sin." Moreover, instead of a supposed tendency in evil to exhaust itself, it unfolds all the powers of a self-multiplication. We see it in the individual: "I saw, and I coveted, and took." "The counsel of the ungodly, the way of sinners, the seat of the scornful," are the different stages of one career. This is, likewise, socially

- "Nemo repente fuit turpissimus." . . . "Nam quis  
Peccandi finem posuit sibi? quando recepit  
Ejectum semel attrita de fronte ruborem?  
Quisnam hominum est, quem tu contentum videris uno  
Flagitio?" Juvenal. Sat. 2. Satir. 13.

true. It lends influence and encouragement. It "makes to sin." "Hand joins in hand." "The wicked rejoice on every side." We have simply to follow out these views of sin through the future duration of the sinful soul. There is nothing in this to limit such tendencies. The wretchedness of the *spiritual*, the horror of the *accountable*, merely are perpetuated in the *immortal*. When *need* this punishment cease? When *can* it cease? So far as we have supposed it, it is not from without: the derangement of *spiritual* nature, the remorse of *accountable* nature, the confirmation of these in *immortal* nature, complete the whole. If the sin inhere in the soul, the burden of proof is upon them who maintain that there shall be a termination of it. *When?* we may ask. *How?* we may continue to inquire. It is obvious that nothing of its present influence favors the supposition, that it terminates of itself, or, that it can "trammel up the consequence." The spring is in the soul, and thence flow the streams. The streams may be cut off, but they are not lost: the spring remains until it be sealed. What can destroy its fulness and its life?<sup>a</sup>

These are constituents of nature: they are what must always belong to man. Save as possessing them, he is not man. An unspiritual, an irresponsible, a non-immortal, creature, has no affinity to the human

<sup>a</sup> "Αυτοὶ δίκησσι θεῶν, κ.τ.λ. "This then, is the judgment of the gods who inhabit Olympus, to thee, O inconsiderate youth, that supposest thyself to be overlooked by them,—he, that becomes more depraved, shall be joined to more depraved spirits, in life, in death, to suffer, and to do, whatever like may expect from like."—Plato: De Legibus, lib. x.

family. He has no share or portion in it. But we have, also, traced principles of human nature, which serve as instruments of moral government, by which men become very mainly the authors of their own happiness and misery, or, in other words, of their own rewards and punishments. These may be now reviewed and applied.

The *Force of Habit* impresses itself upon our every observation of man. Effort is necessary to any new course of thought or action, and not infrequently a disgust is to be overcome. Then there may be a growing facility. The exercise will be soon almost unconscious. Nor is it at all uncommon to perceive the gradual encroachment of such custom from childhood until the end of life. Habits of self-indulgence, of carelessness, of untruth, of envy, are too readily acquired: while vice, on its repetitions, gives to its practices a proclivity which it is hardly within human power to stem. Life may be a series of these links. "We will seek it yet again." "We have loved idols, and after them we will go." "There is no hope; but we will walk after our own devices, and we will every one do the imagination of his evil heart."

Upon the preponderant number and strength of habits, considered in their mental, quite as much as in their outward quality and type, *Character* is induced. If "custom be the principal magistrate of man's life,"\* general usage governing him, a man's own serried and familiar acts bespeak his moral bias, and constitute his

\* Bacon.

moral identity. He is thus shaped from himself. Our judgement of character is necessarily defective. We mark the bent of conduct. He may dissemble, but so must he be reckoned. It is not that we "glory in appearance" rather than "in heart," but this is all of which we can judge. The view, however, which concerns the argument is, that which involves the real complexion and cast of his whole moral being and agency, what he really is, his entire disposition, the prevalent and determinate—in short, his will. This is his "manner of person." These are his "secret parts." The natural proof is that in judging men—"By their fruits ye shall know them." The general course would be,—“A good man, out of the good treasure of his heart, bringeth forth that which is good : and an evil man, out of the evil treasure of his heart, bringeth forth that which is evil.” But these are not certain indications. Hypocrisy may mask the real. Men may “speak peace to their neighbours, while mischief is in their hearts.” But character, in its just and perfect acceptation, is that which the individual would be and do, were there no check, no counter-inducement, to his being and doing thus.

Not with greater certainty may be predicted particular effects when particular causes exist, than we can calculate the *Consequence* of every moral act and emotion. We are sure that malignant dispositions must agitate and corrode the mind in which they dwell. We are sure that, with whatever arrogance the transgressor “lifts up his horn on high,” there is only misgiving and shame. We are sure that remorse has

not left vacant its serpent-throne. The external reactions and issue are often terribly exact. A very counterpart reappears. These, however, are not sufficiently invariable, to preclude the necessity of an ulterior vindication. But "iniquity is ruin." Now, in these facts, we have a conception of misery the most tremendous. The sin of the spiritual, accountable, and immortal, creature, is seen in full and perpetual operation, confirmed by habit, indicated through character, evolved in consequence. While upon earth, the wicked may "flatter themselves in their own eyes," but the time is coming when "their iniquity shall be found to be hateful." Here sin may be palliated, and the sinner say, "They shall find none iniquity in me that were sin;" then, "out of his own mouth shall he be condemned." He now "follows a multitude to do evil;" then, he shall "mourn apart." "Be sure your sin shall find you out." Like the deep-seated, long-latent, leprosy, the depravity of the wicked shall then rise to the forehead, be visible, be loathsome, be inveterate, cutting off all who are infected by it from the congregation of the holy. It is necessary alienation. Sin, thus subsisting and developing, is opposed by no check: its punishment, self-inflicted, is mitigated by no extenuation. "All iniquity shall stop her mouth," retract each complaint of capricious infliction, forego each charge against external circumstances, and strongly feel within herself, to a perfect consciousness, that she is the source of all this woe. The idea presented by these views of moral evil is, that it is necessarily infixed and perpetuated in our being, long

as that being endures, if it be left to its own dispositions, and to its own demerits,—if nothing greater than itself interpose to rectify it.

This is the unaided result and portion of moral evil. We have not, in educing it, spoken of the hand of God. Nor do we yet. We treat it as a fact which has occurred, or as an event which only could have fallen. It is, nevertheless, according to His will. Human nature, in its contrivance, makes it possible and sure. A complex train of causes is ever moving to give it effect. It is not according to his will that any man sin, but he has “prepared the instruments of death” in the very moral and physical stamina of man: it is not according to his will that there should be any wickedness, but it is his will that “the wicked should not go unpunished.”

We see what only could ensue. All that was given to ennoble and bless man is abused to his degradation and misery. The workings and developments of all his natural characteristics and principles are determined against him. That spiritualism and intelligence which associated him with the highest Spirit and Reason,—that responsibility which attached, in the mind of Him who is the exceeding great reward, an interest and importance to all his humblest acts,—that immortality which lifted him high above all the things of creation which can be shaken, and leaves him among the things which, when creation is dissolved, shall eternally remain,—only the more alienates the outcast, brands the rebel, and darkens the wreck. He is sinful, in guilt and depravity; it was the cause of his undoing;



it is the punishment which pursues him now that he is undone. Habit still disposes him, character still expresses him, and the arrears of demerit still weigh upon him, not yet run out, not intimating any pledge that they can terminate. "In the place where the tree falleth, there it shall lie ;" but as it inclines, so it falls !

It certainly cannot be unjust in God to suffer this. It is his own law which is thus fulfilled. The least judicial part which he can be supposed to take is, that he will not interfere. Must he strive against his own law ? Must he interfere to prevent its execution ? His law, in this supposition, but takes its course by a natural outworking and instrumentality,—in fact, by the self-determination of the sinner. For all that God need directly do in this department of retribution, he may stand by, he may retire into his secret place, he may exclaim : " I will hide my face from them, I will see what their end shall be."

And when we consider the question more profoundly, moral consequences will appear to lie beyond the control of Deity. They rather agree with his will than arise out of it. They depend not upon the constitution, but the nature, of things. Some harm or injury may be arrested by him, which, in strict justice, is due to the transgressor, but this must be of an external and circumstantial kind. Turning to mental conditions, as following disobedience, how could Almighty power break them short ? Could he, to say nothing of the monstrous inconsistency presumed, prevent the sense of shame in wrong-doing, the anarchy of passion in sin, the loss of self-respect and peace, the

conscious defeat of all right end and aim, the creature's remorse,—that is, his proper view,—in having rebelled against his Creator? Man, being what he is, must feel in one way: his moral nature informs us what that way is: nor could a mechanical omnipotence turn aside its proper sympathies.

It must not, indeed, be overlooked that God, in supposed cases of withdrawment from the active direction of punishment, may pronounce a virtual sentence the more severe. There is not intervention, he wheteth not his sword nor furbisheth his spear,—but there is a standing back, a calm abandonment, not the less terrific. “Why should ye be stricken any more?” “He that is unjust, let him be unjust still: he that is filthy, let him be filthy still.” “Thy way and thy doings have procured these things unto thee.” “Your sin remaineth.”

If God could interpose, if any consideration could require him to interpose, between the sinner and his own law, so as to interrupt its exercise and to bar its enforcement, the inference must be strong and ignoble against his character and government. The law cannot be separated from the lawgiver, nor can either be separated from the sanction which both alike proclaim. Is it *unwise* to proceed? Is it *unbenevolent* to administer the law? Is it *unjust* to apply it? Is there that which was unforeseen? Is there something for which wisdom has not provided? Was it contrary to benevolence to threaten? Was it repugnant to justice to denounce? Where leave you the Divine faithfulness? How regard you the Divine consistency?

While there was yet the evangelic probation, God might have mercy : He might be just and the justifier of him who believeth in Jesus. This scheme of redemption is one mighty expedient to prevent any violation of law. Until now every menace and imprecation implied that they might be remitted. They were uttered as means of check and calls to repentance. But probation is now shown to be past. "It is the time of the dead that they should be judged." Repentance is not supposed. "The space to repent" has ended. The case as much precludes its disposition as its availableness. And, *until now*, God, in infinite condescension, has described himself repenting, turning towards the sinner. He is grieved for the evil. But all that these accommodations of language veiled, is past. "There is no place for repentance to be found," no opportunity of inducing any altered course in his conduct.

What, then, is the revealed doctrine of the future treatment of the wicked? "Vain," says Butler, "is the ridicule with which one sees some persons will divert themselves, upon finding lesser pains considered as instances of Divine punishment. There is no possibility of answering or evading the general thing here intended, without denying all final causes." If this sagacious remark be so evidently true of present suffering, how much more of that which is future ! The awards against the sinner, at the last,—the awards of judgement,—must be most unequivocally punishments ; if recorded results springing from the nature of things, then punishments, provided that

there was design in those things; if allowed and ratified, though without any augmentation, by the Judge, then punishments, for they are but the operation of that design, under this his public approval; if increased in their severity, then punishments, this being their more signal and determined infliction. Revelation beholds in these punishments, as we have been frequently compelled to state, that of which it takes the cognisance and affirms the justice, but not the responsibility. They are independent of it. Whatever may be their pressure, it did not lay them. Whatever may be their horror, it did not affix them. Whatever may be their duration, it did not extend them. It cannot subvert nature nor annul law. Its purpose is to exhibit a plan of justice and mercy which shall abolish condemnation, and "deliver from the wrath to come." It is so clear in this independence of all present and future evil, that it merely knows them to retrieve them,—like some meek and venerable sanctuary, only proclaiming calamity by its shelter, and disease by its cure. And if Christianity do enter as an element or as an aggravation into the condemnation of men, it is exclusively of them who are favored with its privileges, and who reject them,—of them, to whom the Gospel having come, that "obey not the Gospel of God."

It may be rashly said, that God could save all. To such gratuitous, unproveable, assertion we demur. If a truth, it is never brought before us. We can have no right nor capacity to deal with it. How is it known? But need He? Then our claim is upon

his justice. He owes the debt. *Will* He? Then He may require no punishment, since he may remit it all. *Can* He? This is not a business of omnipotence. Indeed, this attribute never stands alone. It is never set forth as simple power. We cannot speak more unworthily of God, than to aver that he can do every thing, unless the reservation be most distinct in our mind that it is only everything which is wise, and just, and good. Instead of allowing this statement, that God could save all men, we hold it to be utterly false.\* In the sovereign vouchsafement of mercy to some, we do not suppose a deficiency of reasons: we most firmly believe that they do exist. They are unknown to us. By the quality of sovereignty, we negatively express not only this, but that whatever they are, they are not contained in any points to be preferred, in any titles presented, in ourselves. The condemnation of the wicked cannot be thus expressed. Sovereignty only respects favor and mercy. It is only predicable of independent and absolute will or pleasure. But condemnation is related to justice. \*It proceeds upon a recognised arrangement and basis of government. Unlike the acts which sovereignty describes, its progress is open and its reasons are always declared. If, therefore, reasons do exist, however unknown to us and independent of us, for the salva-

\* The flippancy manner in which men speak of the Divine power, what it can so easily do, might remind us of the freed-man's prayer in Horace:—

“ Unum

(Quid tam magnum? addens) unum me surpente morti,  
Dis etenim facile est, orabat.”

Satir. lib. ii. 8.

tion of some, these do not exist for the salvation of others. To save all would be to contradict these reasons. We know that the judgement is according to truth. He consequently cannot save all. Or let reasons be supposed. The just punishment of certain sinners is necessary to mark the evil of sin, or to warn and deter as an example. If there be such reasons, then, He cannot save all. That he does not, in any known manner, is the presumption which may well assure us that it consists not with his moral ability, his only omnipotence, thus to act.\*

We must distinguish, if we would appreciate\* the foregoing argument, between the different aspects of the One Will of God upon this question. He is known to us by a legislative will, in the Law which we have broken and in the Gospel whereby we may be saved. But that will, when proposing the means and blessings of salvation, always respects moral mediums and dispositions. "As I live, saith the Lord, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked; but *that the wicked turn from his way and live.*" "Who will have all men to be saved, and *to come unto the knowledge of the truth.*" "Not willing that any should perish, but *that all should come to repentance.*" "This is the will of God, even *your sanctification.*" Sincerely He offers these provisions of mercy to all, and it is his will that all should accept them. It is not that determinate will which, wherever it acts, secures a resistless effect, nor the inworking will which directly induces a corresponding will. It is moral and

\* Note M.

authoritative. It is His will that all his creatures be holy. They are not all holy. It is his will that all sinful men be saved. They are not saved. Being moral and legislative, it must be enforced, if disobeyed. It impresses this authority upon Christianity. If men reject it, it is his will that they be punished just as it was his will that they should be saved. It is not the will of God that any should refuse the terms of salvation: it is the will of God that all who do refuse should bear the liabilities of their refusal.

It cannot escape our notice, it cannot but awaken our surprise, to find more terrible description and enforcement of future punishment in the teachings of Christ and of his apostles, than in the former dispensation, where they might seem more appropriate. We are prepared for the blasts of the trumpet which rung out from the precipices of Sinai: "for its blackness, and darkness, and tempest." We are prepared for the curses of Ebal. When we enter this dispensation, we await the meekness and gentleness of Christ. We expect an infinite tenderness, and we find it in him. He pleads to weeping: he agonises to blood. Yet what voice ever told so much of hell? He reiterates illustration after illustration: he heaps image upon image: he adds warning to warning. In one of his discourses there is a departure, when urging a terrible retribution, from his accustomed style of address. An emphasis and collocation the most perfectly rhetorical, the true sublime, prevail. The repetitions roll along as successive and loudening thunder-peals. "And if thy hand offend thee, cut it off; it is

better for thee to enter into life maimed, than having two hands to go into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched: *where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched.* And if thy foot offend thee, cut it off; it is better for thee to enter halt into life, than having two feet to be cast into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched: *where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched.* And if thine eye offend thee, pluck it out; it is better for thee to enter into the kingdom of God with one eye, than having two eyes to be cast into hell fire: *where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched.*"\* And who is He? The Judge of the rebel-angels,—the Judge of all men,—the First and the Last,—the Living Being,—the I Am,—whose goings were of old, from everlasting,—having perfect knowledge of every realm and province of the universe, the height and the depth,—the Controller of all events, the Proprietor of all worlds, the Lord of all spirits,—His words must be true! And He stamps such distinctness upon these fearful revelations for two causes,—to prove the greatness of redemption, by showing that from which it delivers us; and to urge, by the solemn motive of consequences, all to take hold upon its blessings.<sup>b</sup>

\* Mark ix. 43, &c.

<sup>b</sup> "The utmost space I would allot in my writings to this part of the revelations of our religion should not at any rate exceed the proportions which, in the New Testament, this part of truth bears to the whole of the sacred book, the grand predominant spirit of which is love and mercy."—Life and Correspondence of John Foster, vol. i. p. 187. But did it not occur to this profound, though fatalistic, thinker, that such proportion is very large, and that if imitated by the



What may we, then, conceive to be the sufferings of them who are surrendered to these punishments? We may believe that they are not only in a state of sin but in a course of sinning. How far that course is like the present,—still bringing down new punishment,—we pretend not to know. Of this we may be assured, that self-punishment *must* grow out of such a course. Proper probation is past. Retribution is understood by us of a former portion, the earthly allotment, of our being. It would appear that the course of sinning, debarred from most of its present forms, is almost entirely personal and mental. This is more probably, then, of the nature of a punishment. The sinner is cast upon his sin. No doom can be more frightful. When it is said of him now, "Let him alone,"—we can conceive of nothing more appalling,—what must this relegation to every evil tendency be in that hell where sin henceforth alone can dwell! And what there must be its operation! That, which was always enmity, is now lashed into fiercer hatred against righteousness and benignity!

modern preachers of the Gospel, it would bring them into the "class" which he finds "denominated?" He would indeed be a "son of thunder" who preached these "revelations" as fully and often as the Saviour." How would his taste and tenderness be condemned! We have called this writer fatalistic: we specially intend the charge in this question. Speaking of infidel publications, vol. ii. p. 418, &c., he says: "The thing seems like a moral epidemic breathed from hell, destined to be permitted for a time to sweep a portion of the people to destruction, in defiance of all remedial interference. They are a doomed race, and their destiny will be accomplished." The "writers" whom he more than sarcastically condemns, never (thank God!) utter any sentiments so horrible.

The restraint, which was seldom quite removed, is now utterly withdrawn! Hypocrisy and dissimulation having no further use, it is seen in its most unreserved manifestations! We may believe that remorse, a sense of folly and shame, a confounding remembrance of the past, are dominant in the minds of the lost! We may believe that all which emboldened them while on earth, which assured them of some ulterior escape, which "put off the evil day," can be no more entertained! We may believe that the delusions of sin, the blinding influence of pride and voluptuousness, the spells of avarice and lust, are now exposed! We may believe that despair sits heavy on them, in contradiction to that imagination of the heart in which they hitherto walked! There is hell in these passions of evil, and in these detections of falsehood. There can be nothing to modify sin, nothing to deter it, nothing to attemper it. Example, influence, expectation, have now an influence which cannot then be known. Fear is cast off. Evil exists in unrepressed maturity and strength. If the resistance of the Gospel be the crime beneath whose charge, including all others, they perished, it must constitute an unspeakable aggravation of their state. The misery, avoidable once, must press upon them; the once attainable happiness, self-neglected deliverance, self-defeated good, self-baffled victory, must mock them with redoubled severity. Torments seize upon the soul, its own engendered brood, feeding upon its own vitals and hiding in its own recesses. "Thou hast destroyed thyself!"

But though it is a general rule of moral government to make the sinner punish himself,—for his “own wickedness to correct him, and for his own backslidings to reprove” him,—it is most competent and righteous, as we have seen, to add positive inflictions. And we cannot doubt that so Scripture is to be understood. We find it impossible, after its most cautious research, to refrain from the idea. Solemn as it is, we cannot conceive of another judicial course. To leave the sinner to himself is rather a privative measure than an act. Something more determinate must be supposed even in leaving him. His mind must be quickened to its full tension in order to suffer. Any external punishment, indeed, can only avail as operating through his capacity, be it sensible or intellectual. But to assert that no punishment can fall from without, seems to deny all external relations and circumstances. These seem requisite to draw forth the powers, the reflections, the horrors, of the soul. They then fulfil all the part of punishment. Nor can we thus restrict ourselves. Truth compels still stronger conclusions. Looking into the revealed page, we discover a most uniform representation that there is a place of suffering, and not that the mind is its own place: that there is painful fellowship among the sufferers: that the Divine wrath afflicts their souls: and that sensible suffering is consequent upon a raised body and a physical restoration. “His flesh upon him shall have pain, and his soul within him shall mourn.”\* One identification is dreadfully recurrent. The elemental fire

\* Job xiv. 22.

is the selected medium of the retribution, or of describing it. It is not the flame which bursts from within the sinner,—it is something distinct from himself: he is “cast into it,” he is “tormented in it,” it is “the furnace of fire,” “the lake of fire.” There are allusions, all foreign to the native self-actings of the soul: “The stripe,” the “horrible tempest,” the “cup of wrath,” the “mist of darkness,” the “taking vengeance,” “the tormentors,” “indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish,” rendered. As some of these descriptions seem incapable of a literal interpretation, none may require it. The more general theory of a diverse interpretation, the arbitrary cipher, we cannot allow. We express our near approach to a conviction,—it is all we dare,—that they must not be verbally understood. Inconsistencies too violent, we think, forbid it. The necessity of the case seems to be sufficient reason for disallowing the literal explanation. A common principle must be adopted. If it can apply to any, it must to all: if it can not to all, it must to none. It is a fearful question: “Shall thine anger burn *as fire*?” But in asking it, we imply the analogical, and not the actual, thing. It is only the comparison which we attempt to divine. It is a still more fearful doom upon the sinner than the storm of the reddest fire,—“A fire *not blown* shall consume him!”\*

Concede, or demand, that these can be only figures. They are figures, at least, of an alarming kind. Why are figures, and of such an order, employed? Because the naked truth, the absolute reality of the retribution,

\* Job xx. 26.

cannot be set before our mind. It is too intimate, too intense, to be made known in any abstract manner. There is no idealised, soul-like, language fitted to impress and explain it. To supply the deficiency images are sought. But, therefore, it follows that if the full force of these images be understood, still a vast amount of signification lies beyond them, they being, after all, confessedly inadequate, except to shadow out the fact. Nor can guilty presumption more egregiously err than when it soothes itself by the thought that these are *only* images: they are only images, and consequently what they intend is inconceivably more severe. "Who knoweth the power of Thine anger? even according to thy fear," the darkest apprehension and foreboding, "so is thy wrath." "If our heart condemn us, God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things."

Are these sufferings corrective? a species of moral discipline? We may answer by a reference to the *character* of the sufferers, and to the *description* of the sufferings themselves. *The wicked are the wicked* still. "The wicked shall do wickedly." "Without are dogs, sorcerers, and whoremongers, and murderers, and idolaters, and whosoever loveth and maketh a lie." They "depart the cursed." There is every tendency of evil in them, and their evil disposition has now been loudly denounced. No penitence, no humility, no submission to a righteous sentence, are confessed. There is no cry of prayer. To the last is it the audacity of claim, "Open unto us;" it is the challenge of right, "Lo, there Thou hast that is thine." These representations point them out as the irreclaim-

able and the incorrigible. Turn now to their sufferings. They are not portrayed with any power to barely chasten, and then to heal. The figures which have passed before us are judicial and pœnal. They belong to justice in its punitive retributions. It is not the rod of paternal love : it is not the pause watching for the signs of contrition. It is the execution of sentence. "The wicked perish in the presence of God." "There shall be weeping, and wailing, and gnashing of teeth." "The same shall drink of the wine of the wrath of God, which is poured out without mixture into the cup of his indignation : and the smoke of their torment ascendeth up for ever and ever : and they have no rest day nor night." It is concerning the fallen angels that a word of the pagan mythology is employed. Tartarus is the name of its fabled hell. By a verb derived from it, their condemnation is told.\* But though affirmed of another race, it has its equal application to those "who go into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels." It is part of an inferential argument : "If God spared not the angels that sinned, but delivered them into chains of darkness,—The Lord knoweth how to reserve the unjust unto the day of judgement to be punished." The doom is not, therefore, specific or exclusive. These are not expressions to denote God's "dealing as with sons," that "chastening" which

\* *Ζεπαῖς ὁφθον ΤΑΡΤΑΡΟΣ*. Pamphilus, in his Apology for Origen, quotes from that Father's Book on the Proverbs of Solomon : "Manifestum est quod una pœna tam dæmonum nature, quam humano generi peccatorum a Domino præfinita sit illa, quam Dominus sua sententia designavit dicens : Matt. xxv. 41."

they must not "despise," that "rebuke" under which they must not "faint." This is not a style befitting the correction which He dispenses "for our profit, that we may be partakers of his holiness;" that which, however "grievous, nevertheless afterward yieldeth the peaceable fruit of righteousness unto them which are exercised thereby." Language like this causes us to "exceedingly tremble and quake." It intimates no relief. It has a final manner and sound. It gives rise to a "fearful looking for of judgement and fiery indignation which shall devour the adversaries." It entirely contrasts with those relentings, those beseechings, which God in his mercy now enunciates. "Oh that thou hadst hearkened unto me!" "Why will ye die!" "Be ye reconciled unto God!" It is utterly unlike the calls, the entreaties, the tears, of the Redeemer! Suddenly all is stern and remediless. Probation is lost in decision. The most different thoughts and representations fill the scene. "The Lord Jesus is revealed in flaming fire." "The wrath of the Lamb." "Tormented in the presence of the Lamb." Other accents are heard, even to scorn and to derision: "Because I have called, and ye refused; I have stretched out my hand, and no man regarded; but ye have set at nought all my counsel, and would none of my reproof; I also will laugh at your calamity; I will mock when your fear cometh." The sentence is of banishment, even to disgust and execration: "Begone from me."<sup>a</sup> Why, if all be but alterative and emendatory, this precipitate change of

<sup>a</sup> Πορεύεσθι ἀπ' ἐμοῦ κατηραμένοι.—Matt. xxv. 41.

language and manner? Could such descriptive terms be apt to the moral treatment and trial of men in the present state? Could they happily and unmistakingly show forth Divine patience and long-suffering? Do they not speak of different things? Do they not teach the tremendous reverse? "It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God." "The wicked would fain flee out of his hand."

If the argument in favor of disciplinary *punishment* (for we cannot surrender the term) be founded on the supposed tendency of all suffering, we may combat this doctrine by the most notorious facts, by experiences most obvious and solemn. In this world there is perpetual suffering in the disorders and bitter fruits of sin. Frequently is it of so retributive a character, that it startles the most careless and convinces the most sceptic. "Then are commended the ingredients of our poisoned chalice to our own lips." But it is more than possible that the human heart shall become only the more hardened. Depravity may be stimulated into a more headlong course. "In the time of his distress did he trespass yet more against the Lord: this is that king Ahaz." In the apocalyptic visions, we behold similar proofs of heightened impiety beneath the judgements against sin. When the fourth angel poured out his vial upon the sun, and "power was given him to scorch men with fire,"—"they blasphemed God which hath power over these plagues, and they repented not to give him glory." When the fifth angel poured out his vial upon "the seat of the beast, and his kingdom was full of darkness," "they



gnawed their tongues for pain, and blasphemed the God of heaven because of their pains and their sores, and repented not of their deeds." And when the seventh angel poured his vial into the air, "men blasphemed God for the plague of the hail, for the plague thereof was exceeding great." Our own observation must have furnished many counterparts ; our consciousness may inform us that it is too natural to resist the most salutary lessons of affliction.

Yet it will, perhaps, be contended that, the fascination and illusion of evil being necessarily precluded in the endurance of these punishments, more sober reflection, more contrite feeling, more self-control, must now supervene ; that reason will now take the place of passion ; that submission will henceforth be readily made, and forgiveness universally sought. In the absence of all applicable proof, we can only resort to that which most nearly approaches the case in other histories. From some intimations we are induced to believe, that an almost rigid parallelism subsisted between the former regimen of angels and the representatives of ourselves. Both were ruled by law ; both were set in probation ; both were brought to a test ; both suddenly fell. The angels forfeited all happiness, they incurred the utmost misery, when they "sinned." "God cast them down to hell, to be reserved unto judgement." Though they be thus "reserved," their punishment of a long time commenced. "Hell" is the hold and safeguard of their keeping. They await but the public denouncement. Satan and his legions have for thousands of years felt

the "unsparing" wrath of their Judge. "The devil sinneth from the beginning." This is equally true of his host. Have "the chains of darkness" subdued their rebellion? Has the fire purged their sin? They still are unclean and wicked spirits. They "now work in the children of disobedience." "They are the rulers of the darkness of this world." "They seek rest and find none." "They go forth to deceive the nations." What a field would their powers and capacities have furnished for experiment were the castigatory principle of punishment at issue! How much was there in the recollections of heaven, in the contrasts of hell, in the terrors of downfall, in the burnings of shame, in the lashings of remorse, to recover them from their fell enterprise, to win them back from their course, to renew them unto repentance! But all has failed. We may presume that, as there is in the endurance of punishments like these no such tendency, so are they dealt with no such design. That tendency, that design, did they inhere in punishment, would long since have wrought out themselves in spirits so intelligent and mighty, once so glorious and blessed: the fact that these spirits are not merely rebellious as they were, but that they advance in that rebellion, "having great wrath, because their time is short,"—constitutes the appalling proof that sin does not change under punitive process, and that punitive process contemplates no such change upon sin.

"If the next state," says Dr. Chauncy, "is a state of punishment not intended for the cure of the patients themselves, but to satisfy the justice of God, and to

give warning to others, it is impossible that all men should finally be saved." Now without at once prejudging the conclusion which he deems untenable if certain premisses be allowed, we cannot capitulate the premisses. Punishment is to "satisfy justice," and cannot have another basis. A very important use of punishment is "to warn others," proving how benevolent is justice. We cannot conceive of punishment unless associated with the first purpose, though the second is not alike necessary. Circumstances may be supposed in which there are none others to warn. The dilemma suggested by the author is, that these things being granted, "the cure of the patients cannot be intended." Certainly not: justice can meditate no such end; it is altogether foreign to its nature. What a confusion of ideas is this! "Justice," "patients," "cure!" "It is impossible that all men shall be finally saved." Certainly it is, if to secure it, punishment must be annulled and justice be dishonored!

The inquiry will now arise: How punishment is necessary, why is it indispensable, and what case for justice exists? It is a simple answer. The function of justice, in its sole resource of punishment, is to mark its view and sense of sin. It is the Divine idea of it. That idea must find its exponent. If the punishment be light, the sin is light: if the punishment be heavy, the offence is aggravated. Sin is "the abominable thing which God doth hate." His conduct towards it is the only criterion by which creatures can measure his hatred. "He cannot deny himself:"

every variance between his sentiments and his acts would constitute that denial.\* "He doth establish equity." But punishment has never, hitherto, been utterly enforced. It has not, at any time of our earthly history, exposed the full turpitude of sin. "How long shall the wicked triumph?" Once, indeed, (but that awful exception pertains not to the argument!) "God condemned sin in the flesh. Man in his present state cannot receive an adequate condemnation. His "frame," his "dust," are unsusceptible of its full weight. The circumstances of trial and probation, in which he stands, restrain and retard its entire infliction. The Divine government rules man as an immortal being, prospectively of all his future.\* It would be impossible to account with him now, and to visit upon him all his doings. They are related to another sphere and duration. If that government were to "seek out the wickedness of the wicked and evil man until it found none," it would not be the search which could be accomplished in time. Universal conscience bears out the principle. The self-expiatist everywhere confesses it. A cruel uncertainty hangs over all his hopes. His repentance has not shed sufficient tears. His maceration has not included sufficient tortures. He gazes into eternity with a shuddering distrust. But turning from the conceits of man, let us think of creation and its wrong by sin. Had it no final cause? Is not that threatened to be frustrated? Was it not appropriated to holiness? Is it not profaned? Does no harm befall it, in the daring openness, and example, and ascendancy, of sin?

Needs the Maker of all no proof, amidst this degeneracy, that he formed creation good, that he will maintain his intention and establish his work? "Shall I not visit for these things?" That proof has not yet taken demonstrative shape. It is not made sensible. Think, too, of His moral government. It has asserted and embodied many of its principles, many of its sanctions have been carried out, yet those principles are to this hour insulted, and those sanctions, which are not immediate, are not only defied, but are argued to the support of an actual impunity. Needs the great and everlasting King no proof that he "reigneth?" that he is most high over all the earth? that his law shall be upholden? that he will vindicate it from all the aspersions and indignities which rest upon it? Requires he no personal and relative amends? The only reason why we do not speak of vindictive justice, as did our earlier divines, is that the etymological meaning of that epithet is lost in a popular acceptation. All that they intended by it, we retain. That process still waits. We were quite willing to conduct our moral reasonings by natural principles, showing how fitting is virtue and how hurtful is vice. We were quite willing to settle our moral reasonings on this immoveable condition of things. But only thus did we make our way. There we could not stop. In that constitution we read nothing arbitrary and contingent, but the justice of God. Of justice so propounded, whatever our more transcendental ideas, we need conceive, for practical purposes, nothing more than that it will see to the obedience of the law or

punish its disobedience. It already arraigns the sinner. It already condemns him. But its curse is not poured out. When is justice to decide and act? There is a solemnly calm provision for its satisfaction. All has been considered and advised. "As for such as turn aside unto their crooked ways, the Lord will lead them forth with the workers of iniquity." "The Lord knoweth how to reserve the unjust unto the day of judgement to be punished." "He will render to them their desert." That will be "the great and notable day" of his justice, retrieving all its injuries and substantiating all its ends. "He shall call to the heavens from above, and to the earth, that he may judge his people." "The heavens shall declare his righteousness, for God is judge himself."

Most clear is the connexion, to be traced link by link, between the sufferings of the sinner and Punitive Justice. It "discerns between the righteous and the wicked, the precious and the vile." "It is a righteous thing with God, to recompense tribulation." "His hand taketh hold on judgement." "Thou hast seen it; for thou beholdest mischief and spite, to requite it with thy hand." The language which describes these judicial inflictions, speaks of a severity which meditates no reform, which admits no relief. "He will heap mischiefs." "Thine hand shall find out all thine enemies." "Thou shalt make them as a fiery oven in the time of thine anger: the Lord shall swallow them up in his wrath, and the fire shall devour them." "Upon the wicked He shall rain snares, fire, and brimstone." Justice unshrinkingly undertakes the charge

and the doing of all. It averts not its eye ; it holds not back its hand. It looks for no excuse in tendency, in consequence, in existing things. It assumes the defence and responsibility of all the misery in the universe !

Upon this basis, we are alone satisfied to establish the reason of any suffering. We, of course, now speak of suffering proper to the whole man. It is not denied by us, that want, uneasiness, pain, may enter into a scheme of perfect benevolence. The inferior creatures know hunger and thirst, are exposed to disease and danger ; and thus, kept alert in every instinct, and thus learning to acquire supply by diligence and defence by watchfulness, enjoy their life as otherwise they could not possibly do. Had man retained innocence, while his was an earthly lot, suffering might have been possible to him, even as a means of his greater happiness. But the suffering which our argument presumes is that of the whole man—not chiefly, only most subordinately, animal and sentient—that which racks the mind, the self-distilling poison which corrodes it, the fire which kindles from within. When sin is pardoned and subdued in the Christian, it leaves a train of sufferings. The iniquities of youth may encompass him : God, having forgiven his people, may take vengeance on their inventions. Not to permit this, would be to break up the present œconomy, to substitute sight for faith, to indicate spiritual blessing by temporal exemption. It is not strict justice : “there is now no condemnation.” Still this discipline respects the sinfulness of our nature. Our heavenly Father visits our trans-

gressions with the rod. He scourgeth every son whom he receiveth. And when we die, though we sleep in Jesus, and are the dead in Christ, "the body is dead because of sin."

We may be reminded that the sacrifice of Christ is the vindication of justice, and that this satisfies all its claims. The statement, imperfect as it is, may pass. The idea wholly approves itself to us. We regard the atonement as universal in its aspect, though rather related to the government and law of God, than to us. It is the act of God alone: "Behold the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world." It is his method of clearing himself,—his sacrifice to truth and righteousness—yet always with the design of laying a foundation for the consistent pardon of sin, and for the honorable acceptance of the sinner. We believe, but for this act, that God could have stood in no covenant with man: that probation must have ceased: that hope must have perished: that the whole system, embracing the present interests of our nature, must have come to an end. We look upon it as a great legislative measure, by which patience and long-suffering towards sinners are explained, by which the necessity of immediate punishment is arrested, by which the moral scheme is extended and secured. It is his own self-vindication. He sets himself right with the universe. He establishes the justice of his conduct. He shows the utmost displeasure against sin, in the manner, and as the ground-work, of his mercy. All this, however, has nothing to do with the title of the sinner to forgiveness. That rests on "the faithful saying," "the record which



God hath given of his Son, that we may believe; upon "the commandment of the everlasting God, for the obedience of faith." The Gospel, the only warrant of faith, proceeds in a moral way, with sanctions. "He that believeth shall be saved: he that believeth not shall be damned." Any view of the atonement, which gives it an occult, unconscious, influence; which assigns to it a perforce, necessary, effect; is most contrary to every principle of revealed truth. Man is placed in most favorable circumstances by it. There is hope for him. Mercy addresses him. The general course of events is directed to his welfare. Wrath forbears to strike. Judgement tarries. But this is all. The Gospel can insure no saving effect, but through a moral influence and medium. It informs all men that they are perishing. This state of wretchedness it finds, and did not cause. It is equally true, whether it had addressed men or not. Its doctrine is reconciliation. The bright orb of its mercy may just touch the outer edge, the penumbra, of that dark shadow which covers man, but is never immersed in it. Nothing is to be done to reconcile the Creator; this he has done and expressed by the atonement. He has taken care—a solemnly jealous care—of his character and government, ere he did move, or could move, towards the reconciliation of man. Now man is entreated to be reconciled unto God. The appeal is to him, as reasonable and accountable; and not the less because of his guilt and depravity. In believing he has life. He shall not perish. He is reconciled. He partakes of all the blessings of redemption. This was, at once, the

purposed and the moral end of the Redeemer's death, "to purify to himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works." He died not for any sinner to leave him a sinner, but to turn him into a loyal and holy subject. The largest passages, breathing the infinity of Divine love, necessarily define themselves within these moral conditions,—“God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son :” but yet we see that the moral distinction is the practical scale of this love—“that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have everlasting life.” “The love of Christ constraineth us ; because we thus judge, that if one died for all, then were all dead : and that he died for all,”—not indifferently, nor for the purpose of an extraneous salvation,—“that they which live, should not henceforth live unto themselves, but unto him which died for them, and rose again.” The whole of the moral testing, which the Gospel passes upon us, should warn us, as it is most effectually prepared and evidently designed to do, that in no blind manner can we become “partakers of the benefit,” but that we must “come to Christ” in an intelligent manner,—swayed by authority, persuaded by truth, melted by goodness, moved by fear, impelled by anxiety,—sinners who would be saved from wrath by him, and who would gladly submit to his righteous yoke and will. No sinner is “in Christ,” by any personal interest, until he believes in Christ. No sinner may boast of security and impunity because of the atonement, until he accepts it with all its scope and intention. Until then, as far as he is concerned in this salvation, “Christ shall profit

him nothing," "Christ is of no effect unto him," "Christ is dead in vain." Nor "has he any suit of right, from the fact of the atonement, by which he may demand exemption from punishment. It is a transaction with which he has nothing to do. The Gospel is published, with it is his simple business, and its belief is the only channel to all its blessings.

We fear that this theory of a salvation, independent of all consent, sympathy, subserviency,—a salvation having no operation but from without,—involuntary, inoperative, uninfluential,—very widely obtains. It may not be enunciated,—it may not take a regular form,—but it is too commonly cherished. It may be but an idea,—even that idea may be almost indefinite and often latent,—but that idea exists. Men are lulled into the hope that they are under some unexplained dispensation of independent, direct, power to save them, and that in spite of their own selves. That idea admits of a very natural enlargement. Christianity may exert the same vague but constraining influence in the future: it may compel a final regeneration of the soul, and violently meeten the most reluctant for heaven.

It is, at least, perfectly clear that they who disjoin punishment from justice, who represent the atonement as only abstract and virtual and not the spring of piety and holiness, venture on ground perilously new. It may well be required of them to show how they have established for the future world principles utterly unknown in this. They may be justly challenged to prove how it is that, after judicial sentence, punishment

ceases, and a treatment with a view to recovery begins. They cannot complain if we urge them to demonstrate that there is an extension of the atonement, that a change is wrought upon it enlargedly beneficial and powerful, immediately after the glorification of those who have experienced its blessings,—and only in favor of those who have hitherto rejected them; that its facilities are extended and its efficacies simplified; that a range of *necessary* influence and action is given to it, deferred until now, but now accomplished just to meet the untowardness of those who have hitherto “counted its blood a common thing.”

To this we can anticipate but one reply: Infants, whose undeveloped mind cannot apprehend and appreciate the blessings of salvation, are saved. We doubt not their entrance into the kingdom of heaven. We doubt it not of all, whatever their descent, who die at that early age,—the age which precludes moral discernment, and, therefore, responsibility. We see in the initial visible ordinance of Christianity the pledge of this, affirming it, however, as a universal truth, a truth which is quite independent of the emblematic rite. It was always, it is invariably, a fact. That service intimates both the fact and the manner of it. All dying at that period are blessed: all dying at that period are cleansed for that blessedness. Christianity, in this beautiful institute, meets them with assurance of its grace on the threshold of life, and with assurance of its glory on the threshold of eternity. A rite may be significant of it, may give certitude to it, but cannot operate to help the effect.

We are satisfied that this arrangement depends upon the mediatorial system. We suspend it upon the atonement. But rather speak we now of that effect secured to departed infants in their glorification. This cannot be a claim. It is grace and favor. It is this which belongs to the death of Christ. We cannot think that their condemnation could consist with moral righteousness. They are guiltless. They are not condemnable. We speculate not as to the treatment which they might have otherwise received. It is certain that it would have been just. The sacrifice of the cross has precluded inquiry by a new and merciful arrangement of the case. It is argued, from these admissions, that a similar operation of influence may take hold of more developed minds. Why may they not be unconsciously, inertly, impressed? The answer is, that while, if done at all, it must be done blindly or unintelligently as to the child, there is no such necessity as to the adult. Nor in the latter instance could it be so effectuated. You cannot convey to the thinking mind anything save what comes within its consciousness. Besides, the notion of an unconscious grace in the dying child is not more inconceivable than an unconscious depravity. By that depravity we mean a tendency, a disposedness, by which it will become sinful: by the grace which regenerates dying infants we intend that tendency, that disposedness, now imparted to them, by which they will become sainted and happy, by which they unfold into spiritual beauty and loveliness. Thus far we have indulged the objection. But it is unsound.

There is no analogy in the case. Our argument deals only with moral agents. And the analogy is attempted to be drawn from those who never were moral agents, to favor not simply those who are, but those who are mercifully placed in a new probationary condition : from those who never had capacity to disbelieve the Gospel, to serve those who wilfully do, that they may enjoy in *this* probation, rendered strangely unconscious to them, advantages and helps they possessed not in their *first*. The objection may probably allege the case of the heathen. But these are moral agents, and will be judged according to their own law. From every right missionary view of their case, it can only be affected and relieved by the Gospel *as received by them* ; or, to state the fact in another way, by the Gospel being understood and embraced by them as *moral agents*.

It may be contended against this antinomian view of the atonement, this view which dissevers it from moral government and holy influence, this view which supposes the forcible abduction of the sinner from claim and law,—that, if it explains the absence of punishment in another world, it leaves unexplained its presence in this. Why is not the curse removed from man at once? Why are not the evils of his state immediately redressed? Under what equity are they allowed? Our doctrine of the atonement is, that the sacrifice *enables* and *authorises* the Divine government to pardon and save in a certain manner ; that it is *its own means* of honorable mercy. We impose on that government no necessity to show this

mercy, but that of its own assurance: we allow to the sinner no suit of right, no challenge of claim, unless the humble form of faith in that assurance. Nothing is compulsorily done. God is not obliged. Man is not enforced. But this view of the atonement now combated, ought to effectuate a perfect and a universal salvation without delay. Its operation, at least, should date from the cross. Then not only should one sinner have passed to Paradise, but all the dying. Then not only should a few graves have opened, but those of all the dead. Righteousness and joy should have sprung up before all nations. Sin should have ceased. Earth should have rolled away its reproach. Eden should have bloomed afresh. The wonder of creation, man, should have stood up once more, as when "made upright," anew "crowned with honor and glory."

The manner of justice, its unperturbed and collected majesty, has been pleaded against this durability of punishment. "Fury is not in me:" but not less is it true that if "the briars and thorns be set against the Lord in battle, he would go through them, he would burn them together." "My son, give, I pray thee, glory to the Lord God of Israel, and make confession unto him;" but not the less did the Lord "trouble Achan that day." "Son, remember," is the language of Abraham to the rich man in hell; but not the less is the mitigation of his torment denied. "Friend, how camest thou in hither not having on a wedding garment?" but not the less is he "cast into the outer darkness." This fearful calm only proves the absence of fugitive passion, of sudden excitement,—that an

unsought necessity prevails, that punishment proceeds in an order and with a necessity which nothing can control. The thought which should most affect the sinner is, that there is no proper, personal, resentment in his condemnation, but only an issue which no disposition could avert.

If that which is due to the demerit of sin, or to the guilt of the sinner, be only the discipline which is necessary to bring to repentance, let us seriously ponder the conclusions which are unavoidable on such a view. This discipline, never exceeding the degree sufficient and requisite for restoration to a better mind and to original happiness, is the curse of the law. That was threatened, that was incurred. Yet it never contemplated more than this. Though we might become by sin "a cursed thing like unto it," that is but a disguised word of love! Though we might be "cursed in the city and cursed in the field, cursed in coming in and cursed in going out," that is but a salutary regulation! Though "the Lord might send upon us cursing, vexation, and rebuke, in all that we set our hand unto for to do, until we were destroyed and until we perished quickly," that is only his harsher call to amend our ways! His judgement upon them who do evil is not to be considered a display of righteous displeasure against them, but the mere consultation of their benefit! All denuncements and maledictions are but intended blessings! They are the circuitous means and instruments not of general, but of individual, good,—the welfare of the very persons against whom they are aimed! They are



exactly measured out for moral cure! Then of future suffering, if it be at all allowed, the same experiment must be maintained. Not a pang must be inflicted beyond this curative effect. That which was not necessary, save to awaken repentance, would be unjust. The kindest expressions of paternal love only could apply: these would be made more tender by the accents of saving mercy. "As many as I love I rebuke and chasten." "By this shall iniquity be purged; and this is all the fruit to take away sin." The curse is, then, a blessing! Why should we be redeemed from it? It is the means of amendment and repentance! It is the security of endless good! How was Christ made this "curse for us?" But justice does not commonly suppose that the offender is its proper beneficiary. Punishment does not ordinarily appear an implicit method of favor. And if these things be so,—we must write another nomenclature, we must recast our ideas, justice and punishment must be released from their functions, must be dis severed from their archetypes, must be torn asunder from their bonds,—flung away as obsolete and abrogated terms!<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> It has been said that *κολάζειν*, which they who maintain annihilation assert to signify, to destroy, may only mean to correct. Does Demosthenes so employ it, in his first Olynthiac, when he denounces "*τοὺς δ' ἀδικούτας κολάζειν*?" Lysias counsels, in his oration against Eratosthenes, that he should be *punished* with death, using the same word. The criticism was first suggested by Petit Pierre, but without any cited proof, saying that he was told that Grotius had so explained it. *Κόλασις* may mean restraint, but then it is that which is included in punishment. The verb *κολάζομαι* occurs

For if there be one idea of justice, as correlative to punishment, more necessary to us than another, it is that on which we have felt ourselves more than once bound to insist,—it is the expression which it presents of the evil of the crime committed against it. Its province is to regard it precisely as it is, to treat it precisely as it deserves, to declare it precisely as it operates. To represent it more or less than its actual enormity is a perversion and a snare. Misrepresentation must be most injurious. The estimate of it can alone be known by punishment. That estimate must be agreeable to eternal right and reason. It must harmonise with the strict demand of the case. If the law do not threaten such adequate punishment, it is not a perfect rule: if it does threaten it, and does not execute it, it is either inefficient or insincere. On any supposition a false moral impression is induced and propagated. “The knowledge of sin” is blinked. A harm is thus done to all who would escape from sin, and to all who are in danger of falling into it. The beacon stands in a false bearing, and throws a treacherous light! Now what place can justice, with its minister and safeguard, Punishment, find in respect of sin, if all that is due to the sinner is a retrieving process? Is this the way in which God setteth his face against

twice in the New Testament, Acts iv. 21, 2 Pet. ii. 9. How the later classical writers understand it, is plain from the following passage in Lucian's *Dialogues of the Dead*: Menippus asks of Tantalus: “Σὺ δὲ ἢ ψυχὴ, πῶς ἂν εἴη ἡ δαψνῆς ἢ πινούσης;” Tantalus replies: “Τούτ' αὐτὸ ἡ κόλασις ἐστὶ, τὸ διψῆν μὲν τῇ ψυχῇ ὡς σῶμα ἀναστῆναι.”

that soul? Is this the idea which creatures ought to entertain? Is it that which the whole of the Divine conduct is designed to teach? Is this all its desert? Is its rectification all that it deserves? Is curse, and vengeance, and wrath, exhausted in this settlement? And doth God array himself in judicial ensigns, doth he sit upon his throne judging right,—doth he proclaim himself the God of truth without iniquity, that vengeance is his and that he will repay, that he is a jealous God,—to prove that other intentions and reservations of his mind make all this a mockery and a fraud? Is there an under-plot which is destined to defeat all the scenes and lessons of that great drama, long since passing before the eyes of a world old with its ages and crowded with its nations, and now hastening to its catastrophe? Is there some clause, which invalidates and deforces all public acts and declarations of the Divine government?

Instead of being led to expect a feebler manifestation of retributive justice in a future state, we are prepared by every anticipated issue, by every sentiment of conscience, by every testimony of Scripture, to forecast that which shall be far more distinct, demonstrative, and awful. It would be in opposition to the genius of the present dispensation that this Divine attribute should now shine forth with a perfect clearness: and not less so, that the "righteous acts of the Lord" should compose an administration of things sensibly complete, an œconomy of exactest order and unperplexed right. Why otherwise do we look for a judgement? For a heaven and a hell? Do we

await these things, that the present irregularities may be perpetuated? that there may be a more indiscriminate confusion? that the orderings of justice may be less decisive? Do we not, on the contrary, feel convinced that this shall be the winding up of a government which forbore much evil which it must now resent, and endured much provocation which it must now no more pass by? permitting the existence and progress of moral evil as incidental to free agency? allowing physical and social evil as essential to probation? calling upon us to judge nothing before the time? leaving the sinner to treasure up wrath unto himself against the day of wrath? "God hath appointed a day in which he will judge the world in righteousness." How perverse must appear, with these considerations pressing upon us, all that speculative reasoning which goes to invert such order, such natural expectation, such inspired assurance,—which concedes to justice a far more restricted course in the future than it now takes,—which assigns to punishment even another range of qualities than it now possesses, for here it is often final and irrevocable,—which founds a new *probation* upon the basis of an *eternal judgement*,—which transforms the *sentence* of condemnation into a warrant of hope, and this from the date of its proper and formal beginning!

Nor are proofs wanting that there is an enormity in sin which renders it more than incompatible with the design of the present dispensation, more than legis-

\* "Dei quanto judicium tardum, tanto magis justum est."—Minucius Felix.

latively inconvenient, to express and exercise towards it that righteous idea which it awakens and demands wherever it can be justly estimated. Special visitations of judgement have fallen upon it. This living world, with the exception of a little remnant, once perished. That desolation, that overflowing scourge, has bequeathed ineffaceable monuments. It was not to be repeated whatever might be the crimes of man. The sign of our security is in the prism of the sky. It was not too severe. Another event of the same kind, however, was irreconcilable with that moral trial to which man was more strictly subjected when his longevity was abridged and when his distance from the period of the creation receded. "And the Lord said, My Spirit shall not always strive with man,"—that is, His angry power, not his gracious influence,—"for that he also is flesh." "The law could not condemn sin,"—to its full desert,—not from any incompetency of that law, but "in that it was weak through the flesh," having so feeble a subject as present man on which to inflict its penalty. Duration, then, must be considered in its counterbalancing influence. That may be protracted which, when summarily dealt, might overpower. The crushing stroke may be commuted for stripes. The fact has been set before us in the moral history of earth. Acts of justice have continued, long after the individual delinquents have ceased to live. There has travelled on a long entail of punishment. The sin has been accounted so heinous that one term of life could not bound it. Though the punishment was always deserved by them

who suffered it to the remotest period, yet in that original offence it took its rise and found its occasion. "The third and fourth generation" upon whom this sentence of God might rest, were "of them that hated him,"—yet did "He visit the iniquity of the fathers upon the children and upon the children's children." The sin of Manasseh, himself a pardoned penitent, was charged upon the descendants of that people which he ruled and corrupted; because of his idolatry and bloodshed, they were "removed into all the kingdoms of the earth."\* Upon the contemporary generation of our Lord, that "generation" whose guilt none could "declare," "came all the righteous blood shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel unto the blood of Zacharias slain between the temple and the altar." A fearful intimation is thus given that sin may pursue the sinner into the conscious and personal futurity consequent upon death; that he may find that death has no power to abstract his guilt; that what could not be meted out in this life may be traversed for the next; and that the punishment, hitherto disproportionate and straitened, may project itself into eternity!

It is very common to separate the question of punishment from its strict relationship to justice, and to argue it on infinite goodness. What is this proper view of God? "Good is the Lord." But is he good to restrain any administration of government, or to impede any exercise of law? Does his goodness look

\* Jeremiah xv. 4.

more indifferently on moral evil, than his justice? Is it not its peculiar province, to check the consequences of sin? We know not of the goodness which exists only to pity and to spare,—which is a misprision of right and holy principle, which is a connivance at every moral perturbation, of the universe. It is easy to reduce this “awful goodness” to our depraved wish and idea. Phrases, uninspired and contrary to truth, give us aid. In the apocryphal Book of Wisdom it is said, in appeal to God: “Thou abhorrest nothing which thou hast made, for never wouldst thou have made anything if thou hadst hated it.”<sup>a</sup> If this means only that God never could create what he hated at the time of its creation, we do not object: but may not moral nature so corrupt its way, as to become hateful? Does not He declare his hatred of his enemies? It is to be regretted, that the Established Church of England should have incorporated this language in her forms.<sup>b</sup> And perhaps more unguarded expression may be found in another portion of its service: “O God, whose *nature and property is ever* to have mercy, and to forgive.”<sup>c</sup> Neither of these phrases seem to us echoes of Scripture. For we cannot conceal from ourselves, those terrible descriptions of anger, and of determination to punish, which contradict the principle on which they proceed. God may walk contrary to those who are perverted from his creative design. Instead of its being “his property and nature ever to

<sup>a</sup> chap. xi. 24.

<sup>b</sup> Collects for Lent and Good Friday.

<sup>c</sup> Prayers for Several Occasions.

have mercy and to forgive," he spared not the angels who sinned. "Our God is a consuming fire." "He is terrible out of his holy place." "God shall destroy for ever." "The enemies of the Lord shall be as the fat of lambs." Those passages which speak of his ire and wrath are many, reiterated and vehement. Do they tell of goodness, partial and fond, as it is now presumed? A mere indulgence? A figure, most beautiful and frequent, does holy Scripture present. God is our Parent. "Have we not one Father?" It is a figure,— "like as a father." It is argued that, all punishment, except for the improvement of the child, would be inconsistent with that relation. But may not the case of the son's disobedience be so heinous, that all, under the influence of the most natural feeling, would justify a treatment the most extreme? disownment? disinheritorship? final separation? The paternal relationship, though not as to its fact, yet, as to its exercise, may be altered by the conduct of the offspring: moral government cannot be altered. The one might be renounced: the other is necessary and insubvertible. May we not fear that, in consequence of sin, the paternal favor is withdrawn, and the filial privilege forfeited?—Let that father be the magistrate. The child is now under his jurisdiction as well as discipline. That child may be the transgressor of social law. It is conceivable, that his father may be called to pass sentence upon him. Will not all, if it be his inevitable duty, see in its discharge, a title to their admiration? Without any impeachment of his tenderness, is not such bearing truly great? Does not



history hallow it? Has it not saved commonwealths? Why should not the same suffrage be accorded to God? He is the "righteous Father." He sitteth King for ever. He reigns not for a part, but for the whole. His goodness must agree with universal justice, or with that which is the same thing, the protection of universal claim and interest. Justice, therefore, has not only been distributed into commutative and distributive: its third division is something more than each of these,—it is called, public. And if this notion of goodness is to be entertained, how frequently would it have been disappointed! Had earlier creatures than ourselves been forewarned, that our earth was soon to be formed, and our race to be created, it would have seemed improbable to them that aught but good could be admitted. The entire scheme would have demanded this expectation. What evils do exist, moral and physical! Then their idea of that which goodness can allow, would have been disappointed. It would have been false.—When men have been threatened with Divine judgements, they have imagined a presumption against them in the Divine goodness. To the antediluvians, the impending fate appeared most unreasonable: the men of Sodom derided the fear of overthrow. If they thought of God at all, arguments, like those which we have considered, were ready and more ingenious then. Goodness forbids it. A parent cannot do it. He who made all things for their own happiness, cannot desolate his works. Then their idea of that which goodness can allow was disappointed. It was false.—

So we may speculate concerning the future state. Its punishment may affect our views as exaggerated beyond all showing of truth, of reason, of analogy. We may interpose the Divine goodness. We may pronounce that this state of things cannot be. But we are not placed more favorably, to give judgement, than they who have palpably erred. Our idea may be disappointed. It may be false.\*

While justice has been divorced from punishment, the purpose of example has, also, been denied to it. In the Divine conduct towards the wicked, this has been held to be no idea or motive. Their simple benefit, it is maintained, is sought. A thought beyond that result is pronounced unjust. None, it is argued, are warranted to take benefit of it. The supposition that any such advantage is intended, supposes an excess, and therefore inflicts an injury. The wicked would thus be made victims to some hypothetical general good. It is forgotten that the punishment is the same, without any superflux to signalise the example. It is forgotten that man belongs naturally to a social condition, and cannot be detached from social influences. It is forgotten that every act of Divine government is public, and of universal interest. All human legislation studies this very end. Its main design, when righteous in its principles, is to proportion

\* "Et cum in penis est natura vitiosa, excepto eo quod natura est, etiam hoc ibi bonum est, quod impunita non est. Hoc enim est justum, et omne justum procul dubio bonum. Non enim quisquam de vitiis naturalibus, sed de voluntariis, penas luit."—Aug. De Civit. Dei, lib. xii. cap. 3.

punishment to crime, that, when it takes place, the good may justify it, and the wicked dread it. The infinite Ruler calls our attention to the same design in his judicial proceedings. "And the man that will do presumptuously, even that man shall die: and thou shalt put away the evil. And *all the people shall hear, and fear, and do no more presumptuously.*" "When the scorner is punished, the simple is made wise." "Smite a scorner, and the simple will beware." "Now all these things happened unto them for ensamples; and they are written for our admonition, upon whom the ends of the world are come." "Even as Sodom and Gomorrha, and the cities about them, are set forth for an example." The mere treatment of the individual, with none other reference than to himself, would destroy the "neighbour" relation of man to man, and the unity of moral administration."

It is a portion of the revealed doctrine of punishments that they are of different degrees. Justice suffers no compromise and no confusion. None can suffer for others: none shall suffer but for his particular demerit. The scale is graduated to a most perfect moral adjustment. There is "the greater sin." We read of those who shall receive "the greater damna-

\* In the *Gorgias* of Plato we find these concurrent sentiments: "They who are held back from hope of liberation by their extreme wickedness, and, on account of such crimes, are adjudged incurables, serve as examples to others. They can derive no advantage from punishment, being incurable: but they can profit others by example, who behold them constantly tormented by the most severe and terrible punishments, exhibited as an example, and monument, and spectacle, in Hades, to all the unjust who descend thither."

tion." Some shall be "beaten with many stripes," some "with few." The doom which shall fall on others is so tremendous, that "it shall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon at the judgement than for them."

Nor need we suspect that there is difficulty in this moral arrangement. It is enough for us to know that "God distributeth sorrows in his anger." We can believe that every sinner is naked and open to him. No throng can embarrass his separate acts towards all. This is the cherished prejudice of the wicked. He fondly dreams that he may thus hide himself. Vain delusion! He stands exposed as though he stood alone: the single mark for the arrows of heaven to strike. But did external difficulty arise, it would vanish before the assurance that the future retribution of the transgressor chiefly is engendered from himself. His own unsubdued pride, his own unpausing sinfulness, his own unappeasable remorse, form the ingredients of his own hell. The individualities of character kindle the individualisations of punishment. It might even suffice for all to remember their irreparable loss. They have rejected the counsel of God against themselves. What might now be theirs! The pearl of great price was once within their reach! They might have reigned in life! What reproaches must they heap upon themselves, what upbraidings of fatuity and wilfulness, remembering how they have squandered advantages and opportunities of such tran-

\* "Ἡμεῖς λέγομεν βαθμοὺς πολλοὺς, καὶ διαφορὰς, καὶ μέτρα, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ βασιλείᾳ, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ γέννῃ."—Chrysostom, Hom. xl.

scendent value ! They see the prize of which they have failed ! They behold the heaven which they have refused ! What needs a retribution more personally pointed than this ? But they are in the arrest of a justice which cannot be baffled. "Strong is the Lord God that judgeth." "Do we provoke Him to jealousy ?" "He maketh a way to his anger." "I will pour their wickedness upon them."

Ah ! what will the every variety of punishment include ! We declare that such varieties exist, because necessary to justice, because conformable to truth, because agreeable to fact. Yet is the doctrine never preached for the relief of fear and for the consolation of conscience. All is dark, though not alike dark. All is lost, though not equally lost. It will be tolerable for none, though not exactly as intolerable. Waste not the precious season for fleeing from the wrath to come, by any of these speculations. Think not of the mitigated hell, when you may escape it altogether. Give all your thoughts and diligence for this. It can be no extenuation, beneath that doom, to compare your less degree with that of greater around you : it will not soothe you that your flame is less fierce, and your worm less insatiate !"

"*Fuge, frater, illa tormenta, ubi nec tortores deficiunt, nec torti moriuntur ; quibus sine fine mors est, non posse in cruciatibus mori. Et exardescere amore atque desiderio sempiternæ vitæ sanctorum, ubi nec operosa erit actio, nec requies desidiosa : laus erit Dei sine fastidio, sine defectu : nullum in animo tedium, nullus labor in corpore ; nulla indigentia, nec tua cui subveniri desideres, nec proximi cui subvenire festines.*"—Augustine : *De Catechizandis Rudibus*.

## LECTURE VII.

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“AND WHEN THEY HEARD IT, THEY SAID, GOD FORBID. AND HE BEHELD THEM, AND SAID, WHAT IS THIS THEN THAT IS WRITTEN ?”

LUKE XX. 16, 17.

WHEN the revelation of the states of men after death was confessedly imperfect, when it fell far short of its present distinctness, when *invisible* was written over the great exits from this passing life, when the impenetrable cloud gathered between the actual and the future existence,—there was much taught, and still not dubiously, that behind the mysterious confines, men were differently and respectively treated, according as they had acted here. Ever was the distinction marked and confessed between the excellent and the wicked of the earth. Ever was the assurance repeated that the Divine conduct towards them should strictly correspond. “The gates of the shadow of death,” though not then thrown open as they are now, sent forth reflections and sounds to cheer the one and to appal the other. No doubt, wicked men wished that this dark curtain might be the limit of being. What they could not pierce they might deny to subsist.

Sheol and Hades might be on their jeering lips. The terms, denoting a deep obscurity, might bring relief to their fear. The unseen and the unknown might also be the unreal. But even these terms were not only negative. Variable and common might be their use, but they often spoke terror. Fearful images did they suggest. "A fire is kindled in mine anger, and shall burn unto the lowest hell." "Hell and destruction are before the Lord." "Hell is naked before him, and destruction hath no covering." Could these expressions only intend the grave? Did they not intimate a region of punishment? When it is said of the evil-doers, that "in a moment they go down into Sheol,"\* it is added, "their destruction cometh upon them," and that "God distributeth sorrows in his anger." "The wicked shall be turned into Sheol, and all the nations that forget God." This must be a sentence ulterior to the common sentence of mortality. The warning against vice cannot surely be only drawn from premature death, declaring with such solemn emphasis, that the licentious "die in youth and their life is among the unclean," that the "steps of the harlot take hold of hell," that "her house is the way to hell," that "the Rephaim, ghosts, are there," that "her guests are in the depths of hell." "The way of life is above to the wise, that he may depart from hell beneath." This can scarcely mean his avoidance of what would tend to an earlier dissolution. "Thou didst abase thyself unto hell." The grave is not surely the gauge of this abjection. Nor was

\* Job xxi. 18.

Hades,\* in the New Testament sense, ever an insistent word, implying nothing but common death. "And thou, Capernaum, which art exalted unto heaven, shalt be brought down unto hades." Now, was that city destroyed? its edifices prostrated to the level, and its foundations crumbled to the dust, of the grave? Or did any uncommon mortality seize upon its citizens? It still survives on the shores of the Galilean lake: "it remaineth unto this day." No depopulation is written against it. The trace of such infliction cannot be recalled or discerned. It was "in the day of judgement," that "the intolerableness" of the doom was to be felt. By what? The city then must fall with every other of the earth. Only can the doom light upon them who inhabited it, them who did not believe nor repent notwithstanding "the mighty works done in it." They were to be "brought down to" the place of retribution. The doom was at their death: in the day of judgement it shall be confirmed and aggravated. "And in hades the rich man lift up his eyes, being in torments." He was buried. What torments were there in his grave? Then, whatever the place to which he was consigned, there is nothing in it alien to these torments, nor forbidding them: they found there a native scene.

But if we quit terms like these, and ponder the strong descriptions of future punishment found in the

\* "Vox Græca ἀδης, cui respondet Hebræa הַעֲמָרָה, et Latina inferorum, denotat illum locum communem, in quem recipiuntur omnes hominum vita functorum animæ. Nunquam vero significat aut sepulchrum aut cælum."—Wetstein: Luke xvi. 23.



earlier testimonies of revelation, we shall confess that there can be no excuse for their disbelief and slight. "The eyes of the wicked shall fail, and they shall not escape, and their hope shall be as the giving up of the ghost." "The wicked is reserved unto the day of destruction: they shall be brought forth to the day of wrath." "Terrors take hold of him as waters, a tempest stealeth him away in the night. The east wind carrieth him away, and he *departeth*; and as a storm hurleth him out of his place. For God shall cast upon him and not spare." "Because there is wrath beware, lest he take thee away with his stroke: then a great ransom cannot deliver thee." "Evil shall slay the wicked." "The transgressors shall be destroyed for ever: the end of the wicked shall be cut off." "He shall take them away as with a whirlwind, both living and in his wrath." "In the hand of the Lord there is a cup, and the wine is red; it is full of mixture; and he poureth out of the same; but the dregs thereof all the wicked of the earth shall wring them out and drink them."

It is certain that man is not only susceptible of punishment, but that this susceptibility enters largely into his moral constitution. He can conceive its justice; he can entertain its fear; he can foreshadow its certainty. He is filled with its presentiments. Already he suffers it. The question is therefore past, whether he can or shall. Preparation is wrought in him for the consequences of sin. When God shooteth at him with his arrows, there is a nature for them to transfix. The subject and the infliction are fitted to each other.

No man could ever deny it. He cannot protect himself. His heart cannot endure, nor his hands be strong, in the days that the Lord shall deal with him. Reasoning from capacities, we may learn what man can enjoy and suffer: arguing from experience, we learn what he does: that temperament which points to rewards as easily adapts itself to punishments.

Nor is the argument feeble that man cannot, whatever be his wishes, and whatever be the obvious cause of those wishes, dissuade himself of retribution. He attempts in vain. He cannot satisfy his reason that there is none, while it adduces its simplest dictates. He cannot abuse his conscience, while it urges its harrowing fears. He cannot put another construction upon the great system around him, and of which he forms so serious a part.

It now becomes us to state what we believe to be the doctrine of Scripture in respect to the duration of future punishment: a question before which all difficulties involved in its nature seem, comparatively, unimportant, and to almost disappear. Eternity is endlessness. When this is predicated of future punishment, it alleges that this punishment admits of no reversal; that it is lasting as the being of the immortal sufferer. But this is not any proper question of Christianity. Therefore the early apologists always throw back the charge upon its adversaries, who sought to confound the question with it. They remind the pagans of their own hell. They establish the fact of this hopeless retribution in far earlier convictions and greatly antecedent truths, which mythology could

not resist, and upon which Christianity only proceeded.\* Yet there is one thing which we are warranted to expect from it. Not to prove it. There is much to establish it in other fields of inquiry. Natural theology shows a perpetuity of evil without any means and principles to intimate or necessitate its surcease. Abundant analogies are found of inveterate habit, incorrigible character, and unrestrained consequence. All this, according to presumptive evidence, would be going on, were there no revelation. But though we might not expect revelation to *prove* it, we must that it would *certify* it. It will surely clear up every doubt. It tells not, that by its will is the punishment, whatever its duration; but only that which, independently of it, is the truth. It makes known what always was. We cannot doubt that there is explicitness in its informations. It is not a problem which it will unfeelingly hang

\* Theophilus, always connected with Justin Martyr, thus speaks: "Διωνοῖς τιμώρσις, ὧν τιμῶριον προειρημένων ἀπὸ τῶν φροφήτων, μεταγενεστεροὶ γινόμενοι οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ φιλόσοφοι, κ.τ.λ. "Eternal punishments,—of which punishments mention is made by your profane prophets, your poets, and philosophers, even in their sacred writings, that they may establish their own doctrines. And well is it that they do, for they not only announce these punishments themselves, but bear witness to them, against the impious and unbelieving, and leave them without the excuse, 'we have not heard nor known them.'"

"Tamen admonentur homines doctissimorum libris, et carminibus poetarum; illius ignei fluminis, et de Stygia palude sæpius ambientis ardoris, quæ cruciatibus æternis præparata, et dæmonum iudiciis, et de oraculis prophetarum cognita tradiderunt. Et ideo apud eos etiam ipse rex Jupiter per torrentes ripas, et atram voraginem jurat religiose. . . . Nec tormentis aut modus ullus, aut terminus."—Minucius Felix.

in the vibrations of an irresoluble uncertainty. When our Lord, with the inimitable grace of truth, said of the heaven which he went to prepare for his followers,—“If it were not so, I would have told you,”—his language warranted an equal inference concerning the pœnal state. And who ever so much explained and fulminated it as he? The fact, be its character what it may, is surely revealed. It is contrary to all we know, that it is unadjudged, that it cannot be ascertained. Can such a point be reserved? Such a secret be withheld? One way or other it is determinable. One way or other it is our duty to decide our belief.

If it be a revealed doctrine, that there is final deliverance for all, then revelation proposes this for our belief. It ought to be held and avowed. It is no mean portion of the creed to which it belongs. Its influence cannot be indifferent. Its place in the mind of him who adheres to it must be broad and commanding. It must not only be an ascendant view, but that ascendancy must be very practical. The effect will necessarily be most immediate. Christianity does not save that man, according to his conception, from an endless perdition. He does not conceive that other men are thus exposed. If it be a truth, it is a large truth, an earnest truth. It should not be suppressed, it could not be concealed. Who would not set the candle on the candlestick that it might give light to all the house? We speak not of those who only wish it: we can scarcely forbear to speak in scorn of those who yield their belief, but think it undesirable to give it assertion. What right have they to impound

this truth? What title have they to prevaricate with the hopes and fears of mankind? What power has committed to their custody keys designed to open, and which they only employ to lock? Their condemnation cometh out of their own mouth. If this be Christian truth, and they fear its publication, they not only walk in craftiness,—they not only profess themselves to be more jealous of the purity and piety of the Gospel than it claims to be,—they not only guard its too tender mercy and shade its too glorious light,—they not only leave agonised suspense and devouring despair, which their hoodwinked hope at once might heal,—but they outrage and desecrate all truth. Its results can be only beneficial. We charge the most systematic cruelty upon them. Their malignity is only equal to their cowardice. They tell us that their faith rests upon a moral demonstration. So profoundly do they regard it as affecting the rectitude and benevolence of the Divine character, as a principle guiding the interpretation of Scripture, as staking the amiable genius of Christianity, as setting free the fears which so long impended over destiny,—that moral science assumes to their eye another complexion, a new interest in the Gospel is stirred, and they may well be expected to give their distinctive view a wide and loud proclamation. If this be a doctrine of the Christian salvation, it is a chief one: it must be, then, a motive to gratitude and a stimulus to zeal. In believing it, all men would be better. The *peculiar* influence of such a sentiment ought to be allowed to the full upon the mind which embraces it,

and ought to be applied to the condition and benefit of all other minds. Is it to be endured that such an announcement be stifled? Is it not insufferable that any should erect themselves into arbiters of what portion of true religion may be taught? Are the mystagogues and hierophants to be installed afresh? the greater and lesser secrets to be adjusted anew? and the initiations to revive? To hold a doctrine, supposed to be most merciful and religious, secretly, is a craven part: not to declare it, proves one of two things,—it may prove both,—that its truth is not felt to be certainly established, or that its influence is not felt to be certainly beneficial.

On the other hand, if we be convinced, upon rigid and solemn inquiry, that future punishment is properly eternal, let us not shrink from its most direct avowal. \*Can we hold it back? May we forbear? May we qualify it? Must not the conviction be as a fire shut up in our bones? What are all the provoking epithets applied to us in a faithful averment of the truth, in its manifestation, compared with the cruelty which would really and indelibly attach to us, if we evaded it by artifice, extenuated it by flattery, blinked it by neglect, and compromised it by silence? What would be our blood-guiltiness, if believing it, we did not speak? Shall we “strengthen the hands of the wicked, that he should not return from his wicked way, by promising him life?” It may be the burden of the Lord, it may be a torture of many of our feelings to prophesy it, but *because* it is so terrible, *because* it is so impugned, it is our more stringent duty to assert and

vindicate it. "Good is the word of the Lord which he hath spoken." Contrariety to that word, of whatever kind and degree, must be evil. If we should, however, be blamed, in sincerity or in sarcasm, for the consciousness of any pain or struggle in the maintenance of what we believe to be the truth, if we be chided, in either mood, because our feeling is not so far chastised as to experience no trial in regarding it, then do we justify that conflicting state of mind, then would we rather cherish than discharge it, as true to the mind of God. Is he indifferent to these results and alternatives? Does he not describe himself in suspense and strait? Does he not turn and relent? Does he will the death of the wicked, or hath he pleasure in it? God would that all men believed the Gospel and were saved! So would we! We cannot be wrong in weeping over them for whom Jesus, the most awful messenger of doom and preacher of retribution who ever stood on our earth,—himself wept! There is another model, finite and therefore more intelligible, perfect and therefore quite unerring,—that of the angels who may be commissioned even to cast the wicked into hell, and they complain not, but do not rejoice, cannot rejoice, are not bidden to rejoice, reserving that burst of gladness for the one sinner who repenteth. In such a spirit we depart not from the finest tempers of the apostles, their sternest faithfulness, their sweetest pity, when they tell often, and tell with tears, that end of destruction which shall overtake the enemies of the cross of Christ!

"This gave the apostle occasion to enter into many mysteries,

In weighing the evidence of this truth we may be ruled by two considerations. The first concerns the general impression which Scripture makes upon the mind. Particular terms, sentences, paragraphs, are all worthy of close analytic study : let them be reduced to an exegetical crucible and ordeal : but the aim and spirit of the whole must be our principal quest. What is the synthesis? What is that which needs no strain nor equivocation? What is the first, readiest, conception? What is the predominant, common, element? That is most likely to be the truth, which cannot most remotely seek untruth, which cannot\* most momentarily allow misinterpretation. Forced construction, adroit evasion, are not the means which truth requires or accepts. The other rule which should sway us in this research, respects disposition. There is no doubt to which side of the doctrine every man inclines. But this is no presumption of its truth. There is no appeal to our common feelings for a judgement in its favor. Can we, however, forget that there is a strong distaste to every doctrine of the Gospel in the unrenewed mind? Do we not know that criminals are under a very obvious temptation to regard the law, which they have broken, harsh and extreme? And who are we? "It is of the Lord's mercies that we are not consumed : because his compassions fail not." We are the obnoxious parties. May we be expected to "judge righteous judgement?" The disinclination to receive it has

and to handle with a bleeding heart *things which his own very pen even trembleth sometimes to set down.*"—Hooker. (The italics are his.)



generally co-existed with the rejection of other Christian verities. It is not too much to say, that the most devout and obedient and zealous Christians have always acknowledged it. Thousands, who had long disputed it, have yielded what they esteemed their sinful prepossessions against it, adored the grace which had averted from them this catastrophe, and henceforth lived but to warn men of their tremendous and imminent danger.

We do not claim for Scripture a uniform use of terms, or a scholastic nomenclature, or a technology. But there are exceptions. There is often an *indoles*, a general idiom. We have found a perfect instance in the Sheol of the Hebrew, and in the Hades of the Greek. They are exact correlates. They follow each other in their general character, and may imply only death and burial, or the happiness and misery of a future life. In rendering these words from either of these languages into the other, these are the only convertible words. We shall also find that the terms denoting duration in the sacred languages have the same interchangeable import. We begin with עולם. It first occurs, with adverbial sense, in Genesis iii. 22 : "Lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever."—Surely, however that Divine speech was meant or uttered, the idea of man in that rash attempt would be to save himself from death, to procure the exemption by his own daring, to live in defiance of fear and danger, to antidote his sin and punishment, to live always and without end. The next application of it, and in adjective sense, is in

chap. xxi., ver. 33, of the same book: "And Abraham planted a grove in Beersheeba, and called there on the name of the Lord, the everlasting God." Here must be the absoluteness of the indefinite idea. This very important and very frequent word is thus early established in its largest and perfect sense. It is rendered in the Greek Septuagint by Αἰών. In the first instance, Ζήσεται εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα,—in the other, ἐπεκαλεσατο τὸ ὄνομα Κυρίου, Θεὸς Αἰώνιος. This early use of the words is most decisive of their meaning: when the two languages reflect the same meaning, the evidence overflows. Both are consecrated to one religious idea. Who could be so well qualified as the Alexandrine traductors to construe Mosaic phrase,—not only by a knowledge of the Hebrew language, but by an accurate acquaintance with the manner in which these terms had always been understood? We, then, possess these equipollents, in the first inspired, and in the first translated, book of revelation,—to which book alone we can look for just notions of man in his origin, and of creation in its wonders. It is of great philological value not only to possess this contextual demonstration of *Gnolam*, but also how the Hebrew scholars translated it. There is no doubt concerning the authenticity of this version of the Pentateuch, and that it was extant nearly four hundred years before any productions of New Testament Greek. As we have traced much similitude between Sheol and Hades, so we shall not discover less between *Gnolam* and *Aion*.\* Both may signify

\* "Adde, quod apud ipsos antagonistas in confesso sit, eternitatem

the world, or a dispensation of events and principles in it. But the strict idea of each is, perpetuity. Now the former word is not the only one to denote this. נצח might be adopted. It supposes a long continuance, a growth to maturity, consummation, and victory: what opposed it, it has overcome and survived. It is commonly taken as implying what is final, a perpetual end. תמיד, תמיד, expresses a common notion of duration, generally given, "continually." Neither are so powerful as Gnolam. When that takes the plural form, it becomes very strong. And it is often combined with another word, in some points of view still stronger, being a more abstract term. ער bears to be rendered, eternity. "For thus saith the High and Lofty One that inhabiteth eternity."<sup>a</sup> This is to be understood of existing eternity. Occasionally it is reduplicated: ער ער. Sometimes *gnolam* is enclosed between a double *gnad*. The effect is the highest which can be conceived. "Ye shall not be ashamed nor confounded world without end."<sup>b</sup> In this combination it seems to respect prospective eternity, while ער more generally intimates previous eternity.<sup>c</sup> It may be added that the Greek translation renders

*semper et ubique denotare durationem rei, quanta esse debet, seu æternum esse idem significare ac durare tamdiu, quamdiu durare res debet.*"—Lampe: De Æternitate Pœnarum. He supports his position by the concessions of authors whose names are now little known. It may be observed that the Septuagint does not present more than twenty cases of *Aion*, except as the rendering of *Gnolam*: and yet *Aion* occurs more than three hundred times. *Sheol* is translated by *Hades* sixty times out of the sixty-three in which it occurs.

<sup>a</sup> Isa. lvii. 15.    <sup>b</sup> Isa. xlv. 17.    <sup>c</sup> Mic. v. 2; Habak. i. 12.

*gnad*, whether simple or in combination, by *aion*. It does not know a fuller or more potential word. It may be also remarked, that the variations of *Gnolam* are used where inferior words would be wholly inadequate. When we read, *מְדוֹר לְדוֹר*, from generation to generation, *לְנֶצַח נְצוּדִים*, for all time, we must note a designed restriction of the continuance or perpetuity.

Confining ourselves to the Old Testament for the present, and to the language in which it is written, we find a veiled allusion to a state of unearthly suffering in the fires of the valley of Hinnom. They were at first kindled for idolatry and its merciless orgies: afterwards, when to debase that scene of moral pollution all the refuse of the neighbouring city was heaped there, they were maintained to consume it. These had been at different periods employed for the purpose of human cremation, and were the common funeral pile. A more revolting picture cannot be presented to the mind than that which is given of the accursed scene. "For Tophet is ordained of old; yea, for the king it is prepared: he hath made it deep and large: the pile thereof is fire and much wood; the breath of the Lord, like a stream of brimstone, doth kindle it."\* It would glare upon every eye, it would haunt every mind, as a terrible visitation of wrath. It would be no more the disgusting, but the necessary pyre. It would be elevated into an awful emblem. "They shall go forth, and look upon the carcasses of the men that have transgressed against me: for their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched; and they shall

\* Isaiah xxx. 33.

be an abhorring unto all flesh." <sup>a</sup> But there the impression could not stay. Between the first and the last quotations which we have made from these prophecies of Isaiah, respecting this scene of judgement, a fearful cry is interposed: "The sinners in Zion are afraid; fearfulness hath surprised the hypocrites. Who among us shall dwell with the devouring fire? who among us shall dwell with everlasting burnings?" <sup>b</sup> We cannot but think that the appeal is allusive to this loathsome furnace; that it was now associated with the flames of a future retribution. Though it belongs not to exegetical criticism, yet, having the whole volume of revelation before us, it is impossible to forget how the Saviour adopted some of the most solemn expressions contained in these cited texts, and applied them in a way not to be mistaken. It is impossible to overlook that the epithet which distinguishes these "burnings" is the same with that which speaks to us of the eternity of the Divine nature and excellence. Nor is the doctrine taught by this prophet alone. "And the multitude," exclaims Daniel, "that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt." The reward and the punishment, the "life" and the "contempt," are alike "everlasting."

<sup>a</sup> Isaiah lvi. 24. "The concluding words of the verse have no meaning, except there be an implied reference to eternal punishment. Of that punishment the impious Jews had a striking emblem before their eyes, in the fires of Tophet, in which the dead bodies of the Assyrians were being burnt."—Henderson on Isaiah. Of this judgement was Cyprian in "*Ad Demetrianum*," and also Eusebius in his *Preparatio Evangel.* lib. xi. <sup>b</sup> ch. xxxiii. 14.

Nor does any event meet this anticipatory language, this supposed case, save the general "awaking," or the universal resurrection.

We have examined more at large the continuous and symbolic passages in the former prophecy, because it stands so intimately related to New Testament phrase. The valley of Jehoshaphat, the seat of these sepulchral and foreboding fires, was also called the valley of Hinnom. The reason of the denomination is not known. It is early noticed.<sup>a</sup> It was not the name of its first owner which made it execrable, if it be only "called after him;" but its original devotion to idolatry, and its subsequent appropriation to real and typic punishment. This is in Hebrew גִּי הִנּוֹם. This is transferred to the Greek, Γέεννα. There can be no doubt that this was supposed to denote the place of future punishment. There can be no doubt that thus our Lord employed it. There can be no doubt that thus it was popularly understood.<sup>b</sup> There can be no doubt that this was the reading of the synagogue and the temple.<sup>c</sup> The first employment of it is in Matthew, the fifth chapter, and the twenty-second verse: "But I say unto you, that whosoever is angry with his brother

<sup>a</sup> Joshua xv. 8; 2 Kings xxiii. 10.

<sup>b</sup> "Nec dubium est quin ista Gehennæ significatio tunc communis et vulgo nota fuerit, ut antiquissimi Judæorum libri, et inter eos Talmudici, testantur."—*Buxtorf*.

<sup>c</sup> It is very intelligible that our Lord and that James should alone use this word. They spoke, in whatever language, Syro-Chaldee or not, perhaps in Greek, (see Diodati,) to the Jewish people, and to the twelve tribes scattered abroad. It is a Hebrew derivative: it was natural that they should transfer it, and intermix it, whatever their vehicle of address.

without cause, shall be in danger of the judgement; and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca," (a term of contemptuous slight and depreciation,) "shall be in danger of the council; but whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell-fire," or Gehenna. To suppose that our Lord would only remind and warn his countrymen of their own civil and ecclesiastical awards, is to impute to him a style quite unlike to his grave and solemn appeals. Besides, he had just rebuked them for their inadequate idea of crime: he informed them that he who hated his brother was a murderer. Did their judicature recognise the incipient principles and motives of crime? Nor was he who called his brother, fool, subjected to be burned in the valley of Hinnom. He borrows from their tribunals, the judgement and the council, similitudes of his own. Gehenna is not now an accommodated, but an absolute, word upon his lips. The distinctions and aggravations of future punishment are, also, thus implied. Immediately afterwards, He describes the same doom, conveying the idea in that which had become a fixed term, though the reference and derivation might be henceforth lost. "And if thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out and cast it from thee: for it is profitable for thee, that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into Gehenna. And if thy right hand offend thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee: for it is profitable for thee, that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into Gehenna." Again, and again, in other connexions, at other times, He warns

and denounces : "Rather fear Him, which, after he hath killed, hath power to cast into Gehenna," "which is able to destroy both body and soul in Gehenna."<sup>a</sup> In similar passages,<sup>b</sup> it is called "the Gehenna of fire," which fire is *aionian*, which fire is not "quenched," or rather, which is quenchless.<sup>c</sup> The proselyte of the Pharisees, is called the child of Gehenna, both as to his guilt and condemnation, both as to his depravity and mischievousness ; it is of them that it is demanded, "How can ye escape the judgement of Gehenna ?" And thus the injustice of man—one instance is mentioned, evil-speaking—is described as "setting on fire the circuit of creation, and it is set on fire of Gehenna ;" it is like the flame of hell bursting forth in its fury, it is like its agony by the consequences thus produced.<sup>d</sup>

We bring both Testaments together in the identity of their language. Their use of terms, in this particular, is singularly fixed. Whatever be their doctrine of future

<sup>a</sup> Matt. x. 28 ; Luke xii. 5.

<sup>b</sup> Matt. xviii. 8, 9 ; Mark ix. 48.

<sup>c</sup> τὸ πῦρ τὸ ἀσβεστον.

<sup>d</sup> It appears that this became a common word, not only among Christian Greeks, but Christian Romans. It is presumed that Ausonius was a Christian, though he does not always write like one.

"Confessam dignare animam, si membra caduca  
Execror, et tacitum si pœnitet : altaque sensus  
Formido excruciat, tormentaue gehennæ  
Anticipat, patiturque suos mens saucia manes."

Ephemeris, liv.

Justin Martyr, in addressing Gentile converts, says—"Gehenna is the place where those are to be punished who have led unrighteous lives, and disbelieved what God declared by Christ."—Comment. Luke xii. 5.



punishment, it is common and one. But we need not confine ourselves to the precision of a terminology. Other descriptions abound in the preaching of Christ, and in the writings of his apostles. Some of these have been adduced: we would not recall them. More must be adduced: we will not anticipate them. It is only necessary to add, that most unsusceptible and inattentive is that mind which does not perceive, that there is throughout a constant, solemn, appeal to future punishment—to that punishment as imminent, as dread, as irremissible.

There is, however, one word which, in its various forms, so frequently recurs—informing us of the issue of unbelief and sin—that we cannot pass it without remark. “The perdition of ungodly men,”—the *promise*, “Ye shall never perish,”—the *condition*, “that they might not perish,”—convey a sound dreadly familiar to all. Man is placed before us: he has “perished,” being already “lost.” He is “that which is lost.”<sup>a</sup> To perish, to be lost, are words of our language startlingly strong. Derived as *perdition*, *perish*, are from the Latin, to explain them by such a root is trifling, though this is not seldom done. *Pereo*<sup>b</sup> signifies utter ruin, loss of life; probably, from its radical composition, to pass entirely away. The original verb, Ἀπολλύω, is commonly opposed to “eternal life,” to “salvation,”—“they who perish,” are contrasted with

<sup>a</sup> τὸ ἀπολλέσθαι—Luke xix. 10.

<sup>b</sup> It is scarcely ever used in the classics, but in this strongest sense. *Peream*! is its solemn form of oath. *Perditus* and *Interitus*, almost always imply destruction, utter and final.

"them who are saved." "There is one Lawgiver, who is able to save and to destroy." Satan, therefore, "in the Greek tongue, hath his name Apollyon." The unclean spirit cried out, "Art thou come to *destroy* us?" But that perdition was not annihilation, but that which would consist with most constant and conscious being: "Art thou come to *torment* us before the time?" The same distinction is obvious in the warning of our Lord: "Except ye repent, ye shall all *likewise* perish." This was an allusion to those Galileans "whose blood Pilate had mingled with their sacrifices," and to "the eighteen upon whom the tower in Siloam fell." Now the same visitation could not be intended: that those "present at that season" should experience similar fates. He passed from such lamentable and frightful facts, to the liabilities of the soul. He urged how it might perish, "likewise," as truly, far more terribly in proportion to its superiority over all contingent harm, far more really in proportion to its higher nature, far more enduringly in proportion to its immortality.—Man has now perished, or his perdition is begun. The Gospel is given to arrest it. Otherwise it goes on, and present guilt and misery are but "the evident tokens of perdition." We are prepared by this ordinary style, a style most strongly marked and unvarying, by the very use of the language,—for a punishment irretrievably extreme.

We now advance to that which is more strictly determinate of the question that concerns this dura-

tion of the pœnal state. The language, in which the later revelation of God is given to man, is known for its nicety and copiousness. Whatever may be the deficiency of the New Testament idiom, it reflects most accurately the ideology of its times. Not affecting Attic refinement, it speaks as the Hellenistic nations would readily understand. We find different expressions which convey the thought of perpetuity. Πάντοτε yields the notion of anything which is constant in our habits, and in our observations of the course of things: it could scarcely intimate what was more continuous. Διηνεκής,<sup>a</sup> employed with the preposition εἰς,—εἰς τὸ διηνεκές,—signifies what is prolonged, uninterrupted, as in a succession and order. Συνεχῆς,<sup>b</sup> supposes a series of times closely connected together. Αἰεὶ, is often accepted in the highest sense. From this adverb are formed two words of the greatest value in this inquiry; αἰδιος and αἰὼν.<sup>c</sup> Both may be put to the fullest sense, or to a sense quite inferior. The first is to be discriminated from Ἀδης, written often in the Greek classics poetically, Ἀΐδης,—which either refers, as in its Scripture import, to the unseen future state of retribution, or is a personification of its heathen god. It occurs twice in the New Testament. "His eternal (aïdian) power and Godhead."<sup>d</sup> "And the angels which kept not their high estate, but left their

<sup>a</sup> Heb. vii. 3.

<sup>b</sup> It is not found in the New Testament, and only twice in Homer: in the Iliad, 82, 26—in the Odyssey, 9, 74, in the latter instance coupled with αἰεὶ.

<sup>c</sup> Note N.

<sup>d</sup> Rom. i. 20.

own habitation, He hath reserved in everlasting, *aïdian*, chains."<sup>a</sup> The philosophic writers apply it to the constancy and durability of nature.<sup>b</sup> The second term of this derivative form, is of greater influence on the argument, from its frequent and generally uniform use. Its purport in the pagan works of this language, is confessedly of little service to any opinion we may embrace, or side we may adopt. Life is its common meaning, and sometimes *αἰών* is conjoined with an epithet which declares its brevity. In the *Iliad* it is to be so understood in the speech of Sarpedon, 5 B, that of Achilles, 9, that of Jupiter to Juno, 16, that of Achilles to his goddess-mother, 19. Twice it occurs with *μυνηθάδιος*. It is declined in Priam's prayer to Achilles, *φίλης αἰῶνος*, 22. We do not meet with it in the *Odyssey*. This criticism, however, principally relates to the poetry of the Greeks: their philosophical writers apply it far more strictly. Even the poets are not invariable in its use. Pindar<sup>c</sup> applies it to death and its consequences. He even describes it by "a sorrowless hereafter."<sup>d</sup> In the Christian records its frequency will be apparent, when it is learnt that it occurs—with its auxiliaries, derivatives, and reduplications, independently of parallel passages—a hundred and forty-five times. It is never employed by them in its common classical sense of individual human life.

<sup>a</sup> Jude 6.

<sup>b</sup> "Κινούμενος κίνησει' αἰδιον, ἀπαύστως δι' αἰῶνος." Aristotle. *De Mundo*. 2.

<sup>c</sup> "Ἐπειμι ἐς τὸν μόρσιμον Αἰῶνα." *Isth. Od.* 7.

<sup>d</sup> "Ἀδαρυν νέμονται Αἰῶνα." *Oly.* 2.

In conformity to its various acceptations, albeit they pertain to one general idea, it sometimes means the world, or the period of its lasting; what is in it, or what shall ensue at the end of it; its course and history; its ages and dispensations. Lest there should be misapprehension in such cases, it is said—"This world," *τούτος*—or "the world at present," *νῦν*. It is distinguished from another, *τοῦ αἰῶνος ἐκείνου*. Twice is it associated with awful periods past, ere the beginning, or ever the earth was; "*Πρὸ χρόνων αἰωνίων*," 2 Tim. i. 9; Titus i. 2. But it cannot be doubted, that the word most commonly expresses the sense of a duration subsequent to that of this world and its economies, an after state and a future existence.

When the Divine Being is described, it is that he is "King of the ages," or eternal; that he is "blessed through the ages," or for ever; that he "liveth through the ages of ages," or for ever and ever; that glory is due and rendered to him through the same interminable revolutions. When the strongest declarations are made in the ancient Scriptures of the Divine eternity,—as when Jehovah lifteth up his hand to heaven, and saith, I live for ever!—*αἰών* is the term every Greek translator adopts to express it, whether of the Alexandrine band, when Greek was classically pure, or of the New Testament writers, when they render a quotation, inspired as they were to understand the whole of revealed truth. When there is the strongest necessity for whatever of force this language contains,—when the demand is most awfully urgent,—this is the term it yields. If there were

greater, it would offer it. One point of construction may be noticed : the preposition *sic* often governs it, and seems to increase its signification, or rather more fully to unfold it.<sup>a</sup> This use and form is peculiar to the inspired style ; the classical writers never adopt it. It is like the launching of any interest, or claim, or cause, upon the bosom of its boundlessness. The initial step of our immortality is marked : all previous to that immortality is indicated : “*now* and *unto* the day of eternity.”<sup>b</sup> It is a new dawn of duration. That this strict idea is intended, the Scriptures abundantly confirm.<sup>c</sup> “The things which are seen are temporal,” *πρόσκαιρα* : “the things which are not seen are eternal,” *αἰώνια*. What more perfect contrast can be supposed? What can be its scope but to oppose our thoughts of the one to our thoughts of the other? “Our earthly house of this tabernacle” is set against “our house not made with hands, *aionian* in the heavens.” The distinction is plainly taken between proper time and proper eternity. This is done, as far as the powers of the language permit. This is done still more in what may be called its arbitrary use by Christianity. For its potestas was not equal to the doctrines of so sublime a religion. Its signs were to be expanded, and many of them newly fixed, when it

<sup>a</sup> This form occurs fifty-six times in the recension of Griesbach.

<sup>b</sup> “*Nūn καὶ εἰς ἡμέραν αἰῶνος.*” 2 Pet. iii. 18.

<sup>c</sup> “*Nam Hellenistæ illam phrasin plane ignorant. Unde clarissimè liquet, Spiritum Sanctum id intendere, ut nervosius æternitatem exprimat, quam stylo humano hactenus factum erat, adeoque omnes cancellos removeat, quos genius linguæ alias videbatur admittere posse.*”—Lampe.

received such a religion into its nomenclature. This is far more cogent in proof than a strict philological argument. We ask not,—as though shut up to the rule,—what does a Greek word express? though we dishonour not these hermeneutics,—but what would Christianity convey by it? And how this precise word *was* understood, is most evident from the later writers of this dialect. The apostolical fathers are uniform in this acceptation of the word. The Christian orators of the Byzantine school always employ it when they would inculcate the eternal idea. Did not Chrysostom, Basil, the Gregories, understand what was the proper word? Did not Councils, when they compiled the symbols of their faith? The pagan authors of the same date follow the same practice.\*

We have supposed that there is no dispute concerning the eternity of celestial happiness. An expression of entire assurance distinguishes its general belief. But it must be asked on what the assurance rests? This, unlike the doctrine of immortality, cannot be inferred from reason, cannot be suspended on consciousness. The Christian believes it upon the testimony of revelation. It is not true because he wishes it to be true. It is not true because of its pleasant conception. It is revealed. One phrase again and again arises: it is *æonian* life. "The end" is eternal life. The future indemnity for loss and pain which may be now suffered for the Christian cause, which leaves poor the hundred-fold compensation of

\* "Χρόνος ἄμα καὶ αἰὼν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν."—Proclus. Plotinus would furnish many proofs.

this present world, is eternal life. The kingdom prepared for the righteous from the foundation of the world, is eternal life. That for which they are ordained, or marshalled, is eternal life. It was promised before the world began. All that forecasts the heavenly reward is thus proclaimed. It is eternal glory, eternal inheritance, the everlasting kingdom, founded on the faithfulness of the everlasting covenant, ratified by the declaration of the everlasting Gospel, secured by the fulness of eternal salvation and by the right of eternal redemption! All is eternity!

But this precise adjective is employed in the same fixed, uniform, unqualified, manner, in representing the punishment of the wicked.<sup>a</sup> They are "in danger of everlasting judgement." "They shall be cast into everlasting fire." "They shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord and the glory of his power." "To whom the mist of darkness is reserved for ever." "To whom is reserved the blackness of darkness for ever." "Depart, ye cursed, into everlasting fire."<sup>b</sup> And that we may learn that hell is as eternal as heaven, the lips of Christ declare: "And these shall go away into *aionian* punishment: but the righteous into *aionian* life."<sup>c</sup>

"Things which are revealed belong to us and our children." If there be an eternal blessedness and an

<sup>a</sup> In the fifteenth chapter of the Apocalypse, and the seventh versè, one of the "living creatures" is represented as "giving unto the seven angels, seven golden vials full of the wrath of God, who liveth *eis tous aiōnas tôn aiōnōn*." Such anger, then, is worthy of an endless Being, and may coexist with Him.

<sup>b</sup> Note O.

<sup>c</sup> Note P.



eternal punishment, they will surely be among the things prominently revealed. They are both revealed, or neither is revealed. If any man be authorised to receive one and reject the other, he "hath a revelation." Whence is it? With what credentials is it enforced? "If a spirit or an angel hath spoken unto him, let us not fight against God." But if he draw it from his own prejudgements, the inward light must be as fatuous as any tale which scepticism or enthusiasm can forge. "Add thou not unto His words, lest he rebuke thee, and thou be found a liar."

We believe that it is most generally allowed, that it is even freely conceded, that the question, if one of literal, lexicographical, criticism, is placed beyond dispute. If the power of words is to determine it, the meaning is plain. The *usus scribendi* seems as certain. We may well restrict our enquiries: What do the words import? What do the writers intend?

The exegetical proof, then, would be perfect, unless there be other reasons which necessitate a different construction. Some of these may be taken from a presumed disproportion between sin and ultimate punishment: others, from a view of the Divine benevolence, supposed to be contrary to it and which is felt to render this extreme proceeding impossible. If there be synthetical disproofs, these may claim a right to be heard against exegetical evidence. It is, also, merely just to add that the impugnors of such retribution generally allow that the terms which express the

duration of future happiness and misery are the same : that they contend for the one and against the other, on wholly different grounds. They describe them to be superior to the mere tenor of dogmatic revelations.

But there are Scripturists who array against the terms we have collated, against our more analytic method, what they think to be the fuller, the general, sense of the sacred volume : with us, they make their appeal to it, and yet reach the opposite conclusion. Their versions demand respectful attention.

Some passages, commonly claimed as favoring the eternity of future punishments, we release. We do not consider them argumentatively just. We disabuse our views of any support supposed to be offered by them. Such is that in the epistle to the Hebrews, vi. 4, 6 : " For it is impossible for those who were once enlightened, and have tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost, and have tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come, if they shall fall away, to renew them again unto repentance." The case supposed is egregious apostacy : the impossibility urged is not of the repentance of these apostates, but the interdict laid upon the church which they had so disgraced, and upon the cause which they had so scandalised, ever again, be the showing of their repentance however satisfying, to receive and recognise them : even though " God peradventure would give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth." " They had crucified the Son of God afresh, and put him to an open shame : " the treason debarred all " possible "

reconciliation of an outward kind and badge with his disciples.—Such a wrongly-applied text we find in the first epistle of John, v. 16, 17: “If any man see his brother sin a sin which is not unto death, he shall ask, and He shall give him life for them that sin not unto death. There is a sin unto death: I do not say that he shall pray for it. All unrighteousness is sin: and there is a sin not unto death.” We trace in this language no distinction of venial and unvenial sin, but the stern truth, that all disobedience is sin. But in apostolic times, certain sins were punished with temporal disease, and sometimes with death. The apostles thus possessed the fearful prerogative, from the breath of their Lord, to remit or to retain sins, in these miraculous interventions. They “had in readiness to revenge all disobedience.” We witness the exercise of its infliction on the perjurers which disgraced the community of goods at Jerusalem, and on the disorders of the Corinthian church. “For this cause many are weak and sickly among you, and many sleep.” This latter case was not necessarily nor designedly punitive in the common sense. They were in this manner “judged,” and yet were only “chastened of the Lord, that they should not be condemned with the world.” Death might be but “chastening,” as was that, though timeless, of Aaron and Moses. “The sin” of these irregularities was in certain instances “unto death.” It was not to be deprecated. Where it was “not unto death,” prayer might be heard for the healing of the judicial disease.

We would exercise a most scrupulous justice in

selecting those Scriptural disproofs which we believe to be the most weighty, and which we believe that our opponents generally prefer. What artifice or evasion could we dare to know in the discussion of such a theme ?\*

An argument, on which no little stress is laid, is borrowed from the considerate kindness, the tender pity, which God has expressed towards his creatures. "For I will not contend for ever, neither will I be always wroth ; for the spirit should fail before me, and the souls which I have made."<sup>b</sup> This was spoken "to revive the spirit of the humble, and to revive the heart of the contrite ones." The "failing" of their spirits and hearts was not beneath the strokes of overpowering vengeance ; it was their penitent tenderness which shrunk from any rebuke and frown of Him they loved. It was not their native strength that perished, it was their contrition which could endure no more. How does this concern the "stouthearted?" What hope does it bring to sinners ? "I have seen his ways, and will heal him. Peace, peace, to him that is far off, and to him that is near, saith the Lord. But the wicked are like the troubled sea, when it cannot rest, whose waters cast up mire and dirt. There is no peace, saith my God, to the wicked." In the same manner the context of similar passages contradicts

\* "Hæc me respondisse illis suffecerit, qui sacrarum literarum, quas communes habemus, auctoritatem non spernunt, sed eas malè intelligendo, non quod illæ loquuntur, sed hoc potius putant futurum esse quod ipsi volunt."—Augustine.

<sup>b</sup> Isaiah v. 7, 16.

any such extension of their application. "He will not always chide: neither will he keep his anger for ever." But this "mercy" is only "towards them that fear him," whose "transgressions he hath removed from them," "who remember his commandments to do them." Of this order are those gracious declarations which He made to captive Judah and Israel. "I will not make a full end of thee." This was fulfilled in their deliverance from the general Assyrian exile. Yet it not only implies what might be done, but is coupled with a threat of that which shall be, "Though I make a full end of all the nations whither I have scattered thee." Quotations, to bear out any general principle, should themselves be general: these are restrictive, and stand in sternest hostility to those very parties whom they are adduced to comprehend. A large class of these passages will be found, by their evident point and purport, not merely irrelevant, but to gainsay the design for which they are cited.

So important has one portion of Scripture been accounted, that it might be almost called the title and the motto of those who plead for the final restitution of all: "Whom," that is Jesus, cried Peter to the people in the porch of the temple,— "Whom the heavens must receive until the times of restitution of all things, which God hath spoken by the mouth of all his holy prophets since the world began." This restitution, ἀποκαταστάσις, is not that which all the prophets have foretold, that is, it is not their burden,—

\* Psalm ciii.

• Jeremiah xxx. 11.

Acts iii. 21.

but there shall be a restitution of all things which they have spoken. What can be the restitution of predictions, but their fulfilment? A redemption of their pledges? A completion of their outlines? A perfect gathering up of them in their order and their complement? Just as John, the prophetic Elias, "restored all things." What? "The law and the prophets were until John:" he unfolded their meaning and established their effect.

The fifth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans has always been reckoned a strong defence of the universalistic doctrine. That it is a description of a religious state and character,—that it is, consequently, entirely of a partial, specific, bearing,—from the first verse to the twelfth inclusive, can allow of no dispute. It is a bright picture of Christian joy and exultation. The apostle speaks representatively of all true believers, and of them alone. The first person plural renders this most definitive. No unbeliever, no stranger to "the love of God shed abroad in the heart by the Holy Ghost," none who are "unreconciled," can claim any portion in this blessed state of things. In the twelfth verse, forward to the close, the person is changed, and another style of argument adopted. The argument is no longer of *actual Christian experience*, but of general truth and moral sufficiency. The premiss is simply this: all men suffer evil because of some connexion with Adam, and this is proved to be pœnal evil, and this connexion is proved to be fœderal, because all men are treated as transgressors of the law by their obnoxiousness to.

death. "For that all have sinned:" this is the cause of universal death. "Death hath entered by sin:" this is the demonstration of universal sin. What can be the law? That of Moses? Men died before, without exception, "even from Adam to Moses." The essential, common, law written on the heart? But millions die who have never wilfully sinned at all. "Death reigneth over them that have not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression." This accounts for infant mortality. There must be a constituent, hereditary, relation between the first parent and all his posterity,—all dying alike, while no one law, save that of the beginning, can include all. This, then, is regarded as established: the moral headship of our great ancestor. But in this species of suretyship, he was the designed counterpart to Christ, made like unto Him, his "figure." A conclusion is embraced,—that since condemnation comes upon us from the one, justification also comes upon us from the other: in the former instance we "were made sinners," or treated as such; in the latter, we are "made righteous," or treated as if we were. "Many" is put for "all," in opposition to Adam as one, and to Christ as one. It cannot follow that "all," in both cases, are equal and the same. It is absolute in the first, for all do descend from Adam: in the second, it is conditional, for men are only justified by faith in Christ. There are those who are not "in Christ Jesus:" they "are without Christ:" for whom "Christ is dead in vain." Can we suppose that the design of this inspired paragraph is to teach that all who are fallen in Adam are efficaciously included

in Christ? Are all mankind in the state of those who are described in the earlier part of the chapter? Do all "receive abundance of grace and the gift of righteousness?" To them alone is it assured that they "shall reign in life."—There might be another view, perfectly just in itself, though we cannot admit it for the purpose of the present exposition. All men to whom the word of righteousness comes, are brought within its sufficiency. Christ, in a most important sense, has died for all men. All men, hearing the Gospel, may be saved. Christ is the Saviour of all, though specifically only of them who believe. "The head of every man is Christ." The good news, the overture, the availableness, have come upon all men unto justification of life. The efficiency depends upon the acceptance we give to it.—It is plain that neither view warrants the idea that Christianity can profit us unconsciously, in spite of all contrary dispositions, or that it can countervail final impenitence. The doctrine is justification. Is there possible justification except by faith? It was, when this very writer, when Paul, the great master of the theme, had preached that "by Christ all who believe are justified from all things,"—that he added, allowing no indirect benefit, leaving no ulterior hope, "Beware lest that come upon you. Behold, ye despisers, and wonder, and perish!"—The winding up of the chapter has been pressed into the argument for this theory: "Where sin abounded, grace did much more abound. That as sin hath reigned unto death, so might grace reign through righteousness unto eternal life by Jesus Christ



our Lord." This triumph of grace over sin we understand to consist in the greater and more glorious blessings, preponderating over all the malignities of evil. But it is urged as to the co-ordinateness of numbers. This is untenable, for at the utmost all who had sinned could only be saved. But if numbers be intended, here it is maintained that there shall be excess. More shall be saved than have sinned! Is not the spirit of this peroration caught and honored, when supposing what it more than intimates, that two conditions of things do and shall exist, we are authorised to proclaim that grace superabounds over the abounding of sin in the character of its operations, and shall superabound over it in the majority of its subjects,—that, while we must allow the usurped power of sin, and foresee not its extinction, we can hail a dominion far stronger and ultimately far wider, only beneficent, only pure, administered by Christ, and absorbed into the felicities of heaven?

Another place of this epistle\* has been quoted for the same purpose. "For I reckon that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us. For the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God. For the creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him who hath subjected the same: in hope that the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God. For we know that

\* Rom. viii. 18.

the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now. And not only they, but ourselves also, which have the first-fruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, namely, the redemption of our body." Now it is obvious, whatever may be thus ardently sought, it is *bounded* by the resurrection; it is to be looked for on *this side* of that event, and not on the other. We think the passage literally plain. Creature, and the whole creation, or every creature, is the same word. The creature is man, as he is now constituted. We never suppose any other interpretation, when we read the great commission of our Lord, Preach the Gospel to every creature; or when we mark the record of his apostle, "the Gospel was preached unto every creature under heaven." Manhood,\* wherever found, is desirous of something beyond its present self. It now feels itself weary and dissatisfied, exposed to vanity, perverted to failure and death. This was the consequence of a fœderal arrangement which was ordained quite independently of it. Yet this is not hopeless. Manhood is to be redeemed. In the case of the saints its vanity shall be done away: the very body as well as the mind shall be exalted to the proper rank. Throughout the world this is the present condition of man: they who have the first-fruits of the Spirit are not exempt. It cannot be the material creation which is to be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God. On no supposition, it is conceived,

\* Col. i. 23. *Kρίσις* is the word in all the above instances.

do any rest the hope that the finally impenitent will *by the resurrection* be delivered at once from this "bondage" into this "liberty." Be our interpretation just or not, the passage can stand the hypothesis in no stead : it marks a distinction which is fatal to it.

The language of Paul in the third chapter of his first epistle to the Corinthians, has been pressed into the service of such a hope. "Now if any man build upon this foundation, gold, silver, precious stones ; wood, hay, stubble ; every man's work shall be made manifest : for the day shall declare it, because it shall be revealed by fire ; and the fire shall try every man's work of what sort it is. If any man's work abide which he hath built thereupon, he shall receive a reward. If any man's work shall be burned, he shall suffer loss : but he himself shall be saved ; yet so as by fire." To warrant any argument in favor of the supposed remission of future punishment, it would be necessary to show that this quotation respected a period *later* than the judgement. But "the day" can point to no *uterior* duration. It is not improbable that the reference is to "the day" of "fiery trial," of raging persecution, which was coming upon the church. If not, it is "the day" of final conflagration. In either instance the lesson is the same. Greatly upon the pastor, "as a wise master builder," must depend the edification of the Christian fellowship. He may seek the mere increase of number, neglecting the proper test of character. It is "his work," special and most responsible. If he select "the gold, the silver, the precious stones," the holy persons, whom these

treasures represent, will maintain their profession in persecution, and will approve their acceptance in judgement: his "work abides," however compassed by the flames, it is inconsumable, and he, in its indestructibleness, "receives a reward." Another, however, accumulates "wood, hay, stubble." He has been careless of the discrimination which should have guided him in the choice of his spiritual materials. He has gathered the formalist, the hypocrite, the worldling, the unprincipled professors of religion. "His work is burned." Persecution detects and scatters them. All his labor is vain. His pile is consumed. Reward he has none. He "suffers loss." His is biting disappointment. Happy is it for him that he possesses the hope of a personal safety, though it be only as a victim snatched from the flames. He is saved, "*yet so as* by fire:" an evident similitude, a common saw, denoting the difficulty of his escape. How can a hope be raised upon such a text? Who can place this scene amidst eternity? Until the very last, the wonders of mercy may be wrought: "is not this a brand plucked out of the fire?" Until the very last, the most strenuous zeal may be exercised: "others save with fear, pulling them out of the fire." But after that day, all is decision; there is no purgatorial flame: none is saved, though as if by fire. It is also plain that the narrowness of the hazard is thus expressed, and not the *means* of salvation.

The magnificent rhetoric and reasoning of the fifteenth chapter of the first epistle to the Corinthians, has been firmly seized to convince us that it contains

the principle of universal salvation. It is supposed to describe the *common* resurrection. But a very cursory inspection will prove that it is the resurrection of the just: simultaneous we believe to be the one resurrection; still it is of the just and of the unjust. It is not a different event, but the issue of that event is varied by character. There are those who are "accounted worthy to obtain the resurrection:" they are "the children of the resurrection." The apostolic writer speaks of them who "believe," who have "hope in Christ," who are "not in their sins," who when they die "fall asleep in Christ." The principle of interpretation is as applicable here as in a former case: universal is death, particular is deliverance from it as a *pœnal* evil. "For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." Who are these, the "all that shall be made alive?" Mankind indifferently? "But every man in his own order: Christ the first fruits; afterward they that are Christ's at his coming." They are "Christ's!" Hence every re-animated body "arises in incorruption, in glory, in power, a spiritual body." Yet what can be more general than this statement, confirming these *distinctive* rewards? "So also is the resurrection of the dead." The last trump,—the note of joy and victory,—the apostrophe of defiance, the burst of triumph, the enforcement of perseverance, which crown and perfect the climax of this chapter, all show that this resurrection is the blessedness of personal character and specific title,—all around is wail, dismay, and shame!—In the progress of this chapter,—like an episode,

but connected with the main argument,—occurs the abrupt and sublime announcement: “Then the end! when He shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father; when he shall have put down all rule, and all authority, and power. For he must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet. The enemy which shall be destroyed last is death.” If the opponents of His Divinity be induced to hope countenance from this language in their attempt to cast him down from his excellency, they may be reminded that he is not, at least, now subject! He is now invested with illimitable, irresponsible, sway! The unsubjected Creature! The finite Possessor of the throne of the universe! Do they so regard him? Thus do they address and obey and adore the temporary Independent? There is no more necessity to suppose his essential inferiority at the period in which he resigns his mediatorial kingdom, than to suspect that of the Father during its continuation: no more necessity to suppose that he ceases to reign generally when he has “delivered up the kingdom to the Father,” than that the Father ceased when Christ was head over all. The Redeemer now possesses “the kingdom,” a solemn delegation, a peculiar trust, to govern, guard, and save: in virtue of it, he now claims peculiar honors. All the subjects of his mediatorial charge will he restore to Him who committed them to his hands. All the distinctiveness of those honors will he forego. He vacates but an intermediate, pending, function. He but lays down what his “obedience unto death” acquired, claims relative and assumed.

The surrender is to God,—that it may be æconomically understood, it is explicated, “even the Father,” “that God,”—æconomical distinction has passed, explicated difference is no more offered,—“that God,” essential Deity, simple Godhead, “may be all in all.” In the midst of this majestic abdication, the hope of universal salvation is thought by many to be encouraged. All his enemies shall be under his feet. All things shall be subdued unto him. The enemy which shall be last destroyed is death. This, however, all *takes place at the resurrection*: Then is Christ’s consummation. It is “the end.” “The kingdom is delivered up.” Is it the style of mercy, is it an expression of conversion, that his “enemies are put under his feet?” Can any find hope for themselves and for others in imagery like this? Are they to be regarded as “enemies” among our race at all? Death is not a being, but a condition,—yet its personification is frequent,—it shall, as still personified, perish, the condition denoted by it shall cease. All live and live for ever. The enemy which is to be last destroyed is destroyed. “The saying that is written is, then, brought to pass, Death is swallowed up in victory.” The wicked are not then to be destroyed. They are subdued by punishment. They must exist, for death is destroyed. They, therefore, cannot die. “Death and *hades*,”\* death and all its certain or possible

\* Hades is personified or put for Pluto in the opening of Hecuba, *Ἑκάβη*, by Euripides; and Clytemnestra speaks in the same manner, when describing the murder of her lord in the *Agamemnon* of Æschylus.

effects, "are cast into the lake of fire." As hopeless is their salvation as their destruction. There is no Mediator. There is no Gospel addressed to sinners. The kingdom is delivered up! Except in heaven, the burden of its acclaim and song, where the nations of the saved rejoice and sing aloud of it, salvation is a sound unheard through the universe!

The beautiful allusion contained in the epistle of James, the opening chapter, and the eighteenth verse: "Of his own will begat He us by the word of truth, that we might be a kind of first-fruits of his creatures," has been ventured for its support of the conjecture.\* They who are saved at present, they who shall be the saved at judgement, are only, it is argued, the first-fruits of those who are destined to be ultimately saved. But these first-fruits are of the harvest which is in the end of the world, and not after: the first-fruits are of the wheat, and not of the tares. "If the first-fruit be holy, the lump is also holy."

The language of Peter has been quoted, not only for the purpose of strengthening the opinion that all shall be saved, but for the illustration of the means. It is supposed to confirm that a probation may be granted to sinners beyond the grave, and that the facilities of recovery may still be extended to them. "Christ was put to death in the flesh, quickened in the Spirit, by which also he went and preached unto the spirits in prison; which sometime were disobedient, when once the long-suffering of God waited in the days of Noah, while the ark was a preparing."\*

\* 1 Peter iii. 18, &c.



is a process of disposition. No force nor constraint can awaken grateful and complacent love. God cannot thus change the soul of man. Or if this necessary salvation of all be produced by spiritual influence of a moral kind, in congruity with the faculties and affections of the soul, "working within us to will and to do," then this must be an act of grace which for ever removes the reason of interposition from any basis of justice, which clearly supposes that the mind would have otherwise preserved its hostility, and which must urgently demand from all who experience it that it be regarded as no right of their own. What can impose it on a righteous ruler that he should only and always operate on the minds of his subjects to convince them of duty, to call them to allegiance, to impel their pursuit of good? This shadows the operation we have conceived. But then this is not legislation: it is favor. Take away from this conception its universality, and you leave the system of grace. "Who maketh thee to differ from another?" In this spiritual inworking is the difference. Yet how many, who, while it is special, call it repugnant to the freedom of the will, justify it when they can think it invariable, see no unrighteousness in it when extended to all, and no more complain of an untrue philosophy, which hitherto they have imputed to it, when they consider it not so much the business of this world, as of the next!

The *opposite theory* to that of *sovereign and efficacious* grace, has been thought to lend very important sanction to the final salvation of all. Some of the statements, occasionally and unguardedly made by its

disciples, may have this tendency : this does not, however, attach to itself. We deem it most faulty. It makes nothing perfect. It establishes nothing sure. It is a palsy of uncertainty over all the features and members of truth : it gives them tremulousness and distortion. It accounts for no conversion. It secures no victorious sanctification. The reward of Christ may be forfeited to caprice and chance. There may be no peopling of heaven. Any certainty, as assured to prescience, is only contingent volition. But the conclusion, from general redemption to the salvation of all, is denied most strenuously by this system. Its general redemption is entirely conditional, depending upon present probation, attainable only in the present life. It is merely just to add, that thousands and tens of thousands who hold it, are the most strenuous opponents of any future discipline and hope. It is not unjust, notwithstanding, to express our conviction that, the premisses of general redemption do—or, at least, may be so made to appear—favor a universal salvation. For if Christ died equally for all, if all are bought by his precious blood—Judas equally with John—then is there a great facility for this issue. If all be given to Christ, there is the strong presumption, that he will undertake for them, and that the surety will claim them. But we press this no more : we seek alliance and not division : and we remember that moral indisposition is allowed in every sinner, by those who abet general redemption, as much as by ourselves.

\*It is not denied that we feel a complexity in the present state of the argument. The cause we plead is

attacked from very different directions. There is the repugnance which is felt against it on the ground of alleged injustice: there is the mooted hope of an indefinite availableness in Christianity, after the abrogation of its œconomy. These are competing and inconsistent views: both cannot be correct. Each shall receive a passing notice. No kind or diversity of objection would we overlook.

The first casts an unreasonableness, an injustice, on the duration of this punishment. It contends, that such consequences cannot be righteously meted to a temporary probation, a life-long term, however it has been abused. But it would be for the disputer to show, against our former proof, that these consequences do not *naturally* ensue, even though there were no positive infliction. If they naturally ensue, can they be unjust? We possess no measure, no idea, of justice, to advance against such operation of natural results. In this view, we seek not to excuse Christianity. It necessarily approves of these consequences as just, though it does not entail them. The Author of Nature and Christianity is one. And surely it becomes us to confess some disqualification, at least, to decide upon the proportions of sin and suffering, when we remember that this is solemnly *our* question, that we are arraigned under it, that the temptation is to a selfishness of pride and interest, that our most enlarged conception is essentially defective and partial. "The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked: who can know it?" "Who can comprehend his errors?" Sin may seem to us a far more frightful

evil, when certain views of it are presented to us. Thoughtless, enwrapped in its pleasures, entangled by its seductions, we may not have examined it. At last it is very commonly made to appear enormous. The sinner sees it then as he did not before. "Though wickedness be sweet in his mouth, it is the gall of asps within him." Nor can the Christian forget that point in his history, when he "was alive without the law once." He boasted his righteousness and his impunity. "But when the commandment came, sin revived, and he died." Surely it seems immeasurably more heinous, when we "look upon Him whom we have pierced," and behold it reflected from the sacrificial sufferings of the cross. Is it not the most reasonable of all probabilities, that the first view of sin, taken by us in the light of eternity, will exceed any, even those most solemnly matured, formed in the present life? that scales shall fall from the clearest eyes? that false judgements shall pass away from the purest spirits?

In considering the enormity of sin, many have maintained its infiniteness. We may call it indefinite, that suits our ignorance of its demerit and entail—but infinite is a positive quality, where it really exists. Eliphaz inquires, "Are not thine iniquities infinite?" It should be rendered: "Are not thine iniquities without end?" No acts of an earthly creature can be numberless; no infinity can attach to any of his acts. To assert that such a quality is derived from the

character of the Being whom he offends, is more than vague: qualities cannot be produced from without. They are personal, inherent, things. No law which man has broken, is infinite. Would his obedience towards an infinite Being become infinite? The requirement upon man is finite. It is only to the utmost of his powers, his heart, his soul, his strength. We satisfy ourselves with the conviction, we rest in the conclusion, that the character of God, and the rectitude of his law, are most aggravating circumstances in every act of sin. "If a man sin against the Lord, who shall entreat for him?" "How can I do this great wickedness, and sin against God?" This thought may well engross the mind, and swallow up every other: "Against thee, thee only, have I sinned, and done evil in thy sight." What we contend for is, that there is an endlessness in sin. We dwell upon its outstretching influences and results, and by these ideas we abide. We cannot denominate it, even relatively, infinite. We might allow ourselves Aristotle's phrase,—"*it has a procession to infinity*,"<sup>a</sup> but this is all. Infinity need not be proved to characterise the act, in order to justify the eternity of its consequences. The first is inconceivable, plainly impossible: the last is a certain fact. Such consequences can only go on, unless arrested by a foreign force. They are interminable vibrations. Like displacements of the elements, like impulsions propagating impulsions, like action and reaction,

<sup>a</sup> "*Εἰς ἀπειρον πρόεισιν.*" Nicomach. lib.<sup>i</sup>. cap. 7.

though not always to be appreciated, they are demonstratively sure. Still we have no such idea of any succession, as a law which can fulfil itself. We can regard nothing as independent on the will of Him who regulates all. Consequence is punishment. It is not only his will, but his doing.

The common argument in favor of the infinite evil of sin is, because it is committed against an infinite Being. The common inference is that, so being infinite, it deserves an infinite punishment. But if by infinite, an endless, punishment be intended, the terms are changed. An infinite punishment qualifies the *act*, or the *acts*, of punishment. Still an infinite act against a finite nature is insupposeable. It would appear that many adopt the endless, instead of the infinite, idea as a sort of necessary commutation. This is, however, low moral reasoning. It takes for granted that something ought to be which cannot be. It proceeds upon the assumption that the due relations of Creator and creature cannot be carried out. Finite measures of punishment can never constitute an infinite punishment. Yet we find in such a writer as Edwards the following passage: "Whence it follows, that if it be suitable that there should be infinite hatred of sin in God, it is suitable that he should execute an infinite punishment upon it; and so the perfections of God require that he should punish sin with an *infinite*, or, *which is the same thing*, with an *eternal* punishment." We are little prepared to find in so acute an intellect this monstrous confusion. It leaves the argument most

dangerously exposed. It could not be maintained. It was weak through its original fault,—the aim to prove too much.

Yet we would not dismiss this view, without impressing on our minds, the exceeding sinfulness of sin. We require to be vehemently urged concerning it. We see an unspeakable aggravation in it, as committed against the most Holy, the Lord our Governor. But its evil is in its own dispositions and acts, in what it is. The turpitude is inborn, and the tendency native. Looking at it, we ought to feel alarm, horror, detestation. Take away its character of disobedience, its relation to law. Consider it intrinsically. It is the opposite to all we can respect and love. Justice is the rendering to every creature of his due and right. Injustice reverses\* this. Who does not feel that such denial is base, and that no society could endure were it universal? Truth is noble and salutary, the basis of confidence and the bond of life. Falsehood reverses this. Who does not feel its meanness, its treachery, its hypocrisy, its cruelty, its malignant influence? Benevolence is beautiful, admirable, divine. Hatred reverses this. All mischiefs does it create. And what is sin but the hideous summary? It wars against these eternal virtues, against the eternal archetypes in which they rest, against the God in whom they are perfected, against the universe which they only can preserve! Who may imagine its demerit? Who can anticipate its doom?

If eternal punishment be unjust, then some limitation of punishment, in the mind of the objectors, is

just. But who can fix that bound? Where is the point at which it is, or is not, right? If punishment work out release, release becomes the subject of claim. All that was due to sin is then discharged. There is legal quittance. This is not salvation. It is a debt of equity which is sued. Nor can another conclusion be reached if there be a supposeable limit to future punishment. The sinner, self-purged, stands on his demand. The principle is new. No period nor measure of punishment secures him guiltlessness in the present life. Through it he may have borne the particular penalty of a particular sin,—the connexion can be traced,—and, unmitigated, it may have pursued him to the last. “His bones are full of the sin of his youth, which shall lie down with him in the dust.” If the principle be admitted in a future state, that guilt may wear out, that the liability of sin to punishment may determine,—then there shall be those who, having cleared and rectified themselves, shall prefer a title strange and new. They need not pardon. They henceforth wash their hands in innocency. What heaven is prepared for them? What shall be their song?

Since this is a simple question of justice, punishment cannot cease until there be a full satisfaction for sin. Mercy is no element in the consideration. The appeal is to justice: to justice must the appellant go. To this corresponds our Lord’s command: “Agree with thine adversary quickly, while thou art in the way with him; lest at any time the adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the



officer, and thou be cast into prison. Verily I say unto thee, Thou shalt by no means come out thence, till thou hast paid the uttermost farthing,"<sup>a</sup>—"till thou hast paid the very last mite." It is egregious trifling, mere fooling, to ascribe to this solemn language a simply secular sense, to quote it as juridical advice. It places the sinner in his true circumstances of obligation. It forewarns him against daring the legal issue. It shows how hopeless is the deliverance which depends upon his instalments. It sternly represents that the dungeon door can alone open by the settlement of the entire exaction. Justice will have its perfect claim. It is most perilous to put ourselves upon such a process. Are we sure that we can pay it all,—have we pondered what the kind of payment is? Have we computed the distance of that date at which the "last mite" shall have been defrayed?

\* We have been caught up into heaven, and beheld in it the scene and manifestation of mercy. Thither all who shall be glorified must be conducted. The idea has glanced upon our mind before, but it was not pressed. They who are exempt from every claim of punitive justice upon them, by their own endurance of its every claim, by their own exhaustion of its every desert, can owe nothing to grace. Why should they sing of it for ever? It did not break their chain; it eat itself away. It did not quench their fire; of itself it died. They have whereof to glory. They are not forgiven nor redeemed. What sympathy can

<sup>a</sup> Matt. v. 25, 26; Luke xii. 58, 59.

they share with the only revealed heaven? What note would its golden harps return to their touch? What associations would its white-robed livery recall to their mind? How could they sing the song of the ransomed? Why should they cast down their crowns? How incongruous these states! How jarring these divisions! Oh, in far-off regions must they find their heaven, their impropriated possession, their purchased right! They only worship justice, which still they cannot love. All that they have acquired was wrung from its grasp. They served it not as the free, but as the bond. Whatever is their enjoyment, it is that which it no longer could withhold: The redeemed in heaven yield it reverence, adoration, delight. "Who shall not fear thee, O Lord, and glorify thy name?" But these act from constraint. They not only boast aloud. They have dread. What secures their obedience? Why may they not relapse? What shall henceforth keep and uphold them? Why may not the prison again receive them, and its bolts shut them in?

If the discrepancy between human guilt and an eternal retribution be alléged as so obvious that it thoroughly revolts both our natural reason and sensibility,—we may demand the clear proof of this. We may examine the sentiments of mankind. Are they thus uniformly contrary? Did Orcus relent? Did Cocytus divide? Did nine-fold Styx ebb in its channels? Was there ending toil for Sisyphus or expected rest for Ixion? Did the vitals of Tityus numb beneath their horrid torture? Did not the

wretched Theseus sit transfixed for ever ?" It is true that Anchises in the Elysian fields speaks to his son of purifications similar to those which Plato taught. But these are not wrought upon the wicked, but the good. They are immortal refinements. The blest continually ascend through new trials and lustrations to higher degrees of purity and joy. The wicked are not restored. Prometheus, the victim, not of justice, but of Force and Strength, is twice bound, first in Scythia, then on Caucasus,—his release from hell was but to greater sufferings,—and though mythology sets him loose at last, it is not by legal expiation, but by the descendant of Io, Hercules, who climbs these crags and pierces the vulture with his shaft. It is not atonement,—it is not remission,—it is not the yielding of justice. It is violence overmatching violence ! It is Alcides conquering Jove !

The history unfolded by Scripture is one series of reprobations against sin. How often has some crime,

\* "Rostroque immanis vultur adunco  
Immortale jecur tundens, secundaque pœnis  
Viscera, rimaturque epulis, habitatque sub alto  
Pectore: nec fibris requies datur ulla renatis."

"Sedet æternumque sedelit  
Infelix Theseus." Virg. *Æneid.* lib. vi.

In the *Phædo* of Plato, the doctrine of an eternal punishment is introduced as indisputable. Having allowed that there are *λάσπηρα ἀμάρτηματα*, remedial offences, Acherusia being the purifying fountain,—Socrates says: "But they who shall be found incorrigible, on account of the enormity of their crimes, their many and foul sacrileges, or their unrighteous slaughters, or for the perpetration of similar acts,—these shall, a fitting doom, plunge into Tartarus, whence they *shall never escape*: *ὅθεν οὐποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν.*"

not the most aggravated, been suddenly overtaken by death, leaving no presumptive hope that such infliction was not the mere hurrying away of the offender to a heavier doom! Why might not, in due desert, every crime thus be visited? If "every transgression and disobedience received a just recompense of reward," what "carcasses" would "fall" around us, what ashes would consume away beneath the fire which came forth from the Lord, what pillars of vengeance would stand thick over the earth! These things have been. "Now all these things happened for ensamples: and they are written for our admonition." "Think ye that they were sinners above all men?" The latent evil, the unsuspected turpitude, of the one, the particular, sin, is thus exposed. This course may now be in operation. We must not judge. It cannot be wholly, if at all, suspended. God has not forsaken the earth. "When He hideth his face, who then can behold him? whether it be done against a nation, or against a man only." How slow should we be to form any opinion which extenuates the demerit of sin and which objects to its threatened condemnation! How little can we be qualified to decide upon the relations of justice to an infinite lawgiver and to a moral universe! How hesitatingly ought we to adjudge that retribution which it is proper to measure out to whatever rebels against it! This is to "speak evil of the law," and "to judge the law."\*

\* "And then as to the duration of this punishment; no man can presume, in our present state of ignorance and darkness, to be able truly to judge, barely by the strength of his own natural reason,

Were we wholly guided by what we consider to be perfect argument, we should now recall the Death of the Cross. We should contemplate it as the most awful example of sin. Its exceeding sinfulness is marked there with its deepest shades. "God spared not his own Son:" can the actual transgressor escape? "For if they do these things in a green tree, what shall be done in the dry?" But we are aware that from this argument certain reasonings may be drawn, holding out hope to the guilty because of this atonement, and liberation to the represented because of this substitution. This leads to a new division of inquiry.

A second objection is raised to eternal punishment, not only from the imputed imparity between it and the acts of a finite agent, restricted as he is to a mortal period, but from the supposed availableness of the Christian system for ulterior benefits. They who attach a very slender estimate to redemption, who equivocate with its plainest language, still may not venture to found their hope upon abstract justice. Chauncy, speaking of the condemned, says that "God entertains tender compassion and grace towards them," and that "their deliverance rests upon the foot of grace through Christ." The more common idea is, however, that Christ having died, there is infinite merit and efficiency in his death: that if largely applied already, its virtues

what in this respect is or is not consistent with the wisdom and justice and goodness of the Supreme Governor of the world; since we know neither the place, nor kind, nor manner, nor circumstances, nor degrees, nor all the ends and uses of the final punishment of the wicked."—Dr. Samuel Clarke's Evid. of Religion.

are yet inexhaustible. But Christianity, while its redemption is necessarily of infinite dignity, from its price and its power, is a system complete in its design. To inquire why it does not save all when it could save all, is as vain (were there not a most fallacious confusion in the term) as to demand why omnipotence does not establish new centres of creation, and fill immensity with other worlds? We believe that redemption has its purpose, its final cause. It is not the decretive salvation of all. Whatever its purpose, it must be fulfilled. A moral system cannot be frustrated so long as its sanctions are enforced. The Gospel, as a reign, cannot be frustrated. It possesses, when disobeyed, the alternative of self-vindication. It is different with a purpose. It is frustrated if it be not fulfilled. There is nothing to which, on failure, it can resort. It is not law: it cannot, therefore, employ sanctions. Redemption is a purpose. If it be comprehensive of the salvation of all men, then it falls short of itself. It fails. But did it ever contemplate this? Was this the travail of his soul with which only the Redeemer shall be satisfied? Was this the pleasure of the Lord which shall prosper in his hand? How, then, can the non-salvation of any be called a failure? Besides, redemption operates by particular means and mediums. These are of a moral nature. Whatever secures their success, they are not the less moral. "Christ is preached." This institute is most fitted to impress and captivate the mind. But for the aversion of the mind, it would accomplish a spiritual revolution in it. And are the administrations of truth and mercy

to be transferred to another state, a state of punishment, punishment inflicted on account of their former rejection? Are they who rejected them to be tried again? Is it still to be proclaimed: "This is a faithful saying, and worthy of being accepted by all, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners," and equally to save all who, in unbelief and impenitence, have passed away from that world? Shall the Holy Ghost still "convince of sin and of righteousness," when He can no more convince "of judgement to come," since that is past? Shall the Son of Man find faith in hell? Shall he travel thither, mighty to save? "Who shall ascend into heaven? that is to bring Christ down from above." To press such suppositions is to refute them. Or by some secret power,—moral instrumentalities being quite withdrawn,—is the influence of redemption to reach and act upon the mind? That this influence may effect its end, it must humble, soften, purify. What are the incentives of contrition which were not known on earth? Is it that now they see the fruits of their doings? their torments, whatever those torments may be? their flames, whatever may compose them? These must rather work a sorrow unto death. Things like these, so far as we know them, harden and infuriate the heart. Moreover, an absolute advantage is given, by this hypothesis, to a state of punishment over that of moral trial and means. There the motives of Christianity cannot fail! There it cannot return void! There must it have free course and be glorified! There it shall find its great door and effectual! Now is come sal-

vation! There is some overmastering might (how suited to form contrite and holy character others must explain!) before which all hostility yields and rancor mitigates! Hell and its rigors prevail! They transcend all the appeals of mercy and overtures of reconciliation! He who has hitherto treated souls only by government, ruling souls as souls, now revokes every former principle and mode,—proceeds, if not in the manner, with the irresistibleness, of a mechanical agency;—no longer draws with “the cords of a man and the bands of love,”—his still small voice no more is heard, but he rushes by in fire,—“another Gospel” supplants “our Gospel,”—and the work of salvation becomes more summary and sure! Why should Lazarus be sent to the five brethren of the rich man, as if they must repent when miracle appears,—that evidence the elder born had himself withstood; and horrible as are the means of repentance, hell provides them, and here “they will repent!”

It is said, that this very power, which the wicked possess in the world of retribution, of working out their deliverance, is connected with redemption and its blessings. But if punishment be shortened by redemption, how far would it be prolonged without it? Did it not come in arrest of punishment, or in preparation for happiness,—where shall be fixed the point of termination? The supposition is, that temporary punishment can alone consist with justice, and that a certain term of endurance would exhaust its claim. Then the utmost which redemption, so understood, could do is,—not in giving power to man to



deliver himself, for this he at least possessed by waiting the expiry of his sentence,—but in releasing him from the necessity of so putting forth all his power : it abridges and assists his posnal expurgation. And thus a mercy is fondly imagined, which mixes itself with right ; it hastens that which would have been only more postponed. And is this the “redemption in Christ’s blood, the forgiveness of sins, according to the riches of the Father’s grace?” Is this the “redemption in Christ Jesus?” Are these the means he sanctifies? Is he a Prince and a Saviour, to give this repentance and remission of sins? Shall they who are rescued by this ordeal call him Jesus, because he has saved them from their sins? Shall they so clearly perceive that remotest influence of his death upon their enlargement from hell, as to cry aloud, “Thou hast redeemed us to God, by thy blood?” Thinking upon this, how is the unanimity of heaven broken! While they who first believed on Christ, who first were called to the marriage supper of the Lamb, shall awake up their glory and their harp, with shoutings, Grace, Grace,—how many who have abided the conditions of justice, or who only owe to grace a little respite of suffering, may rightfully exclaim, that their hand has done this!

There are statements of Scripture, which we do not allege for the purpose of denying the doctrine of universal restoration : they are special. • But they inexorably preclude the hope of some. And since the opposite view assumes the salvation of all, these exceptions may affect it, by showing, that it is not true

of all who have died in sin and have passed to punishment, and that if untrue of all; it may be untrue of any. For the argument is commonly so put, that it is strictly universal, to the impossibility of an exception. A principle would be involved in it. There could be no limit to the restorative act. Whether it were required by justice or mercy, it would be equally required to be impartial and unfailing. They who contend for it, seem to hold that, if it do not comprehend the whole species, the argument is unsound in substance and unworthy of controversy. Now what we adduce are facts. By facts we mean, cases so proposed by Scripture, that we cannot but think that they may be real, we cannot but think that they are. "For, if we sin wilfully, after that we have received the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins, but a fearful looking for of judgement and fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries!" How is this doom to be counterworked? Is it not hopeless, and irretrievable? Whatever may be the sin, the atonement is so presented to us, that it cannot avail. "There remaineth no more sacrifice for sin." It must not be looked to for any ulterior efficacy.—"All manner of sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven unto men: but the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, shall not be forgiven unto men. And whosoever speaketh a word against the Son of man, it shall be forgiven him: but whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, neither in the world to come." This sin,—

whatever be its nature, the argument is untouched,—is unpardonable in any state of being. How is that penalty to be averted?—There are other threatenings and descriptions, which can but justify despair. “He shall have judgement without mercy, that hath showed no mercy.” “He that being often reprovèd, hardeneth his neck, shall suddenly be destroyed, and that without remedy.” “The redemption of the soul is precious, and it ceaseth for ever.” We read in one place of Scripture, that “in the hand of the Lord there is a cup, and the wine is red, it is full of mixture,” that is, it contains every ingredient of punishment, adapted to the kinds of sin and to the character of sinners: we read in another place, of “the wine of the wrath of God, which is poured out without mixture into the cup of his indignation,” that is, without abatement or restraint. In science, the exception may prove the rule, because, if there were no rule, none could prove the exception. But in moral rules there can be no exception allowed. If the rule, in the present discussion, be that all men shall be saved, we have quoted instances which cannot come under it. Now these are not proper exceptions to the rule, but anomalies, counter-facts, which contradict, disprove, destroy it.

There is one example, so revoltingly depraved, so appallingly guilty, that we may well let it stand alone, individualised in its baseness and malignity, towards which accents of vengeance are directed, unheard before and since. We say nothing of prophetic description and menace; how the comminations against Saul, Doeg, and Ahithophel, terminated in him. We

say nothing of the mysterious, and almost historic, sarcasms which break upon him, for "the thirty pieces of silver cast to the potter," the "goodly price that" Messiah "was priced at, of" him. "Woe unto that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed! It had been good for that man if he had never been born." We are aware that this terrific denunciation has been extenuated as a proverbial form of speech. But of whom was it ever affirmed, except of the "son of perdition?" It is an irredeemable sentence. The whole case stands out in those pregnant words. No futuration can possibly indemnify that wretched existence. It is utterly undone. "It stands aye accursed." The vessel is so marred that it cannot be repaired. Like a poisonous root, it only separates to itself whatever of pest it can draw from the atmosphere, and whatever of canker it can absorb from the ground. We could understand, nor yet despair, that it "were better for him that offendeth one of the little ones, that a mill-stone were hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned in the depth of the sea." We could understand, nor yet despair, the "woe to that man, by whom the offence cometh." But, when a man has fallen into such guilt, when a man is overtaken by such retribution, that his whole being is transformed into a curse, that it were better that he had never been born,—when this is pronounced, not by frantic man himself, cursing the day in which he was born, but by Him who is the First and the Last,—"the Lord, who weigheth the spirits,"—then surely eternity can bring no reverse nor compensation. However remote might

be his recovery, his sufferings would not be worthy of thought, and even less of comparison, viewed in relation to the blessed sequel. His would be later, but after all, it would be eternal glory. This would counterpoise any conditions, the most protracted and severe. This would repay the lowest hell. Good were it for that man, who, albeit by the sternest path, attained that glory! Good were it for that man that he ever saw the light! Good were it for that man that he ever began to be! Good were it for that man that he was ever born! Why should he be "cursed, who brought tidings to the father" of the apostate, "saying, A man-child is born unto thee, making him very glad?" He was only—with a longer remainder—a heir of purity and bliss! How could he be the son of perdition? How could that fearful nativity be cast? One dark spirit is, however, seen going forth to perdition! It hath the greater sin! All contempt pursues it! All indignation burns against it! None deprecates its doom! There unfolds for it, its own place! It shall be immured alone! No sympathy draws toward it! It is disowned by all! The lost stand afar off, for fear of his torment! Nor can we endure the thought, that our Lord could consent to conform to language and thought, because of proverbial phrase and popular opinions,—to any forms which were unfounded in truth and opposed to fact! Not less would his mercy than his ingenuousness shudder, to exasperate the terms of a sentence which could not be fulfilled!

We are not unsuspicious that all this specific argument, argument drawn from cases, may be bent to favor a hope, that as these are confessedly extreme, so there is a *general* ground for hope. But the question is not, how many, how nearly all, may be saved ; the simple matter is, whether any one may be remedilessly lost. There is no proof, however execrable his crime, that Judas has surpassed all men in sin, and no proof that what is affirmed of him might not be affirmed of others. And strange is the mental process which extorts a hope from facts like these. It might be encouragement were any sentence known to have been lightened and abridged. It might support conclusions in favor of remission had an individual of the condemned been loosed. Saints have returned from heaven : what sinner has been momentarily set free from hell ? There would, then, be room for inference. There would be ground for hope. But nothing of that kind has been supposed. No semblance has been presented. The argument has only shown that there are those whose doom is marked with sterner aspects : not that there is any precedent for abatement or any instance of release.

It is most important to conceive right views of the state in which the wicked are eternally placed. Is it solely retribution to the wickedness of their earthly life, or is it resentment of present sinning ? Perhaps these views need not be disjoined. The *adjudication* is for past acts. However wicked, some of these acts cannot be repeated. They, at least, must be changed. But these acts have formed and marked a *character*.

That character is the very compound of sin. It cannot be indifferently regarded or treated. The wicked are cast into hell for what they *have been*: there they can only abide, for what they *are*. Their character, endlessly fixed, is that of moral agents. As moral agents they agonise in the unexampled clearness of their moral perceptions. "The law worketh wrath." Every claim of moral obligation is upon them still. They owe to love God and to do his will. The modification of moral agency is only this: here it is always associated with *probation*; there probation is hopelessly cut off from it. Though it may be said that, such arrangement is simply the result of the certainty that "they are not subject to the law, neither indeed can be,"—we cannot consent to the affirmative. We dare not say that as a mere retribution of the probationary term, eternal punishment is unjust. But we think that Scripture does not wholly rest it on this issue. Probation, though defeated of its favorable intention, has not morally failed. The sinner has been weighed in the balances, and is found wanting. The hidden things of dishonesty are brought to light. It is seen what manner of spirit he is of. Character has assumed its final shape, and is perfectly elicited. The present bears out the past. He is condemned. There is an onwardness in his evil principles which leaves a reversal of that condemnation impossible, were it otherwise to be contemplated. Were the exclusive ground of retrospective punishment insufficient, which we by no means suppose, still at this point there is an inextricable dilemma. Where revelation gives us a two-

fold explanation, we accept it with grateful deference. We find it here. It is thus supplied. Hell is the enforcement of retribution. Hell is the characterisation of the wicked. Nor are we left without illustrations in human jurisprudence. The convict is dragged to his prison. He is condemned for some particular crime. That duration may be variously considered. It is punishment; it is restraint from further wrong-doing; moreover, it is adjustment to present disgrace and presumed disposition. Yet he may continue so to transgress against the general law, as to justify his continued detention. His bearing may show how injurious would be his enlargement. It would not be alone injurious to society, but, by yielding him the opportunity of new offences, would be most pernicious to himself. He is fitted only for bondage. The prisoner is supposed, by the laws of society, to be responsible as much within his bars, as when at liberty. They maintain that he may become more criminal, and may aggravate his actual guilt. They may cite him from his cell, under another indictment and to a severer doom. Nothing of moral agency, in its aspect on the community against which he has offended, has ceased. At this point any further comparison fails. There can be no second tribunal before which the finally condemned shall be arraigned. In the eternal prisonhouse is all the necessary, dread, provision. Hell is punishment, it is repression of the external noxiousness of sin, it is adjustment to actual character and determination. Where else could the sinner dwell? All his moral affinities, all his chosen aims, all his



fostered habits, all his companion spirits, are round about him. It is his own place.\*

The Judgement has passed its sentence not only upon particular portions of conduct and passages of life, but also upon the character which they constituted and expressed. That character remains, ever developing itself. Evil is the full election and entire element of the mind. Sin will continue to be committed, for man, though condemned, must be always under obligation. "The strength of sin," even there, "is the law." Sin must always, and most certainly, in such a condition of things, involve and necessitate its own punishment. "Cursed is every man who *continueth not* in all things written in the book of the law to do them." Increasing depravity, according to tendency, seems inevitable. It is simple volition. Increasing misery must attend upon it. Still is there the lower deep. When, then, can the lost be guiltless, or cease

\* "There must be a certain length of time, the precise measure of which can be known to none but God, within which, the promises and the threatenings of the Gospel, joined with the experience which every man's life affords of God's power and providence—of the instability and vanity of all worldly enjoyments,—there must, in the nature of things, be a certain measure of time, within which, if at all, this state of experience, joined with future hopes and fears, must produce certain degrees of improvement in moral wisdom and in virtuous habit. If, in all that time, no effect is wrought, the impediment can only have arisen from incurable self-will and obstinacy. If the ordinary period of life be more than is precisely sufficient for this trial and cultivation of the character, those characters which shall show themselves incorrigibly bad, will have no claim upon the justice or the goodness of God, to abridge the time of their existence in misery, so that it may bear some certain proportion to the short period of their wicked lives."—Horsley.

to be depraved? How can they be released? All that for which they were condemned, abides in them. They cleave to it. They persevere in it. Their custody is necessary to the well-being of the universe. It is the adaptation of sphere and circumstance to state and disposition. Another distribution would be an inversion of order and justice.\*

We are not moved by any taunt that this double reasoning implies dissatisfied conviction. When Scripture supplies more views than one, we are not only warranted, but bound, to argue upon all. We do not find, in its page, that eternal punishment is exclusively urged as reflective upon this life, but also as proportionate to character ever existing: we do not find the latter idea ever disjoined from the former. Both, we think, are plainly revealed. Why should we refuse their mutual aid in illustrating this fearful issue? Why should we break in pieces the common testimony? For here the facts, or truths, are not properly distinct. They are but one: retribution did not strike until character was decided; character is the principal weapon of retribution. They cannot be

\* "Summo enim Deo cuncta bene administrante quæ fecit, nihil inordinatum in universo, nihilque injustum est, sive scientibus sive nescientibus nobis. *Sed in parte offenditur anima peccatrix: tamen quia pro meritis ibi est ubi talem esse decet, et ea patitur quæ talem pati æquum est, universum regnum Dei nulla sua fœditate deformat.* Quamobrem quoniam non omnia novimus quæ de nobis bene agit ordo divinus, in sola bonâ voluntate secundum legem agimus, in cæteris autem secundum legem agimur, cum lex ipsa incommutabilis maneat, et omnia mutabilia pulcherrima gubernatione moderetur."—Augustine. De Diver. Quæst. Octo-Trib.

considered but in union with each other. Neither can be understood but by their re-acting influence. We certainly are not ashamed to reach our conclusion by their commingled and concentrated light.

Where we cannot but expect difficulties, we confess to no small one touching the matter of degrees in punishment connected with an unvarying duration. It may be asked: Should not the graduation be of perpetuity as well as of kind? The difficulty, if confined to the argument, ceases upon firm reflection. The punishment, by the nature of him who suffers it, is eternal. Habit, character, consequence, necessitate this. Justice cannot owe it to him to subvert it. A violence must be done, nor can we see how there could be the counteraction. What could terminate unrepented sin? The Scripture insists most frequently upon the cast and order of the lost. We find not in it the statements which never can convince. It tells us not that every sin alike deserves eternal death. It often touches lightly the demerit of particular sin. But it portrays the unworthiness, the incapacity, the degradation, which it has superinduced. "The wicked shall be turned into hell." "Know ye not that the unrighteous cannot inherit the kingdom of God?" The immortality of man is an independent fact. The lighter or more bitter degree of the retribution, arising out of the less or greater sinfulness, is likewise an independent fact. Man being immortal, it is no prejudice to his nature, it is only in agreement with the principles and stamina of his nature, that whatever be its chosen course, should be continued and prolonged as

himself. It, if left to its own tendency, will carry it forward and work it out. It by no means follows, even in this probationary state, that a man hates his sins because he deplors their consequences. Though the consequences will be so much more dreadfully revealed to the lost, it does not follow that they will renounce their sins. Every known operation of the wicked mind points to the contrary. Even there no compulsion is upon them to be wicked. It is only of their own will that they do not love God. They are deprived of no moral power. They have chosen their own way. Whatever their malignity, it is their real and cherished disposition.\* We hesitate not, therefore, to admit, that, in all certainty, the endlessness of punishment destroys all distinction as to duration : but it does not affect the distinctions of guilt and its corresponding misery. This is the only *moral* branch of the inquiry. This alone is the question of government and retribution. We have nothing, in moral ques-

\* It was the opinion of many of the ancient Christians that with the close of probation after the final judgement, the existence of the human will ceased. Some of the Fathers assented to it. "For when," says Hilary, "we depart out of this life, we depart at the same time from the right of will. . . . For when the liberty of the will ceases, the effect also of the will, if there be any, will cease." Origen, however, differs. "I am of opinion that God so dispenses every one of the rational souls, that he regards their everlasting existence; for they always have free will." To suppose that the lost do not any longer exercise volition, is to destroy their most intimate nature; it alike takes away the source of depravity and the means of punishment. To assert that they *will* only sin, and therefore possess not liberty, equally militates against their present liberty: what else do the wicked now *will*? This being their cherished affection, what else can they *will*?

tions, to do with duration of being. Immortality is not a business of right and wrong. It hangs by constituted tenure. It belongs not to any province of law. It is an established order of nature. It simply regards existence. We may well and deeply consider all moral rules and proportions. These researches concern man. They may be converted to his well-being. There we must stop. He is man. He is immortal. Over that he can have no control. It is independent of him. He is not consulted on that arrangement. He is "made thus." It is a passive effect. But his conduct is the subject of responsibility. It may be what he will. That is his question. It is his only business. It is in his keeping and power. The question of duration is strictly detached from all that is moral,—it is exclusively physical !

## LECTURE VIII.

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“FOR THUS SAITH THE LORD; BEHOLD, THEY WHOSE JUDGEMENT WAS NOT TO DRINK OF THE CUP HAVE ASSUREDLY DRUNKEN; AND ART THOU HE THAT SHALL ALTOGETHER GO UNPUNISHED? THOU SHALT NOT GO UNPUNISHED, BUT THOU SHALT SURELY DRINK OF IT.”

JEREMIAH xlix. 12.

It is an overpowering reflection!—but we have sometimes emboldened ourselves to inquire, What would bring relief and support to the lost in hell? What could allay the load of their despair? What could dull the gnawing of that worm? What could soften the keenness of that flame? And two considerations have raised themselves in our mind as those which, could they be indulged, might yield the assuagement that we had ventured to suppose. Torment, under the influence of such considerations, would lose its sharpest severity: the worm would be unfanged, the fire would be appeased, and endurance might brave them!

The first consideration we should demand is, that the sufferer of the doom might feel that it was *inevitable*. The idea of fate sets us free from the sense of blame.

The wicked often resort even now to this subterfuge, and find ease in this excuse: "We are delivered to do these abominations." Yet they know better. Otherwise their heart would be more quiet: it, at least, would wrap itself in a sullen peace. And did this conviction make its way into those abodes of darkness, did it there find hold, that no different course, that none other form of character, that none other stress of effort, could have prevented that which is suffered there,—that it was irreversibly ordained, that it was inexorably decreed,—they who were charged with guilt would be self-acquitted, the whole responsibility of personal conduct would cease to hang around the conscience, and those spirits with a strong rebound would defy and conquer the circumstances of a condition which no pains nor determination could have averted, by a resolved abandonment to that stern grasp in which they were held passive, and from which there is no escape. It would be joy to those captives, let them only think, We are the victims of ruthless destiny!

The second consideration which might subdue the fierceness of infernal agonies, would be that they are *undeserved*. Punishment is related to crime. The doer of the wrong knows the penalty which he incurs. Whatever he may think, society has adjudged the relation between the wrong and the penalty. That which may be undue in human legislation cannot be supposed of the Divine. God loveth righteousness and hateth iniquity. All his laws are based on essential, eternal, rectitude. And were it possible for

the lost to persuade themselves that aught of caprice entered into their sentence, that the minutest moral distinction was slighted in it, that it was dealt in cruelty,—would they not, in a new revolt, rise up against the injustice and tyranny, and be even soothed by the assurance that the wrong was done to them; that they were the injured and the aggrieved; that, though the power was against them, the claim and the right were theirs; that though crushed, they could challenge the universe to their vindication, and enlist its sympathy on their behalf? It would be joy to those prisoners, let them only think, We are the victims of arbitrary injustice !

Spirit has not, however, passed into such regions with either of these consolations, nor found them there ! Spirit never, in fearful soliloquy, spake : Necessity wrought this chain, and Malignity locked it ! Spirit never exclaimed : Despite of myself I was dragged hither, and here in violation of all truth and equity I am chained !

It is the converse of these thoughts that deepens the outer darkness, that accumulates the horrors of the pit. "It need not have been." What a self-upbraiding ! "Justice had none other recourse." What a self-condemnation ! "Why would ye die ?" is the rebuke for ever in their ear ! "We indeed justly," is the confession for ever on their tongue !

These principles cannot be too strongly established in our minds. There is no future suffering, any more than present, which is not the desert of sin and the infliction of justice. It is the forewarned consequence



of the freest and most spontaneous action. Suffering is punishment. "Why should a living man complain, a man for the punishment of his sins?" Suffering, though always connected with sin, may, in a probationary state, be overruled to good. Taking place beneath the operation of the Christian redemption which repeals the curse, it may become healing and corrective. In itself it has no such tendency and design. It is judicial recompense of moral evil. And when we contemplate future suffering, we mark unallayed punishment. There is none other purpose nor use. But then, though it be mere punishment, it supposes, and itself asserts, a perfect benevolence of ends; for it is goodness in its entire opposition to sin, and it always, in its warnings, exposed and deterred the creature's only misery."

Among the theories of a contrary character we may notice that which assumes a high philosophical rank. It is the system of Necessarian optimism. It regards evil as the means of good. Man is placed in circumstances which are his only motives. These cannot but induce that for which this theory may find another name, but which we call sin. He is, then, placed in circumstances in which he must suffer and amend.

"Ah! Seigneur . . . dans vous, je ne vois que des sujets de confiance, parce que je ne vois dans vous que bonté et que miséricorde. Mais comme cette bonté est essentiellement opposée au péché, et que, sans changer de nature, toute bonté qu'elle est, elle est justice, elle est colère, elle est vengeance à l'égard du péché, voyant ce péché dans moi, il faut que je craigne jusques à votre bonté, jusques à votre miséricorde même."—Bourdais: Sur le Jugement Dernier.

The evil is self-corrective. Many illustrations are invented. It is the mistake of the learner, assisting him in seeking better proficiency; it is the fall of the child, by which it acquires the art of erect posture. There is nothing properly culpable. It is involuntary, hapless, error. It could not have been otherwise. Nothing could have guarded against it. Thought, word, act, were in their just and only succession. It is inexperience, it is immaturity, all necessary to a process, all working out a result. We must wait for the lowest point of evil from which all good will henceforth ascend. It must reach that plumb-line, that the good may be properly and naturally evolved. Virtue is thus the transmigration of vice. Holiness is only the apotheosis of impurity. Heaven is but the elaboration of hell. There are various self-destructive principles in this theory. It is at variance with the most perfect consciousness which we can know, that of our moral liberty.—It formally attempts to obliterate those distinctions which the human mind must take, and which in its utmost perverseness it cannot resist.—It circuitously accomplishes its formula by the triple fate, that man must be wicked, that man must be afflicted, that man must be reformed; but not a moral agent at any step of the course. It is through this path, dark and defiled, that he must attain perfection.—It is in shocking violation of all that Scripture would have us think of sin. This figures it in no beneficent gloss. It lays open in it no latent excellence. It supposes no possible conversion of it into anything less base than itself. Its language cannot be mistaken.

"Oh, do not this abominable thing which I hate!" "Be astonished, O ye heavens, at this, and be horribly afraid, be ye very desolate, saith the Lord. For my people have committed two evils." "Which I spake not, neither came it into my mind." Sin exists and operates against the pleasure of his will. But what is the purport of this theory? It admixes sin as a principal ingredient in the Divine plan. It gives transcendence to it as the chief of Divine instrumentalities. It presumes that it draws forth an indirect Divine complacency. Sin is not wickedness: it is not vanity: it is not that in which there is no profit. Nor is it the least abhorrent feature of these speculations that they attach a very dissembling to Him who is "of purer eyes than to behold evil, and who cannot look upon iniquity." Inwardly he approves! \* Covertly he sanctions! Implicitly he sustains! He dealeth treacherously! It is only his more veiled ministry! It is his more hidden work! —To press such consequences, though only to mark out our disgust of them, is to taint the mind! We maintain that sin is contrary to God, to his nature, to every manifestation of his mind, that it is what he would not have to exist, that he cannot enter into fellowship with it, that he cannot forbear nor connive at it, that he reigns to counteract it. "Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man!"

There are other opinions which do not so much assail the doctrine of ceaseless punishment, as question

the immortality of the creatures on whom it might be devolved,—some rejecting the proper immortality of man, and supposing that punishment consists in physical death,—some maintaining that the punishment consists in the definitive withdrawal of that proper immortality.

All may not be prepared for this sudden turn of objection. It comes upon them as very bold to deny the immortality of man.\* But we have forewarned it. Our argument has not been heedless. We have in previous stages endeavoured to establish it. That anticipative proof we must now apply. And if man be not physically immortal, if immortality be not a physical constituent and determination of his being,—not his appanage, but his nature,—we may inquire, how can its forfeiture be pœnal? Until he sinned, according to this hypothesis, he was only mortal, or, not to imply death, a being who must, at some period or other, cease to exist, unless a sovereign, supernatural, increment be conferred upon him. If he sinned, this was his term of being: if he obeyed, he should be made immortal. We must remember what his real nature is alleged to be: it is determinable: that tendency may be morally allowed, or morally countervailed. The punishment falls within the

\* The opinion is, however, by no means new. Whiston doubts the existence and, perhaps, the possibility of any immortality in the creature, good or wicked: Dodwell affirms that all men are non-immortal, though they may be immortalised in baptism by the hands of those who are in an episcopal succession. More ancient, more philosophic, and more able, names might be quoted.

nature: but since the reward exceeds it, the nature is to be enhanced by a new physical property. Now it will be seen that punishment is not dealt, in any strict sense, upon the man. It descends not upon his nature. After sin, his nature, as determinable, is only what it was before. There is withholdment, but of nothing which was ever his. There is the failure of what was a possible happiness, but not any infliction of harm or hurt upon himself. An inheritance is diverted, but he was never heir. It is less, but only of an adventitious prize. This cannot be the philosophy of retribution. It reckons nothing upon the present and the past. The worst predicament of the sinner is only according to the natural conditions of his existence !

We have, in a very early part of this argument, spoken of this shifted view of man, now perishable, then immortal. It leaves him no fixed nature. It cannot be both. The first cannot be convertible into the second. The second cannot be compressed into the first. There must be reconstruction : a totally different nature must be created, for a creature, whose being is appointed to be short, in order that he may acquire a capacity of endless durability. In that case, the identity would cease, and the responsibility along with it. One nature would be the subject of the virtue. The other nature would be the subject of the reward. So likewise in the moral inversion.

If this opinion be embraced to relieve the Divine conduct of any apparent austerity, we must affirm our impression that it increases it. There is a distinction,

immediately felt, between what a Lawgiver directly and indirectly does. His interposition to punish is far more harsh than his permission of the legal course of punishment. If man be immortal, he must be accordingly treated. Righteousness owes this to him. If not, then his life should determine at its proper limit. This also seems the claim of righteousness. Any renewal or prolongation of it, is præternatural. If renewed or prolonged against its nature, for the very purpose of inflicting suffering, we confess to a shrinking from so unwonted a measure. This transposition of natures cannot be righteous : nor can this violent treatment of either nature be so, seeing that it is in opposition to the nature itself. If man has died, why does not that event, agreeably to the case supposed,—agreeably, though unaccountably in our idea, to the sentence of mortality,—suffice ? He was not, it is alleged, naturally immortal, and the contingent immortality is forfeited. But thus the probable course is interrupted. Whether the soul, in this conjecture, be remitted to sleep with the body, we are not aware. In the resurrection each, at least, revives. Man lives again. Why is he recovered to being ? For suffering,—insalutary and hopeless, except in the termination of the sufferer's being ? Is this the amiable alternative to our sterner faith ? Is not this the stretch of law ? Is it not gratuitous infliction ?

The theory of destruction is the more commonly entertained. It appeals boldly to the language of Scripture for its support. It admits that the nature of man is immortal : that is, it might be, and would be,

immortal, but from outward cause. But it avers that sinful man, not having received the benefit which earthly life proffers, shall, at a common period, or at different periods, under judicial sentence, cease. They shall perish. They shall no more be. This is also adopted by many, as a view more accordant to infinite benevolence than endless punishment.

We are reminded of the terms employed : that they are interneçine and exterminating." There is, however, this reply. Since existence is supposed in connexion with these terms, they cannot indicate, in this case, the cessation of existence. For a certain duration the wicked are to suffer : these terms are applied to the beginning and continuance of this suffering. "They are the cursed who *depart* into everlasting punishment." Their sentence is destruction, is loss, is death, is perdition. If for any period they survive, be the period however brief, then these terms are not inconsistent with survival. They do not necessarily draw after them, annihilation.

But in connexion with the most destructive import of language, they who perish are described as suffering, most vividly and consciously, all that destructive import in themselves. "Before your pots can feel the thorns, He shall take them away as with a whirlwind, both living, and in his wrath." He who is "cut

"Ὀλεθροί, Ἀπώλυναι, Ἀφανίζω, Θάνατος, Κόλασις, Φθορά. Herodotus does not consider ἀπολλύμενος in any sense of annihilation : "Ὅτεν ἀποθήσκειν ἐαυτοὺς νομίζουσι, λέναι δὲ τὸν ἀπολλύμενον παρὰ Ζηνὸς δαίμονα. Melpomene. The Getæ thought not of themselves as destroyed, but only defunct, and going forth still living,—not having properly died at all, into the presence of the god." Paraphrased.

asunder" is "appointed his portion with the hypocrites:" he is not thrown out as a truncated carcase, but is characteristically classified: there is unbroken life for "weeping and gnashing of teeth." They who are overtaken with "everlasting destruction," are "punished with" it: and their exile in which they endure it, is "from the presence of the Lord, and the glory of his power." "He who believeth not the Son shall not see life;" still he exists, for "the wrath of God abideth upon him." "Whosoever was not found written in the book of life," does not cease from being, but "was cast into the lake of fire." "They are cast *alive* into it." "They shall be *tormented* day and night, for ever and ever." "The smoke of their *torment* ascendeth up for ever and ever." "They have no *rest* day nor night." It is *after* that God has "killed," that he "hath power to cast into hell." "Where the worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched." Is it that the worm dieth not, though the man lives no more? that the fire is not quenched, howbeit man has perished beyond its reach? None more frequently than the objectors to endless punishment remind us, that these are figurative expressions. We have never denied that they are. Then, if this worm be reflection! Then, if this fire be remorse! Another viper might have fallen, at some mysterious bidding, into another fire. But these are of ourselves. Our worm, self-engendered, dieth not: our fire, self-kindled, is not quenched. What words of alarm are these to the nonentity? to him who is blotted out of the book of the living? Are we not



warned on account of these deathless and quenchless properties? But if they affect us not, if they be independent of us, why are we thus dreadfully warned? "The second death" is in "the lake of fire," "where the devil is tormented day and night for ever;" into which "whatsoever not found in the book of life is cast;" in which "the fearful, and unbelieving, and the abominable, and murderers, and whoremongers, and sorcerers, and idolaters, and all liars, have their part." As the eternal life of the righteous is far more than immortality, being its blessed fruition, so the eternal death of the wicked is not the extinction of their immortality, but its perversion and woe. While upon earth, in this state of probation, these opposite terms identify the sinner. He is "dead while he liveth." "He abideth in death." He may be "twice dead." With no abstraction from his present life, he may be "dead in trespasses and in sins." With no accession to his present life, he may be quickened and born again. It is the "death of sin:" it is the "life of righteousness." "He passes from *death* unto *life*, and shall not come into *condemnation*." The analogy is perfect, and compels us to explain the death of the future state, not as a cessation of being, but as a state of being in its fullest tension of power and endurance, though under condemnation.

The destructionist very commonly assumes the question, by his quiet use of the word, death. Death, he takes for granted, is non-existence. Death he tells us is death. But this is a mere dictum, an unwarranted assumption. Human death we judge quite

otherwise : we hold it to be a state of a more intense being. The first impression of corporeal death it is the province of reason to correct, and the mission of revelation to refute. From both we derive superior discoveries. It is plain that death cannot operate alike upon animal and intellectual life. The death of the one depends upon the divisibility of material parts : the other has no parts which can be divided. The body decays and corrupts : the soul is independent. Their connexion is not denied : but their identity cannot be established. Death, then, always involves different things. The effect is twofold and diverse. Neither supposes destruction. We know that the bodily disorganization does not waste a particle of the frame. It is not loss, but transformation. If this be true of the humbler instrument, must it not be of that which has ruled it ? It is seen in vegetation,—“Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and *die*, it abideth alone ; but if it *die*, it bringeth forth much fruit.” There is more than reproduction. “It is not quickened except it *die*.” In animal decomposition it is disintegration. Neither analogy can oblige us to infer the extinction of the soul. One cause cannot explain the different kinds of death : that which accounts for the bodily, cannot for the intellectual. The entire presumption is, that as the body is evidently not lost, but really subsists, so the spirit is but liberated, and survives in its distinctive nature.

They who adhere to this hypothesis, are doubtless guided by what they consider the amount of Scripture evidence. We trust that we are not unjust to them,

when we surmise, that they more willingly, readily, resort to it, than to that of eternal punishment.\* They feel that a more benevolent result has been secured. They can better bear to think. Revolted at the presumed disproportion between demerit in sin and endlessness in punishment, they please themselves with a gentler measure, a kindlier proceeding, on which their eye may more complacently rest. The doom is softened. At least, in their idea, it is not eternal. That property can no longer attach to it. If they have conceded largely, still they have purchased to themselves deliverance from this fear. Whatever they are obliged to include in future punishment, they have erased *eternal* from that scroll of lamentation, mourning, and woe. But let them not be too elate! They may not have adjudged the whole question. What have they disproved? What alternative has relieved them? Their cheerless resource is, annihilation! Have they pondered it well? A creature strictly immortal, strictly perishes. He is cut off. He is blotted out. An interminable capacity for greatness and felicity is destroyed. A flame, which might have burnt with all the ardours of piety and love, is extinguished. The portion of an infinite good is snatched away. Do they not think, in common with many who generally agree with them, that the perished soul was convertible to this? Why is it not spared? Is it mercy which shortens its misery, or justice which shivers its being? With

\* "Ὅτι βούλεται τοῦθ' ἕκαστος οἶεται." Demosthenes.

*them* most assuredly rests the charge, commonly, and not invidiously or unjustly, raised against us, of following sin with eternal ban and loss. What do we more than they? *They*, in the destruction of immortal susceptibilities, write the eternal doom of sin! *They*, in the deprivation of eternal happiness, show how the sinner is eternally treated and condemned! *They* mark, in the sudden wreck of immortal hopes and powers, that only an eternal sentence can satisfy! *They* go farther than others: they do not wait: *they precipitate the endless award!*

It is plain that while this eternal loss has befallen the annihilated, that while it is true and real, all consciousness is precluded by the nature of the event. No self-corrective benefit can be supposed. If there be a design in this punishment, it must be the conviction and warning of others. The sufferers can learn nothing. No advantage can accrue to them. But then we are reminded, that the objectors to eternal punishment very generally deny that example has anything to do with the final disposal of the wicked. We cannot allow them to avow and to deny the same principle, according to the expediciencies and turns of the controversy.

Nor can we imagine that the most general conception of the Divine benevolence can be strengthened by this view. Let us think of the attitude in which the doctrine of the soul's annihilation places the Deity! Man, being immortal, a workmanship of the richest store, the heir of measureless blessings, is directly crushed. He dies not away, nor gives up the

ghost. He dies not of himself, nor does his spirit depart. He falls beneath the shattering blow. There is commonly something that intervenes between the final stroke of any judgement. There is pause. But here is punishment prolonged until the last severity is added. And to us, the most unlikely part of the doctrine is that God immediately does it. And still this is not all. God in this act of destruction is seen to revoke his own design. \*He made man immortal. Saw he not the end from the beginning? What else has he cancelled? What other law has he repealed? It would be only a conceit to ask, in parallel or in recrimination, Did not God make man happy? Moral happiness is a condition. When we speak of immortality, we speak not of an accident, but of the essential nature of man. Nor as such a deed is depicted to us, nor as we can at all realise it, does it seem in agreement with any constitution of things. It obeys no law nor tendency. It bears no resemblance to what we know of God. We feel ourselves warranted to attemper much of Scriptural phrase when his anger is described. We do not this arbitrarily: we decide according to consistent principles. The necessity of the case demands it. So we do not understand literally the descriptions of Deity, clothing him with corporeal organs. But how might his annihilation of immortal creatures be described? Is it not his fury poured out? Is it not his fierce jealousy? Is it not the heat of his great anger? Could these descriptions be assuaged? Might they be qualified and subdued? Is not this to make a full end?—The objection which has been

taken to the eternity of punishment, because, though degrees might exist under it, there could be no degrees of its endlessness, very similarly applies in this instance. Degrees might exist until the stroke of annihilation: of that there can be no degrees. The retort of an objection is no positive argument: but that objection is destroyed, when, having been raised by one party against another's hypothesis, it can be proved to be equally opposed to his own.—Moral difficulty is involved in this catastrophe. If there be anything clear in the principles and operations of righteous government, it is that *power* can never interfere with *justice*. As none can deliver out of the hand of God, so his equity cannot be overpowered by any of his own natural attributes. We see this awfully shadowed in the substitutionary sufferings of Christ: "If it be possible let this cup pass from me!" The requirement was that of justice: it was not possible! He could not be saved from that hour! The same reasoning applies to the sinner. If he be obnoxious to the sentence of the law, no force nor pity can exempt him. Only justice can unbind him. Nor can justice look beyond itself for its supposed difficulties. It calls not on omnipotence for help and extrication. Yet this annihilation is not a moral act. It is physical. Why should it supervene? Has justice gone too far? Can it go no farther? It is exhausted, it is baffled, when mere destruction is its resource. This does not assimilate to its nature, nor belong to its means. It looks not the orderly, prescient, holy, arrangement of the Divine procedure. It more resembles a contrivance

to overcome a doubtful or an impracticable claim. Now if the wicked be destroyed before the proper vindication of justice, this is to rescue them from righteous exaction; if they be only destroyed at the point that justice is satisfied, why should they be destroyed at all?

We cannot, therefore, conclude that any advantage is gained, of clearer judgement or of happier relief, by the entertainment of those views. They are new and greater difficulties. All of justice in God we must reverence and love. Our minds are formed for these emotions, and are capable of exercising them when justice is most dread. All of power in God, as coalescing with infinite excellence, we can adore. But a power, independent, detached, violent, we know not, nor is there any like power revealed. We do not feel that our esteem for Deity is excited by the triumph of such power over his moral perfections. In punishment we saw him just: in annihilation he is irresistible! Nor do we acknowledge that the best method of winning our hearts to him is to lead us to the footstool of the throne on which he sits, surrounded by the emblems of destruction and the wrecks of existence!

No doubt many adopt the theory of destruction because they suppose that this brings the fact of sin to an end. They cannot contemplate its perpetuity. They can only see in this expedient the means of its cessation. We who maintain that perpetuity, by the immortality of its agents, do not suppose that it can be diffusive, or relatively pernicious. We believe that

it is brought to all that termination of which moral government admits. Wrath is to the uttermost of which its subject is susceptible. Every possible pœnal measure is in force. And, in any case, could sin be forgotten? Could it be, as though it had not been? In heaven it must be remembered, or the song of redemption would lose its burden, and the nations of the saved forbear their triumph. Does annihilation provide for its effacement? Like a dark pall, it as much proclaims as hides the hideous devastation. In all that does not any longer exist, there is eternal waste of existence! In all that ceases to be subject to moral government, there is eternal violation of moral government! The memorial, including detriment, failure, precipitancy, evasion, abandonment, would be for ever! The epitaph which must surmount the pit of annihilation would be, Eternal Consequence, Eternal Desert, Eternal Ruin! The silence would speak, and, more sullen and piercing than any knell, would be one endless expression of retracted purpose and of necessitated counteraction.

It may be fitting now to meet some particular objections. These might be answered by the general reasonings already employed and the comprehensive principles already established. But they are found in detail: they, by a minute particularity, seize on the common mind.

The *number* of the finally condemned has really nothing to do with the question. The defender\* of annihilation is concerned with the same number. According to the non-immortal scheme, the same



number must cease to exist. And yet it cannot be doubted that this is an objection, however unfounded, very commonly felt. Men forget that, as to the holy and benignant government of God, the difficulty is the same in any case of evil, be it of greater or inferior account. Why is there evil at all? Why are there wicked beings? The reason may lie in the impossibility of prevention wherever the creature is invested with reason and liberty. We cannot conceive of such a creature made necessarily, absolutely, indefectible. But we do not approach that question. Much less can we speculate upon its limits and its operations. It is obvious that we are all more affected by the number of facts than by their common principle. Yet it would be the same difficulty in kind, were only one human being thus condemned. The justice or the injustice, always personal, would be the same. The principle which would be seen in the one is only that which is now seen in the many. If the single instance could be justified, all other instances could. • The prejudice is strong in us, it is almost hopeless to reason with it,—but this argued position is unimpeachable. Yet, lest it should be inferred that we make light of the amount of the saved, or that our system can exercise any contracting influence over our hopes, we affirm that no doctrinal, worthy of the evangelic epithet, so far reduces the number of the lost. It yields up our mind to the perfect liberty of desiring and seeking the salvation of all. It confirms this disposition and attempt with the strongest bonds of duty. It reminds us indeed that none can be saved

but by spiritual conversion; that the personal application and impression of redemption can alone give it efficacy. All who are converted, it tells us, shall, by a persevering grace, be saved. None of them shall be lost. They shall never perish. What system can sum up so many? Ours are no niggard views.\* Nor do we hesitate to avow the inconceivable preponderance of this aggregate over the lost. We do not think that it is an accidental description of the "great multitude," that "no one can number them;" and while we read no such description of hell, we feel that it would be unlike the Book and the Gospel of God. We have strong, large, premisses to bear out our conclusion. These we do not urge. They belong not to our reply. Our only business is to allege, that numbers have nothing to do with the dispute,—is punishment eternal or not? "Lord, *are* there few that be saved?" is a solemn inquiry which respects the present alone: it is as much every man's question as ours. No question can be more inappropriate would we have the secret of the future solved: then should it be framed, "Lord, *will* there be few that shall be saved?"

Time and eternity being established contrasts in our mind, though more philosophically they should be considered as the commencement and progress, in

\* "Neque enim numero comprehendere refert.

Quem qui scire velit, Libyci velit æquoris idem

Discere, quam multæ Zephyro turbentur arenæ:

Aut, ubi navigiis violentior incidit Eurus,

Nosse, quot Ionii veniant ad litora fluctus."

Virgil: Georg. lib. ii.

regard to us, of simple duration,"—there will appear a disproportion between any conduct pursued in the one, and any effect of that conduct which shall be coeval with the other. But in all these questions we must go to the principle. Are we prepared to contend that no effect of a crime can be justly prolonged beyond the period of its perpetration? Are we prepared to decide that no punishment should exceed the season of offence? Since it would be impossible to maintain judgements like these, the principle is untenable.<sup>b</sup> To common sense it is false and absurd. Many are the examples which we might oppose. Adam was "in the transgression:" the time of committing it could not be of hours: short was the interval between the acting of the dreadful thing and the first motion: yet he suffered for it in our world for nine hundred and thirty years.<sup>c</sup> We have already pressed the common remark, that one sin of youth vitiates a protracted life. It is at death that the consequences of guilt are often most terribly revealed. The summoners to judgement then cry the loudest. A glimpse of the tribunal is caught. The flame shoots out from its place. No one of any religious feeling will deny the connexion between the present and the future states. When does that connexion terminate? It is evident that retribution is not foreign to what is now: to actual conditions and circumstances. "He that

<sup>a</sup> "Ὁ δὲ χρόνος." Xenophon.

<sup>b</sup> "Duratio pœnæ respondet durationi culpæ, non quidem ex parte actus, sed ex parte maculæ."—Schol. Max.

<sup>c</sup> "Ille dies primus lethi, primusque malorum,  
Causa fuit."

Æneid: lib. iv.

believeth not is condemned already." It is, therefore, said of some: "Whose judgement now for a long time lingereth not, and their destruction slumbereth not." To assert the injustice of that which may be a necessary consequence, or a Divine determination, is surely rash. That rashness is as foolish as it is profane, if the assertion be made in defiance of all analogy. The consequences of many short-lived acts are, as far as we know, interminable. They have given bitterness to death. Eternity seems only to have unfolded to allow them room and verge. Who disputes that the consequences are just to the last point which they have reached? Who may dispute the justice of their course hereafter, a course of which there can be no disproof, and of which there is every presumption? Who may argue that there is any way of stemming that course, and of otherwise ordering it? What reason can be shown that what is not resisted here, shall be withstood hereafter? Does not memory go with us, and is not this a doom? Are we not the same that we were here, and is not this a sentence? How can a physical dissolution morally purify? How can it constitute a new spiritual character?" How can it interrupt the Divine administration? Are not all worlds within that reach?

"Qualities are not to be measured by duration: they bear no more relation to it than they do to space. The hatefulness of sin is seated in itself,—in its own inherent quality of evil: by that its ill-deservings are to be measured, not by the narrowness of the limits, either of time or space, within which the good providence of God hath confined its power of doing mischief."—Horsley: Sermons. vol. i. p. 78.

Does this do more than open from one to another? It must always be borne in mind, that the signs and the probabilities of retribution augment in proportion as we approach the world to come.

It is a common-place against our argument,—plausible and unhesitating,—perhaps more than any other ensnaring,—that God must have formed man for happiness. Believing that he only is good, and good only, we believe that he did. Yet we demur that this design must be primary and exclusive. His creatures' proper good is secure, but simply in subordination to his own glory. This is necessary. God cannot act save for the highest end. It would be inconsistent with his wisdom. His own glory must be that highest end. He doeth that which pleaseth him. Grant that he formed us for happiness: he must decide its nature. We are formed to be happy in a particular way. The inferior tribes cannot be happy except in their own element, and according to their own habitudes. Our bliss must consist with thought, anticipation, self-knowledge, duty. "The law serveth" to impress what our original happiness was. In studying it, we seem to lean upon the border of Eden, and to regard the rapture of its joy. It was the supreme love of God. It was the love which worketh no evil to any creature. That law is the remembrancer of the holy, happy, scene: it is as the wafted fragrance of its flowers, it is as the floating music of its springs. Still it was law. All depended upon "serving God in righteousness and holiness all the days of our life." Reason was to govern appetite,

good-will to guide self-love, religion to sanctify all. This was the way of happiness, to which were adapted all our faculties, and where only they could find it. The law was ordained to life: it was good, a full instrument of goodness. In falling from that rule, we fell from happiness. How can we exercise a faculty with pleasure? How can we remember, reflect, forecast, but with terror? How can we know a reproachless conscience? In what shall the testimony be found of self-respect? Can there be happiness? It is only in obedience that we become that for which we were formed. There is none other method of endowing a rational creature with intelligent and pure delight. How then has God failed us? In what has he departed from his plan? Has he called back our happiness? Has he contradicted himself? There is falsehood, for we have made lies our refuge: there is undoing, for we have undone ourselves. If the meaning of the objection be, that our Maker is obliged in justice to compel us to be happy, whatever our dispositions, it is something which we cannot conceive, which is contrary to all known law, which is impossible in the nature of things. Surely He is not to be required to force happiness upon us in sinning against him! How little do we say, when we but add, This he cannot do! It is our fault if we have to ask: "What good shall our life do unto" us? Our creatureship is an immense capacity for happiness of a defined nature, in an appropriate order: it must be conditional capacity: it may miscarry of its design. This is the true account of our case. The

Creator could only constitute us for the enjoyment of a particular happiness : of that happiness sin leaves us bereft and incapable.

It has been urged, that it is inconceivable, that it cannot be allowed, that wickedness can retain its relentless character, its vile pertinacity, amidst the scenes of future punishment. It is pleaded that its present infatuation will there be detected, and its present incentives withdrawn. What can then tempt and instigate? Who of the lost shall defy the Almighty? It must be remembered that sin has its seat in the soul. There is a "filthiness of the spirit." There are "desires of the mind." The sinner is now conscious, that when he cannot "go to an excess of riot," when he cannot "work all uncleanness with greediness," that the appetency is yet the same, and that it becomes the more violent in the impossibility of its indulgence. All this may be still supposed. As upon earth, the withdrawment of the scene which tempts little affects the fixed thought and aim of the mind, perpetually revolving themselves in the chambers of imagery ; so amidst future retribution the longings of evil may survive, and rage the more tormentingly from their necessary denial. The defiance of God is in sin. We do not otherwise deem it possible in hell. "Who is the Lord?" sounds not there. It is no part of our system, that only the execration, the malignity, the daring, of sin, are to be found in hell. We do not expel its humanities. It is the dwelling of wicked men. They still are men. Why should we say, that the rich man only dreaded the accession of his five

brethren, lest it might increase his torment ; and why should we deny his bosom a sentiment of pity ? Where there is wholly ungodliness in men, we see not necessarily fiendish violence and rage. Let us make more of self-upbraiding and remorse.\* The dæmon is not our nature, and only in our nature can our sin be condemned. Returning from the digression, which the terms of the objection demanded, we meet the inquiry—Can sin continue in the scene of retribution ? Its perpetuity is pronounced impossible. Our argument for the perpetuity of punishment has in no slight degree been rested upon the perpetuated sinful habit, character, and consequence. "Their sins are retained." But if sinfulness cannot exist among the lost, because of that which surrounds them, that argument is more than impaired. Upon what does the statement depend ? Do wicked disposition and wilfulness never co-exist with the most terrible judgements of earthly wrath ? The hopelessness of inducing men by such methods to repent has been exposed. "Why should ye be stricken any more ? ye will revolt more and more." What would be the value of their resolves extorted by suffering ? wrung from torment ? "When Pharaoh saw that there was respite, he hardened his heart, as the Lord said."

"Vows made in pain, how soon would ease recant !"<sup>b</sup>

\* The supposition of Archbishop King, that "the punishment of the wicked will lead them into a kind of phrenzy and madness," we wholly dissent from. It is as intellectual, the most collected, the most conscious, the most distinct, the most energetic, that we are compelled to regard it.

<sup>b</sup> Milton.



Let us go deeper into the truth of the case. It is taken for granted that, if men be withdrawn from evil enticements and influences, virtue will resume its sway. But when had it that sway? The disposition of the heart is the core of the character. What has been loved and sought, inheres in the spirit with an undying tenacity. It reproduces itself. "Evil men become worse and worse, deceiving and being deceived." External circumstances cannot destroy it. "Their mind and conscience are defiled." The "wicked may more easily forsake his way," than "the unrighteous man his thoughts." The deceivableness of unrighteousness, and the deceitfulness of sin, may possess their continued hold in hell. The taint of one act of vice infixes and diffuses itself in the mind, though it never be renewed. Or let us suppose, that none of the present blinding influences of sin remain—that the perception is the more intense. "They shall see." "God rewardeth him, and he shall know it. His eyes shall see his destruction, and he shall drink of the wrath of the Almighty." The common reflections awakened by the memory of crime, are moody and unhumbling. We may more easily loathe ourselves than our iniquities. And future punishment seems, by its declared effects, to possess no tendency to restore the better emotions. These are the most contrary to repentance. And, moreover, we must remember that moral evil cannot be destroyed by pœnal measures. Is the punishment our remorse? Then that would be evil counteracting and consuming itself. Is the punishment strictly foreign infliction? Then that is

eternal,\* standing very much in the relation of a force. But sin, that it may be destroyed—that is, the sinful principle—must be counter-worked by the opposite to itself, and within that mind which has been its seat. The achievement can only be by the mind's consent. It must be by a process of motive. There must be a turning away from iniquities: a turning unto God. Love must oppose enmity, and loyalty shame revolt. It is a spiritual subjection. If such an operation cannot be anticipated in the minds of the lost, we may safely assure ourselves that punishment can be no substitute for it.

A most probable forethought of hell is, the malignity of sin. Its utter selfishness remains. What is the odious treatment of others it will not excite? What is the implacable resentment of God which it will not excite? All who believe not the Gospel as it is now offered to them, hate God—are not reconciled to Him. They, having done the wrong, are the irreconcilable. This is no uncommon case. They hate, because every reason why they ought to love condemns them. They seek no healing of the breach which they have made.

“For never can true reconciliation grow,  
Where wounds of deadly hate have pierced so deep.”<sup>a</sup>

There has been advanced a general notion that the sufferings contemplated must either exhaust themselves, or destroy\* the capacity of those who are doomed to them. Every proof we have offered in favor of the immortality of the soul, every reasoning

<sup>a</sup> Milton.

we have established against its destructibleness and annihilation, we have a right to recall to aid our reply. But we would rather meet the notion at once. The agonies of the mind may now be terrible. "The arrows of the Almighty are within me, the poison whereof drinketh up my spirit: the terrors of God do set themselves in array against me." Beneath these agonies the body may sink, but the mind endures. It cannot fly them. If it become itself distraught, these, like the Orestean furies, only multiply and haunt the more. Nor is this the fullest, aptest, analogy. It is only borrowed from what we mark in a state temporary and sensible. We will venture to a higher and more solemn counterpart. When the angels sinned, "everlasting fire was prepared for them." But that retribution has not dissipated their existence and energy. Their essence has not failed. They are still unbroken spirits. The qualities of sin still cleave to them. They seek rest and find none. They cannot pluck the canker from their destiny. And in this precedent we see the confirmation of a former view, that punishment does not root out the inbeing and strength of sin, while it demonstratively establishes the powers of an immortal nature to bear its keenest, its endless, liabilities.<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> There is a singular argument in Plāto's Republic, b. x., concerning the indestructibility of the soul by any injurious effect of sin upon it. "Τὸ ξύμφυτον\* ἄρα κακὸν ἐκάστου καὶ ἡ πονηρία ἐκαστον ἀπολλύσιν ἢ εἰ μὴ τοῦτο ἀπολεῖ, οὐκ ἂν ἄλλο γε αὐτὸ ἐτι διαφθείρειν, κ.τ.λ. There is an evil attached to everything, and it is this bane which destroys everything: and unless this evil destroy it, nothing besides can. But if we can find that in which inheres an appropriate

It is felt, in the sense of objection, that there can be no such difference of character between the good and the evil as can justify this difference of treatment. The distinction of the least aggravated sinner and of the most inconsistent saint is considered to be too small to warrant this most diverse result. With such exceptions we have nothing to do : it is purely supposititious. May not this least aggravated sinner be the saint ? May not this most inconsistent saint be the sinner ? But with the question, on the assurance of these distinctive characters, we do not for a moment shrink to deal. We may complain, indeed, that the statement is not made rightly. If the question be of the wicked, we see in their punishment the fulfilment of a law : if it be unjust, so is the law. If the question be of the righteous, we immediately renounce their personal claim. "Boasting is excluded." "By grace are ye saved." The rewardableness of their "work of faith and labor of love," is subsequent to their salvation and dependent upon it. Their felicity is not proportioned to works of righteousness which they have done, but to the everlasting righteousness of the Messiah, and to the exceeding greatness of the Divine power in them who believe. We consider no act and work of grace to be ritual or sensible : but wide as the relationship, and deep as the nature, of evil, making it base yet having no power to destroy, then can that subject be naturally destructible ? Is there not that which can deprave the mind ? Do not injustice, excess, cowardice, ignorance ? But which of these vices destroys the mind ? If it cannot perish by its own evil, nor by any foreign evil, then it is manifest that it always continues to be ; but that, which always is, must be immortal."

their subjects. The Christian heaven would not be due, any more than congenial, to innocence : much less can the fallen, however restored, have a right to it. It is free inheritance and gift. Nor would we for a moment conceal, in pondering the difference of heaven and hell, that while the latter is the distribution of eternal justice, the other is the largess of infinite grace. Nevertheless as sin forms a character appropriate to the world of suffering, so does salvation form a character meet for the world of purity and joy. And it must not be forgotten that Scripture seems often to treat of certain known distinctions between the righteous and wicked as not the most marked and important. We must look to the respective disposition. The one talent is restored, though not doubled; yet how is that "unprofitable" servant punished, while they, who put their deposits to usury, are abundantly rewarded? The virgins have all slumbered, all have awakened and trimmed their lamps; but the wise preparation and the foolish neglect, respectively, of the necessary oil, makes all the difference of the welcome or the disownment.

It certainly appears to be the design of Scripture to mark very strongly the distinction of the righteous from the wicked. He is not negatively described. He is not comparatively approved. He is not exhibited as only less wicked. He is better than his neighbour. Positive excellence distinguishes him. His principle and conduct partake of real virtue. The judgement of the last day is appointed, among other ends, to make this known. Then shall "we

discern between the righteous and the wicked." "The precious shall be taken forth from the vile." "He shall separate them one from another." We are but two classes advancing towards the judgement seat: we see but two classes withdrawing from it. The constant tone of revelation consists with this immense difference between them. There is nothing in the diversities of their destiny but perfectly agrees with the inspired statements concerning them now. We might well stand prepared for the result. And the thought becomes very solemn, in remembering that there are only two states in eternity, that only two characters are now known, distinct as those states, and decidedly appropriate to the one or the other.

All may not be satisfied with the argument that, because men who are lost will ever continue sinful, it is just to leave them in circumstances of punishment. It will be demanded: What certainty is there that they will continue sinful? We answer, abjuring all ideas of necessity, that the certainty consists in their depraved will. Evil abandoned to itself does thus proceed. It is its tendency. Of itself it never will repent and turn. "Iniquity is unto iniquity." The language of Scripture often directs our attention to the present fact, without controlling any portion of human liberty. "I am sure that the king of Egypt will not let you go." "I knew that thou wouldest deal very treacherously." "It cannot be that a prophet perish out of Jerusalem." "Make haste, and get thee quickly out of Jerusalem, for they will not receive thy testimony concerning me." This tremen-

dous prophecy is upon the condemned. Though moral agency may be modified, their natural will is not destroyed. "To every good work they are reprobate." "They shall utterly corrupt in their own corruption."<sup>a</sup> "They work iniquity." "They cannot cease from sin." Their will is singly sinful. Its most distant, its endless, biases may be foretold. Nor can any prescience work the smallest infraction of its freedom by any enforcement of its own motive. Everlasting punishment had not been prepared but for that which would be, of its very choice, everlasting sin. To foresee the issue was necessary to prepare for it, but quite independently of foresight and preparation sinners follow their inclination and pursue their course. Only in this sense can we say of any: "Whereunto also they were appointed:" "who were before of old ordained to this condemnation." The proper punishment was always *allotted*, and always *adjudged*.<sup>b</sup>

Yet will it be pleaded, and not quite hypothetically, If any of these condemned ones were to yield in contrition, to cry for mercy, to humble themselves, would not the command go forth for their deliverance? We doubt it not. Their chains would fall from them. Their flames would instantly expire. But this is the merest sophism. It is no better than to ask, if their

<sup>a</sup> Καταβλήσονται.

<sup>b</sup> Whiston, in his "Eternity of Hell-Torments considered," speaking of the theory which advocates the restoration of *dæmons*, remarks: "There can be no obstacle to my belief of this doctrine, but the supposal of an *utter moral incapacity* in the constitutions of these worst of free agents of ever repenting and amending." It is this fact on which we rest in the case of lost men, as well as in that of fiends.

hell would not cease, it having already ceased? *Could* those condemned ones cherish the emotions described, though theirs might be still the *sphere*, it would not be the *condition*, of hell. That consists in callousness, in impenitency, in enmity, in despair. Were they no more callous, no more impenitent, did enmity no more possess them, did despair no more bind them, the principal means of suffering would be taken away. The inquiry is a paralogism, it is to argue without premisses, it is to beg the question which pends. We can understand no hell where there is no sinfulness, no hostility to the Divine will, no sense of remediless doom : we can understand no hell where there is the broken and contrite heart, where there are the tender movements of love, where there is hope in mercy, where there is entreaty for pardon, where sin is cast away as loathsome, where the soul pants after God. That is not hell. Whence is drawn such inference? How has gathered such vision? What promise lets fall this gleam of hope? We have indulged the thought too long,—a thought founded on no reason and supported by no evidence.

Not the least formidable difficulty, in connexion with our argument,—felt by many,—a difficulty to be slighted by none,—is that it supposes an eternal existence in sin. We have referred to this as the motive which has reconciled many to the harshest treatment, the utter extinction, of beings. This sempiternal duration of sin has been considered a more serious difficulty than any that might be involved in its most violent and lawless abridgement. Is it to be left an



indestructible evil? Were it to be devolved upon us to determine concerning it, our language would be, Let it perish! O let the wickedness of the wicked come to an end! But we, perhaps, should little understand what we meant. What is that end which we desire to befall it? We must go back. We forget that the more formidable problem is that it should have existed at all. It is injurious to the glory of God. It is contrary to his will. It is thwarting to his benevolence. Why was it ever momentarily endured? Was he bound to extirpate it? It could only arise under a system of law; must he, to counteract it, employ any other means than that of law? Must he, to prevent it, abandon his government? Must he dis sever from man moral agency and liberty? What is the resource of government, in case of transgression, except punishment? Is he under any other necessity but to punish it? The perpetuity of sin is a difficulty, but far less than its violent pause. The first is a natural expectation and tendency, within obvious rules of moral wisdom and justice: the other is inconsistent with all that is known of order and freedom. The difficulty we feel in the endless perpetuity of evil is only of the same kind with its present continuation. Why does it last an age, an instant? If God *was* never bound to destroy it, he is not *still*. If God could *never* destroy it without making void all his principles and acts of government, he cannot *still*. Let us place before us the idea of this coercive, mechanical, overthrow of sin. This we can never properly form, for the evil is of a moral kind, which

no force can touch. Let it start forth in some figure. The dragon is slain. The poison-tree is torn up by its roots. But is not this a slur upon government? Does it not betray its inefficiency? Does it not avow its disgrace? Is not this a glaring proof that sin would have of itself remained? Is this its decorous and dignified expulsion? It is the glory of this government that nothing embarrasses its plans nor exceeds its powers; it waxes not old, it grows not feeble; if there be immortal enemies, it holds them in immortal bonds; if it discern eternal evil, it covers it with eternal punishment. Satan is a chained captive, and shall be no more loosed. The wicked are bound hand and foot, and cast into outer darkness. The remainder of wrath is restrained. Sin is not suffered to defy. It ranges not abroad. It is divested of almost all its known active qualities. It is in moral abeyance. It is not a threatening ill. It can tempt no more. Its mischievousness is repressed. It is commanded to go into the deep. It is shut up and a seal is set upon it. In disposition it exists, it will exist: it is a "thing which offends:" "in their heart" the lost "work wickedness:" but it is under perfect restraint as to harm, under perfect conquest as to resistance, for punishment is victory!

They who boast their hypothesis, whatever may be its other conditions, because it secures the destruction of sin, need to be a little more explicit. Can it ever be erased? Its remembrance blotted out? Its vestiges effaced? Though it arise no more in heaven, did not the heavenly places themselves require ex-

piation? Though hell flame no more, can its site be unknown and its anguish forgotten? Though there be issues from that endless death, can they cease to perpetuate the thought of sin? Any violence must operate in one or other of the following ways,—to crush the sinful will and to coerce it from its exercise, or to tear in pieces life itself. In either case you have shown that God thwarts and exceeds his law. There is not the eternal punishment of sin in its moral acts, but its eternal punishment in the unreasoning suppression of its implicit principle, and in the physical extinction of its possible manifestation. All is hurried, incomplete,—the knot is cut,—the dilemma is outforced: it is the flight of the mythological god counterplotted and outvied, escaping amidst his thunders; not our God who sitteth upon the throne, and who will be known by the judgements which he executeth!

But it may be replied, that there are parties who firmly oppose our view, and yet do not agree with the theories of destruction and of coerced volition. They protest against the perpetuity of sin, and consequently of punishment: they, however, rely upon evangelic hopes and means for its consistent conquest. It may, then, be allowed for us to expose the strangeness of the consequences which this opinion involves. A moral government, if the present analogy be preserved, is conducted in the unseen region of retribution, offering greater and far more certain advantages than any known to its natural and appropriate scene of earth. How that moral government *must* secure subjection, we cannot understand. Every conception of such

government prepares us to expect possible failure. Still this form of it shall engage the universal will. It is to succeed with the remission of all penalties, which have hitherto been regarded its only resource. But moral government cannot admit of different constructions. It is identical and unique. How can law operate necessarily to obedience and submission? This view may perchance be discarded. The stress shall be laid upon the Christian redemption. We must now conceive of a new dispensation of it, that which surpasses all which have preceded it,—the only “ministration which remaineth!” Its glad tidings sound on amidst those gloomy realms. The peculiarity is, that nothing can now hinder its success. Its entrance cannot be in vain. This rod of strength was never clothed with such might before. This Gospel never came in such power. It is as though hell were reserved for its most glorified triumph. It would seem selected for its most signalised success. “In the place where it was said unto them,” with accents which sounded the death of hope, “Ye are not my people,”—“there shall they be called the children of the living God.” We have, in another bearing, previously urged this thought. We will not proceed. Ours is not the irony. We look not for Pentecost to fully come, we await not the Crowning Triumph of Christianity, in a world where punishment alone is dealt. Shall there its free course be seen, freer than any past career? Shall there its chorus swell, whose *prelude* only was heard amidst the ages of Millennium?

The allegation, that eternal punishment cannot be

true, seeing that it shocks so many sentiments of the human mind, is presumptuous and unreasoned. These sentiments supply no moral test. They are wholly different from those original, impartial, principles to which the proof of a Deity and of moral distinctions must be proposed. They are necessarily prejudiced. They cannot comprehend all the relations involved. The *motive* which is supplied by such punishment is made clear. The *fact* is the moral sanction. "Ye shall surely die." But after this, ought we to expect every attempt to reconcile our feelings to it? What right have we to infer that our benevolence, vaunted against the Divine, demands to be earliest soothed and satisfied? What grounds have we on which to insist that relief be afforded to our agitated sensibilities? Should they be composed? Could all the illustrative principles, all the justificatory facts, be made plain and intelligible to us? The cautions of the philosophic Butler, rising into stronger language than he is accustomed to employ, might well be pondered. "We make very free, if I mistake not, with the Divine Goodness in our speculations." "The infinitely absurd supposition, that we know the whole of the case."

And now *we* may inquire,—How such an expectation can be entertained, in any consistency with Christianity, that all shall be finally delivered from sin and its consequences? How can men thus read the Gospel? How, even by the most violent effort, can men put this interpretation upon it?

The consummation of the present œconomy of Christian means and privileges is marked with a

solemnly final character. "Then the end." "The end of all things is at hand." "The Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in all the world, for a witness to all nations, and then shall the end come." It is "the consummation." The same style is recorded concerning the wicked and unbelieving. "Then saw I their end." "Whose end is destruction." "What shall the end be of them who obey not the Gospel of God?" "Whose end is according to their works." Is this the catastrophe from which hope can take its rise and write its date? Is it there that man begins his best and most advantageous probation?

The œconomy, which follows on the consummation, is always described as final. It is unchangeably permanent. "Whose voice then shook the earth: but now he hath promised, saying, Yet once more I shake not the earth only, but also heaven. And this word, Yet once more, signifieth the removing of those things that are shaken, as of things that are made, that those things which cannot be shaken may remain." The "kingdom," then introduced, "cannot be moved." It is a definitive ordering and settlement of things. But is not the reintroduction of moral probation, of new classifications, of great spiritual revolutions, another "shaking," and of the things which were to "remain?"

The judgements inflicted in that "end," seem to preclude ulterior reserve and relief. "On whomsoever this stone shall fall, it shall grind him to powder." "Those mine enemies who would not that I should reign over them, bring them forth and slay them before me." "The desire of the wicked shall perish."

"They shall utterly perish in their own corruption."  
"When a wicked man dieth, his expectation shall perish, and the hope of unjust men perisheth." "The hope of the wicked is as the giving up of the ghost."  
"What is the hope of the hypocrite when God taketh away his soul?" "Which drown men in destruction and perdition." "The latter end of that man is worse than the beginning." "The fall of that house was great." "They shall not escape." "Now consider this, ye that forget God, lest I tear you in pieces, and there be none to deliver."

The wicked are represented as having their portion now: "in this life." "They are not in trouble like other men." "Ye have received your consolation." "Remember that thou in thy lifetime receivedst thy good things." "Their houses are safe from fear, neither is the rod of God upon them." But there shall be bitter reverse. "Go to, weep and howl for your miseries that shall come upon you." "Ye have lived in pleasure on the earth." For them can there remain all this sequel, this eternity, of joy? Is it not in express contradiction to all these warnings and denunciations?

The rejection of the Gospel is described to be the sin which precludes its own pardon, which secures its own condemnation. No intimation of hope is breathed. It is irretrievable. "He that despised Moses' law died without mercy: of how much sorer punishment, suppose ye, shall he be thought worthy, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath counted the blood of the covenant, wherewith he was inaugurated into

priesthood, a common thing, and hath done despite unto the Spirit of grace?" "How shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation?" "We are in them who perish the savor of death unto death." "If the righteous scarcely be saved, where shall the ungodly and the sinner appear?" "He that believeth shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be condemned." Is not this unguarded, gratuitous, if the denier of Christ shall be ultimately saved, and if his punishment can bear no proportion to that sure salvation?

A peculiarity distinguishes the true Christian—all the people of God. They are elect according to the foreknowledge of God. He has chosen them, not to wrath, but, to salvation. "For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son; moreover, whom he did predestinate, them he also called; and whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he justified, them he also glorified." All the promises are specifically pledged to them. "All things are yours." "For He hath said, I will never leave thee, nor forsake thee." The arrangements of providence are wielded on their behalf. "All things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose." In what is this peculiarity confirmed? There is a common conformity of character, a general application of promise, a universal consummation of providence; an interval being allowed,—none are made to differ, and the portion of all is the same!



The manner in which the importance of our earthly life is aggrandised by Scripture, opposes additional reasons against this hope. The present is the vestibule to a boundless existence. On what we now are, our weal or woe is, at least, intimated to depend. "Work out your salvation with fear and trembling." "Pass the time of your sojourning in fear." "Strive to enter in at the strait gate." "Redeeming the time." "Lay hold on eternal life." "Seek ye the Lord, while he may be found: call ye upon him, while he is near." In unison with these views of life, are the importunities of the Gospel. "We pray you, in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled to God." "Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish." "Lest any man fail of the grace of God." "The Spirit and the bride say, Come." "While it is said, To-day, if ye will hear his voice." "Brethren, if any of you do err from the truth, and one convert him; let him know, that he which converteth the sinner from the error of his way, shall save a soul from death, and shall hide a multitude of sins." We cannot understand this language, if the most wilful abuse of life can be so easily rectified, or the most criminal rejection of the Gospel can be so certainly countervailed, or the most precious opportunity of usefulness can be so certainly overtaken.

To those who think that all fallen natures shall be restored, the inference which we now urge, will contain no force: but they who think that such an idea is utterly and extravagantly untenable, will not be able to evade it. "Everlasting fire is prepared for the devil and his angels." There is no shadowing of evidence,

that these apostate spirits ever called forth Divine mercy on their behalf. What Redeemer travelled in the greatness of his strength for them? They sinned. They were cast down into hell. Their "lying down is in this sorrow." "Everlasting fire,"—without intimated hope,—without supposeable relaxation. The head of the serpent is bruised by the heel of the Messiah. Satan is bruised under the feet of the saints. He is "destroyed," though not annihilated. Now, into this "everlasting fire," the wicked "depart," "go." Men share it with dæmons. There is but one hell. "The destruction of the transgressors and of the sinners shall be together."

We cannot but think that no slight argument strengthens the interminableness of future punishment, arising from their main and, as we can only conclude, *necessary*, character. We are not taught, in so many words of Scripture, that it is a condition of despair. This would be essential to give it its last severity. This would be the sternest emphasis of its sentence. This would be the heaviest load of its curse. But we must ask, If any description of these sufferings encourages the justification of hope? Do any of them point to relief? Do any of them lengthen out towards a glimmering of the most distant light, like a star-speck, a vista of ultimate escape? Does a bond loosen, or a flame abate? And, moreover, we may ask, If any description of those who are doomed to these sufferings favors the supposition that they indulge the hope? Do they count the ages for their close? Yet if hope be well-founded, it would not be

without its influence even in hell. It would bring support and alleviation. They who had wept, would not always so incessantly weep: they who had gnashed their teeth, would not continue thus frantically to rage. "The sufferings of that present time would not be worthy to be compared with the glory that shall be revealed in them." Hope would create a vision of good, of holy desire, amidst these dreadful scenes. The period of deliverance shall come! The rivet shall be struck from their chains! What a different state of mind would such an expectation produce! What a new spirit of endurance would be raised! And if there be hope for them in their end, if they be "prisoners of hope," surely its intimation will not be withheld from them. They shall be allowed, in pity, all the assuagement it can afford. There cannot fail, for this must be comprehended in the arrangement, to be a moral influence in the impartation of such knowledge. All that we learn, however, precludes the existence, the indulgence, the operation, of such hope. That which "comes to all," to the living man of direst state and keenest woe, finds not there a place. It is the reign of "darkness," that fearful image of confusion, misery, desolation. Nothing brightens it. "The light is as darkness." "It is the blackness of darkness." It is "outer darkness," to which no beam travels, on which the reflection of no stray beam falls. "How great is that darkness!" The palpable obscure! An impenetrable shade! What does it intend? It is the dwelling of despair! How true is all that moody, sullen, grief to it! How

every representation agrees ! Reduce, analyse, every element which constitutes the lost condition, and does not every result proclaim the impossibility that it can admit the idea of mitigation or reprieve ? Does not despair bind and impress all ? Does it not falter in every accent ? does it not deaden in every look ? does it not terrify in every suffering ? It is not "hope deferred," it has perished ! So does revelation leave us to think of hell. So have men always conceived of it. But it can only be the abode and realm of despair, as its punishments are eternal !

That "second death," of which we read, solemnly debars the indulgence of such an expectation. It is an ominous phrase. It is only the soul on which it can be done. It is a living, intellectual, death. Were that soul to cease, to fall from existence, it must be a horrible fate. For such a freight to sink into the waters of oblivion ! For such a star to set in the night of annihilation ! But this is *being* in its wretchedness of perversion and desolation. The soul can die,—it dies when it is cut off from that Divine support which is its *strength*, from that Divine direction which is its *use*, from that Divine favor which is its *good*. The first death is the greatest known evil, though in that the spirit need not "see" nor "taste" it, need not die : this is, then, unspeakably more tremendous, for the spirit is its proper subject, the spirit itself dies. Death falls not on its accidents, but on its substance. The contrast is appalling. The first is a struggle which quickly ends : the second is an endless pang. The former is soon withdrawn ; the

latter, with its dark badge and ensign, can never pass away. The one is not truly final : the other is ultimate. Bodily death is unconscious : spiritual death feels its own pains, its own bands,—its worm is born and fed of its vitals. We require every effort to conceive of it,—every association of the death we know baffling the conception of that which admits of no image nor parallel. The undying spirit dies ! Therefore it is after its own nature, in a manner scarcely to be supposed by us,—there is no shroud but its shame, no reptile but its remorse, no shadow but its grief, no knell but its memory, no grave but its ruin,—capacious of its perished interests, and closed with everlasting night. The sting, which is sin, rankles unmitigated in it. And if the contrast of these deaths only accumulates horror upon the last, much more does their succession. If that be dread which suggests and prefigures it, how much more that to which it refers ! If that which is incipient be so ghastly, what must be that in which it terminates ! If the preparation which we can mark is so deprecated, what must be its consummation ! If what is only relative be so distressing in its fears, what must be that to which it but conducts and demits ! If we shrink from that which may be our sweetest hope, what must be that which can only be despair ! And does “the second death” afford the dreamer argument, that a destiny, such as it seems, at least, to intimate, can be reversed ? Can he repeat these words and be encouraged ? Does all that he perceives of death fortify the proof ? Is it a state so easily changed, a

bondage so easily loosed, a captivity so easily turned? Does he borrow his figures of relenting, of easy intreaty, of yielding partiality, from *it*? Is *it* a thing to be threatened, or to be won? What has ever relaxed *its* hold? As if to convince us that there is a lost condition of the soul, irredeemable, inexorable, —the most resistless ill, the most dire necessity, the most unbending law, is exhibited as specimen and earnest,—the first death is set forth to signify and confirm the “second!”

And if what are felt to be hard conclusions must be drawn,—intended by them who draw them to be painfully extreme,—we can, perhaps, find our apology for them to the letter, however unhappily turned, however they differ from the spirit and manner in which we should hold them. We have but to select the tremendous testimonies of the inspired word. We, if guided by our own views and dispositions, should give them a meaning harmonious to their entire scope. We should protect them from whatever was harsh and apparently merciless. There is not one quotation but we interpret differently from what their sound at first conveys. The warfare is forced upon us. All we want to show is that no statement impugned, as attributed to them who maintain eternal retribution, is without a stronger counterpart in Scripture. Should it be said, that an eternal remembrance and visitation of sin is a relentlessness unworthy of God: “Surely I will never forget any of their works.” Should it be said, that any course which implies an un pitying conduct is impossible with

God: "I will laugh at your calamity; I will mock when your fear cometh." Should it be said, that the tie which binds the Creator to his creatures, however wicked they have become, forbids such a course: "He that made them shall not have mercy on them, and he that formed them will show them no favor." Should it be said, that immortality is sustained only as the subject of poenal inflictions: "Every one shall be salted with fire, and every sacrifice shall be salted with salt." Should it be said, that God will not suffer himself to be provoked into an imitation of the creature's conduct towards him: "As He cried, and they would not hear; so they cried, and I would not hear, saith the Lord of hosts." Should it be said, that such a consummation, if certain, cannot be regarded otherwise than an immediate end and purpose: "The Lord hath made all things for himself: yea, even the wicked for the day of evil." Should it be said, that such a spectacle would solely present the more terrible aspects of the Divine character, and after a most different dispensation: "What if God, willing to show his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction?" Should it be said, that surely prayer ought always to be made for the wicked, and that it cannot be offered in vain: "Pray not for this people for their good." Should it be said, that such an abandonment of his creatures supposes an utter contempt of his own work as worthless: "The ungodly are like the chaff which the wind driveth away." "The wicked of the earth are as dross." "All that do

wickedly shall be as stubble." "The salt has lost its savor, it is thenceforth good for nothing but to be cast out and trodden under foot." "Cut it down: why cumbereth it the ground?" "That which beareth thorns and briers is rejected, and is nigh unto cursing; whose end is to be burned."<sup>a</sup> "If any man love not the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be anathema maranatha." Should it be said, that it is an impossible conception that beings should be compelled to exist who earnestly craved the cessation of an intolerable existence: "They said unto the mountains and rocks, Fall on us, and hide us from the face of Him that sitteth on the throne, and from the wrath of the Lamb." "In those days shall men seek death, and shall not find it; and shall desire to die, and death shall flee from them." Should it be said, that an interdict upon the possible influence of means is unlike all that God has revealed of himself: "Lest at any time they should see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and should understand with their heart, and should be converted, and I should heal them."

Many intimations arise, in considering the treatment of the wicked, which little favor the idea of their eventual happiness, and of their final assimilation to the state of the righteous. They are separated from all the holy and the good. The tares are bound together in bundles. They who are banished from the presence of the Judge, are shut up in their own unmixed fellowship, save that to it is added the fellowship of

<sup>a</sup> The end is of that which "beareth," not of that which is borne:  
 "ἡ τὸ βέλος."



devils. Christ has said: I never knew you ! I know you not whence ye are ! Depart from me ! Is this association the likely means of inducing contrition and working redemption ? The congregated infection of all earthly and infernal sin, the atmosphere to ripen piety and excellence ? The example of evil only, the incentive to holiness ? Cast out in their transgressions, driven away in their wickedness, we are reminded of the language which describes the sinner here : " The Lord shall separate him unto evil." We may learn what that is by known effects : " God gave them over to a reprobate mind, being filled with all unrighteousness, wickedness, maliciousness ; full of envy, murder, debate, deceit, malignity ; haters of God, despiteful, proud, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful." What an adder knot ! What an infernal brood ! These are passions which cannot die. They immortalise themselves. To be " given up" to them is the last judicial wrath against the sinner in his probationary state : can it be the means of his moral cure in hell ?—The anguish with which the lost think of the glorified is quite discouraging to any hope of their future reunion. They weep and wail, and gnash their teeth, when they see Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob in the kingdom of God, and that they themselves are *thrust out*. The rich man, when he seeth Abraham afar off and Lazarus in his bosom, foretells no reversal and obtains no mitigation of his torment. Who, in these descriptions, can catch the faintest glimpse of the feeblest hope that there is an epoch, though most removed, at which they who are thus

thrust out of the kingdom shall ever be permitted to enter it,—at which they who are beyond the gulf shall ever cross it to “the bosom” of celestial friendship and repose ?

Death is represented to us in Scripture, and is taught by all that we know of religion, to be the termination of our probationary state : our conduct on this side of it determines our condition in that. “The night cometh when no man can work.” “Occupy till I come.” “Give account of thy stewardship, for thou mayest be no longer steward.” “It is appointed unto all men once to die, and after death the judgement.” How, then, can a new probation await them ? A longer day ? A larger deposit ? A more precious trust ? A life more availing and privileged after that death ? An opportunity more abundant after that judgement ?

The descriptions of the condemned, of their circumstances, of their lamentations, forbid us to entertain the remotest conjecture of their recovery. “He cannot enter into the kingdom of God.” “Many shall seek to enter in and shall not be able.” “The door is shut.” “They stand without.” “None of them shall be bidden.” “Ye shall die in your sins.” “And he was speechless.” “Out of thine own mouth, will I judge thee.” “Our lamps are gone out.” “Every plant which my heavenly Father hath not planted, shall be rooted up.” “Where I go thither ye cannot come.” “They shall sever the wicked from the just.” “They have pierced themselves through with many sorrows.” “Over them the second death hath power.” “They cannot pass who would come from thence.”

The office of Christ as Saviour shall then merge into the office of Christ as Judge. When he first came into the world, he came not to judge but to save the world. At his second coming, he shall appear not to save, but to judge. "All judgement is committed unto him because he is the Son of man." "God hath appointed a day in the which he will judge the world in righteousness by that man whom he hath ordained; whereof he hath given assurance unto all men, in that he hath raised him from the dead." "When the Son of man shall come in his glory, and all the holy angels with him, then shall he sit upon the throne of his glory: and before him shall be gathered all nations: and he shall separate them one from another, as a shepherd divideth his sheep from the goats." No more serious change can be conceived. He has abdicated the function of "bringing many sons to glory:" his mediation is wound up in this act of adjudication. But the hope of universal salvation inverts all again. He recommences his saving task. The Judge is merged in the Saviour! This is most contradictory. "He hath power on earth to forgive sins,"—but the earth has passed away. "He is able to save to the uttermost,"—that uttermost has expired. "Behold, now is the accepted time; behold, now is the day of salvation,"—the angel hath stood upon the sea and upon the earth, and hath lifted up his hand to heaven, and hath sworn by him who liveth for ever and ever, that there should be time no longer. "He hath trod the wine-press alone," a mysterious intimation of his sufferings for us: then "he treadeth the wine-press of

the fierceness and wrath of Almighty God." He cometh then "without a sin offering." We "show his death" only "till he come." His message shall no more be "peace on earth and good-will unto men." His blood speaketh not its "better things." The transformation of his aspect corresponds to the momentous change. Instead of the meekly-yielding sacrifice, there is "the wrath of the Lamb!"

It seems but idle objection, nor have we deemed it hitherto worthy of notice, that the words which express the idea of eternal duration are sometimes employed in a restricted sense. But assertions like these impose upon the unwary and the unlearned. Our answer is, that they may interchange, as the terms of every language, from higher to inferior meanings. This, however, is invariably in connexions which preclude a possible mistake. They are of *this* world: it may be that the gates of a temple or the foundations of a mountain are called eternal. None are deceived. The "everlasting doors" crumble; the "perpetual hills" bow. But is there any plausibility that these epithets are used in a restricted sense concerning a state *beyond this world*,—the future which they *properly* signify, without catachresis, without license; while the restrictive sense is *improper*, forced, and only to be justified in the flights of poetic diction. Never is there an instance of this kind in the New Testament. There are words far narrower, sufficiently expressive of briefness: why are they never applied to future retribution?

There is greater weight in the objection to any

argument which has been derived from the personifications of Scripture, and the punishments which are denounced against them. Sodom and Gomorrah are "set forth for an example, suffering the vengeance of eternal fire." But, then, their inhabitants are implied, who alone could "give themselves over" to the enormities which disgraced them. "The cities are turned into ashes." Asphaltites has engulfed them; their guilty natives now suffer what those cities never did nor could experience. The names of these seats of wickedness are preserved to perpetuate the warning of their overthrow. "The sinners before the Lord exceedingly" alone can "suffer," and their suffering is "the vengeance of eternal fire." The Apocalypse speaks of death and hades, of the beast and the false prophet, being cast into the lake of fire. These are symbols: how can they be susceptible and conscious of suffering? They are evils: this is the public denouncement of them. The beast and the false prophet have their subjects and dupes.\* These are responsible, the errors did not subsist apart from them, and they are capable of punishment. It would, indeed, be perverse to argue, because personifications have no poenal capacity, though like "sin," they may be "condemned,"—that, therefore, beings of body and soul, when exposed to this punishment, are impassive!

We hope that we have proved ourselves not disinclined to fair, unshrinking, inquiry in the preceding discussions. We have evaded no known argument and difficulty. We have known no ambition of that poor originality which would rest the awful truth upon the

conceit of a criticism or the venture of a theory. Yet have we felt most deeply the words of Paley : " It is very difficult to handle this dreadful subject properly ; and one cause, among others, of the difficulty is, that it is not for one poor sinner to denounce such appalling terrors, such tremendous consequences, against another. Damnation is a word, which lies not in the mouth of man, who is a worm, towards any of his fellow-creatures whatsoever : yet it is *absolutely necessary that the threatening of Almighty God be made known and published.*"<sup>a</sup> Nor is the language of Dwight less solemn. " The very preacher who teaches the doctrine to others, cannot but know, unless certainly assured of his own salvation, (a case undoubtedly very rare,) that he may at that very time be alleging arguments which are to affect *himself*, and to evince his own final destruction, as well as that of others."<sup>b</sup>

Nor have we spoken of recoiling feelings, nor been lavish in professions of sentiment and charity ; not thinking it our duty, whatever was truth, to discredit it by apology or to betray it by regret. Different, far sterner, has been our task : to chastise infirmity, to school reluctance, to raise misgiving, to shame disaffection. It ought to be enough for us that it is a necessary part of a great system, that it is the indispensable act of eternal rectitude. We would not deify ourselves by imagining that we are more benevolent than infinite benevolence, and more righteous

<sup>a</sup> " The Terrors of the Lord." Sermons on Various Subjects.

<sup>b</sup> Theology. We not only think the case he imagines rare, but impossible. 1 Cor. ix. 27.

than infinite righteousness.\* We hold that every thought and desire of our minds should be satisfied when the vision of the bard unfolds :

“ Thus spake the Eternal Father, and *fulfilled*  
*All justica.*”<sup>b</sup>

Is it revealed ? Then are we bound to allow it as the teaching of the Christian dispensation. This does not make it true, but it authenticates it. It recognises and adopts it. It clothes it with irresistible evidence. That which must be the consequence of violated law, to an immortal nature, is taken up and avouched in the direct testimony which God gives to truth. He henceforth is pledged to it. He wants not our defences and vindications. He rests his character upon it. “ He will be clear when he judgeth.”

Is it revealed ? Then have we no warrant for that vacant, dissembling, state of mind, which would waive all opinion, suspend all decision, concerning the fact. This state of mind is often made a boast. Such a course is to slight the ~~Divine~~ testimony, whichever it may be, to disparage its authority, to scorn its information. It is to treat it as not clear, or as not credible, or as not important. If it be a truth of Scripture, it is to be laid hold of like any other. There is not a doctrine which we have not equal right to except and reserve. Besides, this suspended conclusion is mere pretence ; it is settled unbelief.

Is it revealed ? It is then surely to be taught. There

\* “ Et tamen tanto invenitur errare deformius, et contra recta Dei verba perversius, quanto sibi videtur sentire clementius.”—Augustine.

<sup>b</sup> Milton : *Paradise Lost*. B. 5.

must not be equivocation or concealment. Can any motive compare with it? Whether it operate on us to warn, or on others to receive the warning, none other motive can be weighed against it. It must be an ever present thought. Can sloth and apathy stand against it? Shall we prophesy smooth things? Shall we heal the grievous wound slightly? What is the measure of a proper earnestness? Zeal may justify its violence of means. It only has a little time to act. Let it "save with fear, pulling men out of the fire."

Is it revealed? It must occupy a large place in Christianity. We might expect to find it uniformly described. We might expect to find it uninterruptedly reiterated. We might expect to find it assumed rather than argued, and threatened rather than explained. We might expect to find it so interwoven with all the other verities of the system, that to loosen it, is to derange the whole. We might expect to find it adduced as a clear, unlabored, axiom,—that which cannot otherwise be, nor can be differently understood. Our expectations are all borne out; the testimonies are concurrent, multiplied, unquestioning, integral.

Is it revealed? We have until now, chiefly spoken of the Rectitude and Goodness of God. We have endeavoured to identify his moral government with both. But another view now presses upon us. From this time it is a simple question of His Truth. How is that trifled with! Do we seek to exonerate his justice or his benevolence, by the denial of his faithfulness? Can he lie? Is there with him the shadow of



turning? Hath he spoken it? He cannot repent. He cannot deny himself. Let God be true, and every man a liar.\* Well would it be to examine, how far this characteristic perfection of the Deity has been the last to be considered and revered !\*

It has been said, that since human threatenings are often revoked, and without any impeachment of veracity, so God may remit his. But human threatenings ought to be revoked, if hasty and unjust. If well considered and truly just, they ought to be enforced. God has revoked his threatenings, but only those which are conditional. His truth required the revocation. They had pointed to the impenitent alone. They could not in *veracity* be carried out against those who repented. He has threatened hell against the *sinner*. But if the sinner turn—loses his guilty and evil characteristic—he cannot be, according to the intent and fidelity of that threatening, adjudged to that hell. If God has threatened eternal punishment—as we suppose—He has foreseen all difficulties, weighed all principles, anticipated all consequences. It could not be benevolent to threaten, what it was not benevolent to inflict; nor just to threaten, what it was not just to execute. He can use no artifice nor exaggeration. Let us think steadily upon his truth. What did he always intend? If he will not thus punish, he did

\* Origen, in his commentary on Jeremiah xx. 7,—“O Lord, thou hast deceived me, and I was deceived,”—dares thus to impeach the Divine veracity, in the matter of eternal punishment. He allows that it is declared, but that God does not intend. It is an amiable deception which he practises upon his creatures! The passage itself is most erroneously rendered. ~~It~~ signifies, Thou hast persuaded me.

never intend to punish thus. It was never the meaning of his mind. But has he declared that he would? Then it was untruth. It might be a kind deception—it was untruth. It might be a judicial fiction—it was untruth. From the beginning, however merciful its arts and attempts, it was untruth. Let others bear the reproach of making the faithful Creator thus falsify himself: our hearts turn cold at the supposition.

It is a small thing to be ourselves discredited when the God of truth is not believed. We may little complain to be charged with insincerity, when He who is Light does not escape. We are brought under a double accusation. Hard must be our nature to allow the tenet,—harder our nature still, that, allowing it, our conduct continues what it is! The hope, the ingenious effort, is to derive a proof from our inconsistency that we do not believe it ourselves. Much may be learnt from the objection. Let them who believe that there is eternal residue of punishment, not be angry at the retort. Let them more honestly confess their convictions, and more earnestly deliver their souls. Let them cry aloud and spare not. Let them blow the trumpet and give the people warning. Let them be goaded to the decorum of their proper zeal, though by scorn and taunt. But they may reply, to them who reproach them, in no mean strength of justice. Are *they* clear in their own function? They ought to feel to the full of that misery which they can define. They ought to exercise an enlightened sympathy with that which falls within the standard of their ideas. They allege that the theory of eternal

punishment must defeat every end of practically impressing men. They say that it can only confound and overwhelm. Then let them occupy their own assured ground. Yet might they not feel more duly? They hesitate not to declare the relief and abatement of their sensibility in their more restricted view. Do they not enjoy a disproportionate calm? Are they adequately affected with their own forebodings? These enact before them many a tragedy, which might well move their terror and their pity. But in the assertion that eternal punishment cannot be believed, because it stirs no corresponding emotion and zeal, subsists no argument, rises no conviction. The impossibility that any should fully understand and feel the entire case is obvious. The impression of the duty which it suggests may be received, and widely obtains. Towards the whole fact, our conception must fail: towards our relation in respect of it, it need not. It has been often argued that the clearer view of heavenly glory would impair moral agency by acting too strongly on human impulse, by disturbing the regulations and businesses of the present life, by withdrawing thought and sympathy from the objects of immediate duty and affection. But have we not "the substance of things hoped for?" Were more of hell understood, it might distract our freedom rather than move our decision. Have we not sufficient "knowledge of the terror of the Lord to persuade men?" This species of animadversion might be applied to every other truth. The Incarnation of the Son of God,—his Sufferings,—his Glories,—his Claims,—who

entertains aright? Who can grasp the infinite of these themes? Yet may "we know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge!"

And even such chidings as these we little more than share with the spirits of heaven. Their awful applause of Divine judgement,—their halleluia while the smoke of torment ascendeth up for ever and ever, subject them to accusations scarcely less severe. By every endeavor to explain away these acts, we plainly perceive what it is supposed those acts would deserve of blame and censure if they were to be truly believed. We are told if all this were real, heaven could not be endured: that it would be only a higher point whence to descry a wider horizon of misery. Concerning this state of mind which approves as well as acquiesces, we are only bound to ask: Is the judgement "true and righteous?" In its truth we have the pledge of its righteousness. If both true and righteous, the minds of perfected beings must justify them. The holiness of these beings consists in their entire agreement to the Divine Will. They cannot desire,—though this punishment be the necessary means of demonstrating it,—that God should be less just and faithful. We, compassed with infirmity, often fearing lest we ourselves should be disapproved, cannot enter into this dread sympathy. But in Scripture, even in its most devotional portions, do we discover language most terribly denunciatory. There is imprecation which we feel that we cannot employ. It may be very just criticism that it is prophetic. Then is it true. We may also add,—we cannot do less,—that it is an issue

in which—though we do not pray for it—we are bound to coincide. Acquiescence is suspended approbation, a state of mind which assures itself that there are reasons which, when known, shall secure an un-mixed applause. We now read: “Let burning coals fall upon them; let them be cast into the fire; into deep pits, that they rise not again.” It is a menace against the wicked, and it is merciful to them as a moral dissuasion. If they be finally impenitent, it is a prediction. It is an imprecation. We are not called to offer it. Our prayer is for them in their calamities. Yet we must confirm and justify. To the curse, as to the blessing, we must say, Amen. When it is fulfilled, whatever be the shock of feeling, like Aaron, with the ashes of his sons before him, we must “hold our peace.” In a purer state of existence, what is now reluctant shall be reconciled, what is now hesitating shall be corroborated, what is now doubting shall be cleared. Our nature shall be sublimated in all its powers and tempers. In the Divine light we shall see light.

And we would implore to be heard in our remonstrance against the earliest scepticism, dwelling but in a thought, an injected thought, a tempting thought,—“Yea, hath God said?” It may well claim to be *πρῶτον ψεῦδος*, the first lie ever told to man, worthy of the father of lies, who, when he speaketh a lie, speaketh of his own, the first broached against holy truth, the first to invalidate it still. “Ye shall not surely die.” What is it that causes the low, unimpressive, views of Human Redemption which find

their place among us, its freezing descriptions, its attenuated glosses? Where is the tongue which fires with its wonders and tells of it all the day long? Where is the fellowship of those sufferings into which angels desire to look? Where is the ministry instinct, suffused, travailing, with it? Where are the palpitating crowds hanging on its glad tidings? Salvation from the wrath to come! Where is its cry? Where is its vibration? "Who hath believed our report?" What a sublimity in its pretensions! What a humiliation of our acknowledged failings! How can we account for our ease and pitilessness,—whenever the charge may come,—in regarding the spiritual condition of men around us? By what stupor are we oppressed? How slightly are we alarmed at their danger, or concerned for their rescue! What has happened unto us that we are not wrung with commiseration nor shaken by fear? There should be a very great trembling! What is it that steels the hearts of the attendants on the sanctuary and the hearers of the Gospel? Why are the beseechings of mercy so coldly met? "Their heart is made gross." The word comes with no power, it falls with no weight. We, who minister the Gospel, are unto them as one that mocketh, or as one that playeth skilfully on an instrument. They make light of it. What is it,—not to blame others only,—that paralyses our ministry? Where are its burning ensigns, its attesting seals, the watching for souls, the occupation of Christ's stead, the unction, the tenderness, the much fear and trembling? Are we true? Are we alive? clothed with salvation? clad with zeal?

What is it that sophisticates our hopeful youth,—new aroused to inquire, warming with impression, almost prepared to decide, gladdening pastor, parent, friend,—and bears them insensibly, but surely, into the gulf of infidelity? What a change has come over their spirit! Ingenuousness has withered, and seriousness has fled! What a speech of daring falls from their mouth! Cavils and jests, loose and profane, fill up their discourse! There is one answer,—the want of an entire, abiding, conviction that this doctrine is true,—the lurking, undefined, idea, that there may be relief and melioration! We need a more fixed faith and impression of what shall be “the portion of the unbeliever.” We require to think of the case of the lost sinner as utterly, hopelessly, irreclaimable. A few may retain the general truths of revelation, its grace and its godliness, while they cherish a different expectation. Yet with them there will never be found the energy of religion. They are always under the temptation to bend their remaining creed to this perilous unit. It is a thing to disturb or to assimilate all else. It is an “old leaven,” which must either ferment the “new lump,” or remain inert and isolated by its side. In their hands the undertakings of piety presently decline. The great concerts of missionary efforts owe them little. They are consistent! They

\* “Μέγιστα δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν αἱ τῶν νέων ἀκολασίαι τε καὶ ὑβρεῖς, κ.τ.λ.  
“But the greatest among remaining crimes is the petulance and superciliousness of youth, when directed against sacred things, much aggravated when uttered in temple, in assembly, in public convention, or before the multitude in general.”—Plato: De Leg. lib. x.

cannot be moved to grapple with a temporary evil. They look afar, and the universe is restored. But *know* they this? The influence of their assumption passes away from them upon others. If they should "take away from the words of the prophecy of this book,"—and even only understanding it of that specific book, how full is it of eternal retribution,—they may fortify unbelief and embolden sin. More frequently is this theory maintained by them who deny the Godhead and atonement of Christ, the Divine Personality and Regenerating work of the Holy Spirit, whatever constitutes the glory and riches of Christianity. Nor is the process of the scepticism darkling and uncertain. Propound the statement, that this doctrine of eternal punishment need not be believed, ought not to be believed, cannot be believed! Lighter opinions of the desert of sin will instantly possess the mind. As the evil of sin is diminished, so will the necessity and worth of an atonement be reduced. When that again is less and less esteemed, until perhaps altogether rejected, why should God, the eternal Son, the Compeer of the Lord of hosts, take on him our nature and assume our mediatorship? Where is now the height and depth, where is the length and breadth, of the love of Christ? Why should we sing, Worthy is the Lamb who was slain? Every step seems just, every reasoning conclusive. The shipwreck of faith is commonly made upon this rock.

Some controvertists have affected a strong desire to disabuse Christianity of this doctrine, because it is the occasion of infidelity. They have urged that, so long



as the infidel identified it with the Christian faith, he would persist in his disbelief. We affirm, from no narrow observation, from no slight experience, that every attempt to cast it off he regards as a sorry shift, an ignoble evasion. He can read the doctrine in Christianity, if others cannot. He knows that it may not be erased without destroying the emphasis of the whole. What is the ground of its seriousness? What is the reason of its expostulation? So long as there was this "going down into the pit," it might boast its "ransom." So long as there was "wrath to come," it might exhibit "the Son of God, even Jesus, who delivereth from it." Dislodge this doctrine, and the entire system is thrown into incongruity and covered with shame. It no longer comports itself. The ground it occupied is swept from under it. Its high bearing is bowed down. Its hand is shortened. Its pretensions are laid low by the vain eulogy that it has abandoned none to everlasting punishment, which is but the meagre confession that it has snatched none from it!

We cannot, then, for a moment pursue the too common course, that which appeals to men, urging them to act as though this doctrine *may* be true, as though eternal punishment may be possible. This, it is said, with an odious coldness, is the safer side on which to err. We disclaim all share in such appeals. Has God left the awful truth in any, the most partial, the most conceivable, suspense? Is it suffered to oscillate a moment in the balance? Is it yea and nay by turns? God being our judge, we do not know the shadow of

an argument, the pretext of a resting-place, which can help such doubt. All revelation is its affirmation and its Amen. We dare not warn, lest it be so! We dare not remit to the more prudent alternative! Our lips may falter while we pronounce the treble, endless, woe, but it is with pity and not with doubt! And if it might consist with the staidness of dissertation to offer counsel and warning, how would we urge men not to trust to a hope no firmer than a spider's web! Christianity in its first, <sup>fontal</sup>, thought contends against it. To enter into coalition with it, would be to refute all its own scope and aim. It cannot be indulged, but to the most serious weakening of all its claims; seldom, but to their entire rejection. It may be only a secret thought, a reserved wish. But this is perilous. Be sure it is already something more. Rash is he who ventures all on such a trust,—who shoots the gulf because it may drift him to a strand, who leaps the pit because it may not be bottomless. Scripture rigidly insists on pre-requisites of character and conduct to our glorification. This theory annuls them. The wicked are finally secure. They cannot forfeit this. Though they have not “done the will of God,” they “abide for ever.” Though they have not “confessed Christ before men,” they will Christ “confess before his Father and the angels.” Though they have “lived after the flesh,” they “shall live.” Though they have not “overcome the world,” theirs is “the victory.” Let us ask, what premiss suggests it? What analogy paints it? What intuition favors it? Is it not of the spirit and tone of them who say,

"Peace, safety," while "sudden destruction cometh upon them?" Is it not the reversal of every Christian rule and test? "Without holiness" men shall "see the Lord." None "come short of entering into his rest." "The unrighteous" shall "inherit the kingdom of Christ and of God." The objection will be that these conditions shall be complied with. In a future period they shall be qualified and prepared. Our answer has been given. There is no tendency, no provision, to secure this moral change. How is "this kind to go forth?" "When shall it once be?" What is there in their *nature* to encourage it? "As saith the proverb of the ancients, Wickedness proceedeth from the wicked."<sup>a</sup> What is there in their *region* to excite it? "In the land of uprightness will he deal unjustly, and will not behold the majesty of the Lord."<sup>b</sup> What is there in their exercises of thought and feeling to mature it? "How long will it be ere they attain to innocency?"<sup>c</sup>

We know that it is averred that something defined, conceivable, in the measure of retribution will be more binding on the conscience than that which being eternal cannot be apprehended. Something more palpable is wanted. But is it not found that the most wicked always prefer this view? Propose annihilation, and he welcomes it.<sup>d</sup> Propose restoration, and he finds in it an opiate for his fear and a license for

<sup>a</sup> 1 Sam. xxiv..18.    <sup>b</sup> Isaiah xxvi. 10.    <sup>c</sup> Hosea viii. 5.

<sup>d</sup> "Nec ignoro plerosque conscientia meritorum nihil se esse post mortem magis optare, quam credere: malunt enim extingui penitus, quam ad supplicia reparari."—Minucius Felix.

his sin. It allows the careless transgressor a view of punishment which shades off all its deeper gloom in the certainty of its termination. Tell him of agonies, only remedial, all self-exhausting, and scarcely will he tremble. The end redeems, if it does not overpower, them. "The cast away" shall be thrown upon a shore of safety and peace. "The lake of fire" flows into "the sea of glass." The "tongue is tormented in that flame," to attune and modulate it to sing "the new song." Hell is the circuitous, rougher, yet the safe, road to heaven. But while you tell him this, he will think that you tell him more,—that he may lay too much stress upon the importance of time, that he may give too earnest heed to the care of the soul, that he may be too intent upon attaining the present blessings of salvation. Though you intended it not, you have checked his alarm, and soothed his trepidation. Eternity is not at stake ! It shall be well with him ! Things to come are his ! No depths shall separate him from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord ! Wrath even unto the uttermost will soon expend itself ! His agreement is with hell ! Though the Master of the celestial house hath risen up and shut to the door, no more doth "He who hath the key of David shut, and no man openeth !" —There is nothing of Christianity, in a word, which this view does not loosen and contravene. Surely adherence to such a speculation debars all Christian fellowship. We cannot be one with them who maintain it. Our disagreement is not chiefly with the fallacious view which they take of others,—their mischievous flattery

of man,—but with their self-estimation. We hold not a common salvation. We confess not the same Saviour. We acknowledge not the same deliverance. *We* enter the fold rescued from an endless perdition. We are alive from an eternal death. We publish it, we praise it. Brought up from the horrible pit, redeemed from the lowest hell, telling aloud how we have been snatched from everlasting destruction, what would be our meeting with them who deny like obligations,—who declare that such a doom would not be just, cannot be true, has not been averted? Little need have they of the physician! How can we sit together at the table of the Lord? If a struggle be ever known in this hallowed scene, it is, who owes most unto his Lord? Who can then “take his bill,” and “write” a lower sum? Who would defraud the claim? Who abate the debt? “To whom little is forgiven, the same loveth little.” The mystic bread is in our hand,—the muniment of endless life, the

“This belief is necessary to teach us to make a fit estimate of the price of Christ’s blood, to value sufficiently the work of our redemption, to acknowledge and admire the love of God to us in Christ. For he which believeth not the eternity of torments to come, can never value sufficiently that ransom by which we were redeemed from them, or be proportionately thankful to his Redeemer, by whose intervention we have escaped them; whereas he who is sensible of the loss of heaven and the everlasting privation of the presence of God, of the torments of fire, the company of the devil and his angels, the vials of the wrath of an angry and never-to-be-appeased God, and hopeth to escape all these by virtue of the death of his Redeemer, cannot but highly value the price of that blood, and be proportionately thankful for so ‘plenteous a redemption.’”—Pearson’s Exposition of the Creed.

passover from endless bondage: what sympathy, while in this act of the communion of the body of Christ, can we cherish with them who allow no proper punishment, who plead no indefeasible liability, who confound justice with mercy, and right with grace? Let their other principles be correct, this must vitiate them. And while we celebrate our redemption as a sovereign act, passing by fallen angels, abandoning them to everlasting despair,—it may be that they who thus sat with us, would extend their thoughts and hopes even to *their* reclamation! The redemption would not be only of all men, but of fiends themselves! They would drink the cup of devils, the cup of which devils might, prelusively drink! “This is not to eat the Lord’s supper.” “We have not so learned Christ.” An “eternal redemption” we regard as involving an equally eternal enslavement. Heaven is only heaven while there exists a hell!

It is equally impossible to maintain the offices of brotherhood with them who “teach men so.” They oppose our great work, our one function, to warn men to flee from the wrath to come. To give them the right hand of fellowship, to bid them God speed, is to avow the innocence of their error, and the idleness of our faith. None after this can esteem us earnest,—barely sincere. Our teachings, our expostulations, are all annulled. An air of indifference is thrown over all. A man shall be called Christian minister who denies the immortality of the soul! A man shall be hailed evangelic herald who preaches the disciplinary flames of the pit! Well may the

people love to have it so ! He may barter for titles to candor and terms of popularity. But we may not swerve. We cannot turn from the commandment of the Lord. We dare not flatter. With whatever pain, we must stand aloof from those advocates who with sinuous delusions strengthen the refuges of lies, and embolden the hopes of sinners. We speak it in no spirit of denouncement : we obey but stern necessity : ours are different missions ! God speed ! How could we bid it ? Brotherhood ! How could we profess it ? We know no compromise : we brook no alliance : we dream no truce !

One admonition more we cannot restrain. The theology of our community is an immense and precious store. Steady attachment to evangelic truth and to its tremendous sanctions, has been our name. We are indeed fallen, if any take from us this crown. Yet may there be room for fear,—at least occasion for jealousy. We are surrounded by evil influences. There are doting questions of speculation. There are spurious canons of criticism. The fashion of the present mind of man is to object and cavil. There is a love of exception. Error receives much of the homage all of which is due to truth. There is a dread of credulity, the by-word of holy faith. It is a boast that doctrine is held in every extenuated form. It is placed, thus plausibly enfeebled, rather beneath the protection of philosophy than of revelation. There is an impatience of what is ancient and settled. Everything is to be tried and examined afresh. Let it,—but say not that it was never investigated until now. Let it,—but remember

that the *idea*, the substance, of Divine communication can never change. Let it,—but honor the inspired word with at least the same allowance of self-intelligence, consistency, honesty, which human authorship receives. Concession may be a weakness: the emulation of candor may tempt, and the meed of popularity may repay it. To be ranked among the freer spirits of the age,—independent of party, disenthralled from antiquity,—is the prize which many a vain and excitable temperament ardently would seek. To this wile and snare we must oppose an unblenching front. The fawning caress and compliment, the sending of portions one to another, we must spurn. Let us contend earnestly, let us strive together, for the truth. If there be men who have “crept in unawares among us,”—false to the vows of ordination,—glozing and undermining the awful retribution which shall fall upon the impenitent, the unbelieving, the disobedient—cheapening to themselves worldly favor and applause—we are not compelled to falsify our standards, or to dishonor our ancestors. What momentary security have we, that these bold innovators will retain any other truth? This we do ingenuously declare, that beginning with the denial of any other, they might have stopped: they have begun with that dangerous denial, at which few stand still. This we do ingenuously declare, that they have struck a blow, which, though many others would only have shaken outwork or battlement, rives the mighty citadel. We must bear the charge of bigotry and zealotism, but we can only regard it as a pernicious, and destructive, and



truly damnable, error. We call it not an unimportant defect, a point of difference, admitting of simple and easy accommodation. It is rupture, never to be closed. It is war from generation to generation. Be it our lowest appeal, still we make it—Shall the children of the Separatists, and the allies of the Nonconformists, turn aside from that full, strong, rich, theology, which all evangelic churches acknowledge, from the vessel of which they all borrow oil to feed their lamps? We do honestly believe, we must therefore dauntlessly affirm, that this is the most fatal scepticism of the day, —the parent of every other, the bane of all!

A state of mind, in respect of moral dispositions, is not less essential to the formation of sound religious conclusions, than the capacity for evidence. Error is insidious in its approaches. It flatters by liberality, and betrays by sophism. We are not reconciled to it at once. There are disgusts to be allayed, and fears to be vanquished. Little by little are we allured. Of none, perhaps, is the equivocal character more certain than of this. We believe it always originates in an undue conception of sin. This may be greatly modified. It does not “appear sin.” Often, we believe, is it strengthened by the forgetfulness that our facts and faculties are alike limited, and by a pretension to knowledge, far beyond our actual attainment. Let us beware of the first wrong direction of thought and feeling, however minute the degree: fearful may be the after deviations.

The voyager enters a current which seems propitious, there is no apparent diversion from his course,

his bark speeds well, his oar does not toil nor his sail strain. In his confidence all promises success. But while he examines, scarcely does it seem that he has advanced: Much, again and again, reminds him of what he has noticed just before. A strange familiarity impresses his sense. Still current flows into current, while onward and buoyant is his track. Soon he feels an unnatural vibration. Where he glided, he now whirls, along. The truth seizes upon him. He is sweeping a whirlpool. Long since he has entered the verge of a maelstrom, and he is now the sport of its gyrations. No power is left his helm or mast: he is the trembling, unresisting, prey. He hears the roar, he is drawn into the suck, of the vortex. Not only the circle lessens, the very surface slopes. The central funnel and abyss, dark-heaving, smooth, vitreous, yawns. The mariner shrieks, the skiff is swallowed up, where the waters only separate to close, where the outermost attraction was but the minister to the famine of this devouring maw.

If the doctrine of the preceding argument be true, let it be asseverated! Let it possess our minds! Let us rush in between the living and the dead! The gate may be strait, but it is open! The way may be narrow, but it is plain! If we believe this doctrine, let us think, feel, act, as those who not only believe it to be true, but *real*!

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The Lecturer has now fulfilled his solemn task. He undertook it with much self-distrust. Then health seemed firm, and life was strong in him. Suddenly the springs of strength failed. But his task could not be forgotten. It was a fearful weight which he carried with him to foreign climes. It was a duty from which, however, amidst wanderings which brought him no vigor, and lassitudes which yielded to no excitement, he did not shrink. He held fast by it. It was in his thoughts day and night. Not the deep shadows nor the grinding glaciers of Alpine heights, could turn him from it. Whether this condition were favorable or not to his meditation, he must not judge. It may be that it lent feebleness to it. At least, it kept him serious. Still he regretted not that it was his theme. In weakness and fear he pursued it. He knew none more important. Others suggested that none could be more seasonable. Often it was impressed upon him that he could not survive to complete his plan. Then came pensive, but not bitter, thoughts, how some beloved friend might endeavor to collect and shape the materials which survived their compiler ; and *then* it was that he most approved the truth and amiableness of the doctrine which he has lived to vindicate, and *then* too, did he feel, when there could be no boasting, that a better service to the church and to the world—not to forget or cover countless imperfections—might scarcely be attempted by a dying man !

## NOTES.

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### A. (page 34.)

THE doctrine of the Sophists was, *Τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ* : that "whatever is just or disgraceful finds not its distinction in the nature of things, but in arbitrary opinion or law." Against this unworthy notion the greatest of ancient philosophers vehemently contends. Nothing can be finer than the whole of the argument and appeal :

"*Μισθωσάμεθα οὖν κήρυκα, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ ; ἢ αὐτὸς ἂν εἶπω, ὅτι ὁ Ἀριστωνος υἱὸς τὸν ἀριστόν τε καὶ δικαϊστάτον, εὐδαιμονεστάτον ἔκρινε. . . . Τὸν δὲ κάκιστον τε καὶ ἀδικωτάτον ἀθλιωτάτον. . . . Ἡ οὖν προσαγορεύω, εἰπον, εἰάν τε λανθάνωσι τοιοῦτοι ὄντες, εἰάν τε μὴ, πάντας ἀνθρώπους τε καὶ θεοὺς ;*" "Shall we have a herald to sound aloud what I have said ? Rather I will take upon myself to proclaim that the son of Ariston adjudges him who is most excellent and righteous the happiest man, and him who is basest and most unjust, the most disappointedly miserable. And I further ask, May I not so put my case, that this is fully the same, whether or not their actions be concealed from men and gods ?" This is spoken of as an *Ἀπόδειξις*, a demonstration.—Plato: *De Repub. lib. ix.*

"That there are some ideas of the mind which were not stamped or imprinted upon it from the sensible objects without, and, therefore, must needs arise from the innate vigor and activity of the mind itself, is evident, in that there are, first, ideas of such things as neither are affections of bodies, nor could be imprinted or conveyed by any local notions, nor can be pictured at all by the fancy in any sensible colors ; such are the ideas of wisdom, folly, prudence, imprudence, knowledge, ignorance, verity, falsity, virtue, vice, honesty, dishonesty, justice and injustice, volition, cogitation, nay, of sense itself, which is a species of cogitation, and which is not perceptible by any sense, and many other such like notions as include something

of cogitation in them, or refer to cogitative beings only ; which ideas must need spring from the active power and innate fecundity of the mind itself, because the corporeal objects of sense can imprint no such things upon it. Secondly, in that there are many relative notions and ideas attributed as well to corporeal as incorporeal things, that proceed wholly from the activity of the mind comparing one thing with another. Such as are cause, effect, means, end, order, proportion, similitude, dissimilitude, equality, inequality, aptitude, inaptitude, symmetry, asymmetry, whole and part, genus and species, and the like. But that which imposes upon men's judgements here, so as to make them think that these are all passive impressions made upon the soul by the objects of sense, is nothing else but this, because the notions both of those relative ideas, and also of those other immaterial things (as virtue, wisdom, the soul, God,) are most commonly excited and awakened occasionally from the appulse of outward objects knocking at the doors of our senses. And these men, not distinguishing betwixt the outward occasion or invitation of those cogitations, and the immediate active or productive cause of them, impute them, therefore, all alike, as well these intelligible as the other sensible ideas or phantasms, to the efficiency or activity of the outward objects upon us."—Cudworth ; *Eternal and Immutable Morality*, book iv. chapter 2.

This noble statement only needs the modification, that such ideas are not produced by the mind, but exist without : yet their nature is congenial to the mind, and the mind is capable of them. Let them once be presented to it, and it can at once receive, it must at once approve, them. The "appulse" is wanted, and nothing besides.

"O vitæ philosophia dux ! O virtutis indagatrix, expultrixque vitiorum ! Quid non modo nos, sed omnino vita hominum sine te esse potuisset ? Tu urbes peperisti : tu dissipatos homines in societatem vitæ convocasti : tu eos inter se primo domiciliis, deinde conjugis, tum literarum et vocum communione junxisti : tu inventrix legum, tu magistra morum et disciplinæ fuisti. Ad te confugimus : a te opem petimus : tibi nos, ut antea magna ex parte, sic nunc penitus totosque tradimus. Est autem unus dies, bene et ex præceptis tuis actus, peccanti immortalitati anteponendus. Cujus igitur potius opibus utamur, quam tuis ? quas et vitæ tranquillitatem largita nobis es, et terrorem mortis sustulisti."—Cicero : *Tusc. Quæst.* lib. v, chap. 2.

This beautiful paragraph, too flatteringly depicts and celebrates the

praises of philosophy, but it does show most unostentatiously of what unenlightened reason is capable in the conception of morals and the regulation of manners.\* The error of the description is, that the writer attributes to philosophy, modal and systematic, what is due to the workings of simple, original, reason. The truth is, that the sages of antiquity did little for the highest, for the practical, wisdom. That which is called the Pre-Socratic Philosophy is elegant and ingenious rather than useful. The Ionian class, boasting its Thales, Anaximenes, Heraclitus,—its Anaximander, Anaxagoras, Archelaus,—descending to Pythagoras; the Eleatic school, numbering Parmenides, Zeno, Melissus, Empedocles; the Sophist order,—scarcely did they advance the ethical idea, often obscuring it not only with their vague theories, but even with their exquisite visions. It was in such a spirit of disdain for all, that Cicero thus panegyrises Socrates, in the section of the Tusculan Questions next, save one, to the former quotation: “*Primus philosophiam devocavit e cælo, et in urbibus collocavit, et in domos etiam introduxit, et coegit de vita et moribus, rebusque bonis et malis querere.*”

“That men did not become aware of conscience as a peculiar power of the mind, till they had long reasoned and meditated upon actions and rules,—that they did not at first separate it from all other faculties, mark it by a name and clearly discern its place; may well be supposed, for with how much labor and doubt and effort and struggle have *all* abstract thoughts, however clear, *all* foundations of general truths, however sure, been extricated by man from the complex mass of events and appearances which surround him. Tardily and gradually, no doubt, do the principles of moral truth emerge into view even among the sagest and most virtuous of the heathen. But has not this been so with abstract truths of the plainest kinds? Even those portions of human knowledge to which we in this seat of study turn men’s eyes as the very type and exemplar of evident and indisputable speculative truth; the properties I mean of space and of number; were not these, too, brought into view late and slowly and partially among the most acute and luminous intellects of the ancient world? while over the greater part of the earth and during the greater portion of the world’s history, no clear apprehension, at all, of such doctrines has found place in men’s mind. Yet, who among us holds that, therefore, these doctrines are precarious? and who does not see that the faculties by which we apprehend the properties of space and number are not the less real or the less trust-

worthy, because they require to be unfolded and expanded by exercise and by teaching. Even though men's moral judgements should invoke principles as certain and as clear as those by means of which they compare the largeness of visible things ; even if there be, concerning right and wrong, a knowledge as distinct and independent as that which studious men have established concerning the straight and crooked forms of material objects ; it need not surprise us that such knowledge did not manifest itself in a distinct and speculative shape, till men had made considerable progress in the speculative exercise of their intellectual powers."—Whewell : On the Foundations of Morals. From Sermons before the University of Cambridge.

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B. (page 36.)

"NOR is the use of the words, *good* and *evil*, *right* and *wrong*, when used in a moral sense, altogether unfixed and arbitrary, according to the variety of notions, opinions, and views, that occasion the fore-mentioned variety of sentiment. For though the signification of words is determined by particular use, yet that which governs in the use of terms, is *general* or common use. And mankind, in what they would signify by terms, are obliged to aim at a *consistent* use : because it is easily found that the end of language, which is to be a common medium of manifesting ideas and sentiment, cannot be obtained any other way than by a consistent use of words ; both that men should be consistent with themselves, and one with another, in the use of them. But men cannot call anything right or wrong, worthy or ill-deserving, consistently, than by calling things so which truly deserve praise or blame, *i. e.* things, wherein all things considered, there is most uniformity in connecting with praise or blame. There is no other way in which they can use these terms consistently with themselves. Thus if thieves and traitors be angry with informers that bring them to justice, and call their behaviour by odious names ; yet herein they are inconsistent with themselves ; because, when they put themselves in the place of them who have injured them, they approve the same thing they condemn. And, therefore, such are capable of being convinced, that they apply these odious terms in an abusive manner. So, a nation that prosecutes an ambitious design of universal empire, by subduing other nations

with fire and sword, may affix terms, which signify the highest degrees of virtue, to the conduct of such as show the most engaged, stable, resolute spirit in this affair, and do most of this bloody work. But yet they are capable of being convinced, that they use these terms inconsistently, and abuse language in it, and so having their mouths stopped. And not only will (must?) men use such words inconsistently with themselves, but also with one another, by using them any otherwise than to signify true merit or ill-deserving, as before explained. For there is no way else wherein men have any notion of good or ill desert, in which mankind in general can agree. Mankind in general seem to suppose some *general standard*, or foundation in *nature*, for a universal consistence in the use of the terms whereby they express moral good or evil; which none can depart from but through error and mistake. This is evidently supposed in all their *disputes* about *right* and *wrong*, and in all *endeavours* used to prove that any thing is either *good* or *evil*, in a moral sense."—Pres. Edwards: The Nature of True Virtue, chap. viii.

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C. (page 39.)

In analyzing the human mind in reference to its moral perceptions, we may remember, if we do not altogether approve, both ancient and modern distinctions. Aristotle dwells repeatedly upon the Dionœtic and Ethical principles, applying the one to dialectic or logical knowledge, and the latter to virtue and duty. The Germans, in their scholastics, discriminate in nearly the same manner. By *Bernunft* they intend Reason, the highest mind of man, the source of ideas. By *Verstand*, that mind of man, which we call Understanding,—the power of ascertaining and appreciating relationships and obligations.

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D. (page 41.)

A truth is not less a truth from whatever quarter it comes. We know not a better recapitulation of the characters of the natural law than that which is given by Volney, in his "Law of Nature." "It is primitive, immediate, universal, invariable, evident, reasonable, just, pacific, beneficent, and of itself sufficient."

The last character may be denied by some. It must, however, be



understood of simple human responsibility. Its summary, "in the hand-writing of ordinances," is a favor,—was not demanded by the case. That it is insufficient to save, we more than admit. Such a thought, also, was not in the mind of the author of "The Revolutions of Empires." It certainly belongs not to the argument. We are bound to allow, in every sense of moral government, that law is "sufficient."

The following splendid quotation from Cicero is preserved from a work of his on Government, now lost. For ages it must have been extant and known, for Seneca, Augustine, Lactantius, frequently cite it. It is from the pages of this latter Christian father that the quotation is drawn. "*Est quidem vera lex recta ratio, nature congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna: quæ vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat: quæ tamen neque probos frustra jubet, aut vetat, nec improbos jubendo aut vetando movet. Huic legi nec obrogari fas est, neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet, neque tota abrogari potest. Nec vero aut per senatum, aut per populum, solvi hac lege possumus. Neque est querendus explanator, aut interpres, ejus alius. Nec erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athenis; alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et omnes gentes, et omni tempore una lex, et sempiterna, et immortalis continebit; unusque erit communis quasi magister, et imperator omnium Deus. Ille legis hujus inventor, disceptator, lator: cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet, ac naturam hominis adspernabitur: atque hoc ipso luet maximas penas, etiamsi cætera supplicia, quæ putantur, effugerit.*"—Ciceronis Opera, vol. iii. Venice Edition.

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E. (page 45.)

The charge against Locke of irreligiousness because he denies the possibility of innate ideas, might be supposed to find favor with all those who contend for the natural power of every man to discriminate between right and wrong. But these do not treat right and wrong as innate ideas, but ideas presented objectively to the mind, of which the mind has not only the power, but the original disposition and bias, to judge. This is conscience,—a particular, connatural, direction and acting of the human soul. The great author of the Essay upon Human Understanding has, in this instance, received no little wrong. It was not to be expected that he should express

himself with all the precision of later writers who have possessed the double benefit of his experience and their own. To improve upon an hypothesis is far easier than to originate it. He might be considered as the enterprising geographer of an unknown country: subsequent travellers made use of his map and somewhat corrected it. And where has ever risen a more generous seeker after truth than he? Who ever confessed his errors, when they were proved against him, so candidly and even contritely? Who ever took such occasion to revolve and work over again all his opinions and conclusions? There is abundant proof,—not that he was invariably discreet and consistent in his language,—but that in denying the doctrine of innate ideas he retained the strongest conviction of primary moral principles. And, first, let him show in his own words that ideas of sensation were not the whole nor the principal part of those which he ascribes to man. “The mind, receiving the ideas of sensation from without, when it turns its view inward upon itself, and observes its own action about those ideas it has, takes from thence other ideas, which are as capable to be the objects of its contemplation, as any of those it received from foreign things.”—Book ii. chap. 6. Then having defined these ideas of reflection, he anticipates the view in question thus: “I think they equally forsake the truth, who running into the contrary extremes, either affirm an innate law, or deny that there is a law knowable by the light of nature, that is, without the help of positive revelation.” “The visible marks of extraordinary wisdom and power appear so plainly in all the works of the creation, that a rational creature, who will but seriously reflect, cannot miss the discovery of a Deity.” “Had they examined the ways whereby men came to the knowledge of many universal truths, they would have found them to result in the minds of men from the being of things themselves, when duly considered; and that they were discovered by the application of those faculties, that were fitted by nature to receive and judge of them, when duly employed about them.”—Book i. chap. 4. “There is a law of nature as intelligible to a rational creature and studier of that law, as the positive laws of commonwealths.” “Reason is natural revelation, whereby the eternal Father of light and fountain of all knowledge, communicates to mankind that portion of truth which he has laid within the reach of their natural faculties: revelation is natural reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries communicated by God immediately, which reason vouches the truth of by the testimony

and proofs it gives that they come from God. So that he that takes away reason to make way for revelation, puts out the light of both, and does much-what the same, as if he would persuade a man to put out his eyes, the better to receive the remote light of an invisible star by a telescope."—Book iv. chap. 19. These quotations sufficiently express the real design and opinions of this great mental analyst, untoward and infelicitous as are some of his earlier statements and illustrations. We see throughout the just middle-place of those who smile at the conceit of innate ideas, and yet maintain the sound philosophy of certain original principles in ethics, and of as certain connatural perceptions in man.

"History, if I may be allowed the expression, is now a vast museum, in which specimens of every variety of human nature may be studied. From these great accessions to knowledge, lawgivers and statesmen, but, above all, moralists and political philosophers, may reap the most important instruction. They may plainly discover in all the useful and beautiful variety of governments and institutions, and under all the fantastic multitude of usages and rites which have prevailed among men, the same fundamental, comprehensive, truths, the sacred master-principles which are the guardians of human society, recognised and revered (with few and slight exceptions,) by every nation upon earth, and uniformly taught (with still fewer exceptions,) by a succession of wise men from the first dawn of speculation to the present moment. The exceptions, few as they are, will, on more reflection, be found rather apparent than real. If we could raise ourselves to that height from which we ought to survey so vast a subject, these exceptions would altogether vanish; the brutality of a handful of savages would disappear in the immense prospect of human nature, and the murmurs of a few licentious sophists would not ascend to break the general harmony. The consent of mankind in first principles, and this endless variety in their application, which is one among many valuable truths which we may collect from our present extensive acquaintance with the history of man, is itself of vast importance. Much of the majesty and authority of virtue is derived from their consent, and almost the whole of practical wisdom is founded on their variety."—Mackintosh: Discourse on the Study of the Law of Nature and Nations.

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## F. (page 67.)

"I am not much concerned to know precisely, what the ancient Stoic philosophers held concerning fate, in order to determine what is truth ; as though it were a sure way to be in the right, to take good heed to differ from them. It seems that they differed among themselves ; and probably the doctrine of fate, as maintained by most of them, was, in some respects, erroneous. But whatever their doctrine was, if any of them held such a fate, as is repugnant to any liberty, consisting in our doing as we please ; I utterly deny such a fate. If they held any such fate, as is not consistent with the common and universal notions that mankind have of liberty, activity, moral agency, virtue, and vice ; I disclaim any such thing, and think that I have demonstrated, that the scheme I maintain is no such thing. If the Stoics, by fate, meant anything of such a nature, as can be supposed to stand in the way of advantage and benefit of in use of means and endeavours, or would make it less worth while for men to desire and seek after anything wherein their virtue and happiness consists ; I hold no doctrine that is clogged with any such inconvenience, any more than any other scheme whatsoever ; and by no means so much as the Arminian scheme of contingency ; as has been shown. If they held any such doctrine of universal fatality, as is inconsistent with any kind of liberty, that is or can be any perfection, dignity, privilege, or benefit, or anything desirable, in any respect, for any intelligent creature, or indeed, with any liberty that is possible or conceivable ; I embrace no such doctrine. If they held any such doctrine of fate, as is inconsistent with the world being in all things subject to the disposal of an intelligent, wise agent, that presides—not as the *soul* of the world, but as the *Sovereign Lord* of the universe, governing all things by proper will, choice, and design, in the exercise of the most perfect liberty conceivable, without subjection to any constraint, or being properly under the power or influence of anything before, above, or without himself ; I wholly renounce any such doctrine."—Edwards on the Freedom of the Will. Part iv. section 6.

Such is the protest of this mighty man against certain consequences charged upon his system. If they be justly imputable to his system, it must bear them : he is acquitted from every intention, every consciousness, of entertaining them.

" And binding nature fast in fate,  
Left free the human will."

There is little meaning in these lines of Pope. Perhaps he intended what is the constituted state of material things by "nature," expressing thus their uniformity, while he conceded to the will a "freedom"—without which it could not be *will*. It seems, however, to be borrowed from a more noble bard; Shakspeare says:—

"The fated sky  
Gives us free scope."—All's well, &c.

G. (page 71.)

That Aristotle, especially in the Nicomachean Ethics, should, from occasional expressions, be misconceived on the subject of this immortality of the soul, does not surprise; but his belief of it, if his whole writings be examined, must be admitted. The passage in the 11th chap. of the first book, which is quoted against this conclusion, when well considered, strongly fortifies it. "*Μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τε διαφορεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς κεκμηκότας, εἴ τινος ἀγαθοῦ κοινωνοῦσιν, ἢ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, κ.τ.λ.*" For rather may be properly doubted concerning the state of the departed, whether they can partake of good or of calamity. For it seems certain, that if anything did reach them, whether favorable or adverse, it is impotent and trivial considered in itself, and especially to them. For such could not be of sufficient power, and of a proper kind, to make these happy who are not so, or to snatch the blessedness from those who are." The argument does not make light of earthly events; only, they are considered indifferent to the departed. But why? Because these are in a state of reward or punishment, so solemnly engrossing, that earthly good or evil would come alike to them, since they could not augment the one or relieve the other. A stronger testimony could not be borne to the immateriality, the immortality, and the accountableness, of the separate soul.

In the same manner the Stagirite seems to have been misunderstood in his book, *De Anima*. Some of his arguments would at first point to the conclusion, that the soul depended, for its existence and exercise, upon the body. But he thus often seems to love a conclusion which opposes his main one. He is not without a vanity in adroitly meeting and overthrowing his own reasonings. The word which he employs concerning the soul, in the first chapter of the second book, just at its close, is, *Χωριστῇ*, separable, that which can exist in itself. His argument is, that it is not the *Ἐντελέχεια*, the

organ or the perfection of any body. He, like many others, divides the soul as into parts—theoretic and sensitive. But his whole aim is, to show that the higher soul has its own operations and affections. And thus in the fifth chapter of the third book, he speaks in this sort :—  
 “Οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀμειγρῆς, καὶ ἀπαθὴς, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὧν ἐνεργεῖα :  
 This soul, self-existible, and unmixed, and impassive, being in its nature active.” He adds, “Τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδίον, This alone is deathless and eternal.”

The authority of Cicero may be considered inversely to his opinions. He is the declaimer against the public creed. All his objections tend to confirm its existence. He endeavoured in vain to overturn it. The doctrine of the soul's immortality he so attacks, that we must be convinced it was popularly held. \* Even his scornful, unwincing stoicism, is not always consistent with itself. “Sed ut illa secunda moderate tulimus, sic hanc non solum adversam, sed funditus eversam fortunam fortiter ferre debemus, ut hoc saltem in maximis malis boni consequamur, ut mortem, quam etiam beati contemnere debebamus, propterea quod nullum sensum esset habitura, nunc sic affecti, non modo contemnere debeamus, sed etiam optare.” *Epistolæ ad Familiares* : Mescinio, lib. v. So again, in the sixth book of these epistles, he writes to Torquatus, after a similar idea :—  
 “Sed hæc consolatio levis est ; illa gravior, qua te uti spero, ego certe utor : nec enim, dum ero, angar ulla re, cum omni vacem culpa : et, si non ero, sensu omnino carebo.” These passages may simply refer to the insensateness of death, as we speak of it, who fully believe that the spirit is living still. They certainly betray some apprehension and suspense. The bravado ill conceals the cowardice which is at heart.

“The dread of something after death,  
 . . . . . Puzzles the will.”

But it is not difficult to set him at variance with himself. The phlegm of the philosopher ill accords with the ardor of the orator, and the amiableness of the man.

“Quod si omnium consensus, naturæ vox est : omnesque, qui ubique sunt, consentiunt esse aliquid, quod ad eos pertineat, qui e vita cesserint ; nobis quoque idem existimandum est. Et si, quorum aut ingenio aut virtute animus excellit, eos arbitramur, quia natura optima sunt, cernere naturæ vim maxime : verisimile est, cum optimus quisque maxime posteritati serviat, esse aliquid, cujus is post mortem sensum sit habiturus.”—*Tusc. Quæst. lib. i. cap. 15.*

In lamenting the death of Hortensius, he exclaims :—"Summam ejus felicitatem non satis grato animo interpretamur."

"O præolarum diem, cum ad illud divinum animorum concilium cætumque proficiscar, cumque ex hac turba et colluvione discedam ! Proficiscar enim non ad eos solum viros, de quibus ante dixi ; sed etiam ad Cætonem meum, quo nemo vir melior natus est, nemo pietate præstantior : cujus a me corpus crematum est ; quod contra decuit ab illo meum. Animus vero non me deserens, sed respectans, in ea profecto loca discessit, quo mihi ipsi cernebat esse veniendum. Quem ego meum casum fortiter ferre visus sum : non quod æquo animo ferrem ; sed me ipse consolabar, existimans, non longinquum inter nos digressum et discessum fore."—Cicero, *De Senectute* : ad fin.

“Ψυχαὶ γὰρ μένουσιν ἀκήριοι ἐν φθιμένοισι.  
Πνεῦμα γάρ ἐστι Θεοῦ χρῆσις θνητοῖσι καὶ εἰκὼν.  
Σῶμα γὰρ ἐκ γαίης ἐχομεν, καὶ πάντες ἐς αὐτὴν  
Λύμενοι κόνις ἐσμέν· ἀὴρ δ' ἀνὰ πνεῦμα δεδεκται.

Πάντες ἴσοι νεκτές· Ψυχῶν δὲ Θεὸς βασιλεύει.  
Κοινὰ μελαθρα δόμων αἰῶνια, καὶ πατὴρ δδης.  
Κυρὸς χώρος ἅπασι, πένησί τε καὶ βασιλευσιν.  
Οὐ πολὺν ἀνθρώποι ζῶμεν χρόνον, ἀλλ' ἐπίκαιρον  
Ψυχῇ δ' ἀθανάτος καὶ ἀγήρωε ζῇ διὰ παντός.”

Phocylides : *Poëtæ Minores Græci*.

“Souls uncorrupted live, howe'er we die,—  
The gift and image of the Deity.  
From earth we come, our bodies turn to nought,  
Dissolved in dust,—the soul high heaven has caught !  
Equal all parted souls ! 'neath God's command,  
Common their endless home and native land ;—  
A meeting-place for paupers and for kings.  
Short is the time we live, but still it brings  
Important seasons on its rapid way,—  
The soul, undying, towers beyond decay !”

Lanctantius argues the *eternity* of the soul. In his *De Divino Præmio*—which is the seventh book of his *Divine Institutions*—chap. 9, he argues from many proofs, its indissolubleness. In the thirteenth chapter, he says—"Declaravi (ut opinor) animam non esse solubilem : superest, citare testes, quorum autoritate argumenta firmentur. Neque nunc prophetas in testimonium vocabo, quorum ratio et divinatio in hoc solo posita est, ut ad cultum Dei, et ad

immortalitatem ab eo accipiendam creari hominem doceant ; sed eos potius, quibus istos qui respuunt veritatem, credere sit necesse."

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H. (page 129.)

" In verisimilibus, et in propriis rerum notis posita est tota (conjectura.) Sed appellemus docendi gratia verisimile, quod plerumque ita fiat. . . . Verisimilia reperiuntur ex partibus, et quasi membris narrationis. Ea sunt in personis, in locis, in temporibus, in factis, in eventis, in rerum ipsarum negotiorumque naturis. In personis naturæ primum spectantur, valetudinis, figuræ, virium, ætatis, marium, fœminarum ; atque hæc quidem in corpore : animi autem, aut quemadmodum affecti sunt, virtutibus, vitiis, artibus, inertis ; aut quemadmodum commoti, cupiditate, metu, voluptate, molestia. Atque hæc quidem in natura spectantur. In fortuna, genus, amicitia, liberi, propinqui, affines, opes, honores, potestates, divitiæ, libertas, et ea, quæ sunt iis contraria. . . . Verisimilia autem partim singula movent suo pondere : partim, etiam si videntur esse exigua per se, multum tamen, cum sunt coacervata, proficiunt. Atque in his verisimilibus insunt nonnunquam etiam certæ rerum et propriæ notæ. Maximam autem facit fidem ad similitudinem veri, primum exemplum ; deinde introducta rei similitudo ; fabula etiam nonnunquam, etsi sit incredibilis, tamen homines commovet."—Cicero : Oratoriæ Partitiones, cap. 10, 11.

It is plain that analogy to our minds intends far more than verisimilitude so eloquently described in the above passages. The reason, however, is, that we apply it to a theme which Tully could not understand. He beheld but one system, the great physical one,—he knew not that system of revelation which, by an extension of his principles, we bring into comparison with the previous order of things, relieving it of all *peculiar* difficulties by resting it upon *universal* grounds.

In the same manner the Magister propounds his purpose in the Tusculan Questions : " Geram tibi morem, et ea quæ vis, ut potero, explicabo : nec tamen quasi Pythius Apollo, certa ut sint et fixa, quæ dixerò : set ut homunculus unus e multis, *probabilia conjectura sequens*. *Ultra enim quo progrediar, quam ut veri videam similia, non habeo*."—Lib. i. cap. 9.

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## I. (page 133.)

Illustrations will recur to the memory of every classical scholar : the following selections are confined to the main argument, that there is a natural and eternal morality, which the mind of man is formed to approve :

“*Εἴ μοι ξυνεὶη φέρουσι μοῖρα τὰν  
 Εὖσεπτον ἀγνείαν λόγων  
 Ἔργων τε πάντων, ὧν νόμοι προκεινται  
 Ὑψιποδες γ' οὐρανίαν δι' αἰθέρα  
 Τεκνωθέντες· ὧν Ὀλυμπος  
 Πατὴρ μόνος, οὐδὲ νυν θνατὰ  
 Φύσις ἀνερῶν ἔτικτεν, οὐδὲ  
 Μὴν ποτε λάβα κατακοιμασσεῖ.  
 Μέγας ἐν τούτοις Θεός,  
 Οὐδὲ γηρασκει.*” Soph. : Œd. Tyr. 881, &c.

“May the happy destiny be mine which bears with it that pious reverence in all words and deeds, which the transcendent laws, born of the highest heaven, prescribe! They owe their origin to God alone! The mortal nature of man could not suggest them, nor can they sink into oblivion. Deity greatly moves in all of them,—he who grows not old!”

“*Οὐ γάρ τι μοι Ζεὺς ἦν ὁ κηρύξας τάδε,  
 Οὐδ' ἡ ξύνοικος τῶν πάντων θεῶν Δίκη,*” κ.τ.λ.  
 Soph. : Antig. 456, &c.

The following translation is from Potter. It is the answer of Antigone to the question of Creon, How she could dare to transgress the laws?

“For this just cause, that nor the voice of Jove,  
 Nor holy Right, that with the gods below  
 Inhabits, e'er to men such laws ordained.  
 Nor of such force thy edicts did I deem,  
 That, mortal as thou art, thou hast the power  
 To overthrow the firm unwritten laws  
 Of the just gods; these are not of to-day,  
 Or yesterday, but through all ages live,  
 And none know whence they sprung.”

In the Prometheus of Æschylus, the hero vents his proud complaints against Jupiter as an innovator and usurper, ruling by new

laws, and abolishing the things which were formerly venerable :  
 “ *πρὶν πελώρια.*”

The words which the Pagan Ethical writers employ, evince their nice sense of obligation : *προσταςω, δεῖ, ἀναγκάζω, ὀφείλω, χρῆ,*—oportet, convenio, deceo,—dulce, decorum, necessarium.

The Greek *Γνώμαι* would supply abundant illustrations.

J. (page 152.)

Few writers have so boldly impugned the Physical Immortality of man as Edmund Law, formerly Bishop of Carlisle, in his “Nature and End of Death under the Christian Covenant.” His argument is based upon the supposed knowledge which certain parties possessed of death in their times, and upon the assumed completeness of the different revelations made to them. Thus it is asked : What could Adam understand by its denunciation ? It must, it is answered, have been understood by him that the *whole* man, individual, person, or being, at death returned to the *dust or ground from whence he was taken*. Now this we are prepared to contest. The wonderful formation of man belies the opinion. He is made like none other creature. He is constituted after the Divine image. God breathed into his nostrils the breath of life. He became *נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה*. He was not, in his highest constituent, taken from the ground. It is in vain to allege that, three times in the following narrative of the deluge, the inferior animals are classed with man as under a common description, —“wherein is the breath of life.” This equal vital condition is not questioned, and is naturally introduced where there was to be an indiscriminate judgement. “For that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts : as the one dieth, so dieth the other : yea, they have all one breath.” Notwithstanding, let us see that the cases be fairly stated. The breath of life in man is conveyed by a different word from that which expresses the breath of the beast. There may, perhaps, be little force in the difference : \* but is not the immediate agency of Deity in this inspiration most marked ? —“There is a spirit in man : and the inspiration of the Almighty hath given them understanding.” Is he thus described as acting towards the

\* Yet it is not of our imagination. “*עַל, Anima, sed Animæ tantum.*”—Buxtorf. See Gesenius and Taylor. Prov. xx. 27 ; Psa. cl. 6 ; Isa. lvii. 16. In Genesis vii. 22, we have both words combined, because man and all other tribes are comprehended.

breathing animals?—Is not the doom of man abhorrent to all the auguries which such a creative process suggests? The hypothesis leaves out all the revelations which must have been made to man. The history is confessedly in outline. But is nothing to be supplied? He was, on every admission, in some sort the representative of his species. Was he left in ignorance of this? Was such an issue of his probation concealed from him? Could he have remained uninformed of his power over all, and the secret of that power? Was he unconscious of reason? Did he not discern his exclusive faculty of speech? Could disobedience entail, to his apprehension, nothing more than annihilation? Was he not cognizant of that which we know as sin? Were no fears of his Maker's displeasure on his mind? Does not subsequent disclosure render this certain? Was not his punishment a long anticipation of death? Still death was the only commination. Nothing more was verbally pronounced. We give no weight to the double form of the curse: *מוֹת תָּמוּת*, Dying thou shalt die. It is but an evasion of an idiom to describe it as implying more than the certitude of the law. Thus *טָרַף* is reduplicated in Gen. xxxvii. 33, and properly rendered, "without doubt rent in pieces." Another example is presented in Exodus xxi. 19, where the repetition of *רָפָא* is rightly translated, "shall be thoroughly healed." They who think that they find in the phrase, "dying thou shalt die," any recondite meaning, must do it at the expense of criticism. But it is plain, that the sentence as to death, in the common sense of mortality, was delayed for centuries. Yet was death to be *certainly* inflicted as soon as the day of transgression. In the interval of these centuries we think that it was, in a new mental state which was superinduced. The nature of man had fallen. We see that new tendency in compliance with which "all flesh corrupted his way." We find, in subsequent Scriptures, such a state described as *death*, quite compatible with all the functions of life and mainly consisting in their misdirection and abuse. The continuation of such a state is not impossible, for it is independent of mortality, being precedent to it; and, therefore, after mortality, it may proceed, being at least as possibly independent as it was before. The whole account, we conclude, is decisive of a spiritual and future death, besides the bodily disorganisation.—The treatise which follows this work as an Appendix, proceeds on a most uncritical and illogical principle. The exegesis of Scripture is conducted by instituting inquiry into what certain parties understood. We defer that the proper course would be the value of the terms

themselves, and the order of facts which they express. Most limited would be the discoveries of revelation if such an exponent were applied to them. They are uniformly progressive. "The Scripture foresees." When they respect facts, the facts are necessarily the same beneath the most different degrees of information. "Life and incorruption" we believe were always true of man : Christ hath "*brought them to light* by his Gospel."

Examples may be given of this most gratuitous criticism. "Soul is often put for person." It is, but only as we understand *person* for individualised man. Does this disprove that he has a soul ? Is not the presumption strong that he is so entitled on account of this his superior portion of being ? Thus the "souls" of which we read, when large numbers are affirmed, are distinguished from substance and goods. Doubtless, and most properly, it often describes a man's self. What is the man, but the soul ? When it is said to hunger, to thirst, to be made full or empty, these phrases represent affections peculiar to it. When it is "cut off," it is its decease or separation. When it is "lost," it is its abuse and abandonment. *שׁוּפָא* is sometimes employed to denote the human body, and even after death ; but then it is by a catachresis, a frame which was lately inhabited by a soul. But we must remember that there is a "soul" which "man cannot kill," though sometimes it may be confounded with simple life ; that "the spirits of just men are made perfect in the heavenly Jerusalem ;" that "the souls of them who were beheaded for the witness of Jesus are under the altar." Moreover, we must not forget the contradistinction so frequently supposed : "the fruit of the body for the sin of the soul ;" "the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak ;" "the unmarried woman careth for the things of the Lord, that she may be holy, both in body and spirit ;" "abstain from fleshly lusts, which war against the soul ;" "that thou mayest prosper and be in health, even as thy soul prospereth." And yet this Author denies that ever in Scripture there is language which stands for a purely immaterial principle, or for a principle which can subsist in separation from the flesh !

A most palpable "*petitio principii*" is attempted by this prevaricating writer in his account of the descriptions of death in the Bible. Is called "sleep," "silence," "forgetfulness," "darkness," "corruption," "destruction." But then this only describes the body, exanimate and buried. So, likewise, the passages which represent the superior glory of the resurrection epoch are bent against any

happiness immediate on death. Because of the greater consummation, the less is to be altogether denied. Too much stress cannot be laid upon that final triumph : but it is unreasonable that an inferior good, great in itself, should be disallowed.

The method which is pursued by the following parts of the treatise to impugn the intermediate existence and consciousness of the departed soul, is of that order which an obstinate, a reckless, maintenance of a favorite tenet only can produce. "The spirit that ascends unto God who gave it," in opposition to "the dust which returns to the earth as it was," "the spirit of man that goeth upward," in opposition to "the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth," is simple life ! How is it, then, that, perishing with the body, it thus mounts ? One more instance of garbling may be extracted. "To-day shalt thou be with me in paradise." The writer was too discreet to give the *period* to the preceding language : "Verily I say unto thee to-day." But he affirms that it is a common idiom for anything fixed and done. "Hear, O Israel, thou art to pass over Jordan *this day*." "That He may establish thee *to-day* for a people unto him." "*This day* have I begotten thee." Now the Hebrew word, הַיּוֹם, may signify, at *this time*, it was *then*, in *that juncture*, that Israel was to enter Cannan which they had before approached, but were not suffered until now to cross its river boundary, and that ~~they~~ they were confirmed anew as a peculiar people. But *Σήμερον* is more literally precise. It occurs twenty-nine times in the New Testament. Always does it express what is true, real, at the actual instant. Now what sense could it convey alone to the mind of the suppliant ? He implores to be "remembered of Christ *when* He should have come into his kingdom." The answer is, that "*to-day*" he should be admitted into paradise. Was such a fitting term to signify that in the resurrection, he should enjoy that blessedness ? that when thousands of years, still to come, had expired, the suit should be granted ? This is the torture, or burlesque, of philology.

The degrading theory of *absolute* and *relative* time is urged as to many instances in which an immediate happiness, according to the sense of ordinary language, is interpreted as of a most remote future. The rigid conceit is used that there can be no delay nor loss where all is unconscious,—that ages may be taken from a human being, and can constitute no subtraction if he be unaware ! Let it be remembered that all this insensibility is not regarded by the theory as any detriment or incapacity. The extinction of life and thought is surveyed with no dislike. It is treated as a matter of the most

'unmoved indifference. Nay, that hardihood of assertion may not be spared, the bishop avows his principle to be, "that the times of our death and resurrection are really coincident !"

It is mortifying to find on the same side Archbishop Whately. "The long and dreary interval, then, between death and the day of judgement, (supposing the intermediate state to be a profound sleep) does not exist at all, except to the imagination: to the party concerned there is *no* interval whatever ; but to each person (according to this supposition) the moment of his closing his eyes in death, will be instantly succeeded by the sound of the last trumpet, which shall summon the dead ; even though ages shall have intervened. And in this sense the faithful Christian may be, practically, in paradise the day he dies." This prelate's mind leads him to detect fallacies in logic, and to strike out single principles, and this task he achieves most felicitously. But there is often a strangely inconsistent love of novelty, and even of paradox, in his writings.\* The want of synthetic power is his intellectual defect. He never wields great and general truths. His spirit seems made for exceptions. There is a species of gladiatorship, more nimble than brawny and agonistic. The most painful thing in his literary history,—none other is adjudged,—is, that he constantly contends with his own admissions, that his premisses would naturally place him in the very opposite to his conclusions, and that his vigorous eccentricities seem so frequently at variance with his avowed creed and position.

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#### K. (page 166.)

It might not be just to leave unnoticed the recent publication of Professor Bush, of New York University, entitled "*Anastasis ; or the Doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body, rationally and scripturally considered.*" It is of a very speculative character. It greatly vitiates its own professed design, as well as its proper business, by foreclosing the argument. He would show that the popular doctrine was impossible. Now we know not what is the possibility, or impossibility, *a priori*, of any physical arrangement. Mathematical and moral impossibles may be affirmed. But why should this "be thought incredible ?" Our Lord referred all its supposed difficulties, as they exist in our minds, to a twofold ignorance :—"Ye ~~dis~~terr, not knowing the *Scriptures* nor the *power of God.*" He rests its veritableness on the one, and its simple accomplishment on the other.

It may be remarked that this volume states the doctrine as few would consent to do. His countryman, President Davies, may have thrown it into grotesque, as may our poet Young ; but simple Christians hold not themselves responsible. He makes his theme, "the resurrection of the body," and thus comments on an uninspired phrase. Creeds may enunciate it, but the Bible does not. We profess the resurrection *of the dead*. We believe that this includes a material re-integration, but we do not ask, "With what body do they come ?" Man shall be restored. An objection, rather too antiquated, is pressed with all the ardor of a new thought, of a mental surprise,—that which respects every process of decomposition, "in nova mutatas formas corpora." He ought to have understood philosophic identity better. This is the great assault. We go to Revelation after this in vain. For it can avouch no impossibility. Its authority, therefore, is worthless. A more palpable *ignoratio elenchi* cannot be conceived. As a specimen of the reckless manner of this author, we may mention the following. It has ever been accounted a just defiance of the impugnors of our Lord's resurrection, that they should produce the body which was crucified and entombed. If he had not risen, this was the easiest of all contradictions. The Professor might consider himself pressed in the same manner. Denying that Christ arose in a material body, he is challenged to say, what happened to that true body ? He does not know ! "An act of omnipotence may have removed it from the tomb !"—According to this theory, "the resurrection is past already," in respect of the righteous dead. Death liberates from them "a spiritual body," as well as the reasoning soul. What that is we are not told. It is not the spirit, but something extraneous to it. Be it film or pellicle of light, it is only a refined conformity to what is not itself. Here then, however subtilized, is a material integument after all ! How little has been gained ! Who thinks it gross ? a flesh and blood ?—who gives up the belief of "the spiritual body ?"—who has a right to found an exclusive opinion upon it ? The censure of Blumenbach upon another theory would scarcely be too summary for this ; "That which is true is not new, and that which is new is not true." The whole seems conceived in the school of Swedenborg.

The words of Barrow may be applied to all such speculations : "The mere permanency of our souls in being and life, could not, (with any propriety or truth) be called a resurrection,—that which had never fallen, could not be said to be raised again ; that which did never die, could not be restored from death ; nor could men be said to

rise again, but in respect to that part which had fallen, or that state which had ceased to be."—Sermons and Expositions upon all the Articles in the Apostles' Creed.

The title of the book, which we shall not any further consider, suggests to us an important criticism. *Anđotacis* occurs about thirty times in the New Testament. Scarcely in any instance does it necessarily refer to the resurrection of the body. Its radical idea is, re-instatement—its sacred application is, to manhood as it shall integrally exist after death is destroyed. It expresses the proper immortality of our nature. Resurrection is only the means to it, not itself. It is not in the literal resurrection that our Lord intends that "they marry not, nor are given in marriage," but in that state which is consequent on it. The Sadducee denied the after-life altogether, and only the literal resurrection inclusively. The recompense which is given "in the resurrection of the just," points not to that act and "moment," but to a condition which follows it. "That world" is associated with "the resurrection from (★) the dead." It is one and the same. The word is not necessarily used in a good sense. There is the full recovery of being for judgement, as well as life. The interpretation of the word, as it is repeated by our Lord, just before he raised Lazarus from the grave, depends upon his own idea. That is given in a way that precludes the supposition that he expressed by it the forthcoming miracle, or the literal notion of a bodily resurrection. It is the highest, the perennial, existence—the final reclamation of his saints—who, in dying, live only more intensely and more deathlessly,—which he converts into a title and a name. The idea of Martha is quite indecisive as to the point, and indeed seems set aside by our Lord, as unworthy of his glorious purpose.—The apostles were not strictly witnesses of Christ's "resurrection," but subsequent proofs demonstrated to them the fact; "He showed himself alive." David prophesying of "the resurrection of Christ," speaks of the ultimate life, that he liveth for evermore,—"how his soul was not left in hades, neither did his flesh \*see corruption." The anger of the priests at Jerusalem was excited, because, "*through Jesus* the apostles preached the resurrection *from* the dead:" nor less was the contempt of the philosophers at Athens provoked, because Paul combined "Jesus and the resurrection." Both Stoic and Epicurean held light, and generally denied, any future existence.—Sometimes the word is employed where there can be no such allusion; "This Child is set for the fall and rising again of many in Israel:" sometimes, where there is allusion only;



"The first resurrection." We argue from this collation, that *Anastasis*, in nearly all instances, while supposing literal resurrection, does not formally express it, but its sequel. Another term is employed by Scripture, when the thought is limited to bodily resurrection, *ἔγερσις*. The substantive formed from it, *ἐγερσις*, is given to the immediate resurrection of Christ; Matt. xxvii. 53. This may have the most common application, whenever it is said—Arise, he arose, the tempest arose—yet one idea is preserved. Death casts down. In the conquest of death, there is "lifting up." We mark the following references in proof.—Matt. viii. 15; ix. 25; x. 8; xi. 5; \*xii. 41; xiv. 2; xvi. 21; xxvi. 32; xxvii. 52. \* Luke vii. 14; viii. 54; xx. 37; xxiv. 6, 34. John ii. 19, 22; v. 21; xii. 1; xxi. 14. Acts iv. 10; x. 40; xxvi. 8. Rom. iv. 24, 25; viii. 11, 34; x. 9. 1 Cor. xv. passim. 2 Cor. v. 15. Galat. i. 1. Eph. i. 20. Colos. ii. 12. Heb. xi. 19. It is evident, therefore, from this multiplicity of authorities, by no means all which might be collected, that *ἐγερσις* more commonly denotes the act of resurrection, and that *ἀνάστασις* expresses the idea of the renewal of the whole man, as existing in the eternal future after it.

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L. (page 210.)

Calvin may be consulted on the subject of Rewards, in his Institutes, book iii. chapter 18. It may be doubted, however, if he argues here with his wonted acumen. "One objection, however, which has some semblance of reason, it will be proper to dispose of in passing, lest it give any trouble to those less experienced. As common sense dictates that contraries must be tried by the same rule, and as each sin charged against us is unrighteousness, so it is right (say our opponents) that each good work should receive the praise of righteousness. The answer which some give, that the condemnation of men proceeds on unbelief alone, and not on particular sins, does not satisfy me. . . . But as they seem to hold that, in estimating righteousness and unrighteousness, the same rule is to be applied to good and bad works, in this I dissent from them"!! His sophism ("Let all things be done without partiality") is, that universal obedience is necessary for justification, and not one good or more, which a single act of disobedience condemns. This is truth, but not that which is in debate. The question—it is hypothetical, because no one good work will

stand by itself, or remain alone—respects a really good work. There can be but an exclusive standard. By this, each action, according to its quality, receives praise or dispraise. The real point of justification is not at all involved. Nor can we admire his equivocal statements as to the reasons why Rewards are mentioned. “That the godly may not fail in their great straits the Lord is present, reminding them to lift their head higher, and extend their view farther, that in Him they may find a happiness which they see not in the world: to this happiness he gives the name of reward; how, recompense? not as estimating the merit of works, but intimating that it is a compensation for their straits, sufferings, and affronts.” But we should venture to reply, that it is not competent for us to suppose that rewards are adduced in any but the common sense: we must think that those of righteousness and unrighteousness respect the things themselves. A more healthy sentiment is found in the following passage: “But though it is by mercy alone that God admits his people to life, yet, as he leads them into possession of it by the course of good works, that he may complete his work in them, in the order which he has destined, it is not strange that they are said to be crowned according to their works, since by these doubtless they are prepared for receiving the crown of immortality.”

“As to the other ground of this doubt,” (that intuition to a reward is unwarrantable and servile.) “there can only be a fear of sinning, upon this account, to them that make more sins and duties than God hath made. The doubt supposes religion inconsistent with humanity; and that God were about to rase out of the nature of man, one of the most radical and fundamental laws written there—a desire of blessedness:—and supposes it against the express scope and tenor of his whole Gospel revelation. For what doth that design, but to bring men to blessedness? And how is it a means to compass that design, but as it tends to engage men’s spirits to design it too? . . . It is the mistaking of the notion of heaven, that hath also an ingrency in this doubt, if it be really a doubt. What! is it a low thing to be filled with the Divine fulness? to have his glory replenishing our souls? to be perfectly freed from sin? in everything conformed unto his holy nature and will? That our minding our interest in earthly affairs, should be the principal thing with us, is not to be thought: our supreme end must be the same with his, who made all things for himself; of whom, through whom, and to whom, all things are, that he alone might have the glory. But subordinates

need not quarrel. A lower end doth not exclude the higher, but serves it; and is, as to it, a means. God is our end, as he is to be glorified and enjoyed by us: our glorifying him, is but the agnition of his glory; which we do most in beholding and partaking it; which is therefore in direct subordination thereto."—John Howe: Blessedness of the Righteous.

"Hence we discern the futility of the objection against the doctrine of future rewards, drawn from an apprehension, that to be actuated by such a motive, argues a mean and mercenary disposition; since the reward to which we aspire, in this instance at least, grows out of the employment in which we are engaged, and will consist in enjoyments which can only be felt and perceived by a refined and elevated spirit. The success of our undertaking will, in reality, reward itself, by the complete gratification it will afford to the sentiments of devotion and benevolence, which, in their highest perfection, form the principal ingredient in future felicity. To have co-operated in any degree towards the accomplishment of that purpose of the Deity, to reconcile all things to himself, by reducing them to the obedience of his Son, which is the ultimate end of all his works; to be the means of recovering, though it were but an inconsiderable portion of a lapsed and degenerate race, to eternal happiness, will yield a satisfaction exactly commensurate to the force of our benevolent sentiments, and the degree of our loyal attachment to the supreme Potentate." Robert Hall: Encouragements and Supports of the Christian Minister.

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M. (page 317.)

Blanco White, speaking of a sentiment in Dr. Woodward's Sermons, viz., that God cannot prevent *all* evil, says, "It is demonstrable that such a Being is not God. It may be a Jupiter Optimus Maximus, subject to fate; but God, the *Supreme*, he is not. The original idea of God is inseparable from that of unlimitedness. Man is conscious of his own limited existence; and, without the necessity of a logical inference, perceives, in his own limitation, the existence of the unlimited that limits him. Dr. W.'s God must be limited in regard to his power over evil, by one greater than he. That Limiting-Unlimited is God. If Dr. W. does not perceive the force of this demonstration, he is incapable of abstract philosophical reasoning."—Life, &c. vol. iii. p. 18. This paragraph is quoted, not for the

purpose of contradicting the general reasoning on which it is founded. That is taken from Suabedissen's Principles of Philosophical Religion. A creature feels limited; *he* would be, perchance, unlimited or at least less limited; he is limited by his nature, or by the conditions of that nature; he does not limit himself, his Creator has limited him; the existence of that Creator is proved by this limiting power: he must be, therefore, unlimited. To all this we do not object. Let, however, the spirit of this paragraph be considered. That holy regard to character and principle which every virtuous being acknowledges, is denied to the Deity. We never honor ourselves more than when we say that we *cannot* do evil, *cannot* speak falsely, *cannot* act dishonorably. God is a Creator; he has formed creatures with faculties of reason and choice. God is a Moral Governor; he rules those creatures by laws urged with rewards and punishments. Could He make rational creatures otherwise than free? or being free, otherwise than accountable? Evil must then be allowed, *ex hypothesi*, a possible existence.—According to this sophistical and profane reasoning, the means which God morally employs to resent and counterwork evil are proofs of his limitation. This is, indeed, to “limit the Holy One!” How grossly materialised, how senselessly mechanical, are all these ideas of power! The moral rectitude of the Deity is not even surmised.

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N. (page 378.)

So often is the word *αἰώνιος* brought into this controversy, and so great importance really attaches to it, that it is proper to give a larger attention to it, than could be very easily or popularly devoted to it in the text. Its true composition and derivation are found in two words, *αἰ*, an adverb,—always,—and *ἔν*, the present participle of *εἶμι*,—I am. *Οὐσία*, essence, a phrase so much employed by the Greek philosophical writers, is little varied from the feminine of *ἔν*, *οὐσα*. *Ἄῶν* is borrowed from it to denote a class of mythological powers; and the Latin word *ævum*, age, is also taken from it, the digamma passing through the Æolic dialect into the Roman *v*. In the formation of *αἰών* and *αἰώνιος*, we are not left to our fancy. Aristotle furnishes us with its definition and its history. In the ninth chapter of the first book, *Περὶ Θέων*, speaking of Deity and celestial intelligences, he says: “*Τὴν ἀριστὴν ἔχοντα ζωὴν καὶ αὐταρκεστάτην, διανελεῖ*

τὰ ἀθάνατα Αἰῶνα, κ.τ.λ. These possessing a most excellent and self-sufficient life endure to all eternity. For this word has been divinely or inspiredly enounced by the ancients. For the term which includes the sum of every man's life, though according to the most ordinary tenor of nature, is called his αἰών. For the same reason, the consummation of the whole heaven and that which contains endless time, even very infinity, is properly its Αἰών; for taking its actual name from ceaseless existence, ἀπὸ τοῦ δεῖ εἶναι, it is immortal and divine, ἀθάνατος καὶ θεῖος." We find this collocation very frequently. In Plato, in the tenth Book of the Republic, we find it twice in the same sentence: "δῆλον ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ δεῖ ὄν εἶναι εἰ δ' δεῖ ὄν, ἀθάνατον. It is obvious that this must necessarily be always existing, but that which is ever existent is immortal." The ὄν is the neuter of εἶναι; and though not in compound, the constituents are in immediate juxta-position.

It is no reply that αἰών often, in the classical writers, means no more than human life. In Homer this is clearly the case when ψυχὴ is joined with it. Iliad, b. xvi. In the Fragment of Philoctetes by Euripides, we read, Ἀνεπνευσεν αἰῶνα. Sometimes it is personified: Αἰὼν Κρόνου παῖς. Eurip. Heraclidæ. In Æschylus, we find, αἰῶνα παρθεῖον, αἰῶνα εὐποτμον, αἰῶνος χρόνον. In the last, the phrase rises in value, "Who, save the gods, is happy all the time of his life?" Then it might express the duration of the gods. Δι' αἰῶνος means, continually: Choëph. Πολύθρηνον αἰῶνα, would be well translated, an age of woe: Agamem. Aristotle, as we see, admits that it expresses simple life. We have marked, nevertheless, how much more it can convey and is employed to signify. Our reference is to classical authorities for illustration and defence. But they are of little weight in our application of the question. We might find some later Greek writers employ αἰών to give the sense of a mark, and even of the spinal marrow. Our demand is, What is its radical idea? It invariably expresses duration. It may be short or long, just as the subject may be. Human life as to its period, divine life in its immortality, are alike its powers. And still our more immediate question is, What is its force in Scripture? It may take a new or, at least, a stronger, sense, like some of its other appropriated words. Three peculiarities of its inspired use we must notice. Αἰών is never employed to denote human life, though this is its most common pagan acceptation. Its frequent government by εἰς, is as peculiar. It occurs nowhere else, though ἐν αἰῶνας is not an infrequent form, and though the Latins used it,—*"in omne*

volubilis ævum." Nor less strange is its almost constant reduplication, τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων. This latter phrase is always rendered in the Latin liturgies, *secula seculorum*. No canon is more just than this,—where αἰών respects the limited in time, it is itself limited in idea; when it respects the boundless in duration, it is itself of boundless idea. Most commonly it is applied to a state of things subsequent to the judgement; after "the last day," when "time shall be no longer." Then is eternity. It is as to this dread duration that the word is fully and naturally applied.

Perhaps it may be right to notice a counter-argument raised upon this reduplication. Αἰών, it is mooted, must be definite, or it would not admit of it. Why repeat what it might express alone? "Ages of ages" can only be successions of definites. We reply, that we rest not the defence of its eternal meaning on the reduplication. It may be a rhetorical pleonasm. It may be a Hebraistic superlative and intensitive. The *eternal idea* is in the singular form of the word, and is not strengthened by its plural or its reiteration. But this manner may more strongly deliver it. When we say, ever, for ever, we mean, eternal. Yet we often reduplicate it: for ever and ever, ever and aye. What reasoning would that be, which denied that *for ever* could intend eternal, because we said, for ever and ever? which pleaded that we could not deem the one sufficient, or that otherwise we should not utter it again? which tortured the first into necessary limitation from such practice, and then deduced that the second could only pledge a continuance of limitations?

The reader may be referred, in order to facilitate his inquiries, to Stephens' Thesaurus. One striking selection may be quoted: it is taken from Philo, De Mundo: "Ἐν αἰῶνι δε οὐτε παρέληλυσεν οὐδεν, οὐτε μέλλει, ἀλλὰ μόνον υφίσταται." Nor must we forget Suicer's Thesaurus Ecclesiasticus, e Patribus Græcis. One of his selections may be cited here. Theodoretus being referred to on Heb. xi. 3, calling "Ὁ αἰών," Damascenus is described as saying, though much is the same as Gregory Nyssen gives in his Thirty-sixth Oration: "Λέγεται αἰών, οὐ χρόνος, οὐδε χρόνου τί μέρος, ἥλιον φορᾶ καὶ δρόμῳ μετρούμενον, ἤγουν δι' ἡμερῶν καὶ νυκτῶν συνισταμένον, ἀλλὰ το συμπαρακτεινόμενον τοῖς αἰδίοις, ὅλον τι χρονικὸν κίνημα καὶ διαστημα ὅπερ γὰρ τοῖς ὑπο χρόνον ὁ χρόνος, τοῦτο τοῖς αἰδίοις ἐστὶν αἰών."

Passow, as a Greek Lexicographer, is the highest authority of our day. He translates Αἰώνιος by the strongest explanations of his language, *Zimmerwährend*, *Æwig*. An excellent dictionary has been

formed upon his work in our language, by Liddell and Scott. These writers give *αιωνισμος*, which he also gives, but they supply the authority of the Rosetta Stone. Two other compounds are furnished by them, *αιωνωνος*, Synesius, Parent of eternity, and *αιωνοχαρος*, Clemens Alexandrinus, Rejoicing in eternity.

Than this word there is none so significant and forcible. It would be found that, *αβαυστητος*, *ακαταλυστος*, *απαυστος*, *οψωνος*, *εισδελεχης*, *εισδιδασκτος*, and other terms, were deficient and feeble in those awful connexions in which Scripture employs that which we now attempt to vindicate.

In the text a reference has been made to the use of this word by the Christian Greek writers. Justin may be quoted with this particular view. He must have been very conversant with this language,—its philosophy, and genius. The following citations, quite distinct from each other, are out of his Dialogue with Trypho. “Τὰ αἰώνια δίκαια, These everlasting laws,” opposed to those which are æconomical and temporary. “Μετα ταυτα (χίλια ετη) αἰώνιαν δημοθυμαδὸν ἀμα παρων ἀνάστασιν, After these,—namely, the thousand years,—the universally-allowed eternal after-life of all.” “Ἀπὸ του νῦν καὶ ἰὸς του αἰῶνος, From now, and until, or through, eternity.”

It may just be observed that *æternus* is often used in an inferior sense by the classics. To go no farther than Horace, “*Serviet æternum*.” But does he mean no more when he speaks “*Æternæ Vestæ*?” Or Virgil, “*Gleba æternum-frangenda*.” But does he mean no more in his descriptions of Jupiter,

“O, qui res hominumque Deūmque  
Æternis regis imperiis?”

And of Cerberus, “*Æternum latrans*?” Justified by this authority, the earliest Latin Christian writers seek no other word, for their strongest idea: in *æternum*. Surely Lanctantius knew how it might be applied, a man who wrote on the immortality of the soul: “*Colunt; ut mercedem immortalitatis accipiant; accipiunt immortalitatem, ut in æternum Deo serviant*.”—Epitome: cap. 69. Routh's Script. Eccles. Opuscula.

The original stands thus, "Καὶ ἀνάστασιν ὁμοῦ εἰς αἰῶνα αἰῶνος οἱ θεοὶ ἄνθρωποι εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον."—Matt. xxv. 46. To every one who reads these words without prejudice, they must declare the equal duration of both awards. Yet an objection has been raised, founded upon the conjunction, *καὶ*. It is urged that this establishes a difference in the duration. But while a difference is supposed, it is not in the predicate, which is one, but in the respective subjects. The *ἀνάστασις* and the *ζωή*, are the differences expressed. The canon must be, not that a common predicate be disturbed, but that opposite subjects, such as the case supposes, fully meet the difference, *punishment* in contrast with *life*. Had the order of the sentence been inverted, would this criticism apply? There is this inversion in Daniel: "And the multitude that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt." Is the "everlasting," in the first instance, to be considered as less than in the second? It may be said, that nothing in this sentence answers to the force of the *καὶ*. To this the reply is simple, *καὶ* often has this sense; and not only as a copulative, it answers to that idea of the contrary, the alternative, which we express by, *but*. Nor can we conceive a better exposition than that of Augustine. "Si utrumque æternum, profecto aut utrumque cum fine diuturnum, aut utrumque sine fine perpetuum debet intelligi. Pari enim relata sunt, hinc supplicium æternum, inde vita æterna. Dicere autem in hoc uno eodemque sensu, Vita æterna sine fine erit, supplicium æternum finem habebit, multum absurdum est. Unde, quia vita æterna sanctorum sine fine erit, supplicium quoque æternum quibus erit finem procul dubio non habebit."—De Civit. Dei, lib. xxi. cap. 17.

To this agrees the remark of Chrysostom in his Twenty-fifth Homily on Romans. "Ὅτι τὰ ἐκεῖ ληξὺν οὐκ ἔξει ποτὲ, ἀκούσω αὐτοῦ λέγοντος, κ. τ. λ. And that these future things can never reach an end, listen to Christ while he speaks: 'These shall go away into everlasting punishment: but the righteous into everlasting life.' To this he subjoins the comment: "Εἰ τοίνυν ἡ ζωὴ αἰώνιος, καὶ ἡ κολασὶς αἰώνιος. If, therefore, the life be everlasting, everlasting must be the punishment."

"Formula πῦρ τὸ αἰώνιον est imago pœnæ et miseriæ extremæ: Matt. vii. 13, ad significandas pœnas post mortem futuras adhibetur



ἀνάλημα, cui v. 14, opponitur ζωή, et hoc loco v. 46 prolegitur κόλασις, hoc est, supplicium, pœna (Maccab. iv. 38. Ælian. His. Var. 18. 2.) cui opponitur v. 46, ζωή et v. 34, βασιλεία. . . . Pharassæi, quoque et Esseni, existimabant, improbos αἰδίων τιμωρίαν, τιμωρίας ἀδιδέσποτους, pœnas perpetuas expectare.—Apud Matth. xxv. 46." Commentaries on the New Testament, by Theophilus Kuinoël.

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P. (page 383.)

"Everlasting destruction, *ἀλεθρος*, properly signifies that destruction of the animal life which is called death; but is nowhere used to denote the extinction of the thinking principle. When, therefore, the wicked are said to be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, it cannot from that expression be certainly inferred that they are to be annihilated."—Macknight. 2 Thess. i. 9. He proceeds with a theory of his own as to the death of those who survive in the conflagration of the earth, and then subjoins: "The punishment of the wicked cast into the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone, is called the *second death*, to intimate, that as the soul or thinking principle in men, is not destroyed in the first death or destruction of the body, so neither is it to be extinguished by the destruction of the body in the general conflagration; which, therefore, is fitly called the *second death*. And seeing the wicked shall never be delivered from this second death, by any new resurrection, it is properly termed *everlasting destruction*." His particular theory is self-contradictory. If they who are "alive and remain" are thus bodily destroyed, it is their "*first death*." But the "*second death*" follows the judgement, and is the sentence of endless alienation from "the joy of the Lord."

The Comment of Theophylact on the same passage may show how the Greek word was still understood far into mediæval times. "Ποῦ τοίνυν ἀριγενισται; κ.τ.λ. How then do the followers of Origen falsely place an end to punishment? Paul asserts it to be eternal. How can that be eternal which is temporary? *αἰώνιος πρόσκαιρος*;"

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## Q. (page 384.)

The following passage from President Edwards, though in his worst style of composition, places the question in a very strong light of analogy, and is most convincing as an illustration:—

“That this is so, we may be convinced by this consideration, viz., that when we hear or read of some horrid instances of cruelty, it may be to some poor innocent child, or some holy martyr, and the cruel persecutors, having no regard to their shrieks and cries, only sported themselves with their misery, and would not vouchsafe even to put an end to their lives; we have a sense of the evil of them, and they make a deep impression on our minds. Hence it seems just, every way fit and suitable, that God should inflict a very terrible punishment on persons who have perpetrated such wickedness. It seems no way disagreeable to any perfection of the Judge of the world; we can think of it without being at all shocked. The reason is, that we have a sense of the evil of their conduct and a sense of the proportion there is between the evil and demerit and the punishment.

“Just so, if we saw a proportion between the evil of sin and eternal punishment, if we saw something in wicked men that should appear as hateful to us, as eternal misery appears dreadful; something that should as much stir up indignation and detestation, as eternal misery does terror, all objections against this doctrine would vanish at once. Though now it seems incredible, though when we hear of it and are so often told of it, we know not how to realise it; though when we hear of such a degree and duration of torments as are held forth in this doctrine, and think what eternity is, it is ready to seem impossible, that such torments should be inflicted on poor feeble creatures by a Creator of infinite mercy; yet this arises principally from these two causes: (I.) It is so contrary to the depraved inclinations of mankind, that they hate to believe it, and cannot bear it should be true. (II.) They see not the suitableness of eternal punishment to the evil of sin; they see not that it is no more than proportionable to the demerit of sin.”

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## R. (page 422.)

It may be only just to refer to extenuating criticisms respecting the descriptions of Judas. The first is that which our Lord thus emphatically gives: "Οὐαὶ δὲ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἑκείνῳ, δι' οὗ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου παραδίδοται· καλὸν ἦν αὐτῷ, εἰ οὐκ ἐγεννήθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἑκεῖνος." This, it is claimed, ought to be rendered, "Woe to that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed: good were for him if he had not been born that man." The collocation does not favour it, for the word governed generally precedes the word which governs it. Such we believe to be the present construction. The syntax, however, would be destroyed by the rendering: ἐγεννήθη has nothing to govern it except ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος. The personal verb would have admitted a nominative to follow, but γίνομαι is not here a personal one. There is sense of creation, of generation, and not of simple existence. Were it not so, the construction must remain the same. Nor is it real extenuation of the terrible sentence. Where is the difference between, "good would it be that he who betrayed Christ should never have been born he," and "good would it for him that he should never be born?" The sentence proceeds upon the irredeemable curse of such an existence: that the being imparted at birth would be only an evil in its issues. Were philological objection to be met on grounds of Christian truth, we should complain of the fatalistic view of the rendering. "Almost all universalists, though divided by large disagreements, unite in necessarianism. The implication is, that there must be such a traitor, and good were it for him not to have been born to fulfil the character! We believe that to "be that man" was Judas' sole doing and perfect choice. The common sense of the suggested translation is not more defensible: "Good were it for him who betrayeth Christ not to have been born the betrayer," not to have been born himself!

The second gloss is proposed for the conclusion of the prayer offered by the Apostles for Divine guidance in the choice of a successor to Judas: "Λαβεῖν τὸν κλῆρον τῆς διακονίας ταύτης καὶ ἀποστολῆς, ἐξ ἧς παρέβη Ἰούδας, πορευθῆναι εἰς τὸν τόπον τὸν ἰδίον."<sup>a</sup> We should translate it thus: "That he draw the\*lot" (which was to be the sign of election) "of this service and apostolate, from which Judas

<sup>a</sup> Acts i. 25.

fell, in order that he might go to his own place." The attempt is to represent "going to his own place," as spoken of the new candidate and not of the apostate: that "having drawn the lot, he might enter upon his proper office." We more than doubt whether *πορευθῆναι* can bear so slight a figurative allusion to motion, as we understand, by accession to a trust or duty. It implies absolute departure for another locality. We know not what canon can warrant the construction of the two infinitives, *λαβεῖν*, *πορευθῆναι*, if they refer to the same person: *παρίβη*, however, may govern *πορευθῆναι*. The Codex Alexandrinus gives *δίκαιον*, instead of *ἴδιον*, evidently pointing out "the place," *τόπος*, as that of retribution. We think that, on very satisfactory grounds, we may conclude that the signification is, Judas was no longer suffered by the Divine wrath, but in his transgression had so sinned, that he might be suddenly sent to his appropriate award. Ignatius, in his Epistle to the Magnesians, reads it in the same manner, applying it to every one who departs. Chap. ii. v. 1.

The question of his suicide concerns not our argument. The affirmative may establish the certainty, but touches not the duration, of his doom. The criticism on *ἀπῆγγατο*, to get rid of his self-murder, seems to us accommodating and strained. If Ahithophel, who "hanged himself," shadowed him, such a catastrophe becomes the more probable. The Septuagint applies to the end of that wily intriguer this very word. Thucydides also warrants this sense. Relating the conduct of the Corcyraeans towards their prisoners, he says of these latter: "Many of them laid violent hands upon themselves, some thrusting the arrows shot at them by the enemy into their own throats; others, tearing the cordage of their beds which they found there, or twisting such ties as they could form from their own garments, strangled themselves: *ἀπαγχόμενοι*." Lib. 4 De Bell. Pelop. Ælian in his Various History, b. 5, chap. 8, uses the same sense: "Socrates being ridiculed in a comedy laughed: *Πολυαγρος δὲ ἀπῆγγατο*."

Saurin has a masterly discourse upon this subject.

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## S. (page 473.)

Perhaps nothing, in the shape of concession, can be found more remarkable than in the following passage from "Discourses on Universal Restitution, by John Prior Estlin, LL.D." "But though all will be thus restored to virtue, and finally admitted to the enjoyment of everlasting happiness, the wicked will have lost all the happiness of Christ's mediatorial kingdom; they will not only have lost this, but their future situation, their situation both absolute and relative, *to all eternity*, will be affected by the loss. They must be, *for ever*, behind those who made a proper improvement of their first state, and who will be advancing in intellectual and moral perfection and happiness, *during all that period*, in which *they* are suffering that *punishment*, which was necessary to *destroy, not themselves, but their sinful habits*, and to prepare them for the enjoyment of eternal happiness. So that literally, without any straining of the words, their punishment will be eternal." "Of all practical considerations, this is the most important. It shows that the connexion between *sin* and *misery* is *eternal, immutable, indissoluble*; that *really and truly*, though in a sense *different* from that in which the words are generally understood, *sin is of infinite demerit*; that in its consequences,—consequences which cannot be avoided, but which are a part of those laws by which the moral world is governed,—it affects the *state for ever*."

The italics are literally transcribed.

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It may not be either irrelevant or uninteresting to trace the suffrage of ecclesiastical opinion upon the doctrine of future punishment. No testimony can be more generally agreed. We shall find that every departure from it has been accounted a gross and dangerous error. The Jewish church was so corrupted by its traditions, that no great importance may be attached to any of its later and humanly enunciated tenets. But we learn from Josephus, in the first chapter of his xviii. Book on the Antiquities of the Jews, that the Pharisees "believed that souls have an immortal vigor in them: and that under the earth there will be rewards, or punishments, accordingly as they have lived virtuously or viciously in this life: and the latter are to be detained in an *everlasting prison*." He shows the influence

which these views had over the people, even over "the cities." He then records the opposite notions of the Sadducees, yet adds that, when they become magistrates, "They addict themselves to the notions of the Pharisees, *because the multitude would not otherwise bear them.*" But our disquisition rather pertains to the decisions of Christian antiquity, the palæology of them who lived near to the events of redemption. In quoting from the writings of these early times, we rather look for criticism and illustration, than for doctrine. We cannot respect those authors as authorities or textuaries. But the Patristic Treatises reflect their times, identify their contemporaries, and expose their controlling influences. Their genius and eloquence and frequent unction are deserving of all admiration. Because of a few fables, for much wild dreaming, all their historic truth is not to be invalidated nor all their beauty to be overlooked. We need not believe the Phœnix of Clement, nor very greatly applaud the Ichthyology of Tertullian, but it would be unreasonable to forego their sober and legitimate use. They are not the interpreters of Scripture, but they are of archaistic language, of their own period, of the popular idea: they are neither to be elevated to an idolatrous veneration nor to be decried by a vulgar disparagement.

So little was the doctrine of eternal punishment disputed in the first ages, that when Origen argued against it, Augustine protests: "non immerito reprobavit ecclesia." Desiring to give a more distinct analysis of the writings of these great opponents on this question, in a subsequent page, we shall not further notice them in this synopsis. We begin at a much higher point, only observing that, with almost this exception, one confluence of attestation sets in towards it.

The Apostolic Fathers, as they are entitled, occupy the earliest date. Clement, perhaps, ranks the first. Any tradition that he was a companion of the apostles, and bishop of Rome, is merely gratuitous: indeed, evidently false. As baseless is his identity with him of the same name, recorded in Philip. iv. 3. We possess his two epistles to the Corinthians. In the sixth chapter of the second, we read: "If we do the will of Christ we shall find rest. But if otherwise, he will in no wise rescue us from endless punishment:" οὐδὲν ἡμᾶς ῥύσεται ἐκ τῆς αἰωνίου κόλασεως. He quotes, loosely enough, from Ezekiel xiv. 20, to argue the impossibility of their escape, "τίς παράκλητος;" In the following chapter he illustrates the fact by the

ancient games. "It becomes us to reflect that the athletes of those short-lived contests, if he was proved to have suborned or to have transgressed, was scourged and driven from the stadium. What should that teach us? The punishment which he shall suffer who has violated the immortal combat. For it is said, concerning them who preserve not the seal, τὴν σφραγίδα, "Their worm dieth not, &c., ὁ ὀγκάλῃ αὐτῶν οὐ τελευτᾷ," κ.τ.λ. "If the Potter have gone so far as to throw the broken vessel into the furnace of fire, he can no more bring any remedy or succour to it : οὐκέτι βοηθήσει," literally, "cannot come to its cry." "For after we have left this world, in the next we can neither confess, nor any longer repent."

Ignatius says, in his epistle to the Ephesians, "He that is thus defiled, shall depart into unquenchable fire." And again in that to the Smyrneans : "For what remains, it is very reasonable that we should repent whilst there is yet time to return unto God."

In the general epistle of Barnabas we read : "For this cause there shall be both a resurrection and a retribution."—Archbishop Wake's translation.

Polycarp, in his epistle to the Smyrnean church, thus makes his appeal to the proconsul who threatened to consume him with fire : "Πῦρ ἀπειλείς τὸ πρὸς ὄραν καίόμενον καὶ μετ' ὀλίγον σβεννύμενον. Ἀγνοεῖς γὰρ τὸ τῆς μελλούσης κρίσεως καὶ αἰωνίου κόλασεως τοῖς ἀσεβεσι τηρούμενον πῦρ. The fire thou threatenest can but burn\* for an hour, and will speedily expire : know thou that there is a fire of approaching judgement and everlasting punishment perpetually fed for the profane." The whole account is in Eusebius, Eccles. History, b. iv. ch. 15.

Justin Martyr, (A.D. 140,) from his learning and philosophy, as well as from his constancy, has always received a large share of deference. In his second Apology, after quoting Matt. xxv. 46, and Philip. ii. 10, he adds : "Καὶ τότε μετανοήσουσιν ὅτε οὐδὲ ὠφελησίοισι.—page 155. Who will not repent when it can be no avail." In his first Apology to the Roman Senate, he thus strongly speaks : "Εἰ μὴ τοῦτο ἔστιν (ὅτι κολάζονται ἐν αἰωνῷ πῦρι οἱ ἀδικοὶ) ὅτι ἔστι Θεός, ἢ εἰ ἔστιν, οὐ μέλει αὐτῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἀρετὴ, οὐδὲ κακία· ἀδίκως τιμωροῦσιν οἱ νομοθέται τοὺς παραβαίνοντας τὰ διατεταγμένα καλὰ. If it be not so (that the unrighteous shall be punished in everlasting fire) then is there no God; or if there be, he troubles not himself about men, neither virtue nor vice can exist, and legislators unjustly punish those who transgress what is set forth as good."—page 132.

Bishop Taylor quotes a passage which says: "They who are designed to punishment shall abide so long as God please to have them to live and to be punished." "Αἱ (ψυχαι) δὲ καλῶνται ἔσθ' ἂν αὐτας καὶ εἶναι καὶ κολαῖσθαι ὁ Θεὸς θέλη," page 36. The language might imply, though not necessarily, that such punishment admitted of possible termination. That "will" is not assumed. Nor can any restoration to happiness be inferred. This, however, is not spoken by Justin, but by his venerable instructor in Christianity The writers who are commonly associated with Justin, who are ranked as his disciples, Athenagoras, Tatian, and Theophilus of Antioch, especially the two latter, frequently enforce the same doctrine. He always speaks with the most confident decision concerning the final doom of the wicked. *Αἰώνιον πῦρ* very frequently occurs in his writings. How he understands the adjective is clear: "*Αἰωνίαν κόλασιν κολασθησόμενων, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ χλιωνταετῇ περιόδον.*" *Απολ. : Β' προς Αντιων : Ευφ.*—Paris edition, (Lutetiae.)

Irenæus, (A.D. 178,) in his *Symbolum Ex. lib. i. cap. 10, Adver. Hæreses*, professes: "Christ shall send the impious, and the unjust, and the lawless, and the blasphemous of mankind, into endless fire: *εἰς τὸ αἰώνιον τὸ πῦρ πέμψῃ.*" In another place, he says: "They who fly from the eternal light of God, which contains in it all good things, are themselves the cause of their inhabiting eternal darkness, destitute of all good things, becoming to themselves the cause of this habitation," *lib. iv. cap. 76.* Bened. edit. 285.

Clemens Alexandrinus, (A.D. 194,) in his admonition to the Gentiles, speaks of "eternal torments." In his *Pædagogus*, he says, "*Τοῦδε αἰῶνος ἐστὶν ἀρχή, τοῦ ἡμέτερον τέλος.*" And again, "*Οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ ταυτον αἰὼν καὶ χρόνος.*"

Tertullian. (A.D. 200.) In his *De Anima* we find the taint of his Montanist opinions. He considers the Paraclete not quite as did his master—that is, altogether different from the Holy Ghost of Pentecost—but only that much more was revealed in his own age by Him. Among these revelations he specifies certain purifications which the souls of the righteous may require in their separate state, ere they enter heaven. This is a dawning of the gross error which has so widely spread over the world for centuries, the thunderbolt of ecclesiastical despotism. But this is supposed to precede the Judgement. Upon the eternity of future punishment he is unwavering. In his work against Marcion, he says—"Non enim omnes salvi fiunt." In his *Apology*, chapters 48 and 49, he maintains that the punishments



of the wicked will endure for ever. In the 15th chapter, he thus declares himself—"Recogitate etiam pro brevitae supplicii cujuslibet, non tamen ultra mortem remansuri. . . . Enim vero nos qui sub Deo omnium speculatore dispungimur, quique æternam ab eo poenam providemus, merito soli innocentie occurrimus, et pro scientie plenitudine, et pro latebrarum difficultate, et pro magnitudine cruciatus, *non diuturni, verum sempiterni*." Again in chapter 18, he describes it—"Æque perpetem et jugem."

Cyprian. (A.D. 248.) "Nec erit unde habere tormenta vel requiem possint aliquando vel finem." "Quando istinc excessum fuerit, nullus jam poenitentiae locus est, nullus satisfactionis effectus, hic vita aut amittitur aut tenetur; hic saluti æternæ culta Dei et fructu fidei providetur."—Ad Demetrianum.

Lactantius. (A.D. 306.) "Tunc et impii resurgent non ad vitam, sed ad poenam. Eos quoque, secunda resurrectione facta, Deus excitabit, ut ad perpetua tormenta damnati, et æternis ignibus traditi, merita pro sceleribus suis supplicia persolvant."—Epitome, Routh's Script. Eccles. Opuscula.

Athanasius. (A.D. 326.) "Ἀρα δὲ ἐχει τέλος τῶν ἀμαρτωλῶν ἡ κόλασις, ἥ οὐ;" The answer is, "When our Lord speaks concerning those in Gehenna, 'Their worm dieth not,' &c. and again, 'The wicked shall go into everlasting punishment;' and also the apostles, 'Be not deceived, for neither adulterers, &c. shall inherit the kingdom of God:' from these proofs it follows that, as is the blessedness of the just, so is the punishment of the wicked, eternal. And again, the Lord says concerning Judas, 'Good were it for that man that he had not been born!' For if that punishment were to have end, certainly would it be an advantage that he was born, if very late, οὐκ ὀψοιτο, after punishment, he should enter the kingdom of God, as deceived heretics have fancied."—Questions ad Antiochum: 102 Quæst.

Jerome. (A.D. 392.) In his commentary on the 66th chapter of Isaiah, he sums up the passages of Scripture commonly adduced in his day, just the same as in ours, towards the support of the final deliverance of the wicked, evidently with strong disapproval. Whatever his admiration of Origen, and his presumed share in the Philocalia, Hieronymus was quite hostile to any such opinion. Indeed he formally catalogues his errors or heresies, and vehemently condemns

Chrysostom. (A.D. 398.) Hom. 28. ad Corin. "Ὡς περ αἱ ἐνταῦθα κολασεῖς τῇ παροῦσι συγκαταδύονται βίῃ, οὕτως αἱ ἐκεῖ διαρρήχεται μένουσι.

As here these punishments follow to the close of the present life, so there they continue permanently." The argument is, that they must correspond to the duration of both states alike. It is felt to be unnecessary to add more from John of Constantinople, because of his redundant mention of it.

At greater length we may refer to Origen and Augustine. They were both men of the most exalted genius. They can only be called opponents as ranging themselves on the contrary sides of this question, since the former flourished more than a century and half previous to the latter. Of the Greek father much only exists in Latin translation. This is the case with his work, *Περὶ Ἀρχῶν*. The following extract is from it, lib. i. cap. 6. num. 8.—"Interim tam in his quæ videntur, et temporalibus sæculis, quam in illis quæ non videntur et æterna sunt, omnes isti pro ordine, pro ratione, pro modo et meritum dignitatibus dispensantur; ut alii in primis, alii in secundis, nonnulli etiam in ultimis temporibus, et per majora ac graviora supplicia, nec non et diuturna, ac multis (ut ita dicam) sæculis tolerata, asperioribus emendationibus reparati et restituti eruditonibus primo angelicis, tum deinde etiam superiorum graduum virtutibus, et sic per singula ad superiora proVecti, usque ad ea quæ sunt invisibilia et æterna perveniant, singulis videlicet quibusque celestium virtutum officiis quadem eruditionum specie peragrat. Ex quo, ut opinor, hoc consequentia ipsa videtur ostendere, unamquamque rationabilem naturam posse ab uno in alterum ordinem transeuntem, per singulos in omnes, et ab omnibus in singulos pervenire, dum accessus profectum, defectumve, varios pro motibus vel conatibus propriis unus quisque pro liberi arbitrii facultate perpetitur." This may be considered a summary of his opinions. His one idea is that of a purgatorian fire; wherever the word arises in Scripture, he almost always thus interprets it: and often he seems to think that this is that of the last conflagration, through which the righteous shall pass unhurt, while it shall purify the wicked. Isaiah xlv. 2; Malachi iii. 3; 1 Cor. iii. 12 *passim*, are his frequent arguments. Yet is he not consistent. He says in the second book of the same treatise—"Cujus ignis materia atque esca nostra sunt peccata. . . . Cum mens ipsa, vel conscientia per divinam virtutem omnia in memoriam recipiens, quorum in semetipsa signa quædam et formas, cum peccaret, expresserat, et singulorum quæ vel fœde ac turpiter gesserat, vel etiam impie commisserat, historiam quamdam scelerum suorum ante oculos suos videbit expositam: tunc et ipsa conscientia propriis stimulis agitur

atque compungitur, et sui ipsa efficitur accusatrix et testes."—Cap. f. Num. iv. Vide Contra Celsum, lib. v.

Yet even he, bold as he is, sometimes falters. "Quæ quidem a nobis etiam cum magno metu et cautela dicuntur, discutientibus magis et pertractantibus quam pro certo ac definito statuentibus." Nor is he confident that there may not be, after the end of all things, a revival of sin—contrary to the seductive theory of so many who quote his authority, and seek his patronage. "Καὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πραγμάτων ἀναιρεθῆναι ἐστὶ τὴν κακίαν πότερα δέ, ὥστε μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς εἴτι αὐτὴν ἐπιστραπῆναι δύνασθαι, ἢ μὴ, οὐ τοῦ παρόντος ἐστὶ λόγου διδάξαι." C. Celsum, lib. viii. 72. The end of all is destined to abolish all wickedness; but whether so completely that it never can in any future instance be permitted to recur, or whether otherwise, it is no part of my present discourse to determine."

Augustine is well known as the defender of the Scriptural truth of retribution. In his *Civitas Dei*, the twenty-first book, he enters upon a formal investigation of the objections and difficulties supposed to attach to its eternal duration. Some of the earlier chapters are taken up with questions pertaining to the *nature* of future punishment. The ninth is devoted: "De Gehenna, et æternarum qualitate pœnarum." The eleventh treats: "An hoc ratio justitiæ habeat, ut non sint extensiora pœnarum tempora, quam fuerint peccatorum." The twelfth concerns: "De magnitudine prævaricationis primæ, ob quam æterna pœna omnibus debeatur, qui extra gratiam fuerint Salvatoris." The thirteenth is directed "Contra opinionem eorum, qui putant criminosis supplicia post mortem causa purgationis adhiberi." The seventeenth expatiates: "De his qui putant nullorum hominū pœnas in æternum esse mansuras." The eighteenth discourses: "De his qui novissimo judicio, propter intercessionem sanctorum, neminem hominum putant esse damnandum." The twenty-third is, "Contra opinionem eorum qui dicunt nec diaboli, nec hominum malorum perpetua futura supplicia." The intermediate chapters refer to points of the Antichristian system from which the Bishop of Hippo was not himself entirely clear. In many of the foregoing chapters, whose titles have been given, the argument is conducted with great judgement and force: in others it halts, in consequence of leaning upon false science and inapt theology.

The Romish church, dating its secular existence from Phocas, though its worst errors are of a far later period, has never blenched

'from this dogma. On this account Origen has always been refused canonisation. Cruel and anathematising has been its wielding of it ! Again we repeat the rule of our induction: we seek not authority, but fact. It may be supposed that its doctrine of purgatory interferes with it. But that only respects venial sin, or unatoned temporal punishment, in the destined heirs of heaven. The impenitent do not enter it. Besides, its expiations are not after the judgement, but before it. Those who desire information concerning it, may consult the Rev. Dr. Wiseman, in his Lectures, and the Rev. Dr. Rock, in his Hierurgia. Those who are absolved by priestly power are released from "the guilt and eternal punishment of sin." But they may still owe disciplinary satisfaction. If not rendered here, it will be required in this middle state. According to evidence, none can prove who are in that region and who are not. Suffrages may be offered for them who are allowed no such hope. Only particular cases are certainly exempt from the purgatorian fire. Martyrs constitute one. Gross as this theory, often made to obtrude itself so as to conceal post-mundane retribution, the favorite theme of the Tridentine Council, which is nearly, if not altogether, silent upon the state of eternal punishment,—the real opinion of the Roman Catholic Church cannot be doubted. Perhaps she holds it not concerning any in communion with her : she does most energetically towards them who are without.

The Protestant Confessions,—such as the Helvetic, the Dort, the Augsburg, decisively agree with the testimony of Christian antiquity. From the latter we may cite the seventeenth Article. It denounces them "*qui sentiunt hominibus damnatis ac diabolis finem pœnarum futuram esse.*"

In some of the Continental Churches, especially that of Switzerland, a different opinion very early found entrance. The eloquent treatise of Curio Cœlus Secundus, published at Basle, 1554, perhaps prepared the way. It is entitled, "*De Amplitudine beati regni Dei.*" It is by no means universalistic, yet it has that tendency. His theory only seems to be half developed. This is a most honorable name: not a more lion-hearted man ever braved the brunt of persecution. M'Crie does only justice to him in the History of the Reformation in Italy. But there is a leaven in his book which wrought evil. It slowly spread. Other causes gave success to a doctrine which he had too much facilitated, though he would have shrunk from that which it was abused to corroborate. The effect of

the doctrine may be seen in the Protestantism of those regions until this day. There may be reaction,—but a deep mischief has been left to work. The Huguenots yielded, notwithstanding the warnings of a Claude and a Saurin,—and Geneva opened its gates to it, though the seat of Calvin, Pictet, and the Turretines.

The Church of England is quite undisguised in its sentiments. A contrary suspicion has attached to it from an alteration in its original articles. Under Edward the Sixth, instead of thirty-nine, there were forty-two. The last of the forty-two bore this title: "All men shall not be saved at the length." It is as follows: "They also are worthy of condemnation, who endeavour at this time to restore the dangerous opinion, that all men, be they never so ungodly, shall at length be saved, when they have suffered pains for their sins a certain time appointed by God's justice." With the reason and the history of this omission we are not acquainted. Perhaps "the endeavour to restore that dangerous opinion" did not continue in the time of Elizabeth. The Sermons, or Homilies, constantly affirm the eternity of punishment. It is only necessary to refer to two: "The Misery of all Mankind, and of his condemnation to Death Everlasting by his own Sin:" and "Repentance and of true Reconciliation to God." The Athanasian Creed cannot be objected to as inexplicit: "The life everlasting" in the Apostles', "the life of the world to come," in the Nicene, are always treated by episcopalian commentators as comprehensive of the two future states of all men. The phrases, in the Litany, "From everlasting damnation,"—in the Burial Service, "Deliver us not into the bitter pains of eternal death,"—are perfectly decisive.

It cannot, however, be concealed that some writers in that church have spoken with great licence upon the subject. Tillotson is among the number, though not with a uniform consistency. Jeremy Taylor hesitates, in his "Christ's Advent to Judgement," and would be a very unsafe *Ductor dubitantium* here. Yet we must not forget his peroration to "The Miracles of the Divine Mercy." "Mercy is like a rainbow, which God set in the clouds to remember mankind: it abides here as long as it is not hindered; but we must never look for it after it is night, and it shines not in the other world. If we refuse mercy here, we shall have justice to eternity." "To suppose," writes Bishop Newton, "that a man's happiness to all eternity should absolutely and unchangeably be fixed by the uncertain behaviour of a few years in this life, is a supposition even more unreasonable and

unnatural, than that a man's mind and manners should be completely formed in his cradle, and his whole future fortune and condition should depend upon his infancy,—infancy being much greater in proportion to the few years of this life, than the whole of this life to eternity.”—Vol. vi. of his Works. Hartley works out his theory of vibrations into the same conclusion.

“And when we speak of the Christian scheme being *necessary to salvation*, we should understand *salvation* in the Scripture sense of that word ; as implying a particular *state* of happiness ; or as the *Christian's heaven* ; not as the sole condition of enjoying everlasting life ; or as strictly necessary, in all men, to the avoiding absolute misery ; or escaping the pains of *hell*. Christ has told us, that in his Father's house are many *mansions* ; states suited to every degree of holiness and virtue : and as it often appears that men, under very different dispensations here, differ but almost insensibly from each other, in the above-mentioned qualifications ; can we conceive, that their future state of retribution shall be so infinitely different as those of *heaven* and *hell* are commonly believed to be ? No doubt, there are great advantages and sure promises, belonging to those who have been so happy as to be included in the *Christian* covenant ; and so honest as to hold it in faith and purity. But let not such exclude others from the mercies of their common Lord ; or murmur at the good man of THE HOUSE, if these also receive every man his penny. Whether they shall not sometime hereafter be called into the vineyard, and at length become acquainted with that Person who had done so great things for them, as well as us ; or what amends may be made them for the want of those advantages which we here enjoy ; is known only to the God of all mercies, in whose hands they are. What our Saviour said of the *Gentiles*, in contradistinction to the *Jews*, may be no less true between *Christians*, and the rest of the world that never heard of *Christ*, but yet are prepared to enter, and in a good measure worthy to be admitted, into his kingdom ;—who have duly attended to the candle of the Lord which is set up in the breast of every man ; and which would naturally lead such proficients to the clearer light of his Gospel ;—other sheep I have, which are not of this fold ; them also must I bring, and they shall hear my voice ; and there shall be one fold and one shepherd. To them, likewise, at length may the times of refreshing come from the presence of the Lord.”—Considerations on the Theory of Religion, by Edmund Law, D. D., Bishop of Carlisle.

We gladly quote in opposition to these inconsequential, mischievous, allegations, the following passage from Hooker :—

“And because in the subject of God’s providence over reasonable creatures, there is now an addition of sin which was not before considered, the laws of his general providence, in regard of this addition, are somewhat different from such as have been already noted. For as nature draweth love from God, so corruption of nature procureth hatred, it being as natural to him to abhor that which defaceth his handy-work, as to delight in the absolute perfection which himself hath given. So that sin hath opened now in God every way of wrath which before was shut. Sin hath awakened justice, which otherwise might have slept. Wrath and justice we attribute to God, by reason of those effects of punishment which God inflicteth. The first rule, therefore, of providence now is, that sin do not go altogether unpunished in any creature ; whereupon it followeth that, seeing all men universally are sinful, punishment hath also fallen upon all. Some are, after this life, tormented with eternal flames, yet here permitted to live at large till the hour of death come.” . . .

“The justice, which worketh by way of revenge, proportioneth punishment with sin. And sin hath two measures whereby the greatness thereof is judged. The object, God, against whom ; and the subject, that creature in whom sin is. By the one measure, all sin is infinite, because he is infinite whom sin offendeth :<sup>a</sup> for which cause there is one eternal punishment due in justice unto all sinners. In so much that if it were possible for any creature to have been eternally with God, and co-eternally sinful, it standeth with justice by this measure to have punished that creature from eternity past no less than to punish it unto future eternity. From the other measure, which is according to the subject of sin, there are in that eternity of punishment varieties, whereby may be gathered a rule much built upon in holy Scripture : That degrees of wickedness have answerable degrees in the weight of their endless punishment.”

—Hooker: *Eccles. Polity*, book v. Appendix 1. (Keble’s edition.)

To this illustrious defender we may add the names of the Rev. Dr. Matthew Horberry, and the Rev. Sir William Dawes, afterwards Bishop of Chester.

Though most of the modern Unitarians embrace the theory of

<sup>a</sup> The authority is only quoted as to the fact of this writer’s opinion: this particular reasoning has been objected to in the text of the Sixth Discourse in this volume.

universal restoration, they interpret it differently. Some deny future punishments altogether : to them the Rev. Bernard Whitman, and the Rev. Dr. Channing, of America, have powerfully replied. The professors of this creed in our own country, generally, it is supposed, allow the truth, though not the finality, of those punishments. The Racovian Catechism teaches, however, the received opinion. The following quotation is taken from a note to Rees' translation. It is the testimony of Wissowatius. Having referred for his proofs to the Socinian Confession of Faith, 1642—to certain comments of Crellius and Schlichtingius, he adds: "It is, therefore, a mere calumny of some persons that these churches deny the resurrection and the punishment of the wicked. For it is evident from the cited authorities that they, equally with others, constantly maintain that there will be a resurrection both of the just and of the unjust—and that the latter shall be consigned to everlasting punishment, but the former admitted to everlasting life."—page 367.

The Society of Friends, with a few exceptions, retain the same side of the question. "We are placed, in this life, in a state of probation ; and though that probation will soon pass over, yet the state of being to which we are approaching is of eternal duration. And as we enter on the boundless ocean of eternity, we enter in under one of these awful sentences: 'He that is unjust, let him be unjust still: he that is holy, let him be holy still.' The Divine Master particularly mentions some offences that should not be forgiven, either in this world or in the world to come. It has been remarked by a celebrated writer, 'What ardently we wish, we soon believe.' But however pleasing it may be to those who cling to sinful pleasures, to suppose that the judgements of the Almighty, in another state of existence, are temporary, and will soon pass over—however they may resort to inventions to find out expedients and plausibilities, in the doctrine of purgatory, or the transmigration of souls, or the expiation of sins by the present inconveniences of vice, such schemes and notions are but human contrivances, that may indeed amuse for a while, but which they cannot carry with them beyond the grave. On the manner in which we pass our probation, our final happiness or misery depends. How vain, how delusive, is the idea, that any may slight the offers of redeeming love, squandering away their invaluable time which was given them to work out their salvation with fear and trembling ; relying on another opportunity to be afforded in some new body, or, perhaps, in some new



world!" "They make that separation between God and their own souls, which must continue for ever." "How awful is the consideration of this important subject! To despise and reject the heavenly visitation, and finally to destroy the only possible means of salvation! The measure of grace thus given to each individual, as the means of salvation, is the purchase of Christ's death. If this is destroyed, is Christ again to suffer in the flesh? or did the apostle say truly, that 'there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins?' Hence the exceeding sinfulness of sin, and the eternal duration of its consequences."—*The Doctrines of Friends*. By Elisha Bates.

The great Nonconformist communities of this country, Congregational and Methodistic, have in no wise swerved from their original confessions. There has been much reflection upon this particular question of late: this has arisen from the habit of the age, and from contact with the theology of other lands: but everything shows that the inquiry has led to settled and solemn conclusions upon it. No man could retain his station as an Independent minister for an hour after avowing its disbelief, even should he dishonestly keep possession of the pulpit. The Connexional bodies might be more formal in their exclusion of such as impugned it than our discipline admits: but it would not be more decisive. Happily we have no ban: we do not anathematise: but not less do we own and practise the duty,—From such withdraw yourselves!

It is not within our knowledge whether any Universalist churches exist in this country, apart from those which are Arian or Psilanthropic. Some individuals we know holding this opinion, who are otherwise evangelical in their creed. Winchester headed a considerable sect of such persons: these are almost entirely gone over to Unitarianism. Properly the epithet intends universal restoration to happiness. But under it, will fall many parties who deny physical immortality, and who assert the sentence of destruction. In America, however, the strict Universalist denies future retribution altogether. The followers of the Rev. Dr. Huntington place the non-punishment upon the most antinomian idea of the satisfaction of Christ. Rely, after whom a considerable number of his followers were called, abets the same. These are now generally absorbed in the two divisions of Impartialists and Restorationists. The former are generally Unitarian in their other doctrines, but hold as their specific views that man is not immortal, that there is no consciousness nor indeed existence of the soul after death, that no effect of

present conduct can attach to an after state of being, that all the dead shall be raised in the last day without any moral distinction, all alike good and happy. The latter allow, like Chauncy, limited suffering, of a poenal or of a disciplinary character, hereafter, with a consummation to all of ultimate restitution. A most perfect courtesy does not dwell between these two sections: occasionally they tell each other that they would prefer the common opinion to the latitudinarianism and the cruelty which they charge upon their respective opinions. Transatlantic Unitarianism lives upon their strife.

Neology, very mainly the offspring of Germany, spread over this error its fostering wing. Its cavilling and sophistry are favourable to it. Yet there is a counteraction springing up even in those regions. Indeed, the truth for which we contend is most firmly intrenched in the letter as well as the spirit of Scripture, and can suffer nothing, but must gain everything, from literal hermeneutics. The language of our Lord assures our solemn faith: "THE SCRIPTURE CANNOT BE BROKEN."

Having thus brought his volume to an end, the Lecturer expresses his feelings in the language of an ancient orator: "*Καὶ εἰ μὲν καλῶς καὶ ἀξίως τοῦ ἀδικήματος κατηγορήκα, εἶπον ὡς ἐβουλομην· εἰ δὲ ἐνδυστέρως, ὡς ἐδυναμην.*" *Æschines, In Ctesiphontem.*

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